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Abstract
Deterrence has played a large role in Israel’s management of its conflict with 
Hamas throughout three distinct periods (1987-2000, 2000-2007, 2007-present). To 
accomplish deterrence against an actor that has varied in form across distinct periods 
with different political contexts, it has utilized myriad forms of deterrence, some of 
which are not part of the everyday deterrence vocabulary elsewhere. After initial 
instability, each of the three distinct periods has so far featured extended periods of calm
following Israeli tactical shifts and the establishment of new deterrence relationships. 
The shifts between periods themselves, however, have led relatively stable deterrence 
relationships previously established to collapse or become irrelevant. Explaining these 
shifts and illuminating the operation of deterrence during each of these periods is an 
integral part of the first aim of this thesis and is a primary focus of its body chapters.
Israel’s myriad tactical successes have not thus far provided a stable, enduring 
situation of calm. After each significant shift in the political context within which Israel 
and Hamas operate, both sides have had to ‘re-learn’ deterrence. This calls into question 
the long-term effectiveness and stability of deterrence as a means for managing the 
conflict. Nevertheless, there does not currently seem to be a vision for moving beyond 
deterrence in some way. The conclusion contains a discussion of this and of Israel’s 
options for bolstering deterrence in the short- to medium term and perhaps moving 
beyond it in the longer term.
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1. Introduction
This thesis is about Israel and Hamas. Hamas is an Islamist group founded in the
late 1980s with the goal of ending Israeli control of all the territory in Israel, the West 
Bank, and Gaza. Since it was founded, it has engaged in several rounds of violence 
against Israel and Israel has responded in myriad ways as Hamas has evolved and the 
political context within which it operates has changed. This thesis examines the conflict 
between the two through the lens of an updated conception of deterrence set out in 
chapter 2. In simple terms, deterrence is the attempt to forestall an attack from an 
opponent by threatening punishment in the form of a counter-attack if the opponent 
carries out its attack. Using deterrence as a lens for studying Israel and Hamas is 
appropriate because it has been a key tenet of Israel’s approach towards Hamas since 
shortly after the group’s founding. In fact, it can be argued that deterrence is often the 
most important aspect of Israel’s overall approach to threats to state security in general. 
Some have argued that Israel follows a strategy of cumulative deterrence leading to 
acquiescence in Israel’s existence over time. The thesis therefore asks questions about 
deterrence theory itself, building on the work of other scholars. Unlike the vast majority 
of work done on deterrence so far, it takes a ‘longitudinal’ (see 1.2 below) approach to 
the case study: observing the changes and continuities in the deterrence relationship 
between Israel and Hamas over the period of Hamas’s entire existence.
The reason for studying Israel and Hamas over a lengthy period is that nuclear 
deterrence was/is expected to be absolute (if a nuclear weapon was detonated, 
deterrence had failed and the result was potentially so catastrophic that no learning was 
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possible). A key difference with non-nuclear deterrence is that it is not absolute and can 
thus involve rounds of escalation leading to learning via punishment. The international 
relations literature on deterrence has been heavily influenced by nuclear deterrence 
thinking and has generally omitted any mention of learning, viewing any escalation as a 
deterrence failure. Criminologists, however, have long accepted that learning can occur 
through punishment and more recent international relations scholars have begun to 
address this.1 This insight demands a re-conceptualization of deterrence and has wide-
ranging consequences for the understanding and study of it in practice. Other 
differences between nuclear and other forms of deterrence have an impact on whether 
more attention needs to be paid to credibility (often requiring ‘tougher’ responses) or 
stability (suggesting conciliation).
The following sections of this introduction will explain various types of 
deterrence, focusing on how traditional (mostly nuclear) conceptions of it can best be 
adapted to the particulars of Israel’s situation. It is important to differentiate between 
nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence because the requirements of each vary greatly and 
the practice of non-nuclear deterrence is therefore very different from that common in 
nuclear deterrence. Chapter 2 will use insights from more recent thought on deterrence 
(the so-called ‘Fourth Wave’), plus some gleaned from criminology and Israeli doctrine,
to illustrate the core differences between nuclear deterrence and conventional 
deterrence, particularly that involving non-state actors. This ‘updated’ deterrence 
conception will then form the basis for analysis of deterrence in the rest of the thesis.
The differences between nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence are most 
consequential in two ways. The first is that non-nuclear deterrence is not absolute and 
allows for—even requires—learning in the form of rounds of violence. This makes 
1 Indeed, this is a pillar of most conceptions of criminal justice.
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defining and assessing the success or failure of deterrence more difficult, as it is not 
enough simply to say that violence has occurred. The second critical difference arises 
from the first: Nuclear deterrence can often be pursued as a strategy, or in lieu of one, 
because it can create a stable status quo due to its absolute nature and the durability of 
the bilateral relationship(s) that arise(s) out of it. Conventional deterrence, particularly 
involving non-state actors like Hamas, is not absolute, stable, or inherently bilateral. 
This complexity and instability mean that the peaceful status quos it does create are 
unstable. It is thus no permanent solution on its own and can function only at the tactical
level. The experience of Israel shows this tactical success: Violence from Hamas is low 
enough that a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis has not even featured heavily in 
the past two Israeli elections. Deterrence has kept violence on a low flame, but has not 
snuffed it out altogether.
Ellie Lieberman has argued that scholars have failed properly to conceive of 
deterrence against non-state actors as a learning process. He argues that this has led 
them to take a comparative case-study approach to the investigation of deterrence and 
that this, in turn, has led them to misunderstand deterrence and sometimes wrongly to 
conclude that it does not work. Learning processes must be assessed over a lengthy 
period in a so-called ‘longitudinal’ study.2 This thesis seeks to help remedy the dearth in 
longitudinal studies of deterrence by examining the changes and continuities in the 
relationship between Israel and Hamas over the entire period of Hamas’s existence.
Chapter 2 examines deterrence theories in over the four so-called ‘waves’ of 
theorizing in international relations literature and analyses which portions of these 
theories are most appropriate to the Israel-Hamas confrontation. Criminologists have 
2 Elli Lieberman, Reconceptualizing Deterrence: Nudging Toward Rationality in Middle Eastern 
Rivalries, Routledge Global Security Studies (London ; New York: Routledge, 2012).
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long considered deterrent effects on crime and have conducted studies in this regard that
would be impossible in foreign affairs. The chapter therefore also takes a brief look at 
criminological theorizing on deterrence, specifically focusing on the ability of criminals 
to ‘learn’ to be deterred by punishment and how effective punishments for various 
infractions are best designed. The result is a model of deterrence used for analysis 
throughout the body chapters (4-6) of this thesis. Chapter 3 looks at Hamas’s nature via 
is structure (internal vs. external leadership, political vs. military wings) as well as its  
raison d’etre, and motivation and how religion has informed these. The purpose of this 
is to examine what effects the various factors in its nature might be expected to have on 
attempts to deter or coerce Hamas and what range of outcomes might be expected 
before this is looked at in practice in later chapters.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are the main ‘body’ chapters of the thesis and seek to put the
theory poses in chapter 2 into practice in analysing Israel’s relationship with Hamas 
over the course two-and-a-half decades. Chapter 4 covers Hamas’s birth during the first 
Intifada, Israel’s initial responses to it, and the effects of the Oslo process on violence. It
shows how Israel made use of ‘indirect deterrence’ and how the Oslo process made this 
possible. It will argue that this worked well after a slow start, bringing violence to a 
minimum by the late 1990s. Chapter 5 chronicles and explains the collapse of that 
indirect deterrence relationship and the spike in violence it caused: the Second Intifada. 
Partly as a result of its own actions, Israel was forced to shift tactics towards more direct
methods, including targeted killing and a greater reliance on denial. It again eventually 
succeeded in lowering violence until Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip once again 
altered the situation. The period of Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip is the subject of 
Chapter 6 and marks a third distinct period in the deterrence relationship with Hamas. 
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Israel could now use tactics more akin to those used when deterring other states. Israel 
succeeded in establishing a new deterrence relationship with Hamas, but it has been less
stable than desired. This instability and the prospects for the continued indefinite 
maintenance of deterrence in absence of a broader political strategy will then be 
discussed in the conclusion.
1.1 Aims
The aims of this thesis are twofold. The first is to show how deterrence has 
played a large role in Israel’s management of its conflict with Hamas. To accomplish 
deterrence against an actor that has varied in form across distinct periods with different 
political contexts, it has utilized myriad forms of deterrence, some of which are not part 
of the everyday deterrence vocabulary elsewhere. The thesis will further identify three 
distinct periods in the deterrence relationship between Israel, the PA, and Hamas, with 
each covered in its own chapter in chapters 4 through 6. The chapters will show how the
shifts between periods came about, generally as the often inadvertent result of one or 
more actors (Israel, the PA, and/or Hamas) making changes in reaction to the overall 
environment. After initial instability, each of these larger periods has so far featured 
extended periods of calm following Israeli tactical shifts and the establishment of new 
deterrence relationships. The shifts between periods themselves, however, have led 
relatively stable deterrence relationships previously established to collapse or become 
irrelevant. The collapse of the three-way relationship between Israel, the PA, and Hamas
in 2000, for example, led directly to the Second Intifada. Explaining these shifts and 
illuminating the operation of deterrence during each of these periods is an integral part 
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of the first aim of this thesis.
Establishing the prevalence of deterrence in Israel’s management of the conflict 
with Hamas and explaining and illuminating the three distinct deterrence periods will 
lay the ground for the second aim of this thesis. This is to show that Israel’s myriad 
tactical successes have not thus far provided a stable, enduring situation of calm and 
that, after each significant shift in the political context within which Israel and Hamas 
are operating, both sides have had to ‘re-learn’ deterrence. This calls into question the 
long-term effectiveness and stability of deterrence as a means for managing the conflict.
Nevertheless, there does not currently seem to be a vision for moving beyond deterrence
in some way. Interviewees for this thesis could reveal no grand strategy Israel is 
following other than to wait and see, with one even admitting ‘you take it day by day’.3  
A discussion of this, as well as Israel’s options for bolstering deterrence in the short- to 
medium term and perhaps moving beyond it in the longer term will be the main focus of
the conclusion.
1.2 Methodology
This project takes a qualitative, case-study approach, though it uses quantitative 
assessments as a guide to the success or failure of deterrence and other approaches 
Israel employs. Examples of these quantitative guides include the number of suicide or 
rocket attacks and their effectiveness, as measured by casualties and deaths per attack. A
fall in ‘effectiveness’ can be a sign either of a fall in Hamas’s capabilities due to Israeli 
or PA actions or the result of a decision by Hamas to reduce attacks’ deadliness—for 
reasons related to deterrence or not. This underscores the need to supplement 
quantitative measures with an analysis of the broader context of observed changes. In 
3 Israeli academic with a security background, Author interview in person, February 2013.
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addition to being quantitative or qualitative, a study can also be cross-sectional 
(comparing similar cases or individual incidents, with each covering a short period) or 
longitudinal (observing the development of a case over time). The method chosen here 
is longitudinal, aiming to observe throughout the periods covered in the body chapters 
changes in both Israel’s policies and in Hamas’s capabilities and responses to them. 
Such an approach is the most appropriate because deterrence, especially the non-nuclear
variety, is best seen as a learning process. A decline in violence over time that exists 
despite continuing tension and animosity would indicate that deterrence is working, 
even if occasional violence erupts. Longitudinal approaches have been rare and, as Elli 
Liberman argues, this is one reason why attempts to find examples of deterrence success
have had mixed results.4
A quantitative, statistical, methodology would be inappropriate for this study for 
two reasons. The first is that deterrence and the factors meant to establish it can only be 
quantified using what would always be a subjective and spurious dichotomization into 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ for deterrence and ‘present’ or ‘not present’ for the factors leading
to it. The second is simply that, even if deterrence and its conditions were quantifiable, 
there are not enough cases to provide statistical results that could in good conscience be 
generalized. That said, the author’s starting point was the compilation of a database of 
Hamas terror attacks in order to chart the rise and fall of Hamas violence over the 
years.5 These data are then combined with deeper historical analysis to understand the 
reasons behind the observed peaks and troughs. Such charts thus feature in each of 
chapters 4 through 7 to illustrate the effects, in terms of violence, from changes in 
deterrence relationships (the three distinct periods) and Israel’s adjustment to them.
4 Lieberman, Reconceptualizing Deterrence, 29.
5 Charles Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks,” Database of Hamas Terror Attacks, January 
2015, www.hamasterrordatabase.com.
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The author has made use of the wealth of material available on Israel’s conflicts 
and security policies and augmented these with interviews with Israelis and experts on 
Israel, especially those with a background in security, in order to gain insight into Israeli
thinking and interpretations of their own actions and context. The thesis examines 
Israeli policy towards Hamas over a longer term using deterrence theory as a conceptual
guide. It uses the model of deterrence set out in chapter 2 to reinterpret existing material
and generate new insights. Hamas and Israeli actions and counteractions were 
determined both via statements made by officials in the form of press releases and 
newspaper reports, as well as via third-party reports on actual actions taken on both 
sides, mostly from secondary sources like newswires and news services. Special care 
was taken while recruiting interviewees to protect their identities, if they so wished, as 
well as the identity of other participants. Although most participants were willing to be 
identified, some, especially those with links to current government institutions or 
possible hopes for future links, were willing to speak only anonymously. Their wishes 
have been respected and great care has been taken to corroborate their statements with 
publicly available data. None of the assertions contained within this thesis relies on the 
statements of any one interviewee, anonymous or otherwise, which should help to set 
aside potential questions about sources’ reliability.
There are a number of reasons this author chose the case of Israel versus Hamas. 
The most important is that Hamas has changed and grown over time and, as it has done 
so, Israeli tactics have changed in response. This makes it possible to assess ‘indirect’ 
deterrence of a social organization with a militant wing and also of a political party and 
quasi-government of a quasi-state, for example; or attempts at direct deterrence of 
Hamas using different tactics when Hamas had different levels of state-like 
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characteristics. For example, Israel changed from coercion of patron states and the PA to
deterrence of Hamas directly as Hamas increasingly possessed assets that Israel could 
hold at risk for the purposes of deterrence.6
Hamas’s capabilities have also increased over time. Before the overthrow of 
Egypt’s Muslim Brother President Mohamed Morsi, Hamas’s legitimacy among Muslim
heads of state and government had been on the rise. The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifa al-Thani, Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Kandil, and Malaysian Prime 
Minister Najib Razak all visited Gaza in October 2012.7 The Turkish Prime Minister, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was reportedly planning to visit Gaza in 2013, but cancelled that
journey after support for Hamas began to decline again in the wake of President Morsi’s
ouster.8 There is no way to predict whether Hamas’s current international difficulties 
will intensify or turn for the better, but the combination of increased strength and 
increased international support Hamas enjoyed for a while suggests that the prospect of 
eliminating Hamas outright through military action has mostly decreased over time. At 
the same time, Hamas’s rise to power as a quasi-government that Gazans hold 
responsible means that it has shifted from a group that existed solely to alter the status 
quo to one that also has a stake in it. As deterrence is used to uphold a status quo, this is 
6 Trager and Zagorcheva analyze the importance of “holding assets at risk” and illuminate the assets a 
state can target that may be important to a non-state actor lacking many of the targets of a state. See: 
Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” International 
Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 87–123.
7 Tom Perry, “Palestinian President Abbas Chides Leaders Over Gaza Visits,” NBC News, February 6, 
2013, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/50718789/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/#.UVV1RFea9hI; 
Haroon Siddique, Paul Owen, and Tom McCarthy, “Israel and Gaza Conflict: Truce Broken During 
Egyptian PM’s Visit - as It Happened,” The Guardian, November 16, 2012, sec. World news, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/16/israel-gaza-conflict-egyptian-pm-solidarity-visit-live; 
“Erdogan to Visit Gaza to Confirm Israel’s Promises Are Carried Out,” The Yeshiva World, March 28, 
2013, http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/General+News/162431/Erdogan-to-Visit-Gaza-to-
Confirm-Israels-Promises-are-Carried-Out.html.
8 “Erdogan Cancels Gaza Trip After Running Afoul of Egypt Government,” www.JPost.com, August 4, 
2013, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Erdogan-cancels-Gaza-trip-after-running-afoul-of-Egypt-
government-322005; Shari Ryness, “Turkish PM Erdogan’s Gaza Visit Blocked by Cairo Interim 
Government, Reports Egyptian Media,” European Jewish Press, August 5, 2013, 
http://www.ejpress.org/article/67459.
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significant as it should provide increased opportunities to deter Hamas. All these factors 
make Hamas and Israel an interesting and illuminating case study for the deterrence of 
non-state actors.
Studying deterrence poses methodological challenges. The thorniest is perhaps 
in judging its success or failure (and therefore whether it works or even exists). 
Declaring deterrence to have been a success is not straightforward as it relies on a 
counterfactual: How does one know that the level of violence (including zero violence) 
is lower than it otherwise would have been? This is made even more difficult by the 
adoption here of a model of deterrence that includes learning and therefore accepts that 
rounds of violence—which would be considered deterrence failures within non-learning
conceptions—may be part of a longer-term learning process. To determine success or 
failure, there must first be conflict between two sides intense enough to make war 
plausible. Then, outright war must not be present or the level of violence must be lower 
than one would expect given the level of tension. For example, Patrick Morgan argues 
that the level of animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War was high enough to make the fact that they did not fight each other 
remarkable. ‘Each side thought the other capable of the worst behaviour, and each saw 
the conflict as fundamental—about basic values, the future, life and death. Each 
prepared extensively for a war.’9
This argument is attractive, but not totally convincing, especially if a posture of 
deterrence itself is the cause of conflict rather than something inherent in the relations 
between two sides. Lebow and Stein point out that the US and the USSR, having gained
much in winning WWII, were status quo powers in many ways, who were more 
9 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 89 (Cambridge 
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 36.
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preoccupied with preventing loses than with achieving gains. In addition, ‘wars between
the winners of the last great war have historically been uncommon for a lengthy period 
thereafter.’10 Morgan further argues that, without nuclear weapons, the distance between 
the US and the USSR, along with the size and power of the countries, would have made 
a Great Power War between them unlikely. It was the idea of a ‘cheap victory’ provided 
by nuclear weapons that made such a war conceivable in the first place. He concludes 
that the fact that they were not used under such hostile conditions, however, is 
remarkable and asserts that this was almost certainly due to the development of mutual 
deterrence thinking on both sides.11
The same logic is applied to the case of Israel and Hamas. Crucially, Hamas is 
not a status quo actor (see chapter 3). Its raison d’etre is the eventual elimination of the 
State of Israel and the unification of historic Mandatory Palestine. Its animosity is thus 
almost a given without fundamental changes to the organization’s goals and it definitely 
cannot be said that Israeli deterrence is the source of that animosity. Israel’s proximity to
Hamas makes attacks easy and the level of hostility between them is definitely high 
enough for violence to break out—as it often does. Three issues then remain. The first is
whether deterrence is responsible for lulls in violence or whether this can be attributed 
to other factors, such as a level of disruption or control so high that Hamas is unable to 
carry out attacks for a time or because Hamas has decided for internal reasons to refrain 
from attacking. The fall in suicide attacks from 2002 to 2005, for example, can largely 
be attributed to denial (Shin Bet and the security barrier were able to stop most of them) 
rather than deterrence-by-punishment.12 On the other hand, the drop in rocket attacks 
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 38–39.
12 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 153.
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after Cast Lead in 2009 was due to Hamas’s decision to stop firing rockets after Israel 
announced a unilateral cease-fire.13 The Israel Defence Force estimated that Hamas had 
lost around 1,000 rockets during Cast Lead, about one-third of its inventory.14 This 
shows not only that Cast Lead hit Hamas hard, but that Hamas still had the capacity to 
return fire but refrained from doing so. This suggests deterrence and is analysed further 
in chapter 6.
The second issue is the cause of escalations. Each major round of escalation 
within the three larger periods is thus closely examined. A frequent cause observed is a 
steady decline in the desirability of the status quo and thus a lack of commitment on 
both sides to maintaining it. This is sometimes partly by design: There is a tension 
between maintaining deterrence now and cumulatively reducing violence over the 
longer term through periodic escalations. This becomes particularly salient in chapter 6 
as well.
The final issue is related to the second: Is there indeed a cumulative effect from 
the beginning of the period studied (from 1987) to the end of 2014? Quantitative 
measures are used to make this assessment, but as a holistic analysis of the entire period 
is required, this will not be judged until the conclusion. Various questions related to 
Israel’s deterrence of Hamas throughout the period will thus be answered in this manner,
though it must be accepted that, because deterrence is unobservable by its very nature, 
estimations of its efficacy will always be in terms of probability rather than certainty.
13 Ibrahim Barzak and Christopher Torchia, “Israel, Hamas Cease Fire Agreed Upon,” The Huffington 
Post, January 18, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/18/israel-hamas-cease-fire-
a_n_158848.html.
14 Yaakov Katz and Rebecca Stoil, “‘Hamas Has Dozens of Missiles with 60-Km Range.’ Group Test-
Fired Iranian Rocket That Can Reach Tel Aviv, Yadlin Reveals *PM: These Missiles Endanger the 
Whole World, but Above All, They Threaten Our Civilians and Cities,” The Jerusalem Post, 
November 4, 2009, sec. News, Nexis UK.
Page 16 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
2. Deterrence Theories
Deterrence has been one of the three ‘pillars’ in Israel’s defence doctrine since at
least the founding of the modern state, the other two being advanced warning and 
decisiveness of victory (a fourth pillar, ‘defence’, was added around a decade ago to 
reflect the new possibilities afforded by missile defence systems and the security 
barrier).1
The assumption is that since deterrence is bound to fail sooner or later, there will 
eventually be a need to recourse to military decision. In turn, the ability to achieve a 
battlefield decision is supposed to help rehabilitate Israel’s failed deterrence; to 
significantly prolong the lulls between wars; to underscore the enemy’s inability to 
destroy Israel or to ‘reduce it to size’; and, over the long term, even to bring about 
peace with the Arabs. From these points of view, military decision in a sense 
demonstrates Israel’s ability to stand firm: the Arabs will launch one war after the 
other, only to be defeated time and again until such time as they lose the taste for 
initiating further wars.2
Kober’s description of Israel’s military doctrine shows the prominent role 
deterrence plays within it. In fact, it can be argued that the second and third pillars 
(advanced warning and decisive victory) serve primarily to complement and enhance 
the first (deterrence). Advanced warning serves to alert the countries’ leaders that 
deterrence is about to fail, while decisive victories are meant to restore that deterrence 
and lead to eventual peace with the Arabs when they ‘lose the taste for initiating further 
wars’. At the same time, ‘advanced warning’ amounts to pre-emption: Israel is 
determined to attack before it is attacked. Because deterrence relies on retaliation and 
includes an implicit ‘conciliatory promise’ not to attack unless attacked, these two 
1 Gabriel Freund and Saher Raz, “Defending the Nation for 65 Years,” Israel Defense Forces, May 30, 
2013, http://www.idf.il/1283-19078-en/Dover.aspx; Avi Kober, “A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel’s 
Doctrine of Military Decision,” Israel Affairs 2, no. 1 (1995): 188–211, 
doi:10.1080/13537129508719370; Udi Dekel and Omer Einav, “Revising the National Security 
Concept: The Need for a Strategy of Multidisciplinary Impact,” Insight (Tel Aviv: Institute for 
National Security Studies, August 16, 2015), http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?
id=4538&articleid=10318.
2 Kober, “A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel’s Doctrine of Military Decision.”
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elements of the doctrine have the potential to work at cross purposes. What brings them 
together, however, is the element of time as expressed in the ‘decisive victory’ portion 
of the doctrine: Successive failures against Israel are expected to bring about eventual 
Arab acquiescence. This sort of ‘cumulative deterrence’ idea, to use Bar-Joseph and 
Almog’s term, is unique to Israel and requires further examination.3 To do this, we first 
turn to a discussion of deterrence itself. In particular, how well do traditional 
conceptions of deterrence fit Israel’s particular situation and what sorts of adjustments 
might be made to improve the fit? This purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature 
on deterrence and generate a model that will be used for analysis throughout the rest of 
the thesis that combines concepts from the four ‘waves’ of deterrence theory in 
international relations literature with some insights from the criminological literature on 
deterrence. That model focuses on tactical deterrence, but the theoretical implications of
‘cumulative deterrence’ will also be examined here and the conclusion will look at 
Israel’s ‘cumulative deterrence’ record and probe the potential for it to continue into the 
future.
2.1 Nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and the first three ‘waves’
Deterrence comes in two broad forms: deterrence-by-punishment and 
deterrence-by-denial. This thesis will use the words ‘defender’ and ‘opponent’ to 
describe the party attempting to deter and that being deterred, respectively.4 Deterrence-
by-punishment is defined as ‘measures by one state or group of states discouraging 
3 Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” Parameters 34, no. 4 (Winter 
2004): 4–19; Uri Bar-Joseph, “Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli 
Strategic Thinking,” Security Studies 7, no. 3 (1998): 145–81.
4 This word choice is based on roles within the theoretical deterrence model and should not be 
construed as indicating an assumption on the author’s part that all Israel’s actions are ‘defensive’ in 
nature.
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hostile action by another state or group of states, by arousing in the other fear of a 
counter action effective enough to be unacceptable to the party to which such measures 
are addressed’.5 Put simply, deterrence-by-punishment is in operation when 1) a 
defender issues a threat of violence should an opponent carry out a particular act and 2) 
the opponent responds to this threat by not carrying out that act. For example, the Israeli
Chief of Staff might state that rockets from Gaza damaging property or injuring people 
in Israel would result in heavy retaliation. If Hamas, in response, prevented rocket fire, 
deterrence would be in effect. If a threat is made and the undesired action is carried out 
anyway, deterrence has not occurred. Deterrence occurs only when the opponent decides
to be deterred in response to a deterrent threat. It centres on the opponent’s decision, not
the defender’s threat. Similarly, if the opponent never planned to carry out a specified 
undesirable action, deterrence has also not occurred, as the opponent’s action is not due 
to the defender’s threat. Deterrence-by-punishment is an act of coercion, which accepts 
that both sides have choices.
Deterrence-by-denial, on the other hand, involves protecting a given target well 
enough that a would-be attacker decides it is not worth the effort. An example of 
deterrence-by-denial would be if a suicide bomber coming from the West Bank decided 
to travel around the West Bank security barrier rather than attempt to cross it. The 
security barrier is far from impregnable, but, as will be shown in chapter 5, it does often 
pose enough of an obstacle to cause would-be attackers to change behaviour. Such a 
change in behaviour is deterrence-by-denial. Deterrence-by-denial is also coercive in its 
effect, but that effect is achieved through control. It relies on defending (or 
‘controlling’) a target or territory well enough, or at least giving the credible impression 
5 Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, “Deterrence,” Strategic Terminology: A Trilingual Glossary (London: 
Pall Mall, 1966), 55.
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of such control, that an opponent decides not to attack or to change tactics instead.6 Not 
having to rely on retaliation may sound like a better method of preventing violence, but 
achieving the necessary control is frequently expensive, difficult, impossible, or simply 
impractical, which is why deterrence-by-punishment often remains necessary.
The evolving literature on deterrence and the four ‘waves’
A great body of literature has accumulated on deterrence over the last several 
decades since the end of WWII. This accumulated literature is often grouped into four 
‘waves’, the first three of which were described by the third-wave theorist Robert Jervis.
According to Jervis, the first two waves came in the decades immediately following the 
Second World War and included scholars such as Bernard Brodie (first and second 
waves), Thomas Schelling, and Glenn Snyder (both second wave).7 The theory was 
deductive and little attempt was made at empirical research into deterrence in the first 
two waves. There was not even much debate about how to establish deterrence in the 
first place. As Lawrence Freedman notes: 
By the time it entered its most creative phase, the critical commitments had been 
made and the essentials of a nuclear deterrence posture had been established. There 
seemed to be little point to theorizing about how a strategic relationship of this sort 
might come to be established in the first place when the core problematic was that it 
existed and somehow had to be survived. Theorizing was taken to a high level of 
abstraction, but no attempt was made to verify its central propositions until the ‘third 
wave’ began in the 1970s.8
The sections below will examine deterrence theory in greater detail and look 
specifically at the insights gained from so-called ‘third wave’ authors like Jervis, George
and Smoke, and Lebow and Stein, who questioned the rational actor model at the heart 
6 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 36–37.
7 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289–324.
8 Freedman, Deterrence, 22.
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of deterrence and began to analyse such aspects as the paradoxical relationship between 
credibility and stability and how excessive focus on one could harm the other. This will 
be followed by insights from existing ‘fourth wave’ literature, which involves the study 
of deterrence against non-state actors and to which this thesis belongs. This chapter and 
thesis will also bring in a few insights from the criminological literature on deterrence. 
The modified definition of deterrence found below is taken from criminology and the 
‘fourth wave’ discussion is followed by a brief section on criminological deterrence and 
sentencing structures. This also includes criminology’s own insights into the credibility-
stability paradox, particularly in the form of an explanation of how harsh sentences may 
actually increase the activities one wishes to curtail by removing incentives towards 
moderation.
Nuclear deterrence and uncertainty
Nuclear deterrence does not apply directly to the confrontation between Israel 
and Hamas because, although Israel is generally believed to have nuclear weapons, they 
are intended for use only in the most extreme circumstances, when Israel’s very survival
is threatened.9 Keeping them for a ‘last resort’ situation matches the usage doctrines of 
other nuclear powers for good reason: There are very strong international norms against 
the use of weapons of mass destruction in general and against nuclear weapons in 
particular. Israel could not use them without suffering an extensive international outcry. 
More importantly, however, Israel could not use nuclear weapons against Palestinians 
even if it wanted to. The proximity of Hamas-controlled Gaza to Israel, and of the West 
Bank to Israeli settlements and Israel proper, not to mention to Jewish and Muslim holy 
9 Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2002), 165.
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sites, means that nuclear weapons could not be used in such places without harming 
Israel and Israelis themselves. Because this thesis does not focus on the use of nuclear 
weapons by non-state actors, arguments about the effectiveness or stability of nuclear 
deterrence may seem less relevant. They are not, however, because many of the same 
uncertainties that apply to nuclear deterrence also apply to deterrence in general. Indeed,
uncertainty may be even more salient in the absence of nuclear threats.
There are long-standing criticisms of the conception of deterrence provided by 
second-wave scholars. These included assertions that the balance-of-terror adopted by 
policy makers was riddled with internal contradictions. These are summarized by Keith 
Payne in a recent book on America’s ‘gamble’ with nuclear deterrence.10 Perhaps the 
most striking is related to the element of uncertainty, which Schelling believed was 
necessary for deterrence, particularly when extended to US allies. The reasoning was 
that opponents could never be completely certain of how the US might respond to 
provocation and would thus be very cautious about provoking the US in the first place. 
This causes difficulties when examined more closely: ‘crisis decision making is said to 
include an unavoidable degree of uncertainty and unpredictability, with the exception of 
how opponents will respond to our deterrence threats; here they are certain to be 
prudent, cautious, and “deterrable”.’11
This concern with uncertainty was and still is common. In an argument for going
to war against Iraq in 2002, Charles Krauthammer points out that:
We came more than once to the brink of Armageddon. In October 1962, we came to 
within a single misjudgement, a single miscommunication, perhaps even a single 
overeager fighter pilot. Had one thing gone wrong... the United States and the Soviet 
Union might well have reduced each other to a smoking ruin. The fact that we 
10 For a discussion of Schelling’s theorizing vs. American nuclear deterrence doctrine, see: Keith B 
Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the 
Twenty-First Century, Kindle edition (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008).
11 Ibid., 250.
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escaped is not an argument for the stability of deterrence. It is an argument for luck. 
Indeed, it is an argument for trying to escape deterrence and find sturdier ground for 
human survival.12
The issue of uncertainty is arguably even more important for types of deterrence 
that do not involve nuclear weapons. As Kenneth Waltz put it, ‘nuclear weapons make 
military miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent prediction easy.’13 This is 
because conventional ‘[w]ars start more easily because the uncertainties of their 
outcomes make it easier for the leaders of states to entertain illusions of victory at 
supportable cost. In contrast, contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is 
possible focuses one’s attention not on the probability of victory but on the possibility of
annihilation.’14 Waltz believes that the possibility—even a fairly distant one—of 
annihilation, instead of the probability (even if much greater than the possibility of 
annihilation) of merely a humiliating defeat, make nuclear deterrence more stable and 
reliable. It also gives rise to the expectation that deterrence can be absolute. After all, it 
was argued during the Cold War that a single strategic nuclear explosion could cause the
end of civilization as we knew it. The desire to avoid this on both sides meant that 
nuclear deterrence, solely because of the power of nuclear weapons, could be, and had 
to be, absolute. This proposition is logical, and if it is correct, the implication is that 
non-nuclear deterrence is not absolute and therefore less stable and reliable. Because 
deterrence failures when nuclear weapons are not involved are less catastrophic, we may
expect them to occur more often. This also has an impact on the issues of credibility and
uncertainty. Without the certainty of calculation provided by the prospect of mutual 
assured destruction, it becomes possible for an adversary like Hamas to test Israel and 
12 Charles Krauthammer, “The Obsolescence of Deterrence,” The Weekly Standard, December 9, 2002, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/964dzkuf.asp?page=3.
13 Kenneth Waltz, “Toward Nuclear Peace,” in Realism and International Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 262.
14 Kenneth Neal Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” in Realism and International Politics 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 280.
Page 23 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
perhaps even to believe in the attainability of victory at a ‘supportable cost’.15 The 
uncertainty also necessitates more careful analysis of an adversary’s capability and 
credibility. The thorny issue of credibility is discussed in more detail below.
Rationality
Talk of uncertainty, calculation, and credibility suggests that deterrence works by
affecting an opponent’s cost calculus. This throws up questions about rationality 
because carefully weighing the costs and benefits of prospective courses of action is 
something that actors will not do if they are completely irrational. This applies to the 
deterrence of state- and non-state actors alike and thus must not be ignored. Deductive 
approaches to studying deterrence have assumed rationality because such an assumption
is ‘productive’. While this is helpful for devising the theory of deterrence, Thomas 
Schelling himself admitted when he put forth his theory that ‘[w]hether the resulting 
theory provides good or poor insight into actual behaviour is... a matter for subsequent 
judgement’.16
Robert Pape argues convincingly that even groups that use suicide terrorism act 
according to strategic logic and that their actions are not what one would expect were 
they irrational or guided only by religious fanatacism. He lists three reasons for this:
1. Timing. Nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as 
isolated or randomly timed incidents.
2. Nationalist goals. Suicide terrorist campaigns are directed at gaining control of 
what the terrorists see as their national homeland, and specifically at ejecting foreign 
forces from that territory.
3. Target selection. All suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades have been 
aimed at democracies, which make more suitable targets from the terrorists’ point of 
view. Nationalist movements that face non-democratic opponents have not resorted 
to suicide attack as a means of coercion.17
15 A term used in: Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.”
16 Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University, 1980), 4.
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Statements by those close to organizations that have used (here suicide) 
terrorism reinforce this assertion of strategic logic. One oft-cited example is a comment 
made by Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who was widely considered to
have had a decisive ideological influence on Hezbollah, in Monday Morning, a 
Lebanese newspaper, in 1985: ‘We believe that suicide operations should only be 
carried out if they can bring about a political or military change in proportion to the 
passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb.’18 The economist 
Bryan Caplan suggests that the confusion stems from different definitions of rationality. 
He reasons that a willingness to commit suicide defies the expectation that a person will 
act according to narrow self-interest. He argues that even suicide terrorists respond to 
incentives, however, and one must focus on that aspect of rationality when attempting to
understand terrorism.19 Just because someone is willing to die for a cause does not mean
that person would be willing to die for a cause that had no chance of succeeding.
Schelling defines rationality as ‘behaviour motivated by a conscious calculation 
of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent 
value system’.20 The idea of acting according to a ‘value system’ adds flexibility to a 
conception of rationality: A person or group may value political goals over survival and 
may consider fighting more important than winning, for example. Deterrence based on 
such rationality also accepts that there will be difficulty in understanding an opponent’s 
value system clearly enough to be able to influence his cost calculus. If rationality is 
limited in predictable ways, it is still possible for deterrence theory to tell us something 
17 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Kindle edition (New York: 
Random House, 2005), 266.
18 Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah (Hizbullah) (Hezbollah),” Martinkramer.org, accessed
March 28, 2013, http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/MoralLogic.htm.
19 Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” Public Choice 128, no. 1–2
(July 21, 2006): 91–107, doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9046-8.
20 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 4.
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if these ideas are incorporated. In addition, nuclear deterrence theory is even generally 
seen as requiring a certain degree of irrationality to function.
Patrick Morgan suggests a few possibilities for how the assumption of rationality
could be loosened in ways that are comprehensible, even if their outcomes remain 
unpredictable. Furthermore, this ‘loosened rationality’ could even strengthen deterrence.
One possibility is that a deterring government may act irrationally in crisis situations 
‘because it might be so angry, frightened, or lacking in control that it would do’ things a 
completely rational actor would not.21 As he and others have pointed out, however, this 
assumes a lopsided rationality in which the deterrer can be irrational but the attacker 
will respond to this rationally. This was partially resolved simply by saying that 
governments ‘are rational about the fact that they can be irrational’.22 Morgan 
concludes, however, that this is not much help in deciding whether deterrence will work,
only in explaining why deterrence does work when it does, thereby failing to fulfil the 
prescriptive role desired for the theory.
Jervis, Lebow, and Stein investigate some of the ways in which actors are less 
than rational when responding to deterrence threats. They argue that unmotivated biases 
(limits in our ability to process and make sense of information) and motivated biases 
(stemming from a ‘subconscious need to see the world in certain ways’) affect the 
decisions leaders make.23 For example, Lebow’s analysis of cases of deterrence suggests
that internal or domestic factors weigh heavily on the perceptions of leaders.24 Daniel 
Byman hints at this when he suggests that groups like Fatah were intimidated by Israel 
21 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 89 (Cambridge 
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 54.
22 Ibid., 55.
23 Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Psychology and Deterrence, Perspectives on 
Security (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 25.
24 See for example: Richard Ned Lebow, “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the 
Falklands War,” in Psychology and Deterrence, Perspectives on Security (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 89–124.
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but that this could not overcome inter-factional competition between Fatah and other 
groups and possibly within Fatah itself. Attacking Israel was the only way to attract 
recruits and support.25 Lebow uses the example of the Falklands war, suggesting that 
‘the [Argentinian] generals were to a great extent the prisoners of passions they 
themselves had helped to arouse and to which they had subsequently become 
increasingly vulnerable by virtue of their faltering legitimacy.’26 Special attention will 
thus be paid within this thesis to Israel’s attention to ‘push’ factors behind attacks 
(actions that stem from internal pressures rather than those motivated by external 
opportunities to attack). This is not because they are necessarily more important than 
‘pull’ factors, but because Lebow and Stein have shown that deterrers may pay too 
much attention to their own credibility and not enough to push factors (i.e. the stability 
or sustainability of a deterrence status quo), contributing to suboptimal outcomes.
In the meantime, it is useful to point out that concluding that human beings are 
not entirely rational is not to conclude that they are irrational. The fact that deterrers 
and opponents are subject to biases and internal pressures may complicate the practice 
of deterrence, but little in the third-wave literature demonstrates irrationality, nor is 
there any proposed practical substitute for the rational actor model. More careful 
attention to the potential forces acting on decision makers may explain many cases of 
deterrence failure. Returning to Lebow’s example of the Falkland’s War, he concludes 
that ‘“defensive avoidance,” an attempt by British policy makers to shield themselves 
from threatening realities which they were unprepared for and unable to face’ may 
explain the failure of British intelligence to see the warnings that the Argentinians were 
25 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 62.
26 Lebow, “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War,” 109.
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likely to invade the Falklands.27 As he himself points out, however, ‘there are almost 
always trade-offs to be made between escalation and passivity in pre-crisis or crisis 
situations’. As he also notes, Britain was in the middle of extensive and often unpopular 
budget cuts. Starting an expensive naval operation in the South Atlantic at such of time 
would have caused anger. If it had successfully bolstered deterrence, it would also have 
appeared unnecessary, since successful deterrence is a non-event. It would also have 
seemed unnecessarily aggressive, inviting condemnation from countries around the 
world sympathetic to Argentina and harming British relations with the United States, 
which was trying to improve its own relations with the Argentinians. Successfully 
bolstering deterrence would therefore likely have harmed the Thatcher government both
politically and electorally. On the other hand, if the attempt to bolster deterrence failed 
to deter, it could have come to be seen as the provocative catalyst of an Argentine 
invasion itself. This would have been equally harmful politically and electorally. Taken 
together with the fact that the Argentinians had often bluffed in the past about the 
Falklands and Britain’s reluctance to act in advance becomes logical: Successful or not, 
bolstering deterrence could have lost the government the next elections, caused 
problems with its allies, and ending up with it receiving the blame for the crisis that 
followed.
The lessons from all this for this thesis are clear. Hamas is clearly subject to 
internal pressures. Its raison-d’etre is to return Palestine to Arab Muslim control, so any 
attempt to force it to give up on that goal amounts to a choice between being attacked by
Israel and forfeiting its entire purpose and existence. Hamas will always almost 
certainly choose the former, though fudges and compromises may be found (such as 
‘temporarily’ accepting the pre-1967 borders and allowing a referendum on recognizing 
27 Ibid., 103.
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Israel that would not require Hamas itself to do so). Hamas also consists of several 
groups, many of them acting independently from one another and with interests that are 
not always in alignment (see chapter 3). For example, ending the blockade of Gaza may 
be a desirable political goal for Hamas’s political leadership, but the resultant loss of 
income from smuggling tunnels would hit Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades,
making ending the blockade less desirable for the portion of Hamas that directly 
controls the weapons (see chapter 6).28 A threat to the survival of all or part of Hamas 
would constitute a ‘push’ factor making escalation more likely. None of this means 
Hamas is not rational or deterrable, but it does mean that deterring Hamas is 
complicated and that ‘push’ factors are significant. These push factors mean that Hamas 
can be backed into a corner, so to speak, making it the kind of ‘highly motivated’ actor 
that George and Smoke determined may undermine deterrence by ‘designing around’ 
threats and red lines.29 This can be a key issue: Attacks problematic for Israel that 
nonetheless fall outside or on the grey edges of its red lines feature frequently in chapter
6, particularly as regards rocket launches and the construction of tunnels.
Absolute nuclear vs. restrictive non-nuclear deterrence
Deterrence of Hamas is not absolute and a model of deterrence that expects it to 
be is a poor fit. Without the destructive power of nuclear weapons, violent escalations 
become less than a struggle for life or death. Nuclear deterrence was expected to be 
absolute. The detonation of a single nuclear weapon could spark massive retaliation. 
This prospect was so horrifying that any such detonation would be perceived as a failure
28 This may be less of an issue now, as few, if any, smuggling tunnels to Egypt now remain: “Anatomy 
of a Gaza Smuggling Tunnel,” Al Jazeera English, 2015, 
http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2015/gaza_tunnels/tunnel.html.
29 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974), 543.
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of deterrence and was to be avoided. In a situation in which nuclear weapons do not 
apply, the criminological idea of deterrence is a better fit: Deterrence is meant to reduce 
the number of crimes committed; it is not expected to eliminate crime altogether. An 
alternative definition of deterrence from criminology is thus: ‘the omission or 
curtailment of criminal activity by an individual in whole or in part because the 
individual perceives the omission or curtailment as reducing the risk that someone will 
be punished as a response to the activity’.30 ‘Someone’ here refers to ‘(1) the individual, 
(2) another person who stands in some special social relation to the individual, and/or 
(3) a group of other such persons’.31 This definition thus allows for vicarious or 
collective punishment and is better than the one above for two reasons. The first is that 
it allows for the reality that deterrence does not have to be absolute in order to be useful.
The second is that it includes perception and focuses more on the deterred party than the
deterrer. This difference may seem slight, but it is significant because deterrence relies 
on the target of deterrence deciding to be deterred. Focusing solely on the threats, 
capabilities, and will of the defender is inadequate as all of these factors may fail to 
impress the opponent. This thesis will use a restrictive, rather than absolute, conception 
of deterrence throughout.
The destructive power of nuclear weapons also simplifies the definition of 
success: It is absolute. If nuclear bombs explode, deterrence has failed. If they do not, 
deterrence has supposedly succeeded. In a nuclear context, then, limited (non-nuclear) 
wars can be viewed as cases of tacit bargaining even as deterrence remains successful 
overall from the viewpoint that nuclear annihilation has not occurred.32 Assessing the 
30 Jack Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1975),
39.
31 Ibid., 32.
32 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970, Cornell
Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 10.
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success of deterrence without absolute devastation as a threat must rely on the level of 
violence being lower than it otherwise would have been. Determining this requires 
looking at cycles of violence and relative calm more closely to assess their causes and 
weigh these against each other in what can only ever be a probabilistic manner. This is 
the aim of chapters 4-6 of this thesis.
Symmetric vs. asymmetric, bilateral vs. multiliteral
Further aspects of the nuclear deterrence model make calculation easier, but 
those aspects unfortunately do not apply to non-nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence 
relationships between opponents are inherently symmetrical and bilateral. This is 
because, except in very extreme cases, the number of nuclear weapons each side 
possesses is essentially irrelevant. Beyond a certain low level, adding additional nuclear 
weapons makes no real difference in relative destructive capability. If 100 nuclear 
missiles are enough to completely destroy an enemy (and are safe from a first strike), 
then having thousands of them cannot add any additional value.33
This symmetry also tended to make much of nuclear deterrence inherently 
bilateral. Just as having additional nuclear weapons beyond a certain low level does not 
provide their owner with any additional power, adding additional members to an 
alliance does not do much to change the power relationship. Any one opponent has the 
power to cause unacceptable damage—if they act together, this does not change.34 This 
is not the case for Israel and Hamas, who each navigate a web of multiliteral 
relationships and can gain considerably in diplomatic terms by increasing the number of
allies they have. This means Israel must focus on several parallel ‘games’ on multiple 
33 Ibid., 8.
34 Ibid.
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levels.35
The symmetry and inherent bilateral nature of nuclear deterrence also mean that 
there is less need for precise intelligence on an opponent’s capabilities. It is enough for 
both sides to assume that the other side has the capability to inflict unacceptable 
damage. This simplifies the relationship considerably and makes miscalculation, at least
as far as capability is concerned, unlikely. As Kenneth Waltz put it, ‘nuclear weapons 
make military miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent prediction easy.’36 The 
fact that the relationship between Israel and Hamas is far from symmetrical 
paradoxically makes the situation for Hamas and Israel more like that of nuclear 
deterrence in this important aspect: Hamas does not have to work hard to assess Israel’s 
capabilities (as distinct from its willingness to use them—its ‘credibility’) because of 
the latter’s clear superiority.
Stability vs. credibility
The issues of stability and credibility are important because a lack of either will 
cause deterrence to fail. Moreover, the two must be finely balanced, as too much of one 
will tend to undermine the other. Here, too, there are differences between nuclear and 
non-nuclear deterrence. According to some scholars, the absolute nature of nuclear 
weapons simplifies calculation in nuclear deterrence by making credibility less of an 
issue. ‘Contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is possible focuses one’s 
attention not on the probability of victory but on the possibility of annihilation.’37 Just 
because one side is not sure its opponent is willing to use nuclear weapons does not 
mean that it will be willing to risk annihilation to find out, especially since the 
35 Shmuel Bar, Author interview in person, February 27, 2013.
36 Waltz, “Toward Nuclear Peace,” 262.
37 Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” 280.
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probability of the use of nuclear weapons increases as an opponent’s position becomes 
more dire. Even a 10% probability of an entire country being wiped off the face of the 
earth is too high a probability to gamble with. Because neither Israel nor Hamas are 
immediately threatened with total annihilation, they must engage in more complex 
calculations of credibility and likely gains and losses, with more opportunities for 
miscalculation making periodic bursts of violence more likely. On the other hand, some 
assert that credibility is less of an issue without nuclear weapons. This is because of the 
irrationality of deciding to respond to an attack with nuclear weapons at any stage if this
is expected to initiate a nuclear counter-attack that will destroy both countries. As 
Patrick Morgan points out, conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence does not suffer this 
issue, making escalation credible at any stage.38
Perhaps the most important effect that multipolarity and issues of credibility 
have is that they complicate calculation. To use Shimshoni’s term, the parties involved 
in a deterrence relationship must possess a certain degree of ‘common knowledge’. 
‘Before a defender communicates threats he must devise them, and to do this 
appropriately he must understand his challenger’s available strategies and valuation of 
war objectives and costs.’39 All of this means that deterrence with conventional weapons
is more difficult to establish and maintain. In addition, while there is little that can 
change the inherently symmetrical and bilateral relationship between two sides using 
nuclear deterrence, the situation among parties, possibly several of them, in a 
conventional context can change continuously, bringing with it new assessments of 
capabilities and goals. These assessments may sometimes take shape during periodic 
‘limited wars’. Shimshoni also asserts that ‘limited war can serve as a bargaining tool 
38 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 19.
39 Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 6.
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between nuclear powers.’ There is no reason, however, that such bargaining cannot 
occur in a non-nuclear context as well, as Schelling has illuminated.40 As capabilities, 
including those of alliance partners, shift, one side or the other may attempt to test its 
boundaries.
Many scholars, like Morgan and Payne, assert that nuclear deterrence has a 
serious credibility problem. As Morgan summarizes: ‘Retaliation against a nuclear-
armed state... might set off a nuclear war and cancel the future—your society and state 
could disappear. There would be no point to retaliating to prevent future attacks.’41 Not 
all authors agree with this assessment, but the main point for this thesis lies in the 
differing sources of the credibility problem. With nuclear weapons, capabilities are 
scarcely part of the equation. The capability to back a threat is made credible by the 
possession of enough nuclear weapons (and the means to deliver them) to cause 
unacceptable damage to the opponent.42 It is the will to use those weapons to retaliate in 
the face of attack that is questionable. When nuclear weapons are absent, the question is 
not just whether the defender has the will to carry out a threat, but also whether it has 
the capability to do so. In spite of the fact that the situation between Israel and Hamas 
does not involve any nuclear threat, however, Israel’s capabilities are scarcely in 
question due to the overwhelming asymmetry between it and Hamas. Israel is therefore 
like the United States or the Soviet Union in the Cold War in the sense that its capability
is not in question. It must convince Hamas that it is willing to take action. This is 
something Israel constantly strives to show.43
In the run-up to the 2008-9 Gaza War (referred to here by the name of Israel’s 
40 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 6.
41 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 19 (emphasis in original).
42 Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.”
43 For example, concerns about Israel’s credibility, specifically its willingness to use force, have come up
in the majority of interviews the author has conducted with experts on Israeli security thinking.
Page 34 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
military operation in that war: ‘Cast Lead’), the spokesman of Hamas’s military wing, 
the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, said that Israel had not yet invaded the Gaza Strip, 
despite numerous rocket launches into Israel, because the ‘Zionists military commander 
or political cannot afford results of a decision as big as the invasion of the Gaza Strip, 
especially the feel of defeat, failure and disappointment are still fresh to them after the 
war in Lebanon.’ Israelis seem to accept that this was not just tough talk, and frequently 
discussed the need to regain or maintain credibility.44
Other policy makers in other conflicts have concentrated too heavily on 
credibility, however. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lebow and Stein show that 
President Kennedy’s concerns about credibly showing resolve were misplaced. 
Khrushchev twice denied Castro’s request to base nuclear missiles in Cuba out of the 
belief that Kennedy would sink or stop the ships transporting the missiles—there is no 
sign that he questioned US resolve. Lebow and Stein show further that, rather than 
helping resolve the crisis, the unnecessary attempts to show resolve were instead 
interpreted as displays of aggression, which themselves required a tough response. 
According to this line of reasoning, the Cuban Missile Crisis came about at least in part 
because of misplaced concerns about credibility stemming from the practice of 
deterrence, though the horrifying thought of war did, in the end, convince both sides to 
find a way to step back from the brink. The whole crisis might have been avoided 
altogether, however, had Kennedy been less concerned with credibility and more willing
to conciliate.45 In a separate article, Lebow adds: ‘In retrospect, it is apparent that 
44 The majority of those interviewed by the author believed Israel’s enemies may sometimes view its 
threats as incredible. Israeli authors have also made similar a case, see, for example: Jacob Amidror, 
“Israel’s Strategy for Combating Palestinian Terror,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002, 118; 
Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Terrorists,” Policy Review, no. 149 (June 2, 2008), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5674.
45 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995).
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American concern for resolve, in theory and practice, bordered on the neurotic.’46
This focus on credibility can have consequences for stability. As Morgan points 
out: ‘If the point is to deter an attack, and stability rests on each side being confident it 
can deter, then one side’s determined effort to gain the capacity to fight and win for the 
sake of credibility will breed deterrence instability.’47 This applies to situations of 
symmetrical, mutual deterrence, but Israel’s vast superiority over Hamas does not mean 
it is willing to seek conflict with Hamas at any given time. In seeking periods of quiet, 
during which Hamas is deterred, Israel must implicitly agree to maintain its own quiet. 
Deterrence is therefore to a certain extent always mutual. Just as attempts to shore up 
credibility can undermine stability, however, a long period of stable deterrence could 
undermine credibility by making the prospect of escalation and retaliation appear more 
distant. This amounts to a sort of credibility-stability paradox.
There are, of course, vast differences between the case of the US vs the USSR 
and that of Israel vs Hamas (geographic proximity and size, territorial goals that are 
quite often fully competitive, and the fact that nuclear weapons do not factor here, to 
name just three). Israel does also focus on the credibility of its threats, however. This is 
rather striking in light of its vast superiority when compared to Hamas. It is possible that
domestic and international restrictions on Israeli action cause Hamas to question Israel’s
will to use its overwhelming force, and this will be explored in more detail later. In 
general, however, it must be said that few would question Israel’s will to retaliate 
fiercely for attacks on its citizens. Both its capabilities and its credibility are generally 
strong and seen to be so. There has not been enough discussion of how some of Israel’s 
attempts to show toughness may be unnecessary or even harmful, however. ‘When 
46 Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence: Then and Now,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 5 (October 
2005): 768.
47 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 52.
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leaders become desperate, they behave aggressively even though the military balance is 
unfavourable and they have no grounds to doubt their adversary’s resolve. When leaders
are motivated by need, deterrence and compellence can... intensify the pressures on 
leaders to act, make the costs of inaction unbearable, and inadvertently provoke the kind
of behavior they are designed to prevent.’48 In other words, an opponent like Hamas can 
be made so desperate through push factors designed to shore up credibility that 
deterrence stability is undermined. Finally, while nuclear deterrence has been 
remarkably stable over the past seven decades, Israel’s deterrence of Hamas has not. 
Stability has thus been a major issue and, since attempts to shore up credibility can 
undermine stability, it is reasonable to ask whether Israel might be focusing too heavily 
on the former to the detriment of the latter.
Benedetta Berti of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies hints at this 
when she mentions that ‘in the last two rounds [Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9 and 
Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012], it has become increasingly difficult to say who 
started it.’ She suggests that Israel’s targeted killing of Ahmed Jabari was what led to the
escalation that culminated in Pillar of Defence, while the targeted killing was itself a 
case of Israel responding to increased rocket launches from Gaza.49 If both sides see the 
other as initiating challenges, then both sides see themselves as defenders. Bargaining 
theorists expect defenders to be more motivated than challengers, all other things being 
equal.50 If both sides see themselves as the defender, then both sides will be highly 
motivated not to back down. Furthermore, once a crisis has begun, stopping it becomes 
an issue of compellence rather than deterrence as one side or both must then back down
—publicly. As will be argued in more detail below, compellence brings with it issues of 
48 Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 321.
49 Benedetta Berti, Author interview in person, February 20, 2013.
50 Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 316.
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honour, face-saving, and humiliation. If both sides view themselves as defenders, this 
problem is intensified. All in all, too little attention has been paid in the literature to the 
split between deterrence and compellence and the impact this has on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (and therefore could have on many other conflicts throughout the 
world). This will be a major focus of this thesis.
2.2 Insights from the ‘fourth wave’ and criminology literatures; 
indirect deterrence; deterrence vs. compellence
The third wave of theorizing provided a helpful complement to the deductive 
deterrence theories set out in the first two waves. Its focus was still on deterrence 
between two or more state actors, however, meaning it does not fit perfectly with the 
situation between Israel and Hamas. Jeffrey Knopf therefore identifies an emerging 
‘fourth wave’ of deterrence theory arising to tackle questions surrounding the deterrence
of non-state actors by states.51 Thomas Rid has noted that some aspects of deterring non-
state actors resemble activities by law enforcement agencies (indeed, terrorism within a 
country’s own territory, at least, is generally treated as a law enforcement issue). This 
section thus includes a look at some of the criminology literature on deterrence, 
especially the insights of the 19th century scholar Cesare Beccaria, whose seminal work 
On Crimes and Punishments was the first to place criminal justice in a utilitarian light 
(i.e. to ponder whether punishments could deter crime to the benefit of the greater good 
rather than simply providing an outlet for society’s drive for revenge).
51 Jeffrey Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 
(April 19, 2010): 1–33.
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Fourth wave deterrence research
What insights does the literature on the deterrence of non-state actors bring? 
This form of deterrence seems often to have either been overlooked, because it did not 
fit the balance-of-terror paradigm, or doubted, as nuclear weapons could scarcely be 
used against non-state actors with no obvious targets to hold at risk. It is notable that 
deterrence has usually continued to be associated, in the end, with nuclear weapons. 
George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn all co-wrote an article 
for the Wall Street Journal in which they state ‘In today’s war waged on world order by 
terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state 
terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent
strategy and present difficult new security challenges.’52 Robert Pape stated his 
scepticism, noting ‘future... anti-American terrorists may be equally willing [as the 9/11 
attackers] to die, and so not deterred by fear of punishment or of anything else’.53 Even 
Kenneth Waltz, who is a strident and well-known proponent of deterrence and promoter 
of the idea of nuclear peace, apparently does not believe this applies to non-state actors: 
‘The difficulty is if irregular groups, terrorists, get control of weapons of mass 
destruction. [...]Then they are not deterrable. We’ve always known that deterrence does 
not cover this kind of situation.’54
Some authors, like Knopf, Lupovici, Rid, and, briefly, Freedman, have addressed
deterrence and non-state actors who practice terrorism as part of the ‘fourth wave’ of 
deterrence theory. Much of the work on deterring non-state actors is about Israel and/or 
written by Israelis, who work on the belief that certain types of such actors can be 
52 George P. Shultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007,
A15.
53 Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 5.
54 Kenneth Waltz, “Conversation with Kenneth N. Waltz, P. 6 of 7,” Institute of International Studies, 
UC Berkeley, 2003, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Waltz/waltz-con6.html (emphasis added).
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deterred in certain situations. That so much of the work comes from Israel is 
unsurprising considering Israel’s long and constant history of dealing with non-state 
threats. One piece on Israel is Daniel Byman’s seminal book on the history of Israeli 
counter-terrorism. Though not a work on deterrence, Byman makes frequent references 
to Israeli deterrence of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah failing, being restored, or 
being maintained. He therefore obviously accepts that this is possible. The deterrence 
narrative within the book is also coherent and plausible, though he does not explicitly 
discuss the dynamics of terrorist tactics and deterrence.55
Shmuel Bar also shows that deterrence can work against non-state actors in his 
article studying this subject using the case of Hezbollah. Interestingly, he notes that 
Israeli policy makers make an important distinction: ‘It is a widely held view in Israeli 
defence and security circles that terrorist organizations per se lack the organizational 
characteristics and assets that can be threatened in order to achieve deterrence, but as 
they develop social, political, or state-like manifestations, they become more susceptible
to deterrence. Therefore, the mainstream of Israel’s policy toward terrorism was based 
primarily on disruption and preemption.’56 When such social, political, or ‘state-like’ 
targets were lacking, Israel has relied on ‘indirect deterrence’ of terror groups’ state 
backers; in the case of Hezbollah this referred primarily to Syria and Iran.57
The term ‘indirect deterrence’ is somewhat misleading, however, as the final 
target may not actually be deterred at all. What a state attempting ‘indirect deterrence’ 
must actually do is attempt to coerce, often via compellence, another actor to stop or 
55 Byman, A High Price.
56 Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah,” Comparative Strategy 26, 
no. 5 (2007): 469, doi:10.1080.
57 First mentioned in 1998 with reference to nuclear deterrence situations, Shmuel Bar has adapted the 
concept to deterrence of non-state actors. See: Robert E. Harkavy, “Triangular or Indirect 
Deterrence/compellence: Something New in Deterrence Theory?,” Comparative Strategy 17, no. 1 
(January 1998): 63–81, doi:10.1080/01495939808403132; Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: 
The Case of Hizballah,” 471.
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curb the target group’s activity. How that actor influences the target group is not 
necessarily by deterrence, but this is secondary. The fact that ‘indirect’ deterrence often 
employs compellence is important because compellence is commonly argued to be more
difficult than deterrence (thus providing one explanation for why indirect deterrence has
proved difficult, see chapter 4), largely because compliance with a compellent demand 
is more blatant and carries with it the humiliation of bowing to pressure from another 
party. Deterrence, moreover, has clear limits, whereas complying with a compellent 
demand may attract further demands for concessions that would undermine the party’s 
credibility and therefore its ability to deter.58 Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal himself has 
noted this phenomenon: Negotiations conducted during a period of weakness ‘lead only 
to surrender in the face of a dominant enemy... lowering the ceiling of demands and 
political discussions’.59 Many authors have failed to highlight adequately the difference 
between deterrence and compellence. In one article, Bar mentions compellence only 
together with deterrence, as if the two were essentially one tactic; in another, he makes 
no mention of compellence at all.60 Thomas Rid, Jacob Amidror, and Doron Almog also 
make no mention of the word ‘compellence’ in some of their important articles.61
This study will focus more on correctly categorizing policies as deterrence or 
compellence and analysing the effects this difference can have on outcomes. It is often 
difficult to differentiate between the two, but this is itself extremely important: If it is at 
times unclear whether Israel is attempting to maintain the status quo (deterrence) or 
change it (compellence), it is easy to understand how both sides can see themselves as 
58 Freedman, Deterrence, 110.
59 Khaled Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement HAMAS (London: 
MEMO Publishers, 2013), 21.
60 Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah”; Bar, “Deterring Terrorists.”
61 Thomas Rid, “Deterrence Beyond the State: The Israeli Experience,” Contemporary Security Policy 
33, no. 1 (April 2012); Amidror, “Israel’s Strategy for Combating Palestinian Terror”; Almog, 
“Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism.”
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defenders and both be unwilling to back down without significant escalation.62 This 
thesis will thus place emphasis on the interplay between deterrence and compellence 
and the role played by the latter, in particular, in repeated escalation.
Israel’s experience with indirect deterrence shows there are challenges to 
compelling states that go beyond the difficulties just mentioned. Israel experienced only 
limited success when attempting to deter Hezbollah indirectly via Iran, Syria, and the 
Lebanese Government. According to Bar, the first reason for this was that Iran, the most
important supporter of Hezbollah, was powerful enough to deter Israel from trying to 
compel it. The second was that Syria, which acted primarily as a conduit for Iranian 
support, has come to rely more on Hezbollah than the other way around. Finally, 
attempts to coerce the Lebanese Government have tended to fail due to the weakness of 
that government and its inability to influence the situation on its southern border.63
This is not only a question of the type or level of force that can be brought to 
bear, as Thomas Schelling notes that even nuclear deterrence is not always successful. 
Some of this may have to do with communication and credibility. He notes, ‘The North 
Koreans were not deterred in 1950. There is some hint that the North Koreans or their 
Soviet mentors took seriously a US diplomatic statement that seemed to leave Korea out
of the declared US area of responsibility; still, they knew they were facing US nuclear 
weapons.’ The same applies to the North Vietnamese.64 The ability to endure hardship 
stands on the opposite side of the deterrence equation from the level of force a state 
attempting to compel is willing and able to bring to bear. This ability is beyond the 
62 The Cuban Missile Crisis is once again instructive, as both sides saw themselves as defenders of the 
status quo even as the situation blurred between deterrence and compellence. Lebow and Stein, We All
Lost the Cold War.
63 Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah.”
64 Thomas Schelling, “Foreword,” in Deterring Terrorism Theory and Practice, ed. Andreas Wenger and 
Alex Wilner (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 
2012).
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compeller’s control and is difficult or impossible to assess in advance, but cannot be left
unaddressed.65 This latter point mirrors the difficulties Israel at times faced in attempting
to compel the Palestinian Authority (PA) to crack down on Hamas.
Interestingly, Bar illustrates that Israel has had more success in deterring 
Hezbollah directly, presumably due to Hezbollah’s ample ‘state-like’ characteristics—it 
administers something that in many aspects resembles a state in southern Lebanon. 
Critically, he asserts that deterrence failures in the case of Hezbollah were due to a 
failure on Israel’s part to communicate properly where it had drawn ‘red lines’, which, if
crossed, would spark heavy retaliation (an offshoot of George and Smoke’s ‘design 
around’ problem). ‘A number of cases of confrontation between Israel and Hizballah 
brought [Hizballah’s leader] to the conclusion that the real Israeli deterrence was much 
lower than the objective Israeli capability.’66 Therefore, ‘Hizballah did not challenge 
Israeli deterrence—as it saw it—in its decision to abduct Israeli soldiers in July 2006. 
Israel had given it no reason to believe that such an act would no longer be considered 
within the rules of the game.’67 He backs this by noting ‘Nassrallah’s contrite 
appearance on al-Manar [a Lebanese satellite television station affiliated with 
Hezbollah] after the war, in which he claimed that had he believed that there was even 
one percent of a possibility that Israel would react as it did and wreak destruction in 
Lebanon, he would not have ordered the operation’.68 He also argues that Hezbollah did 
not believe Israel’s threats to respond with ‘high-intensity deterrence’, in part due to 
such issues as public and media discussions in Israel of the domestic and international 
cost of a heavy retaliation. Like the example in the run-up to Operation Cast Lead 
65 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Kindle edition (Oxford: Acheron Press, 2012) Book 1, Chapter 1.
66 Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah,” 484.
67 Ibid., 487.
68 Ibid., 483.
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mentioned above, this shows that credibility remains an issue for Israel, even if stability 
may often be a bigger one.
One issue brought up by Bar that could have ramifications for deterrence was his
conclusion that there were ‘very few occasions where terrorist leaders were in firm 
control over the violence orchestrated by their followers’.69 Since deterrence (especially 
of the non-nuclear variety) requires very careful communication of threats and ‘red 
lines’, a lack of control over the organization could lead to it crossing red lines by 
accident. Alternatively, this could be used as cover for crossing them intentionally, 
complicating decision making for the defender. Bar also notes that there are ‘two 
“entities” that are usually overlooked in accounts of classical interstate deterrence [and] 
must be addressed...: The “host state” and the “patron state”’.70 Beyond patron states, 
there is a further question: To what extent do non-state groups use the international 
community to exert pressure on target states? This is an important and constant issue for
Israel that will be addressed in the latter chapters of this thesis, in particular.
Regarding the central control of non-state groups’ members, there is some 
disagreement among Israeli experts about Hamas’s command structure. One expert with
a security background stated that Hamas’s chain of command was strong, with the 
‘political leaders’ in firm control (though not specifying which political leaders).71 Bar, 
who also has a security background, asserted that there were multiple ‘Hamases’ with 
often competing interests and that the external leadership still had more power than the 
internal.72 This conflicts with reports in the media that have tended to suggest that the 
69 Shmuel Bar, “Deterrence of Palestinian Terrorism: The Israel Experience,” in Deterring Terrorism 
Theory and Practice, ed. Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner (Stanford, California: Stanford Security 
Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2012), 206.
70 Ibid., 207.
71 Expert on Israeli policy, Author interview in person, January 31, 2013 It is worth mentioning that the 
Yaari article cited above reports that the “secret elections” held in 2012 strengthened the military wing
at the expense of the political wing.
72 Bar, interview.
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internal leadership in Gaza now predominates, with the external leadership becoming 
less relevant.73 This has been a repeated factor for Israel and Hamas, most recently in 
discussions in mid-2014 of whether Hamas in Gaza ought to be held responsible for the 
actions of one of Hamas’s militant cells in the West Bank. This will be examined in 
greater detail in the next chapter.
Bar reports that Israel is well aware of the need for clear communication and that
it sometimes resorts to using ‘a caricature of a message’ to ensure that Hamas, with its 
limited intelligence capabilities and multiple audiences, receives that message.74 
Communication goes beyond direct relaying of messages and need not even involve 
actual words. ‘Tacit bargaining’, a phenomenon by which parties to a dispute negotiate 
via actions, e.g. testing what threshold of attack will spark retaliation, rather than words,
is a salient concept here.75 The final element is the perception of the threat by the party 
that is supposed to be deterred. This is perhaps best viewed as part of the definition of 
credible threats. Whether a threat is credible or not and whether the damage threatened 
is ‘unacceptable’ both depend on the perception of the party to be deterred.76 In other 
words: Israel’s capabilities and its threats are irrelevant if Hamas does not view them as 
threatening or credible.77
Adding to the credibility problem, non-state actors may have a few advantages 
that state actors do not have, helping to make up for the asymmetry in the former’s 
73 Benedetta Berti, an expert on Hamas and Hezbollah as the INSS, suggests the internal leadership is 
becoming more dominant. Ehud Yaari, a prominent Israeli journalist and expert, agrees: Ehud Yaari, 
“Secret Hamas Elections Point to Internal Struggle,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
May 16, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/secret-hamas-elections-point-
to-internal-struggle.
74 Bar, interview.
75 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 21.
76 For a further discussion of perceptions of defender credibility, see: Patrick M. Morgan, “Saving Face 
for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Richard Ned Lebow, Perspectives on 
Security (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 125–52.
77 Again, one way to make threats seem incredible would be through excessive use by Israel of the 
“strategic disinformation” mentioned above. Hamas could be confused by messages that are 
sometimes false to the point that it decides to stop attempting to interpret Israel’s overt messages.
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conventional capabilities. One aspect that can be seen in the case of Hamas is the 
network-like structure of the organization and the fact that some parts of the 
organization operate well outside of territory controlled by Israel. This means that it 
may be more difficult to eliminate a non-state actor than it would be to eliminate a state 
actor with similar military capabilities. Max Boot makes the related argument that 
guerrillas have experienced success out of proportion with their ostensible capabilities 
due to their use of ‘hit-and-run’ tactics, which prevent ‘the stronger state [from] bringing
its full weight to bear’.78 This applies to all non-state actors insofar as they are able to 
disappear into the civilian population after a strike. Even without trying to eliminate the 
actor, these factors also make it more difficult to deter non-state actors. Additionally, 
this can make threats by such groups all the more plausible because deterring the groups
from carrying out those threats is more difficult, opening the door for non-state actors to
‘punch above their weight’.
Criminologists on deterrence
The conception of deterrence in criminology has some striking similarities to 
situations involving the non-nuclear deterrence of non-state actors. For one thing, it is 
restrictive rather than absolute. For another, it expects that punishment can teach a party 
to be deterred (‘specific deterrence’) and that this can be used to establish norms that 
then must only be maintained with occasional uses of force. When writing about Israel 
and deterrence, the phrases ‘red lines’ and ‘rules of the game’ are often used to depict 
the limits of what Israel and its opponents are ready to accept. The ‘rules of the game’ 
are, in effect, norms, even if neither side is entirely happy to acquiesce to them. Because
78 Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular Warfare: Insurgents and Guerrillas from Akkadia to 
Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 2 (April 2013): 100–114.
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of its norm-setting function and the close association of norms with ideas of legitimacy, 
criminological conceptions stress the importance of proportionality of the punishment to
the crime. Indeed, many criminologists have asserted that ‘disproportionate’ 
punishments, those that are seen as too harsh for a given crime, may in fact increase 
incentives to perpetrate worse crimes. These insights all have something to tell us about 
the practice of deterrence, especially as it regards norm-setting (establishing new ‘red 
lines’), deterrence, compellence, and proportionality.
Cesare Beccaria, an Italian jurist who was the first to take a utilitarian approach 
to criminal justice, stated that
‘Laws are the terms by which independent and isolated men united to form a society. 
[…] They sacrificed a portion of [their] liberty so that they could enjoy the remainder
in security and peace.’ To protect these remaining portions, however, ‘Tangible 
measures were needed […]. These tangible measures are the punishments established
against lawbreakers. I say tangible measures because experience has shown that the 
multitude do not adopt fixed principles of conduct […] unless those measures have a 
direct impact impact on the senses and present themselves continually to the mind in 
such a way as to counterbalance the strong impressions made by the particular 
passions that oppose the public good.79
This meant that ‘The purpose of punishment... is therefore none other than to 
prevent the criminal from doing fresh harm and to deter others from doing the same.’80 
Punishment therefore leads to the ‘specific deterrence’ of the offender himself and to the
‘general’ deterrence of others considering offending. This idea of specific deterrence is 
not found in the traditional international relations/strategic literature on deterrence, 
mainly due to the focus on nuclear weapons: there could be no learning if a deterrence 
79 Cesare Beccaria, “On Crimes and Punishments,” in On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, 
ed. Aaron A. Thomas, trans. Aaron A. Thomas and Jeremy Parzen, The Lorenzo Da Ponte Italian 
Library (Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 11.
80 Ibid., 26.
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failure ‘cancelled the future’.81 Some fourth-wave theorists, like Doron Almog, Thomas 
Rid, and Uri Bar-Joseph have already picked up on this possibility.82 They observe that 
progressive rounds of violence may over time teach Israel’s opponents, including non-
state actors, that Israel cannot be defeated, eventually leading to peace. In this view, not 
every round of violence is necessarily a deterrence failure. Instead, it may be part of a 
chain leading to greater overall deterrence over time.
Beccaria and Voltaire both commented on proportionality, stressing that a lack 
thereof could lead to more crime rather than less: ‘If the same punishment is prescribed 
for two crimes that injure society in different degrees, then men will face no stronger 
deterrent from committing the greater crime if they find it in their advantage to do so.’83 
Voltaire provides an example: In a country where petty theft, grand larceny, and murder 
all carried the death penalty, the worst crimes would increase in frequency. For one 
thing, the aggrieved would be less likely to report a crime because they would not want 
to see someone put to death for it. For another: ‘Since the death penalty is applied 
equally to petty theft and grand larceny, it is clear that they will try to steal a lot. They 
could even become murderers if they think that this is a way not to be caught.’84
This may not initially seem to apply to Israel, but it does. The assertion about an 
aggrieved’s willingness to report a crime is actually an observation about credibility: If 
Israel threatens to take extremely severe action in response to relatively minor 
infractions, this may lower its credibility and invite those very infractions as a means of 
81 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 19 It should be noted, however, that Morgan DOES argue that the 
superpowers learned to deter each other after WWII and that this occurred only slowly (39). This is 
not the type of learning referred to here, however, in which there is a possibility for multiple rounds of
fighting to lead to greater deterrence.
82 Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism”; Rid, “Deterrence Beyond the State”; Bar-
Joseph, “Variations on a Theme.”
83 Beccaria, “On Crimes and Punishments,” 19.
84 Francois-Marie Arout De Voltaire, “Commentary on the Book On Crimes and Punishments, by a 
Provincial Lawyer,” in On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. Aaron A. Thomas, trans. 
Aaron A. Thomas and Jeremy Parzen, The Lorenzo Da Ponte Italian Library (Toronto ; Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2008), 140.
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testing its resolve, with Israel’s credibility further undermined if it fails those tests. At 
the same time, if such an extreme response were forthcoming, there would be little to 
discourage Hamas from taking even greater action since it was already suffering the 
direst of consequences. This harks back Schelling’s concept of a ‘conciliatory promise’: 
Deterrence requires not just the threat to take action if a certain red line is crossed, but 
also the promise not to if it is not.85 If the status quo Israel promises to maintain is less 
acceptable (or equally so) than its threat, deterrence will fail. Followed to its logical 
conclusion, this suggests that deterrence can be bolstered through properly calibrated 
threats, but also through properly calibrated promises and rewards. If the status quo for 
Hamas is improved, it has more incentive to maintain that status quo and also more to 
lose in another round of escalation with Israel.
Specific deterrence in criminological practice
Does specific deterrence actually work? Empirical studies in criminology 
support the deductive reasoning of Beccaria and other utilitarian theorists with regard 
both to proportionality and the existence of specific deterrence. Criminological research 
into deterrence has often run into methodological issues, but these have proved more 
easily surmountable than those involved in studying political deterrence. They are 
therefore a useful complementary proxy to studies of deterrence from the international 
relations literature. An example of the methodological challenges is provided by the 
search for specific deterrence effects; some studies have found punishment to increase 
crime rather than reduce it.86 Patricia Brennan and Sarnoff Mednick argue that much of 
this had to do with a failure to implement proper controls, however, particularly for 
85 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 7.
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assignment bias.87 When they controlled for assignment bias, along with age and socio-
economic status, they found that the Danish men in their study between the ages of 15 
and 26 were less likely to re-offend if they received punishment for their crimes. 
Crucially, they also found that more certain punishments reduced recidivism more 
effectively. For example: Those arrested three times who received punishment three 
times (rather than being let off despite being found guilty) were less likely to re-offend 
than those punished only twice, who were in turn less likely to commit further crimes 
than those punished only once. Brennan and Mednick also found that more severe 
punishments did not reduce recidivism. In the case of first-time offenders, imprisonment
even led to higher recidivism rates than fines. In addition, ‘easy jail’, which featured 
fewer restrictions on personal freedoms while incarcerated, led to lower rates of re-
offending among first-time offenders than did harsher types of imprisonment.88
Another study has shown that punishments can be too soft as well as too harsh, 
however. Research conducted by the Minneapolis Police Department, in which three 
police responses (arrest, ‘advice’, or an order for the offender to leave for eight hours) to
domestic violence were randomly assigned, determined that arrest reduced subsequent 
violence more than forcing the offender to leave for eight hours, which was in turn more
86 See for example: M Gold and J.R. William, “The Effect of Getting Caught: Apprehension of the 
Juvenile Offenders as a Cause of Subsequent Deliquencies,” Prospectus: A Journal of Law Reform, 
no. 3 (1969): 1–12; L.W. Klemke, “Does Apprehension for Shoplifting Amplify or Terminate 
Shoplifting Activity?,” Law and Society Review 12, no. 3 (1978): 391–403; S. Shoham and M. 
Sandberg, “Suspended Sentences in Israel: An Evaluation of the Preventive Efficacy of Prospective 
Imprisonment,” Crime & Delinquency 10, no. 1 (January 1, 1964): 74–83, 
doi:10.1177/001112876401000111.
87 Assignment bias is the likelihood that judges will punish more severely those they believe more likely 
to re-offend, adding a confounding correlation between severity of punishment and recidivism. To 
control for this, they grouped defendants together according to the number of prior offences, as prior 
re-offending is an indicator of the likelihood of future re-offending and also raises the likelihood of 
harsher sentencing.
88 Patricia A. Brennan and Sarnoff A. Mednick, “Learning Theory Approach to the Deterrence of 
Criminal Recidivism,”. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 103, no. 3 (August 1994): 430.
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effective than simply providing advice.89 Another study with randomized punishments 
found that specific deterrence worked, though it also discovered that instilling a sense of
community was more effective at reducing recidivism than punishment.90 In a more 
recent review of the scholarship on deterrence for the UK Government, Hirsch et al 
conclude that the idea that criminological deterrence works is now beyond doubt: 
‘criminal punishment has by now been shown capable of having deterrent effects’.91 
This all suggests that specific deterrence works and that frequent and certain 
punishment in response to each infraction is more effective than the severe punishment 
of only some of them. Here we find an echo of Beccaria’s assertion that punishment 
must be swift and certain, but that overly harsh punishments will lead to increased 
crime. In terms of deterring armed groups rather than criminals, this would suggest that 
frequent, certain punishments may reduce the likelihood of future attacks. Israel does 
indeed make an effort to respond in small ways to small Hamas ceasefire violations and 
in bigger ways to larger ones, as will be shown in the later chapters of this thesis.
Proportionality, the status quo, deterrence, and compellence
Beccaria and Voltaire stressed that punishments must be in proportion to their 
crimes lest overly harsh punishment undermine deterrence. What counts as a 
‘proportionate’ punishment? One of Beccaria’s examples on proportionality suggests 
that what is seen as ‘proportionate’ is subjective and can change with time: ‘As 
punishments become more cruel, the minds of men, which like fluids always adjust to 
the level of the objects that surround them, become hardened, and the ever lively force 
89 Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk, “The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic 
Assault,” American Sociological Review 49, no. 2 (April 1984): 261–72.
90 Anne L Schneider, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime Results from a National Policy Experiment (New 
York, NY: Springer New York, 1990), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-8925-5.
91 Andrew von Hirsch et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent 
Research (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, 1999).
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of passions is such that after a hundred years of cruel punishments, breaking on the 
wheel causes no more fear than imprisonment previously did.’92 The implication is that 
what is seen as ‘proportionate’ is set in the eyes of the beholder. The definition of 
‘proportional’ is therefore an additional rule within the ‘rules of the game’ that exist in 
any status quo between two parties. If Hamas does not respond to an Israeli retaliation 
with escalation, this indicates tacit acceptance that such a retaliation is ‘proportionate’. 
The same is true of Israeli reactions to Hamas actions. We can therefore judge the 
proportionality of responses in comparison with previous responses to similar 
undesirable actions.
Occasional breaches by Hamas are akin to the daily criminality dealt with by a 
domestic police force and should not be viewed as deterrence failures as they are all but 
inevitable in a situation in which deterrence is restrictive rather than absolute. Thomas 
Rid asserts that Israel has learned this lesson through long experience and implements it 
in practice. Attacks must be proportionate ‘when the goal is maintaining the rules [of the
game, i.e. the status quo,] and keeping them from eroding’. He notes, however, that 
when the goal is to change the status quo, the ‘disproportionate use of force may be 
demanded’.93 This is more nuanced than the conception of deterrence displayed by 
Daniel Byman, who avers that deterrence ‘demands disproportionate responses to any 
attack’.94 This reveals a misconception of deterrence, which should properly be seen as a
policy for maintaining the status quo. Any attempt to change the status quo through 
threats of force or violence is compellence. Since compellence is more difficult than 
deterrence, it is logical that the use of disproportionate force is necessary to overcome 
the resistance present on the other side due to the humiliation associated with the 
92 Beccaria, “On Crimes and Punishments,” 50.
93 Rid, “Deterrence Beyond the State,” 138.
94 Byman, A High Price, 362.
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inherently obvious nature of compliance with a compellent threat and the risk that the 
weakness shown will imply a lack of resolve for defending future commitments. It is 
thus to be expected that ‘disproportionate’ force is needed to establish a new status quo, 
while ‘proportionate’ force may be enough to maintain it. The former is compellence, 
the latter deterrence.
The constant need to establish a new status quo, and thus the inherent instability 
of the deterrence situation with Hamas, throws the sustainability of the current 
relationship between Hamas and Israel into question. Hamas is a special case among 
non-state actors because it in many ways transcends that label. For the purposes of 
deterrence, it is more or less the de facto government of a quasi-state. This gives it at 
least a minimal stake in the status quo (i.e. maintaining its control over the Gaza Strip). 
As Fatah discovered when it was seen as giving in to Israeli demands, however, 
maintaining the status quo may not be enough to maintain the support Hamas has 
enjoyed from the people of Gaza. The question of the sustainability of the current 
situation is therefore as critical as ever. It stands to reason that a more stable deterrence 
relationship that did not collapse into escalating violence as frequently as that between 
Israel and Hamas currently does would have the potential to last longer and therefore be 
more sustainable. A long calm might also open up possibilities for negotiations. This 
brings us back to the relationship between stability and credibility and whether Israel is 
overly concerned with the latter to the detriment of the former (see chapter 6 and the 
conclusion).
2.3 The strategy of cumulative deterrence and the Iron Wall doctrine
One of the goals of this thesis is to evaluate Israel’s ‘cumulative deterrence’ of 
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Hamas over the entire period of study and assess its future prospects. Doron Almog and 
Bar-Joseph write that cumulative deterrence is the process by which Israel’s foes come 
to accept Israel’s existence over time as the result of repeated failures to eliminate it.95 
This is a strategy of deterrence-by-denial for achieving Arab acquiescence: denied their 
aims, the Arabs, Palestinians included, eventually stop trying to achieve them. The 
implication is that peace might one day be achieved if Israel’s opponents can be denied 
victory for long enough. Denial usually involves hardening targets and otherwise 
providing defence robust enough to make an opponent reconsider an attack. As a long-
term strategy, however, denial can involve many other elements as well, from pre-
emption to deterrence-by-punishment. Over the short term, pre-emption can undermine 
deterrence by altering the status quo and removing the promise of quiet-for-quiet. If it 
repeatedly succeeds in preventing attacks or weakening an opponent, however, that 
opponent may decide to avoid losses by no longer trying to prepare for attacks or even 
to arm in the first place. Repeated, successful pre-emption, while undermining 
deterrence-by-punishment in the short term, may achieve deterrence-by-denial over the 
long term. Similarly, successful deterrence-by-punishment itself may lead to deterrence-
by-denial over the long term if repeated punishments convince an opponent that the 
defender is undefeatable.
The authors Freedman (‘internalized deterrence’), Morgan, Rid, and Lupovici 
have all made reference to the potential for deterrence to establish norms of behaviour 
that become internalized.96 Its functioning was explained by Shmuel Bar in an 
interview: After each round of violence with Hamas, Israel sets the bar for acceptable 
95 Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism”; Bar-Joseph, “Variations on a Theme.”
96 Freedman, Deterrence; Patrick M. Morgan, “Taking the Long View of Deterrence,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, no. 5 (October 2005): 751–63, doi:10.1080/01402390500393837; Rid, 
“Deterrence Beyond the State”; Amir Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-
Toward a New Research Agenda,” International Studies Quarterly, no. 54 (2010): 705–32.
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Hamas violence lower. Over time, then, cycles of confrontations with Hamas will lead 
to lower levels of violence. For his part, Bar suggested this was a tactic, not a strategy. 
When asked if there was a plan for what to do when an acceptably low level of violence 
was achieved, he said ‘you take it day by day’.97 Others have proposed answers to that 
question, however.
The Oxford Historian and Israel expert Avi Shlaim argues that Israel has 
followed a strategy based on an essay by the Zionist thinker Ze’ev Jabotinsky written 
before the founding of the State of Israel.98 A closer look at Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall 
doctrine is warranted because it provides a fair description of Israeli defence policy and 
a template for combining control (pre-emption and defence) and coercion (deterrence-
by-denial and -punishment) approaches to obtain a long-term, cumulative denial effect. 
Combined with the considerations in the previous section, it is the last piece in the 
‘updated’ deterrence model this author has used as a conceptual lens for investigating 
the relationship between Israel and Hamas.
Jabotinsky wrote about his ‘Iron Wall’ concept in a 1923 essay that had a 
decisive impact on later thinking. As one Israeli journalist has noted: ‘More streets, 
parks, and squares are named after Ze’ev Jabotinsky than any other Zionist leader, and 
many factions cite him as inspiration.’99 Many Zionists at the time believed Jews could 
create a state in Palestine with the acquiescence of the Arab population there. He 
stridently rejected that idea. ‘There can be no voluntary agreement between ourselves 
and the Palestine Arabs. Not now, nor in the prospective future... My readers have a 
general idea of the history of colonization in other countries. I suggest that they consider
97 Bar, interview.
98 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2001).
99 Joanna Paraszczuk, “A Revisionist’s History,” www.JPost.com, April 28, 2011, 
http://www.jpost.com/Metro/Features/A-revisionists-history.
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all the precedents with which they are acquainted, and see whether there is one solitary 
instance of any colonization being carried on with the consent of the native population. 
There is no such precedent.’100 He went on to counter those who claimed that Arab 
resistance was due to a misunderstanding. This idea held that Arabs would agree to 
allow Jews to immigrate to Palestine if they just understood that they would be treated 
well and not driven off their lands. Jabotinsky began his essay stressing his support for 
‘equal rights’, as long as Jews made up the majority in the population, and asserted that 
‘we shall never try to eject anyone’. This was irrelevant, however, as ‘the future of the 
Arab minority would depend on the goodwill of the Jews; and a minority status is not a 
good thing, as the Jews themselves are never tired of pointing out. So there is no 
“misunderstanding”. The Zionists want only one thing, Jewish immigration; and this 
Jewish immigration is what the Arabs do not want.’101
Jabotinsky assured his readers that his eventual goal was peace and that peace 
was eventually possible. For the time being, however, that goal was not achievable and 
it was anyway secondary to the goal of establishing a Jewish state. Like ‘mainstream’ 
Zionists, his aim was a Jewish state with a majority Jewish population. Where he 
differed from many other Zionists (whom he called ‘peace-mongers’), was in the means 
to this end. Negotiation with the Arabs could not lead to the foundation of a Jewish state
in Palestine. The state thus needed to be established without their consent. ‘Zionist 
colonization must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population. Which
means that it can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is 
independent of the native population—behind an iron wall, which the native population 
100Ze ’ev Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” November 4, 1923, 
http://www.jabotinsky.org/multimedia/upl_doc/doc_191207_49117.pdf.
101Ibid.
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cannot breach.’102
Once the Arabs had lost all hope of breaching the ‘iron wall’,
the leadership will pass to the moderate groups... And when that happens, I am 
convinced that we Jews will be found ready to give them satisfactory guarantees, so 
that both peoples can live together in peace, like good neighbours. But the only way 
to obtain such an agreement, is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in 
Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure.103
Avi Shlaim argues the Iron Wall, particularly its first stage, has been Israel’s 
unacknowledged strategy ever since.104 David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister 
and, until the establishment of the State of Israel, chairman of the executive committee 
of the World Zionist Organization, accepted Jabotinsky’s reasoning that the Arabs of 
Palestine would never accept a Jewish state there as long as they had any hope of 
eradicating it. ‘A comprehensive agreement is undoubtedly out of the question now. For 
only after total despair on the part of the Arabs, despair that will come not only from the
failure of the disturbances and the attempt at rebellion, but also as a consequence of our 
growth in the country, may the Arabs possibly acquiesce in a Jewish Eretz Israel.’105 
Although he did not use the terminology of Jabotinsky’s ‘Iron Wall’ essay, he had 
clearly come to the same conclusions.106 Israel’s Arab strategy has been heavily 
influenced by these concepts ever since. Israel’s current Prime Minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, wrote in a book published in 2000, ‘the only kind of peace that can endure 
in the Middle East is a peace that can be defended (the peace of deterrence)’.107 In his 
analysis, the reason Israel, the Palestinians, and Israel’s other Arab neighbours have no 
102Ibid., emphasis added.
103Ibid.
104Shlaim, The Iron Wall.
105David Ben-Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders (Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1972), 80.
106Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 19.
107Binyamin Netanyahu, A Durable Peace: Israel and Its Place among the Nations (New York: Warner 
Books, 2000), chap. 7.
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yet achieved peace is because the Arabs have yet to accept Israel’s permanent existence. 
Until they do, Israel must defend itself and deter aggression.
2.4 Cumulative and specific deterrence, push factors, and positive 
reinforcement: An updated deterrence model for Israel and Hamas
The model of deterrence used in this thesis incorporates the above insights from 
the 3rd and 4th ‘waves’ of deterrence scholarship as well as those from criminology. In 
many ways, criminology provides the main gateway for the move from the deterrence of
the Cold War era to the variety practised by Israel. The first step in this involves a shift 
from an absolute definition of successful deterrence to the restrictive one always utilized
in the study of crime. Theft continues to occur despite the best efforts of law 
enforcement. Few would therefore suggest, however, that criminal justice systems 
should no longer seek to deter crime. The same is true of attacks by Hamas: the 
expectation is of fewer attacks due to deterrence, not no attacks at all. As shown in 2.2 
above, criminological research also provides empirical evidence in support of the 
existence of deterrent effects. While these cannot be used to prove that states or non-
state actors can be deterred by punishment, they do support the idea.
The next step that a criminological conception of deterrence allows is the idea of
specific deterrence. Criminologists expect that some people will be deterred from ever 
committing a given crime out of fear of being punished as a result. This resembles the 
idea of deterrence in the nuclear age, when the hope was that the mere threat of nuclear 
retaliation would be enough to forestall any attack. There was no room in this 
conception for rounds of nuclear missile launches leading to greater deterrence over 
Page 58 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
time. ‘Specific deterrence’, the process by which specific criminals are deterred after 
committing a crime and receiving punishment for it, is not part of the deterrence 
parlance in the international relations literature. The idea that rounds of attacks and 
reprisals, the political equivalents of crimes and punishments, can teach deterrence over 
time also provides the key theoretical stepping stone to cumulative deterrence, the idea 
that Israel’s opponents can be taught over time to accept ever-lower levels of violence 
and, eventually, Israel’s permanent existence. Israel has long attempted to carry out such
deterrence, but theory, in the form of ‘fourth wave’ deterrence research, is only now 
catching up with that practice. This thesis looks at Israel’s deterrence of Hamas through 
a restrictive deterrence lens that views rounds of violence as potentially leading to 
improved deterrence and lower violence over time.
‘Third wave’ research insights are also incorporated here. Perhaps most 
important in that regard are Lebow and Stein’s ‘push factors’, pressures placed on an 
opponent that encourage that opponent to violate a cease-fire or strike at the defender 
even if such an action seems futile and therefore irrational. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below 
depict the deterrence model of this thesis in graphic form, incorporating both these push 
factors and ‘pull factors’ (defender weaknesses, perceived or otherwise, that may 
encourage opportunistic attacks). The second figure alters the model to depict a situation
of ‘indirect deterrence’, a ‘fourth wave’ concept whereby the defender encourages a 
third party, through threats and/or incentives, to rein in the opponent. The increased 
complexity of the indirect model also makes for an increased number of potential push 
and pull factors, which must be managed between not only the defender and the 
opponent, but also with the third party, making so-called indirect deterrence more 
difficult. Such issues will feature prominently in chapter 4.
Page 59 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
It bears remembering that deterrence is a tool for making ‘agreements work 
when trust and good faith are lacking and there is no legal recourse for breach of 
contract’.108 These ‘agreements’ are not cordial, but they nevertheless reflect an 
acceptance of certain conditions because accepting them is seen by both parties to a 
conflict to be in that party’s own best interest. Deterrence will begin to erode when this 
is no longer the case. Because Lebow and Stein showed that push factors were just as 
likely, if not more likely, to cause escalations than pull factors, and that these push 
factors were often inadvertently created by defenders in attempts to show resolve, this 
thesis will also focus on what Israel has done and can do to ameliorate such push factors
and improve deterrence stability—thus keeping the interests of Israel and Hamas in 
alignment.109 The promise not to attack noted by Schelling is a promise to maintain the 
status quo. It stands to reason that, the better the status quo is for an opponent, the more 
likely that opponent is to maintain it. Providing additional benefits as a reward for 
peaceful periods also increases the number and variety of things a defender can target in
retaliation, which should grant it greater leeway to calibrate responses as it chooses. The
stability-enhancing potential of this sort of ‘positive reinforcement’ will therefore also 
be explored in the body chapters and in the conclusion of this thesis.
108Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 20.
109Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?,” in Psychology and 
Deterrence, Perspectives on Security (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 184.
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Figure 2.1: Factors that ‘pull’ and ‘push’ an opponent towards attacks and thus 
undermine deterrence.
Figure 2.2: Factors that ‘pull’ and ‘push’ an opponent towards attacks and thus 
undermine deterrence in an ‘indirect’ deterrence relationship.
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3. Hamas’s Characteristics and Deterrence
The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at Hamas, its interests, its 
raison d’etre, its structure, and the variations in its nature (from a religious and social 
group, to an armed resistance organization, to the ruling authority of a quasi-state in 
Gaza). In particular, it will ask what effect these factors can be expected to have on 
attempts to deter Hamas. The first section will examine Hamas’s raison d’etre as a 
resistance group and the effect its religiosity can be expected to have on its willingness 
to negotiate or accept peace with Israel. This is not as straightforward as it might seem, 
as Hamas is religious, but it is also nationalist and therefore desires at least eventual 
control of territory, at which point it also gains a stake in the status quo. In addition, 
Hamas recognizes that its continued relevance requires not just resistance, but its 
continued survival. Both of these aspects mean that Hamas does have valuable assets 
that it could lose in conflicts with Israel, making it at least theoretically susceptible to 
coercion and deterrence. Thereafter, the chapter turns to Hamas’s decentralized 
structure, uncertainty regarding Hamas’s command-and-control structures, and potential
strife between and within its armed and political wings and its internal and external 
leaderships, and the challenges these factors all pose for deterrence. They all make 
deterrence more difficult, but, the chapter will argue, not impossible.
3.1 The formation of Hamas and its ideals
Understanding Hamas and its motivations, and therefore their impact on its 
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deterrability, requires a brief look at its history and ideological ancestry. The name 
‘Hamas’ is an acronym for Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, or ‘Islamic 
Resistance Movement’. ‘Hamas’ itself means ‘zeal’ or ‘enthusiasm’ in Arabic. Its 1987 
founders included Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantissi, Dr. Mahmoud Zahar, 
Musa Abu Marzouq, Ismail Abu Shenab, Salah Shehadeh, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Issa al-
Nashar, and Abdel Fattah al-Dukhan.1 The movement sprang out of the Palestinian 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization with branches in much of 
the Arab world now perhaps best known for its brief stint running Egypt before its 
government was ousted in a 2013 military coup.
Hamas’s view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its own role within it are 
described in its Charter and in a 1993 ‘introductory memorandum’. The memorandum 
asserts that Zionism is to be seen as part of a ‘Western project to bring the Arab Islamic 
umma under the domination of Western culture, to make it dependent on the West, and 
to perpetuate its underdevelopment’.2 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is thus ‘a conflict 
between the Muslim Ummah [transnational body of believers] and Israel’s colonial 
expansionism.’3 It thus sees Zionism as a form of colonialism and Israel as little more 
than an artificial Western colony and tool for Western subjugation. The memorandum 
also sets out four points that together form Hamas’s resistance doctrine. It is worth 
reproducing these points in full here, because Hamas’s actions and statements continue 
to reflect this doctrine to this day:
1. The Palestinian people are the direct target of the Zionist settler occupation. 
Therefore, they must bear the main burden of resisting the unjust occupation. 
This is why Hamas seeks to mobilize the full potential of the Palestinian people 
1 Beverley Milton-Edwards, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 
53.
2 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Inst. for Palestine Studies, 
2000), chap. The Strategy of Hamas.
3 Khaled Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement HAMAS (London: 
MEMO Publishers, 2013), 3.
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and channel it into steadfast resistance against the usurper.
2. Palestine is the terrain for confrontation with the enemy. The Arab and Islamic 
countries are regions from which our Palestinian people can draw support, 
particularly political, informational, and financial support; but the bloody 
confrontation with our Zionist enemy must take place on the sacred soil of 
Palestine...
3. There must be incessant resistance to and confrontation with the enemy in 
Palestine until we achieve victory and liberation. Jihad for the cause of God is 
our objective in that confrontation. The best method of resistance is to do battle 
with the soldiers of the enemy and destroy their armor.
4. It is our view that political action is one of the means for pursuing jihad against 
the Zionist enemy. Its objective should be to strengthen the endurance of our 
people and our umma in defense of our cause; to defend the rights of our people;
and to present their just cause to the international community.4
Several points stand out. The first is that Hamas, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood
from which it stems, believed that Palestinians could not and should not wait for 
outsiders, including other Arabs and Muslims, to fight for them. Hamas leader Sheikh 
Yassin, who became the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza in 1968, himself 
initially opposed taking up arms against Israel, but not because he wished to wait for 
outsiders or until Palestinian society had been fully Islamized, as many within the 
Muslim Brotherhood argued.5 Instead, Hamas supporter Azzam Tamimi insists his 
reluctance was purely tactical. He quotes Yassin: ‘I had a personal desire, and I was 
motivated, to launch the battle as early as 1967. However, whenever we studied the 
circumstances and assessed the resources we found them insufficient and had to 
postpone. Then we would study the case once more then postpone again.’6 As Khaled 
Meshaal, the head of Hamas’s external leadership puts it: ‘We can’t afford to follow the 
old, mistaken view that as long as the conflict with Israel has Arab and Islamic input 
then the Palestinians should wait and see what the Arab states do with their armies. …
the Palestinian people should not be spectators to their own freedom struggle and simply
4 Hroub, Hamas, chap. The Strategy of Hamas.
5 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch, 2011), 32.
6 Ibid., 35.
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wait for others to do something about it.’7 At the same time, however, Hamas does not 
believe the Palestinians can ‘liberate’ Palestine all by themselves. They expect ‘the Arab
and Islamic world... to engage in defence of their mutual destiny, moving beyond moral 
support and solidarity’.8 After all, the ‘religious dimension of the conflict also spreads it 
beyond the responsibility of the Palestinians, for Palestine’s history and status makes it 
exceptional for Muslims and Christians alike’.9 (One might note here that Meshaal 
omits the importance of the region to Jews.) Hamas therefore sees its role as resisting 
Israel, not defeating it, as it expects that it cannot do this alone. This will have important
implications in later chapters as regards Hamas’s definition of ‘success’ in any particular
round of conflict with Israel.
Well into the 1980s, the Brotherhood’s line was that the ‘liberation’ of Palestine 
‘was too great a task, which only the power of an Islamic state could undertake’.10 
Debate continued right through the First Intifada, as Palestinians remained divided over 
the utility of armed struggle. Sheikh Yassin, however, decided to prepare for action. He 
and a close circle of associates received funding from the Kuwait branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to purchase weapons and send men to Amman for training as fighters in 
1982 and Brotherhood organizations from several countries met and agreed to provide 
financial and logistical support to the Brotherhood in Islam to wage jihad. The plot was 
soon uncovered, however, and Yassin was arrested.11 Many within the Brotherhood 
opined that this showed how futile taking up armed struggle against Israel was.12 Even 
while the First Intifada was already underway, many moderate members of the Muslim 
7 Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 4–5.
8 Ibid., 5.
9 Ibid., 5–6.
10 Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 45.
11 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & Co., 2007), 45; ibid., 46; Shaul 
Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000), 34.
12 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 47.
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Brotherhood were still arguing against taking violent action.13 Yassin and his 
compatriots, however, surmised that the time had come and founded Hamas to begin 
armed resistance against Israel (see chapter 4).
Hamas has always been an organization more narrowly focused on nationalist 
goals for Palestine than the Muslim Brotherhood’s pan-Islamic goals for change 
throughout the Muslim world. The second point in the memorandum reflects this: 
Hamas has always restricted the territory of its fight against Israel to Israel and 
Palestine. Unlike the PLO, which used international terrorism in its early days to attract 
attention, it has always avoided expanding its list of targets abroad. Hamas expert 
Khaled Hroub quotes an internal Hamas memo as stating: ‘[T]he movement has no 
quarrel with any foreign nation. It is not the policy of Hamas to attack or undermine the 
interests or possessions of various states.’14 This is probably strategically shrewd. Arafat
abandoned attacks on foreign targets after 1973 because of pressure from Arab 
governments ‘and because [his] international operations were damaging the diplomatic 
progress the PLO had made after Munich’.15 Hamas has long attempted to bolster its 
position internationally by portraying itself as a victim responding to Israeli aggression. 
This portrayal would be harder to carry off if Hamas also attacked European or 
American targets.
Hamas has not abandoned the Pan-Arab ideals of its parent organization 
altogether, however. Meshaal makes this clear in his critique of ‘the nation state and the 
narrow prejudices it inevitably produces’. Pan-Arabism is an eventual goal, however, 
much like the defeat of Israel: ‘We are not asking the regimes or governments to 
13 Nicolas Tatro, “Palestinians: United In the Street, Divided Over Peacemaking,” The Associated Press, 
March 4, 1988, PM Cycle edition, sec. International News.
14 Hroub, Hamas, chap. The Parties to the Struggle.
15 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 48.
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abandon that reality in one go, because it is substantial. What we call for is that the 
concerns of the nation-state and local interests should not override Arab and Islamic 
interests.’ ‘We live in a world with a globalised economy, easily accessible mass media 
and social networks, effective communications and transport, and common influences’. 
He asserts that this is leading to the creation of ‘blocs and planning on a continental 
rather than national scale’ and points to super-national unity in ‘our own history’, 
referring to the Ottoman Empire and its predecessor Caliphates.16
The third point in the doctrine set out by the memorandum contains a remark 
with consequences for deterrence: ‘Jihad for the cause of God is our objective.’ For 
Hamas, the fight itself is the goal. Hamas’s timeline for victory is in centuries or 
millennia, not months or years. As Abu Bakr Nofal puts it: ‘The world is in a hurry. We 
are not in a hurry.’17 Canny observers may note a congruence between this perspective 
and the long-term and indefinite horizon espoused by the Iron Wall strategy and 
reflected in comments from the current Israeli leadership opposing the West’s 
‘solutionism’. The conflict may not be resolvable today, but that may change. Rushing 
to try to resolve it before the time is ripe would be a worse blunder than waiting.18 It is 
more difficult to deter a group that perceives fighting as equally important to winning, 
especially when it views time with such long horizons. To be viewed as successful and 
in keeping with the goals it professes, Hamas must merely live to fight another day, not 
achieve any specific and immediate goals. Nevertheless, only a group’s most devoted 
followers will continue to follow it if it appears to be completely stalled or to be making
things worse for the general population. This is why Hamas pays considerable attention 
16 Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 8–9.
17 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 17.
18 Gil Hoffman, “‘US Shifted from Resolving to Managing Conflict,’” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, 
December 25, 2011, online edition, sec. Diplomacy & Politics, http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-
Politics/US-shifted-from-resolving-to-managing-conflict.
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to public opinion in an attempt to maintain significant support among the Palestinian 
public. ‘A basic element necessary to achieve a breakthrough in international relations is
for us to be strong on the ground; embedded within our people and community.’19 This 
ties in with Hamas’s concerns about legitimacy, which led it to participate in elections in
2006: ‘A lack of participation would have facilitated our downfall on the grounds that 
we would have strayed from Palestinian legitimacy and a national decision. […] We are 
satisfied that we were acting from a position of democratic legitimacy.’20
Hamas’s desire for public support also plays a role in the final point about 
political actions as a means to jihad, which highlights Hamas’s willingness to make 
instrumental use of politics. It is keen to engage in politics if this will help strengthen it. 
Indeed, as will be discussed in 3.2, Hamas sees politics and a ‘shura’ democracy as 
ways to facilitate a necessary Islamization of society. This engagement with public 
opinion is both a strength, in that it may help ensure continued support for Hamas, and a
weakness, as measures designed to target Palestinian public opinion can negatively 
impact Hamas. This has been especially true since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip
(see chapter 6). At the same time, Meshaal recognizes that religion is also instrumental 
in Hamas’s conflict with Israel, as it ‘informs our sense of belonging, our identity, our 
culture and our daily conduct and reinforces our patience and fortitude.... As such, it 
plays a significant role in opposing the oppression of our people and community.’21 
Politics can aid in the Islamization of society, which will provide strength for the fight 
against Israel, which will then pave the way towards the ultimate goal of an Islamic 
state that will transcend current national borders.
19 Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 33.
20 Ibid., 52, emphasis added.
21 Ibid., 31.
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3.2 Deterrability: Hamas’s beliefs, ideological rigidity, and the problem
of high motivation
Hamas’s beliefs and ideology make it more difficult to deter. They grant it a high
level of motivation, but they do not make it irrational, as argued in the last chapter. As 
works like Robert Pape’s Dying to Win have shown, committing suicide for a cause, 
which strikes many the West as an irrational act, has a strategic logic. Indeed, the very 
shock of encountering opponents who are undeterred by death is part of the reason 
suicide attacks spread terror so effectively.22 Furthermore, the definition of rationality 
set out by Schelling requires only that people act in accordance with an ‘internally 
consistent value system’.23 The fact that people are willing to die for a cause is not 
surprising if one considers the possibility that a person can value political goals more 
highly than their own lives. Such a willingness is not terribly unusual. Western 
militaries may not intentionally send soldiers on one-way missions, but soldiers are 
frequently willing to place themselves in harm’s way and countenance a considerable 
risk of death or dismemberment out of a belief that the cause for which they fight is a 
just one worth potentially dying for. This is the reason for common references to a 
willingness to die for one’s country and beliefs in expressions of popular culture like 
Hollywood films, in which such a willingness is portrayed as a heroic value, not 
inexplicably irrational behaviour. As will be visible in subsequent chapters, Hamas has 
changed tactics in response to changing conditions on the ground several times since its 
founding in 1987. It also always has an eye on Palestinian public opinion. Adapting to 
22 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Kindle edition (New York: 
Random House, 2005).
23 Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University, 1980), 4.
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changing conditions when tactics become less successful is the action of a rational actor.
Hamas is therefore not irrational, but it is highly motivated. The devotion of its 
members to its cause does make it more difficult to deter. This is reflected in the group’s
raison d’etre and reinforced by the religious underpinnings of many of the positions it 
espouses.
Hamas’s reason for being is based on resistance to Israel and the eventual 
‘liberation’ of all of mandatory Palestine. Giving up this goal would threaten the 
ideological cohesion that holds the group together. This makes deterring Hamas from 
resistance more difficult, a problem common to the deterrence of many non-state actors,
who often share similar aims. As Shmuel Bar noted, contrasting Israel’s deterrence of 
Hamas with the US’s deterrence of Russia in the Cold War: ‘There’s a difference 
between deterring someone from something he really wants to do and keeping him from
falling into a situation neither of you want’.24 Perhaps Hamas could be deterred from 
violent resistance while carrying it out in different ways? Although some Hamas 
members have shown some potential flexibility on this (see below), this is also 
problematic. As Jeroen Gunning highlights: ‘Violence plays a significant role both in 
Hamas’ discourse and symbolism, and in its overall identity as a “security provider”. At 
issue is not whether Hamas actually delivers increased “security”. Rather, it is the 
perception among both its leaders and its supporters that Hamas’ violent record is an 
important part of what makes it a legitimate political faction in the Palestinian arena—in
other words, that given the perception of a threat to existence, violence-as-protection is 
a valued commodity.’25 Violence is difficult to stop because Hamas and its supporters 
view it as valuable and potentially useful. This in itself makes an important point: 
24 Shmuel Bar, Author interview in person, February 27, 2013.
25 Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics Democracy, Religion, Violence (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008), 175.
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Though it is also part of Hamas’s identity, violence is still a means to a national-political
end. Furthermore, Hamas experts Mishal and Sela assert that ‘Hamas’s concern about 
the population’s daily hardships and immediate needs... increased its awareness and 
hesitation to translate its dogmatic vision into actual practice’ during the First Intifada.26 
They also suggest that the group is in many ways typical of Islamic movements like the 
Muslim Brotherhood that are common in the Middle East, including with regard to 
violence. The authors give the example of Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic 
National Front, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot in Sudan. Turabi promotes the 
legitimacy of violence to counter repression, but ‘emphasizes the importance of gradual 
penetration into the armed forces and bureaucratic apparatuses, parallel to the 
participation in politics.’ Like many Islamist movements, elements of Hamas’s doctrine 
require it to consult with the public.27 The question for long-term deterrence is thus 
whether Hamas, its supporters, and that public continue to view violence as valuable 
and potentially useful and whether Israel can influence that perception.
Religion and rigidity
Hamas’s religiosity adds rigidity when it comes to negotiating. For example, 
Hamas itself is unlikely ever to recognize Israel’s right to exist in what it views as 
Muslim land granted to the umma (world community of believers) from Allah himself. 
As Tamimi explains: ‘If Hamas remains loyal to its founding principles, it will not 
recognize Israel’s right to exist. […] The movement regards Israel as nothing but a 
colonial enclave planted in the heart of the Muslim world. […] Another consideration is 
26 Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 60.
27 John Esposito and James Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” The Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 
(1991): 427–40.
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that Palestine is an Islamic land that has been invaded and occupied by a foreign power. 
It would contravene the principles of Hamas’s Islamic faith to recognize the legitimacy 
of the foreign occupation of any Muslim land.’28 Article 11 of Hamas’s charter reflects 
this: ‘The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an 
Islamic Waqf [endowment] throughout the generations and until the Day of 
Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it.’29 This 
would seem to make Hamas almost undeterrable, but in actuality, it is more accurate to 
say merely that it will be all but impossible to compel Hamas to accept Israel’s right to 
exist. Refusing to recognize Israel does not necessarily imply a need for constant 
violence and Hamas has shown some flexibility in this regard. It should also be pointed 
out, however, that although the PA does recognize Israel, recognizing Israel as explicitly
Jewish is a bridge too far. Even Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly 
stated that he would not—and never would—recognize Israel as a specifically Jewish 
state.30
Religion and flexibility
Religion does not always rule out compromise, however. Gunning laments that 
‘the secularisation credo has led scholars to unproblematically regard Islamists as 
rigidly dogmatic compared to their secularist counterparts, ignoring both the existence 
of persistent dogmatism among secularists, and the capacity of Islamists to reinterpret 
28 Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 156–157.
29 “Palestine Center - The Charter of the Hamas,” The Jerusalem Fund, accessed October 21, 2011, 
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html.
30 Jeffrey Heller, “Abbas Says Won’t Recognize Israel as Jewish State,” Reuters, April 27, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-idUSTRE53Q2ZU20090427; Khaled Abu 
Toameh, “Abbas Reaffirms Refusal to Recognize Israel as a Jewish State,” The Jerusalem Post | 
JPost.com, January 11, 2014, online edition, sec. Diplomacy & Politics, 
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Abbas-reaffirms-refusal-to-recognize-Israel-as-a-
Jewish-state-337854.
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their sacred texts in response to changes in political opportunities.’31 As the scholars 
Mishal and Sela point out, ‘the question is not how closely Hamas adheres to official 
dogma, but how and to what extent Hamas is able to justify political conduct that 
sometimes deviates from its declared doctrine without running the risk of discontent or 
internal dispute among its followers.’32 Hamas has, for example, moderated its view of 
its enemy. ‘In the first two years of Hamas’s existence (1987-89), the preliminary 
identification of friends and foes... was rather oversimplified. In subsequent years, 
Hamas’s discourse reflected a new sensitivity to the idea that it was unwise to expand 
the list of one’s enemies... . In its presentation of the identity of the parties to the 
conflict, the Hamas Charter is a good example of the earlier phase, which was 
influenced by the traditional stereotype of a Crusader-style world Jewish conspiracy 
against Islam.’33 The Charter makes frequent reference to the ‘crusader West’ and 
‘Communist East’ and even includes ‘Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, Lions, and other 
spying associations’ among Hamas’s enemies.34 ‘Such language vanished from the 
movement’s literature and political discourse, and its dealings at the international level 
ceased to reflect such positions. Since the early 1990s, this change can be attributed to 
the input of Hamas’s “outside” leadership. A number of leading personalities who have 
lived abroad and been exposed to wider experiences than their counterparts in the Gaza 
Strip (who formulated the Hamas Charter) have re-oriented Hamas’s political thinking 
and influenced the formulation of its discourse.’35
From the beginning, Hamas has also showed a (proscribed) willingness to 
negotiate with Israel. Hamas founder Mahmoud Zahar met with the then Minister of 
31 Gunning, Hamas in Politics Democracy, Religion, Violence, 11.
32 Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, viii.
33 Hroub, Hamas, chap. The Parties to the Struggle.
34 “Palestine Center - The Charter of the Hamas.”
35 Hroub, Hamas, chap. The Parties to the Struggle.
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Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, in 1988 and spoke of negotiations on terms that are 
strikingly similar to those Hamas proposes to this day. Hamas’s proposal ‘consisted of 
the following: a call for Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 territories, put the occupied 
territories under a neutral side, choose our representatives by our own methods, elected 
by us. Everything should be on the agenda, and we should even discuss Israel’s 
existence and the right of return.’36 These are not, to be clear, proposals to end the 
conflict. Instead, they are a proposal for a hudna, or long-term (potentially over 
decades) ceasefire, that would let a future generation decide on how to end the conflict. 
Many Israelis are uncomfortable with the idea of negotiating an agreement with an 
entity that would continue to call for the destruction of their country. Efraim Halevy, a 
former head of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, has a different view, 
however. Recalling the Treaties of Westphalia, he remarks ‘Europe has enjoyed a hudna
for around 300 years. In view of there being no really viable alternative, should we 
continue to ignore Hamas in any political context?’37 The fact that Hamas would even 
consider maintaining quiet for an extended period indicates that deterrence of Hamas is 
not as impossible as Hamas’s rigid ideological positions might suggest, though it does 
call into question the longevity of such deterrence. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw, 
however, if deterrence is used as a tactic for conflict management rather than as a 
strategy for conflict resolution.
Hamas has thus shown a limited willingness to negotiate, but it should not be 
surprising that Hamas views negotiations as an ‘extension of the struggle’ and ‘a way of 
conducting the war in a different manner’.38 ‘If resistance itself is a means and not an 
objective, it is inconceivable that negotiations could be made an objective—a sole 
36 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 59.
37 Efraim Halevy, “Israel’s Hamas Portfolio,” Israel Jorunal of Foreign Affairs II, no. 3 (2008): 41–47.
38 Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 19.
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option and permanent programme rather than a means or tactic that can be resorted to 
when needed and strategically advantageous.’39 After all, ‘[i]f your enemies know that 
you do not possess anything except negotiations; you don’t speak about anything except
peace; and don’t possess any other option, why should they make concessions to you?’40
Hamas is thus unwilling to negotiate a final settlement unless and until it has the ability 
to force that settlement to occur on its terms, meaning the destruction of the State of 
Israel. A temporary peace would be tactical. As Halevy suggests, however, such a peace 
could turn out to be useful, especially in the absence of alternatives.
The rigidity of Hamas’s position on negotiations and peace might seem to 
suggest that it can only be defeated, not coerced. Individual Hamas members, however, 
have hinted at ways to circumvent this rigidity. Speaking of a theoretical Palestinian 
referendum on a permanent peace deal with Israel, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh told Reuters in 2010 that Hamas would ‘respect the results (of a referendum) 
regardless of whether it differs with its ideology and principles.’41 Haniyeh is not alone 
in this. One of Hamas’s co-founding members, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, also declared: ‘It 
is our right to oppose an agreement that [PA President] Mahmoud Abbas brings, like 
you have your own opposition, but I stress here: we will accept the results of a national 
referendum and the decision of the majority’.42 By separating itself from decisions made
by a Palestinian government and/or the Palestinian people, Hamas opens a door to 
potential agreements with Israel that it ‘accepts’ even as it disagrees with them. This 
could allow Hamas to compromise, as long as negotiations are carried out by others, 
39 Ibid., 20.
40 Ibid., 21.
41 JPost.com Staff and Associated Press, “‘Hamas Will Honor Palestinian Referendum on Peace Deal,’” 
Jerusalem Post, December 1, 2010, sec. Middle East, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hamas-will-
honor-Palestinian-referendum-on-peace-deal.
42 Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas Would Accept Peace with Israel, West Bank Leader Says,” The Times of 
Israel, March 25, 2014, sec. Israel & the Region, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-would-accept-
peace-with-israel-west-bank-leader-says/.
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even as it maintains the image of ideological purity essential to its self-conception. In 
that regard, it is notable that Hamas has already agreed to unity governments with Fatah 
and agreed to work within the Palestinian Authority, an authority that officially 
recognizes Israel.43 Hamas’s short-term ideological flexibility provides it with short-
term political advantages ‘at a tolerable normative sacrifice’.44
Furthermore, Hamas is more of a religiously-inspired nationalist (or pan-
nationalist) movement than a nationalism-inspired religious movement. As Hamas 
military-wing leader Sheikh Saleh al-Arouri asserts: ‘For us as Muslims it is not a 
religious war because we lived together here before 1948. […] In our area there was 
never a genocide based on religion. This is only a nationalistic issue and a nationalistic 
war because of the occupation.’45 Indeed, others have argued that the stress should be 
placed on the ‘political’ in ‘political Islam’ in general. The British former Islamist 
Maajid Nawaz notes that the man who first recruited him into an Islamist organization 
spoke not ‘in the orthodox, religious way of the imam with a stick; he was talking about 
politics, and about events that were happening now. That’s crucial to understanding 
what Islamism is all about: it isn’t a religious movement with political consequences, it 
is a political movement with religious consequences.’46 Although its national goal for a 
unified Palestine on all of what are now Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza and the 
religious idea that no leader can surrender Muslim lands does serve to stiffen Hamas’s 
opposition to permanent concessions much more than it did to Arafat’s Fatah, Hamas’s 
nationalistic yearnings are important. They mean that Hamas requires a Palestinian state
and recognition, neither of which can become a reality without territory. Hamas’s 
43 Mishal and Sela argue it is the separation of short and long-term goals that allows Hamas this 
flexibility: Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 48.
44 Ibid., 148.
45 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 15.
46 Maajid Nawaz and Tom Bromley, Radical (Croydon, UK: WH Allen, 2013), 85–86.
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control of territory (and its desire to maintain it) is therefore an asset that Israel can hold
at risk when attempting to deter Hamas.
The problem with holding Hamas’s grip on Gaza at risk is that they ‘believe that 
Israel will not seek to destroy Hamas’ ability to rule in the Gaza Strip; rather, Israel will 
focus on degrading Hamas’, as well as that of other Gaza based Resistance groups, 
military capabilities and infrastructures. Therefore, Hamas is likely to continue fighting 
until it achieves its goals and as long it does not foresee an existential threat.’ They 
assert that this belief ‘has in fact given Hamas an opportunity to escalate the conflict 
without feeling that it is risking its survival.’ To counter Hamas’s sense of security, the 
authors argue Israel must become less predictable: ‘[W]hen Israel launched the 2006 
campaign [in Lebanon] following the abduction of two IDF soldiers, Hezbollah felt that 
Israel “had gone crazy.” This lesson shattered Hezbollah’s previous conception and 
proved that Israel’s actions cannot be foreseen. This is what has primarily deterred 
Hezbollah since 2006, and what has spared both sides additional suffering and 
bloodshed. Hamas — unlike Hezbollah, which is undoubtedly watching the events and 
learning from Israel’s conduct in the current conflict — is still convinced that Israel’s 
tactics are predictable.’47
Variations in motivation within the organization and over time
All this suggests that Hamas does have vulnerabilities than can be exploited for 
deterrence purposes. Furthermore, motivation is not consistent across members and 
time. Trager and Zagorcheva put forth a model for determining potential deterrence 
approaches and outcomes based on the intensity of a non-state militant group’s 
47 Uzi Rabi and Harel Chorev, “To Deter Hamas: Expect the Unexpected,” The World Post, August 12, 
2014, US edition, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/uzi-rabi/israel-hamas-ceasefire_b_5673068.html.
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motivations and the extent to which its goals can be accommodated. Israel cannot, of 
course, accommodate Hamas’s overall goal of dismantling the State of Israel itself. In 
addition, Hamas appears highly motivated following Trager and Zagorcheva’s definition
of ‘high’ motivation as present when militants ‘value goals over life’. The best that can 
be hoped for in such a circumstance is deterrence by denial and temporary deterrence by
punishment.48 This temporary deterrence can be expanded, however, because not all 
elements of a militant organization may be equally motivated or have goals that are 
equally at odds with a given state’s interests. Those willing to provide finance to non-
state groups like Hamas may be less ideologically motivated and certain than their 
counterparts within the organization, opening them up to measures designed to deter 
them from cooperation with actors like Hamas. ‘State sponsors represent another 
element of terrorist systems that many view as less motivated and easier to find, and 
therefore susceptible to deterrence. Scholars and policymakers who are skeptical of 
using deterrence against terrorists often believe that, on the contrary, their state sponsors
are deterrable. The Bush administration’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
contains a long discussion of the administration’s policy of deterring state sponsors of 
terrorism.’49 It is notable that Israel’s neighbours Jordan and Egypt do not, at least 
officially, share Hamas’s goal of destroying Israel and many other states in the region, 
despite their sometimes fiery rhetoric, show little real interest in getting dragged into 
battles with Israel.
Targeting states sponsoring or hosting militant groups is sometimes called 
‘indirect deterrence’ and was discussed in the previous chapter and will feature 
prominently in the next. Even before the rise of Hamas, however, Israel had a long 
48 Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” International 
Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 95.
49 Ibid., 97.
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history of targeting states that allowed non-state actors to act in ways Israel found 
unacceptable. From the founding of the modern State of Israel in 1948 until the Suez 
War in 1956, Israel battled infiltration from Jordan and Egypt. Unable to defend the 
entire length of its serpentine border, Israel retaliated for infiltrations against targets in 
Jordan and Egypt. ‘[then Israeli Chief of General Staff Moshe] Dayan and Shimon Peres
both strongly believed that, especially given the configuration of the frontier, to try to 
police it would be both futile and a strategic error’ by moving too many resources to the 
border.50 As Dayan put it in 1955: ‘We cannot guard every water pipeline from 
explosion, and every tree from uprooting. We cannot prevent every murder of a worker 
in an orchard, or a family in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our 
blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army or the Arab government 
to think it worth paying.’51 The extent to which these attempts to coerce foreign 
governments to halt infiltration remains a subject of fierce debate in Israel,52 though it 
can be noted that infiltrations did fall to a very low level after 1956.
There are also avenues for direct deterrence, at least at the tactical and 
operational levels. Even highly motivated Hamas militants who would not be deterrable 
in the final moments before an attack may be deterrable at earlier stages when ‘the 
prospects of achieving a successful attack are more uncertain’. This is because ‘[e]ven 
those willing to give their lives when the success of an attack is assured may be 
unwilling to begin a process that may not, in the end, advance their cause’.53 This is a 
50 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970, Cornell
Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 38.
51 Quoted in: Byman, A High Price, 21.
52 On the “no” side, see, for example: Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration,
Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War (Oxford: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University 
Press, 1993); Zeʼev Drory, Israel’s Reprisal Policy, 1953-1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation 
(London ; New York: Frank Cass, 2005); On the “yes” side, see, for example: Mordechai Bar-On, 
“Small Wars, Big Wars: Security Debates during Israel’s First Decade,” Israel Studies 5, no. 2 
(September 25, 2012): 107–27; Uri Bar-Joseph, “Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of 
Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking,” Security Studies 7, no. 3 (1998): 145–81.
53 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 98.
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particularly salient observation when it comes to deterrence by denial and the security 
barrier. For all its imperfections, the evidence strongly suggests that it deters a high 
percentage of attacks against Israel (see chapter 5). Denial has wider effects, too. 
Because it ‘can minimize the terrorists’ power to hurt thereby lessening the coercive 
power of terrorist action. This in turn reduces terrorist motivation, increasing the 
effectiveness’ of other forms of deterrence.54
Hamas survival and sources of legitimacy:  Politics, Palestinian public opinion, and
control of territory
Whatever views Hamas espouses, it must survive as an organization to continue 
to espouse and fight for them, meaning it has an interest in avoiding Israeli actions that 
would threaten its very survival. Hamas may be willing to risk the lives of its members 
or leaders on the individual level, but its survival would be in graver danger were it to 
take such losses that its control of Gaza became threatened. There is a precedent for this:
‘The PLO’s loss of its autonomous territorial base in Lebanon as a result of the Israeli 
incursion into that country in 1982 generated mounting ideological and structural crises 
within the organization, which had effectively been deprived of the military option and 
had its political option severely curtailed by being forced out of Lebanon.’55 Hamas 
survived without controlling territory for many years, but losing Gaza would represent a
massive setback for Hamas’s agenda, in terms of both its social goals and political 
goals. An onslaught that would remove Hamas from power be difficult to accomplish 
without re-occupying the Gaza Strip, which Israel fears would bring unacceptable 
consequences with it. One Israeli army official claimed the daily attrition in Gaza would
54 Ibid., 106.
55 Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 14.
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make Israel ‘long for southern Lebanon’, even as massive unrest would likely also erupt
in the West Bank.56 Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon justified his opposition to retaking 
the Strip, saying ‘if we had gone for such a move, we would still be bringing back 
bodies (of soldiers) and (terrorists) would still be launching rockets at Israel’.57 Israel is 
thus unlikely to re-occupy the Gaza Strip unless the security situation on its southern 
border deteriorates massively. Israel does not necessarily need to remove Hamas from 
power physically, however. Hamas has long recognized that its strength also relies on 
support from the Palestinian public. It also sees winning the support of the majority as 
instrumental to its goal of Islamizing society. Israel may be able to influence Gazan and 
Palestinian support for Hamas.
As Gunning notes, ‘Lack of popular support for political violence was indeed 
one of the factors leading Hamas to focus on social and political activities towards the 
end of the 1990s.’58 Shlomi Eldar, an Israeli journalist who has covered Gaza and 
Hamas for years, asserts that Hamas responds to public opinion: ‘If the public doesn’t 
support their activities, they wait or do something different.’59 Hamas expert Benedetta 
Berti agrees. Speaking of Hamas’s internal decision making in the mid-1990s, she 
asserts that ‘the more Hamas’s popularity goes down the more support for armed attacks
declines. I think Hamas is rational and responded to this public opinion.’60 ‘As a 
religious and national movement self-perceived as the sole moral and political 
alternative to the existing order, Hamas had to maintain its radical image, which is 
56 Daniel Byman, “Five Bad Options for Gaza,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 
37–53, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002153; Itamar Sharon, “Cabinet Told Purging Gaza of Terror 
Would Take 5 Years, Cost Hundreds of Soldiers’ Lives,” The Times of Israel, August 6, 2014, Online 
edition, sec. Israel & the region, http://www.timesofisrael.com/purging-gaza-of-terror-would-take-5-
years-cabinet-was-told/.
57 Times of Israel Staff, “Ya’alon: If We’d Occupied Gaza, We’d Still Be Bringing Bodies Home,” The 
Times of Israel, March 14, 2015, Online edition, sec. Israel & the region, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/yaalon-defends-idfs-decision-not-to-reoccupy-gaza/.
58 Gunning, Hamas in Politics Democracy, Religion, Violence, 47.
59 Shlomi Eldar, Author interview via Skype, February 26, 2014.
60 Benedetta Berti, Author interview, Skype, March 16, 2014.
Page 82 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
identified with a strategy of all-out confrontation. Yet as a social movement, Hamas had 
to take into account local considerations.’61
Hamas’s desire for public acceptance goes beyond immediate concerns over its 
relevance in the landscape of Palestinian political and armed groups. It sees popular 
support as essential to ensuring that fallible temporal leaders remain on the correct path, 
so Hamas is likely to continue to care about public opinion. In fact, it is dogmatically 
invested in mechanisms to maintain legitimacy:
In recognition of the fallible nature of human beings and the corrupting influence of 
power, Hamas proposes a number of checks and balances. It proposes regular 
elections to ensure that legislators and the government remain accountable to the 
electorate who must “watch over the performance of their representatives”. It 
advocates a separation of power between the executive, legislative and judiciary 
branches and expects each branch to scrutinise the other two. If the executive branch 
has lost the trust of the Shura Council, the latter would have the right to disband the 
former following a (weighted) majority vote. If any member of the executive, 
legislative or judiciary branches is accused in a court of law, that member would have
to undergo trial like any other citizen. The notion of political immunity is condemned
because those in power are believed to be particularly prone to power’s corrupting 
influence.62
Furthermore, an ‘Islamic state must be “willed” by the people, and can only 
come about if a clear majority support its establishment. If it is enforced, it ceases to be 
an Islamic state.’63 Maintaining public support is therefore not just about monitoring 
fallible leaders, it is also a tool for creating a sort of Islamic renaissance. As Gunning 
explains, ‘Consultation, then, becomes a process of socialisation, rather than an exercise
in empowerment and direct democracy.’64 Maintaining public support is therefore 
essential for Hamas and it has been a source of strength. It is also a weakness, however, 
because if the Palestinian public comes to disagree with Hamas violence, Hamas begins 
61 Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 151.
62 Gunning, Hamas in Politics Democracy, Religion, Violence, 58.
63 Ibid., 60.
64 Ibid., 91.
Page 83 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
to lose legitimacy, endangering its strength and continued ability to rule and attract 
recruits.
The fact that Hamas currently controls territory is also important, as Gazans now
hold Hamas at least partly responsible for conditions there. In addition, ‘It is a widely 
held view in Israeli defence and security circles that terrorist organizations per se lack 
the organizational characteristics and assets that can be threatened in order to achieve 
deterrence, but as they develop social, political, or state-like manifestations, they 
become more susceptible to deterrence.65 In the earlier phases of Hamas’s existence, it 
lacked such ‘state-like manifestations’. This left Israel reliant on attempts to disrupt 
Hamas and to deter it indirectly, which, as the model in the last chapter shows, can be a 
difficult task involving more compellence than deterrence. Hamas has always had social
institutions that were vulnerable to attack or confiscation, however, and these are critical
to Hamas’s goal of Islamizing Palestinian society. Israel generally avoided shutting 
down such institutions in areas under its control during the 1990s because this would 
have caused a backlash. Indirect deterrence can open alternative avenues, however, and 
Arafat had fewer reservations about shutting down Hamas social institutions. Hamas 
founder Sheikh Yassin responded by remarking that even ‘Israel never dared to close 
these associations when I headed them or even afterwards’ (see chapter 4).66 Even 
without territory, then, Hamas has thus long had assets that can be ‘held at risk’ when 
attempting to deter the group or compel it to halt violence.67
Since the ‘indirect deterrence’ days of the 1990s, Hamas has also increasingly 
been subject to Israel’s attempts to deter and compel it directly. When the indirect 
65 Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah,” Comparative Strategy 26, 
no. 5 (December 13, 2007): 469–93, doi:10.1080/01495930701750307.
66 “Sheikh Yassin Denounces Closing of HAMAS Institutions,” Agence France Presse -- English, 
October 2, 1997, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
67 Trager and Zagorcheva note that such non-state assets can be the key to deterring terror groups in 
general. See: Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done.”
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deterrence of Hamas collapsed at the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Israel eventually 
attempted to compel Hamas directly to curtail violence, rather than relying on the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) to rein in the group. In addition to the West Bank security 
barrier, which was intended to effect direct defence and deterrence-by-denial, Israel 
began targeted killings of Hamas military and political leaders in an attempt to coerce 
them into halting violence. The challenges and effectiveness of both tactics are 
discussed in chapter 5. Finally, since Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the 
group has had ample ‘state-like manifestations’ that are now subject to Israel’s direct 
deterrence reprisals. As one official at the time explained: ‘The bank of targets has 
grown tremendously with Hamas’s takeover. Hamas is a clear and defined enemy and 
that means that when we decide to respond it will be easier than before since all their 
buildings are now targets as is anyone walking around with a weapon.’68 This means 
that deterring Hamas has since 2007 in many ways been more akin to deterring a 
neighbouring state than to deterring a shadowy non-state network. Hamas’s control of 
Gaza means it now has a stake in the status quo and gains it wishes to avoid losing. This
in theory should make it easier to deter and is examined more closely in chapter 6. All 
the factors discussed in this section suggest ways in which Israel can counter the 
extensive level of motivation Hamas members have, ways around the rigidity that 
Hamas’s ideology and religious underpinnings provide, and that Hamas’s religiosity 
does not make Hamas irrational nor necessarily rigid to the point of being undetrrable. 
Not all of Hamas is based in the Gaza Strip and subject to Israeli air strikes, however. 
It’s de-centralized structure and dispersed leadership pose additional deterrence 
challenges. Furthermore, in its earliest days, it did not control territory that could be 
68 Yaakov Katz, “Israel’s Main Options: Disconnect Totally from Gaza or Talk to Hamas. Security 
Chiefs Discount Notion of Invading Strip to Try and Help Fatah,” The Jerusalem Post, June 15, 2007, 
sec. News, Nexis UK.
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held at risk. These factors present additional challenges to deterrence that are covered in
the next section.
3.3 Deterrability: Organizational structure, internal divisions, and the 
problem of multiple ‘return addresses’
The above section illustrated the ways in which Hamas’s raison d’etre and 
religious beliefs affect its deterrability and showed that, although Hamas’s reason for 
being is closely tied to violent resistance against Israel and this resistance is stiffened by
its religious beliefs, the group is not entirely inflexible nor immune to coercion. The 
lack of ‘state-like manifestations’ in its earlier years noted in the above section led to an 
additional complication however: a version of the so-called ‘return-address’ problem, 
whereby non-state groups often lack specific targets that can be held at risk for coercive 
purposes. Hamas does now have ample physical assets Israel can target. Its structure, 
however, makes ‘decapitation’ (taking out its senior leadership) difficult. In addition, the
geographic spread of its leaderships, the sharing of responsibilities between them, and 
the autonomy of Hamas’s militant cells all mean that there are multiple ‘return 
addresses’ for deterrence or compellence messages targeted towards Hamas. Finally, 
threats to endanger Hamas’s political, national, and religious programme by threatening 
its survival ring hollow when some of its most important leaders are abroad and it has 
cells scattered not only in Gaza, but in the Israeli-controlled West Bank.
As Trager and Zagorcheva point out, the ‘return address’ problem does not mean
that attempts at deterrence must fail, only that it is important to match demands states 
make to the level and types of threat they can reasonably bring to bear.69 Further, there 
69 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 108.
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are interests shared by every part of the Hamas organization and the evidence suggests 
that, despite considerable autonomy, Hamas’s militant cells do respond to queues from 
the political leadership. This ensures Hamas a level of discipline necessary to sustain it, 
but it also means it is more deterrable than a group lacking any sort of leadership 
hierarchy. Finally, there is evidence that killing senior members of Hamas in Gaza and 
the West Bank affects Hamas’s decisions and can lead the group to reduce attacks under 
certain circumstances (see chapter 5).
Hamas has structured itself to make it less susceptible to attacks on its internal 
leadership: ‘to safeguard against “decapitation” … the political, social and resistance 
wings were separated (although the charities had always been somewhat autonomous, as
they included non-members in their advisory boards). In 1991-2, the “Izz al-Din al-
Qassam Brigades were established, and by then, a leadership structure had been created 
in the Diaspora, initially under the umbrella of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian 
Brotherhood, to ensure continuity when the internal leadership was in prison.’70 One of 
the external leadership’s primary responsibilities became raising funds for the Qassam 
Brigades. ‘Its success in doing so increased the tensions between the internal and 
external leaderships as the latter came to de facto control the Qassam Brigades through 
their control over funding.’71 At the same time, however, this initially ensured that the 
Qassam Brigades were reliant on the external political leadership, making them more 
likely to respond to its instructions. This did not always ensure disciplined, hierarchical 
control, however: ‘The relationship between the internal and external leaderships was 
further complicated by the increasing autonomy of the Qassam Brigades. Established 
with the specific purpose to prevent detection, the Brigades were highly decentralised. 
70 Gunning, Hamas in Politics Democracy, Religion, Violence, 40.
71 Ibid.
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Already during the first Intifada, this created tensions when individual cells carried out 
actions without authorisation from the leadership—particularly against collaborators.’72 
Such concerns have resurfaced since 2007, after which the Qassam Brigades developed 
a new source of financing: taxes on smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. As 
Benedetta Berti of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies explained, ‘one of the 
unintended and very unfortunate consequences of the siege is that it has boosted this 
underground, informal tunnel economy, paradoxically empowering Hamas because 
Hamas runs the tunnels. There’s a tunnel ministry, you get a permit, they regulate the 
construction, they collect taxes from it. And... a lot of the tunnels are run by Hamas’s 
military wing, so the Qassam Brigades are making money directly, which means there’s 
also potential for inter-organizational strife.’73
Overall, however, it is difficult to point to any action taken by the Qassam 
Brigades against Israel that was definitely or even most likely not sanctioned by the 
external leadership. When the political leadership, particularly the external branch, 
agrees to a ceasefire, the Qassam Brigades maintain quiet and even enforce that quiet 
with regard to other armed groups (see chapter 6). As one Israeli expert with a security 
background told the author, Hamas’s chain of command is ‘pretty strong. When political
leaders make a decision, Hamas’s “army” responds.’74 On closer examination, cases in 
which there was media speculation about ‘rogue’ Qassam Brigades cells or internal 
divisions turn out to be better explained by the Brigades’ autonomy and to be in line 
with the external leadership’s public statements.75 The 2014 abduction and murder of 
three Israeli teens in the West Bank is one example. It occurred just as the internal 
72 Ibid., 41.
73 Benedetta Berti, Author interview in person, February 20, 2013.
74 Expert on Israeli policy, Author interview in person, January 31, 2013.
75 For an example of the “rogue” hypothesis, see: Shlomi Eldar, “Accused Kidnappers Are Rogue Hamas
Branch,” Al-Monitor, June 29, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/qawasmeh-
clan-hebron-hamas-leadership-mahmoud-abbas.html.
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leadership in Gaza was making conciliatory noises and had recently agreed to the 
formation of a unity government with Fatah. Conditions were quiet. The teens’ sudden 
abduction seemed to defy all logic, but it was not long before evidence arose of wider 
planning of the attack, suggesting it was not merely the work of a ‘rogue cell’. 
Furthermore, statements made by Hamas leaders, including external leader Khaled 
Meshaal, in the days and months leading up to the attack suggest the external political 
leadership was signalling to the Brigades that they should take action (also covered in 
chapter 6).76 This shows that the interests of the internal and external leaderships can 
diverge, but it also indicates a high degree of discipline within the chain of command 
from the external leadership to the Qassam Brigades, which means the Brigades should 
be deterrable by targeting messages at Hamas’s external leadership. This 
internal/external divergence of interests presents its own problems, however.
Israelis therefore believe that the external leadership has been the main body that
steers overall decisions to attack since at least the deaths of Sheikh Yassin and Abdel 
Azziz Rantissi. The internal leadership in Gaza, meanwhile, is essentially uninvolved:
Let’s say the politburo decides it’s time to carry out a terror attack against Israel 
because of certain political circumstances. It will give the order to Damascus military
HQ. They’ll say it’s time to do something significant. They might say it should be in 
Israel or limited to the [Palestinian] Territories. The military HQ will translate that 
into practical action and give orders to cells ‘inside’, who decide the target and 
location. Haniyeh and Zahar are not directly involved in attacks.77
76 Hamas PM Haniyeh encouraged the Brigades to kidnap Israeli soldiers in April 2014: “Kidnapping 
Israeli Soldiers ‘Top Priority’ Hamas Says,” April 16, 2014, 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/insideisrael/2014/April/Kidnapping-Israeli-Soldiers-Top-Priority-
Hamas-says/; This was followed in May by a speech by Meshal in which he stated that Hamas 
prisoners’ problems would be solved by the Qassam Brigades, possibly a signal to the group to carry 
out an operation:: YAAKOV LAPPIN, “Mashaal’s Speech May Have Been Signal for Kidnapping,” 
Jerusalem Post, June 19, 2014, sec. NEWS; Finally, Hamas spokesman Hussam Badran specifically 
called on the Brigades in the West Bank to target Israeli soldiers and settlers just days before the 
kidnapping: Elhanan Miller, “Hamas Calls on Armed Wing to Kill Soldiers and Settlers,” The Times of
Israel, June 10, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-calls-on-armed-wing-to-kill-soldiers-and-
settlers/.
77 An “Israeli government analyst” quoted in Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 114.
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This can complicate decisions on calibrating responses to Hamas attacks. The 
2014 kidnapping example is again illustrative. The Gazan leadership denied all 
knowledge of the plot, despite the fact that Hamas’s external leadership had recently 
called for further abductions. It is entirely possible that the Gazan leadership was telling 
the truth. This may be why Israel initially responded with restraint in Gaza. After all, if 
the leadership in Gaza is not responsible, attacking Gaza seems questionable. 
Furthermore, attacking Gaza can mean hitting moderates rather than hardliners. In 2006,
around the time when the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped, an elder member of
Hamas’s leadership admitted that there were divisions between hardliners and 
pragmatists within the movement. He noted: ‘[Gaza-based Palestinian Prime Minister 
Ismail] Haniyeh is from the pragmatic school, but there is great pressure on him from 
the hardliners.’78
There are reasons that Gaza can serve as a return-address for all of Hamas, 
however. Hamas keeps a close watch on Palestinian public opinion, linking even its 
external leadership to the Palestinian Territories. ‘One of the conditions of legitimate 
authority in Hamas’ Islamic state is that a leader consults the people. Hamas roots this in
various Qur’anic injunctions where either the Prophet exhorts his followers to consult or
God exhorts the Prophet to consult his companions. So significant does Hamas deem 
this command that it often calls its version of an Islamic state  “shura democracy”. It 
considers elections central to the consultative process.’79 The external leadership is thus 
unlikely ever simply to ignore Gazan opinion when the Strip is attacked, as this would 
even violate its reading of the Quran. This means that the intermediate audience for 
Israel’s retaliations is the Palestinian public. If they become convinced that Hamas’s 
78 Ibid., 128–9.
79 Gunning, Hamas in Politics Democracy, Religion, Violence, 59.
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hardline approach is bringing more hardship than benefits and is not going to work, 
Hamas could find itself toppled if Palestinians encounter a viable alternative to Hamas’s
message (though such an alternative has yet to emerge).
Hamas also sees politics as a potential tool for effecting change. This tool cannot
be used if it loses the support of the Palestinian public. Though their interests diverge, 
both the internal and external leaderships want Hamas to retain control of Gaza. 
Benedetta Berti, who specializes in the political integration of militant groups, argues 
that ‘institutional pressures to expand and accommodate, in response to a legitimacy and
relevancy threat’ and ‘a decline in the availability of mobilization resources’ are two 
reasons groups may decide to engage in politics. Both of these suggest tough measures 
or constant denial of success may encourage a militant group to seek less violent means 
of advancing its agenda. In a parallel with Schelling’s ‘conciliatory promise, however, 
she also notes that this must be combined with an ‘opening’ of the political system that 
makes the group’s participation feasible.80 What the opponent can gain (or avoid losing) 
through deciding to be deterred must be greater than what the opponent can get (or 
avoid losing) through escalation, and this includes intangible elements like face, honour,
and legitimacy. As Berti cautions, political integration has not tended to lead inexorably 
to groups’ moderation. Instead, she described the process as ‘cyclical’ with groups 
alternating between more moderate periods of political engagement and more violent 
ones of militancy and escalation.81
The importance to Hamas of its control of Gaza and of public opinion there 
mean that threats or attacks directed at Hamas’s ‘interior’ can be effective, despite the 
internal/external divide and militant cell autonomy. The fact that there are multiple 
80 Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration, Kindle edition 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), chap. Conclusion.
81 Ibid.
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recipients of deterrent signals does however mean that messages directed at Hamas must
be clear and directed at all levels of the organization. Large-scale attacks on the Gaza 
Strip send clear messages to Hamas, though open admissions that Israel does not wish to
topple Hamas may blunt their effects.82 Messages in the form of actual words, however, 
are more subtle. Shmuel Bar, an Israeli academic with a background in security, 
suggests a way in which those messages can be made clear as well: Send a ‘caricature of
a message’ to ensure all levels of Hamas take notice. A ‘leaked document’ (fake or 
intentionally leaked) with Israeli plans to invade the Gaza Strip is one such possible 
message.83 Israel thus has techniques at its disposal to overcome the ‘return address’ 
problem Hamas’s organizational structure represents. Chapter 6 presents evidence that 
the targeting of the Gaza Strip in general as Hamas’s return address has met with 
considerable, if imperfect, success, while chapters 4 and 5 show the other methods 
Israel has used to target Hamas despite its lack of territory that could be held at risk.
3.4 Conclusion 
Hamas’s raison-d’etre, ideology, and structure all present challenges for Israeli 
deterrence. These challenges are not inherently insurmountable, however, and these 
factors also present certain opportunities. Hamas exists to resist Israel. Negotiation 
backed by the threat of force can be successful if the result of abandoning the negotiated
status quo would be worse than maintaining it, however, as a deal struck between the 
American and Philippine governments and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front shows. 
82 In 2014, for example, the Israeli government openly stated that it did not plan to topple Hamas. This 
was also made clear during previous escalations (see chapter 6). Herb Keinon, “Livni: No Policy to 
Reoccupy Gaza, but If Rockets Don’t Stop, ‘All Options on Table,’” www.JPost.com, July 21, 2014, 
sec. Operation Protective Edge, http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Livni-No-policy-to-
reoccupy-Gaza-but-if-rockets-dont-stop-all-options-on-table-367171.
83 Bar, interview.
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That deal accommodated some of the group’s local political demands in exchange for 
abandoning others and renouncing any cooperation with Al Qaeda.84 Hamas cannot be 
seen to surrender the cause of fighting Israel if it wishes to remain relevant, but even 
long-term ceasefires with Israel are permissible and would allow Hamas to claim to be 
holding true to its resistance principles. Put in another way: There is scope to encourage 
Hamas to relinquish its short-to medium-term goal of carrying out violence against 
Israel in exchange for allowing it remain in control of Gaza and to retain its relevance. 
Hamas, like any organization, cannot carry out its mission if it is too weak or goes out 
of existence altogether. While it is true that Hamas does not need to ‘win’ against Israel 
in any given battle, it does need to remain operationally viable. Credible threats to 
weaken Hamas severely can therefore have an effect, but these must be backed with 
credible promises to leave Hamas is a state it is willing to accept in the meantime if it 
refrains from violence. That is what the successful, medium-term tactical deterrence of 
Hamas would look like.
There may be possibilities beyond this tactical deterrence as well. Hamas’s 
ideological commitment never to recognize Israel’s right to exist is rigid and unlikely to 
be abandoned, but its commitment to ‘shura democracy’ provides a way to loosen that 
commitment. By agreeing to abide by the results of a referendum, Hamas also implicitly
opens the door to long-term peace and even potentially to serving in a government that 
recognizes Israel as long as Hamas need not officially do so and can remain committed 
to its goal of eventual ‘liberation’ of Palestine from Israeli control. The question of what
would happen after a long-term hudna is an open one; there are just as many reasons the
Palestinian public might move away from Hamas and resistance during a long-term 
peace as there are that it would move towards it. Hamas’s ideology and strong 
84 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 118.
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motivation pose challenges, but they do not make deterrence impossible. Furthermore, 
Hamas’s desire for relevance, public support, and even control of territory mean that the
divides between its internal and external leadership and between its political and 
military wings do not pose insurmountable obstacles to deterrence, either. Hamas’s 
effective control of the Gaza Strip remains a vulnerability. Even before it gained control 
of the Strip, however, there were several approaches open to Israel for curbing Hamas, 
including indirect deterrence, denial, and compellence through targeted killings.
The rest of this thesis moves on from the theoretical to the practical and analyses
Israeli policy towards Hamas in three phases: During the First Intifada and the ‘Oslo’ 
years, the Second Intifada until the takeover of Gaza, and from the takeover of Gaza 
until mid-2014. These three phases correspond to very different conditions with regard 
to deterrence. During much of the first phase, Israel saw the primary threat as emanating
from Fatah and the PLO. This meant it initially did not even attempt to deter Hamas. 
Later in the period, the signing of the Oslo Accords with Yassir Arafat changed the 
calculus and opened the door to potential ‘indirect deterrence’ via the Palestinian 
Authority (chapter 4). When Israel could not longer rely on the PA to reign in Hamas 
during the Second Intifada, it began to try more direct methods, despite Hamas’s lack of 
‘state-like characteristics’ that it could target (chapter 5). In the final period, Hamas’s 
acquisition of territory meant that deterring it had become a much more ‘traditional’ task
akin to deterring a neighbouring state—albeit one with a leadership abroad out of 
Israel’s reach (chapter 6). Throughout the three chapters, the thesis will examine Israel’s
use and attempted use of indirect and direct deterrence-by-punishment, deterrence-by-
denial, and compellence and ask how effective these tactics were/have been in reducing 
violence or maintaining calm. At each stage, it will also take into account other factors 
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that may have had an impact on violence to arrive at a probabilistic assessment of 
deterrence success and begin to investigate ways in which that deterrence might have 
been improved. The main subject of the first of these chapters is indirect deterrence, 
which was arguably the main plank of Israel’s approach to Hamas during much of the 
1990s.
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4. Hamas’s First Decade: Tolerance, Disruption, and
Indirect Deterrence, 1987 to 2000
The last chapter showed that Israel has used deterrence since before the state was
even founded. This was often by necessity rather than by choice: Israel’s long borders 
and low population density meant that halting through defensive measures infiltrations 
from Jordan and Egypt, for example, was impracticable. Prior to that, during British 
rule, military weakness placed limits on Jews’ ability to control the territory: ‘holding 
out and retaliating was all that Haganah had prepared for’.1 Crucially, even as Israel 
sought to deter neighbouring Arab states, it also attempted to deter non-state actors, 
mostly individuals and small, unorganized groups, from crossing the border into the 
newly established state. It attempted to do this mostly through a tactic known as 
‘indirect deterrence’. Israel would hit civilian or military targets in the neighbouring 
states’ territories in response to infiltrations. This, in turn, would encourage the state 
directly, or via the local people targeted in reprisals, to work to halt infiltrations. As this 
was an attempt to make its opponents do something, rather than refrain from doing 
something, this was a form of compellence. As theory would suggest, compellence 
success was difficult to achieve: Compliance was blatant and humiliating and Israel’s 
reprisals could easily be viewed as disproportionate attacks to be resisted, even at high 
cost. Nevertheless, Israel did achieve some successes with this tactic.
As the politics of the Israel-Palestinian conflict began to shift during the Oslo 
peace process in the 1990s, Israel entered the first of the three distinct deterrence 
1 Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2002), 72.
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periods set out in the introduction. It would now find itself again attempting indirect 
deterrence, as it had in the period covered in chapter 2, but this time of Hamas. The 
same challenges it had faced in earlier times were repeated. Israel had to encourage and,
especially later, attempt to compel one group (the Palestinian Authority) to rein in 
another group (Hamas) without instead sparking escalation. Because the peace process 
required close cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) on shared 
territory, Israel had to be more sensitive than in other cases towards not humiliating the 
PA or its leader, Yasser Arafat. Finally, as a democracy, Israeli leaders faced opposing 
pressures: Working closely with the PA and showing it sensitivity risked looking like 
appeasing an enemy. Israel’s Labour Party constantly had to worry about its electoral 
prospects should it appear too soft. At the same time, Hamas was in an excellent 
position to spoil the peace process with violence by intensifying the choice of Israeli 
politicians between sensitivity towards the PA and pressure from the Israeli public for 
greater security. This chapter will argue first that the alignment of interests between 
Israel and the PA brought about by the Oslo Accords first provoked Hamas into 
violently expressing its opposition. It initially did this easily in the absence of indirect 
deterrence and before Israel and the PA could adapt to their new partnership. Second, it 
will argue that the PA began to understand in the mid-1990s the threat that Hamas posed
to its prospects of becoming the government of an independent Palestinian state. This 
led it into a precarious indirect deterrence relationship with Israel in the mid-1990s that 
began to take effect in the late 1990s and eventually led to Hamas ceasing its terror 
attacks altogether in 2000 (see figures 4.1 and 4.3).2 This alignment of interests between
the PA and Israel meant that the fortunes of the calm at the end of the 1990s and into 
2 The number of casualties peaked in 1997 (a year after the number killed) due to two particularly 
catastrophic attacks in July and September 1997, which each wounded more than 150 people. The 
number killed in the attacks was also high (15 and 6, respectively), but not altogether remarkable.
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2000 were tied to those of the peace process. Should the peace process fail, so would the
indirect deterrence of Hamas.
Figure 4.1: Total casualties and deaths in Hamas terror attacks (including kidnappings)
from 1989 to 28 September 2000.3
Deterrence would fail if the peace process failed because, as figure 1.4 in the 
introduction showed, the task of attempting ‘indirect deterrence’ of Hamas required that 
the PA’s interests be aligned with those of Israel. Both the PA and Hamas, furthermore, 
had to prefer the status quo to escalation (or in Hamas’s case potentially be too 
weakened to challenge it regardless). Israel had less influence over ‘pull’ factors (ability 
and willingness to counter attacks) in this indirect situation than it would have in a 
3 Charles Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks,” Database of Hamas Terror Attacks, January 
2015, www.hamasterrordatabase.com Note: “Killed” and “Casualty” figures for suicide attacks 
generally include the suicide attackers themselves, though this was not always clear from the sources 
used.
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direct deterrence situation: The pull factors were characteristics of the proxy (the PA), 
rather than of Israel itself. Israel thus had to ensure that the PA’s interests remained 
aligned with its own and that the PA was willing and able to counter Hamas, all while 
avoiding antagonizing Hamas or the PA any more than necessary. This required Israel to
walk several fine lines.
4.1 Hamas’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and its birth in the First 
Intifada
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. He became 
the group’s leader in Gaza in 1968.4 After Israel took over control of the Gaza Strip in 
1967, Yassin found himself in a more accepting environment than that under Egyptian 
rule. ‘Israel... permitted the creation of voluntary or non-governmental organizations [in 
the West Bank and Gaza] such as charitable, educational and other forms of privately 
funded service institutions. ...[It was] a policy of “non-intervention” drawn up and 
supervised by Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defence.’5 Israel did not at that time 
consider the Brotherhood’s social and religious activities a threat because they were 
non-violent and did not get involved in politics. In addition, the organization had few 
adherents in the 1960s, a time when support for the Pan-Arabism of Egypt’s President 
Nasser was high and membership in Fatah was expanding.6
In 1973, Israel officially recognized Yassin’s organization Mujama Al-Islamiya 
4 There is disagreement about exactly when. Tamimi asserts that he joined in “1966 or 1967” after being
arrested by the Egyptians in Gaza for allegedly already belonging to the banned group. Others, like 
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, suggest that he was indeed already a member at the time of his arrest.
See: Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & Co., 2007), 16; Shaul Mishal, 
The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), 17; ibid., 19.
5 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 37–38.
6 Ibid., 17.
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(the Islamic Centre), which founded an Islamic university and set up mosques, clubs, 
and schools.7 Far from deterrence or disruption, Israel’s policy towards the organization 
that would later spawn Hamas was one of at least tacit acceptance and possibly even 
active promotion. Former Israeli official Avner Cohen has remarked that traditional 
Muslim clerics in Gaza as early as the 1970s had warned him that Yassin was dangerous
and ‘ultimately more interested in politics than faith’. Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, 
too, has said that, by 1979 at the latest, Israel was aware of Yassin’s anti-Israel rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, Fatah was Israel’s main enemy at the time, as Yassin ‘was still 100% 
peaceful’.8 In 1981, New York Times journalist David Shipler even quoted Segev as 
saying ‘the military government gives to the mosques’, with Shipler relaying that ‘the 
funds are used for both mosques and religious schools, with the purpose of 
strengthening a force that runs counter to the pro-P.L.O. Leftists.’9 Even in those early 
days, clashes between Islamists and secular leftists did indeed occur, a prelude to the rift
between Hamas and the PLO that would eventually see Gaza and the West Bank ruled 
by separate, seemingly irreconcilable, authorities. Many Gazans at the time believed 
that Israel tacitly approved of Muslim religious groups’ attacks on secular Palestinians 
and PLO supporters. One supporter remarked that Shin Bet (Israeli security) agents sat 
in a car and did nothing as fundamentalists attacked secular Palestinians in the Jabaliya 
camp in the northern Gaza Strip in 1986. ‘The Israelis say these things are a domestic 
matter. Why should they bother to intervene when someone else is doing their dirty 
work for them?’10 Referring to Rabin’s time as Defence Minister from 1984 to 1990, 
7 Andrew Higgins, “How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas,” The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123275572295011847; Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 36.
8 Higgins, “How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas.”
9 David K. Shipler, “Under Gaza’s Calm Surface: Death, Drugs, Intrigue,” The New York Times, March 
28, 1981, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/28/world/under-gaza-s-calm-surface-death-
drugs-intrigue.html.
10 Ian Black, “Muslim Fundamentalists Add to Gaza’s Misery,” The Guardian, June 3, 1986.
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Arafat himself claimed in 1993 that the rise of Hamas was Israel’s fault: ‘Rabin thought 
that by helping Hamas he could create competition for the PLO. Instead he created 
extremism.’11 Just before the outbreak of the Intifada, however, Israel began to become 
concerned over the spread of Islamism in the Palestinian territories, particularly in Gaza,
where the number of mosques had tripled from 200 to 600 in 20 years. The Muslim 
Brotherhood still did not call for violence as late as October 1987, but they did 
‘understand and condone it’ when practised by others. It was also not lost on Israelis that
the Brotherhood called for Arabs eventually to regain control of all the territory in Israel
and the Palestinian Territories.12 In addition, it was apparent that members of the more 
militant group Islamic Jihad were a product of the Islamization of Palestinian society 
driven by Yassin’s Mujama, from which Islamic Jihad drew most of its recruits.13
According to Azzam Tamimi, a friend of the current head of Hamas’s external 
leadership, Khaled Meshal, Yassin’s initial non-violence was tactical rather than 
stemming from personal conviction. Quite simply, he surmised that Arabs in general, 
and Palestinians in particular, were too weak to win. In 1965, Yassin had refused to join 
the PLO in its fight against Israel because ‘[h]e saw no point in drawing [the Israelis and
Arabs] into a duel that was most certainly going to end in [the Arabs’] defeat’.14 The 
Brotherhood believed that this weakness stemmed from a failure to live an Islamic way 
of life.15 As late as 1980, the organization was still insisting that the liberation of 
Palestine was too big a task for Palestinians themselves and that this could only be 
11 David Brinn, “Arafat Blames Rabin for Rise of Hamas,” The Jerusalem Post, May 19, 1993, sec. 
News.
12 Ian Murray, “Revival of Islam Brings New Spirit to Jaded Struggle: Islam and Israel - Part 1,” The 
Times, October 12, 1987.
13 Ian Black, “Israelis Alarmed as Islamic Fundamentalism Tightens Its Hold on Occupied Gaza Strip,” 
The Guardian, October 26, 1987, Nexis UK.
14 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 18.
15 Ibid., 29.
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accomplished by an Islamic state.16 Although Sheikh Yassin and a close circle of 
associates did receive funding from the Kuwait branch of the Muslim Brotherhood to 
purchase weapons and send men to Amman for training as fighters in 1982 and 
Brotherhood organizations from several countries met and agreed to provide financial 
and logistical support to the Brotherhood in Islam to wage jihad, the plot was soon 
uncovered and Yassin arrested.17 Israel still categorized the Mujamma as ‘non-violent’, 
however, and, perhaps because of this categorization, it released Yassin after less than a 
year in prison as part of a prisoner exchange with the PFLP.18
Israel was thus right that the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in the Palestinian 
Territories were non-violent because the organization itself had not yet decided that an 
armed struggle with Israel was sensible, despite this initial attempt by Yassin to arm 
some of its members. Some of the organization’s leaders, ‘especially in the West Bank’, 
where its historical ties to Jordan tended to make it more moderate, argued that Yassin’s 
imprisonment showed how futile armed struggle against Israel was.19 One of those West 
Bank leaders was Sheikh Hassan Yousef, one of Hamas’s founding members. His son, 
Shin Bet mole Mosab Hassan Yousef, recalls: ‘My father did not oppose violence, but 
he didn’t think his people were in any position to take on the Israeli military.’20 The fact 
that Israel’s military might led these leaders to conclude armed resistance was futile 
could be considered a sign that deterrence was working except that it seems mostly to 
have affected those who were already opposed to violence. Younger members of the 
group, who were educated within the Palestinian territories rather than in Jordan or 
Egypt, were ‘galvanized by the Iranian revolution and the Jihad in Afghanistan’ and 
16 Ibid., 45.
17 Ibid.; ibid., 46; Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 34.
18 Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 26; Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 47.
19 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 47.
20 Mosab Hassan Yousef and Ron Brackin, Son of Hamas (Milton Keynes, UK: Authentic Media, 2010), 
19.
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were ‘discontented with waiting’.21 The First Intifada would finally break this stalemate 
and move the group towards active resistance.
Hamas’s first communiqué was released on 14 December 1987, five days after 
the outbreak of the Intifada.22 Hamas did not initially call for mass demonstrations, 
fearing a direct confrontation with Israeli security forces, but Yassin did instruct his 
followers to use firearms against the Israelis from the very beginning, provided these 
actions could not be traced back to Hamas. He also established ‘strike groups... to carry 
out most of the daily Intifada activities, such as blocking roads, throwing stones, writing
slogans and directives on walls, and enforcing Intifada directives on the population, 
including work strikes and not working in Israel’.23
When it came, Israel’s crackdown against Hamas began slowly. Hamas’s first 
communiqué was unsigned, so Israel began by arresting known public figures 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood who had extreme views.24 Mahmoud Musleh, a
Hamas member who worked to distribute the group’s leaflets in the early days of the 
Intifada, attested that: ‘It was difficult for the Israelis to find us, and it was only through 
later security breaches that they then made arrests.’25 Israel had placed around 18,000 
Palestinians in custody at various times since the beginning of the Intifada, but this did 
not amount to a significant crackdown against Hamas. This may simply be, as Musleh 
suggested, because Israeli did not have the intelligence.26 Another possibility is that 
Israel hoped Hamas would weaken the uprising by causing internal strife among the 
21 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 48.
22 Ibid., 55; Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine, 1st ed (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 24.
23 Mishal, The Palestinian Hamas, 55.
24 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 55.
25 Beverley Milton-Edwards, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 
56.
26 John Kifner, “Islamic Fundamentalist Group Splitting Palestinian Uprising,” New York Times, 
September 18, 1988.
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Palestinians. At the time, ‘many Palestinians [maintained] that [Hamas was] being 
tolerated by the Israeli security forces in hopes of splitting the uprising, noting that such 
tactics [had] been used in the past in the Gaza Strip to set Islamic fundamentalists 
against Palestinian leftists.’ A Western diplomat agreed, saying ‘It is certainly 
remarkable with all these arrests, that someone like Sheik Ahmed Yassin, who just goes 
on saying the most awful things about Jews, isn’t touched’.27 As far as Yassin goes, 
Azzam Tamimi asserts that Israel was not using Hamas, but lacked intelligence and was 
therefore allowing Yassin to remain free in order to ‘find out more about his activities 
and to monitor his movements and communications’ (a variant of the first possibility 
above).28
If Israel wanted to pursue a ‘divide-and-conquer’ strategy, there was indeed a 
split between PLO and Hamas supporters that it could exploit.29 Discussions between 
Palestinian factions showed disagreement about the best way forward. The division was 
not limited to PLO supporters endorsing political discussions with Israel and Islamists 
rejecting the idea of a settlement. There were also voices within the Muslim 
Brotherhood who spoke against using any violence in the protests who thereby stood in 
opposition to Hamas, which, though associated with the Brothers, encouraged violence 
from the beginning of the Intifada.30
There is some evidence that Israel refrained from moving forcefully against 
Hamas in the first year of the Intifada, hoping to encourage infighting among the 
Palestinians. Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell assert that ‘[e]ven pro-
Islamic newspapers complained about Hamas’s links to Israel. “For all the anti-Israeli 
27 Ibid.
28 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 56.
29 Ian Black, “Israel Holds 200 in Gaza Raid,” The Guardian (1959-2003), September 10, 1988.
30 Nicolas Tatro, “Palestinians: United In the Street, Divided Over Peacemaking,” The Associated Press, 
March 4, 1988, PM Cycle edition, sec. International News.
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rhetoric”, opined one editorial, “its [Hamas’s] efforts were dissipated in infighting rather
than against the common enemy... The Israelis essentially followed the same policy 
towards Hamas as they followed against the Mujamma earlier: not suppressing it in the 
hope that it would distract young Palestinians from supporting more dangerous 
groups.”’31 Mahmoud Zahar, a founding Hamas member, admits he met with Israeli 
officials at that time. In 1989, then Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin also admitted that 
both he and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had met with ‘figures spanning the entire 
conceptual spectrum existing in the territories, from Islamic fundamentalists to very 
moderate individuals’. This ‘conceptual spectrum’ must have excluded the PLO, 
however, as Israeli law prohibited direct contact with its members and Israel criticized 
dialogue between it and the United States.32 Israel’s alleged tacit support also included 
funding: ‘The large amounts of money that were flowing into Hamas’s coffers from 
Muslim supporters abroad were ignored by the Israeli authorities, while the same 
authorities did everything they could to stem the dollars heading to the PLO.’33 
Raanan Gissin, who was a former media adviser to Ariel Sharon, asserts that 
Israel was following a deliberate policy of ‘divide and conquer’:
A broad consensus was that here is a religious movement that has great sway among 
the public and could actually, because of its animosity to Fatah, because of its policy 
of opposing the corruption of Fatah and all those manifestations of Fatah people 
taking money for their pocket, could serve a useful purpose in weakening the 
strength of Fatah on the street. That would benefit Israel in its struggle against Fatah. 
We are talking about before Oslo. The major leading terrorist group was Fatah. 
Statistically speaking, or in any way you look at it, they were responsible for the 
major terrorist attacks, they had the most sophisticated and largest terrorist 
organization. [Hamas] at that time was not involved in terrorist activity, didn’t even 
have a military arm… Later, when they started developing the military arm, I think 
31 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 58.
32 Yitzhak Rabin, “Interview with Defense Minister Rabin on Israel Television -Arabic Service-- 27 July 
1989,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, 11–12: 1988–92, no. 85 (July 27, 1989), 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook8/Pages/85%20Interview%20with
%20Defense%20Minister%20Rabin%20on%20Israel.aspx; Ahron Bregman and Jihan El-Tahri, The 
Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs (London: Penguin Group and BBC Worldwide Ltd, 1998), 226.
33 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 58.
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the Shabak [Shin Bet] was the first one to point out the change in their policy, or the 
fact that they were actually now becoming a terrorist organization.34
By the end of 1988, disagreement between supporters of the PLO and those of 
Hamas was increasingly the cause of violence. As Israel rounded up large numbers of 
Palestinians and sent them to prison camps, Islamists and secularists were placed in 
detention together. After Hamas released its charter, clashes broke out in prison camps 
and PLO supporters refused to coordinate with members of Hamas, who often organized
separate strike days, disrupting Palestinian unity. Many PLO supporters saw elements of
Hamas’s charter as a direct challenge to the pre-eminence of their organization.35 Fist 
fights also broke out at times in the occupied territories when Hamas militants 
proclaimed and enforced (for example by burning tires and threatening shopkeepers) 
separate strikes from those called by the PLO.36 Mosab Hassan Yousef recalls, ‘If 
Hamas called a strike and threatened to burn the stores of anyone who stayed open, PLO
leaders from across the street threatened to burn the stores of anyone who closed.’37 
Fatah was still the strongest faction, but it soon became clear that Islamist groups like 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, though fostering disunity, were central in intensifying the 
Intifada.38 If Israel was attempting to sow division, there was certainly no sign that this 
was slowing the Intifada down.
Not everyone agrees with the assertion that Israel even tacitly supported Hamas 
34 Ibid., 60.
35 Ibid., 57; For example, Article 13, which states “[Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, 
and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of 
the Islamic Resistance Movement”, and Article 27, which calls the PLO a “father or brother”, but says
Hamas must oppose it because it is secular. See: “Palestine Center - The Charter of the Hamas,” The 
Jerusalem Fund, accessed October 21, 2011, 
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html.
36 Glenn Frankel, “PLO-Fundamentalist Rift Seen in Occupied Territories,” The Washington Post, 
September 6, 1988, Final edition, sec. First; Glenn Frankel, “200 Gazans Arrested in Israeli Army 
Sweep,” The Washington Post, September 10, 1988, Final edition, sec. First.
37 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 33.
38 Nicolas Tatro, “Islamic Militants Play Key Role in West Bank and Gaza Strip,” The Associated Press, 
April 3, 1988, sec. International News.
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during this period, however. Brigadier General Shalom Harari, who was a senior adviser
on Palestinian affairs for the Ministry of Defence, has said: ‘The only thing that you can
accuse [Israel] of is that it started to treat [the Hamas problem] too late.’ He also pointed
out that Islamism was on the rise throughout the Middle East, not just in Israel.39 After 
all, as Carmi Gillon, Head of Shin Bet from 1994 to 1996, explains: ‘The number one 
terrorist enemy of Israel until the day that Arafat entered Gaza [after the signing of the 
Oslo Accord] was Fatah. All at once, Fatah left the circle of terror. Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad filled that vacuum.’40
There were no attacks associated with Hamas until the end of 1988, when Hamas
activists were involved in violent activities like throwing petrol bombs.41 The turning 
point was a more severe attack in February 1989, when Hamas militants, disguised as 
orthodox Jews, abducted and killed the Israeli soldier Avi Sasportas, who was 
hitchhiking within Israel proper. In this case, however, it was not initially clear who was
responsible for the attack.42 The Israeli authorities did arrest Sheikh Yassin and fellow 
founding member Mahmoud al-Zahar, along with around 250 other Hamas members, in 
May 1989, but the charges against them included murdering Palestinian 
‘collaborators’—no mention was made of Sasportas’s abduction.43 It was not until 
November that any mention of Yassin in connection to Sasportas was made, suggesting 
that Israeli intelligence on Hamas was initially weak, though this would now change.44 
Many of the other Hamas members arrested were later released.
39 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 61.
40 Dror Moreh, The Gatekeepers, DVD, Documentary, (2013).
41 Joel Greenberg, “Homes of 2 Activists Demolished; 2l Injured in Clashes,” The Jerusalem Post, 
January 3, 1989, sec. News, 2.
42 Michael Rotem and Michal Sela, “‘Shallow Grave Prepared in Advance’. Body of Sasportas Found; 
Hunt for Sa’adon Continues,” The Jerusalem Post, May 8, 1989, sec. News; Jon Immanuel, “Terrorist 
Given Life for Role in Soldiers’ Deaths,” The Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1991, sec. News.
43 Michal Sela, “250 Islamic Activists Arrested by Army,” The Jerusalem Post, May 22, 1989, sec. 
News.
44 Michal Sela, “Gaza Hamas Leader, Kidnap-Murder Gang Suspects, Among 200 Indicted,” The 
Jerusalem Post, November 12, 1989, sec. News.
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Whatever the reasons behind its initial policy, the kidnapping and murder of Avi 
Sasportas and, not long thereafter, that of another soldier, Ilan Sa’adon caused a shift in 
Israeli policy toward Hamas.45 This was the first time that ‘Hamas was directly 
identified in an attack on Israeli military targets’.46 With it now clearly posing a rising 
threat, Israel shifted from tolerance of Hamas to active attempts to disrupt it, not only by
arresting prominent members, but also by declaring membership in it a punishable 
offence.47
Israel also began to try new methods against Hamas. In response to Hamas’s 
abduction and holding for ransom of an Israeli border policeman, Nissim Toledano, in 
December 1992, Israel arrested more Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders and deported 415
of them to southern Lebanon.48 This particular policy backfired miserably on multiple 
levels. Firstly, it failed to halt Hamas’s terrorist attacks, as shown in figure 4.2 below:
45 Rotem and Sela, “‘Shallow Grave Prepared in Advance’. Body of Sasportas Found; Hunt for Sa’adon 
Continues.”
46 Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine, Library of Modern Middle East Studies 10 
(London ; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 152.
47 Ibid., 153.
48 Ibid., 157; Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 66.
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Figure 4.2: Total casualties in Hamas terror attacks, per incident, 1992 through 1993.49
There were clearly many more incidents in 1993 (after the deportation) than there had 
been in 1992. Secondly, the number of deaths and casualties per incident rose in 1993 
(see figure 4.3 for mortality figures per attack). The Hamas leaders deported to Lebanon
may previously have had a moderating influence on Hamas: ‘While [Sheikh Hassan 
Yousef] and the others had been in Lebanon, the most radical Hamas members were still
free and becoming more furious than ever... these radicalized men filled the temporary 
leadership roles within Hamas.’50 Furthermore, a fact not represented in the chart is that 
Hamas began using suicide bombing in the months after the deportees returned, 
claiming its first ‘official’ attack in April 1994.51
Thirdly, the deportations had a negative impact on Israel on the level of global 
public opinion. The next day, on 18 December 1992, the UN Security Council 
49 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
50 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 52.
51 Ibid., 54; Hamas did commit two earlier attacks classed by Israeli and Western media as suicide 
attacks, one in April 1993, the suicide aspect of which may have been accidental, and one a week 
before the first “official” one in April 1994. See: Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
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unanimously adopted Resolution 799, in which it ‘strongly condemn[ed] the action 
taken by Israel, the occupying power, to deport hundreds of Palestinian civilians’, 
asserting that this was ‘in contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949’.52 The fact that Israel’s staunch ally, the United States, also 
supported Resolution 799 underscores how widespread the international outcry was. 
The deportations thus led to an embarrassing international isolation for Israel. At the 
same time, Hamas was portrayed as a victim of Israeli aggression and its name now 
appeared frequently in the media. One Hamas leader even appeared on CNN’s ‘Larry 
King Live’ on Christmas night to remind the world of the Palestinians’ predicament. 
‘For the first time, Hamas was able to get its message across to individuals, 
organizations and governments all over the world.’53 As Arafat later pointed out, Rabin 
had ‘made 400 deportees into heroes’.54
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the deportation to an area outside of 
Israel’s control allowed members of Hamas’s internal and external leadership to meet 
each other freely for the first time in years, granting them an opportunity to ‘put the 
movement’s house in order’. Hamas was also ‘inundated with offers to train its young 
deportees in a variety of combat techniques including the manufacture of explosives 
from old mines and from readily available chemicals’.55 Some of these offers likely 
came from Hezbollah, which ‘made a great show of caring for their compatriots during 
exile’.56 ‘The prisoners used their time in exile to forge an unprecedented relationship 
52 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 799 (1992) [on Deportation of Palestinian 
Civilians from Territories Occupied by Israel], S/RES/799, 1992, 799, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/799%281992%29; UN Security 
Council, “Voting Record for S/RES/799 (1992),” UNBISnet, December 18, 1992, 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=sres799%20(1992).
53 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 69.
54 Brinn, “Arafat Blames Rabin for Rise of Hamas.”
55 Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 68.
56 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 74.
Page 110 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
between Hamas and Hezbollah. … [They] often snuck out of the camp to avoid the 
media in order to meet with Hezbollah and Muslim Brotherhood leaders, something 
they could never do inside the Palestinian territories.’57 ‘Hizballah may also have 
familiarized Hamas with suicide bombings and how bombers could use living wills to 
publicize their martyrdom.’58 It is thus almost certainly no coincidence that Hamas’s 
first suicide attack came just a few months after the deportation.
Israel in 1992 was as yet unable effectively to disrupt Hamas or halt its attacks. 
On the contrary, its attempts to do so granted Hamas greater publicity, strengthening 
rather than weakening it, while also allowing it to organize itself better and improve the 
effectiveness of its attacks. Its new policy toward Hamas was a complete failure and 
actually contributed greatly to the group’s rising deadliness in the following four years. 
The start of the Oslo peace process would strengthen the PLO at Hamas’s expense, 
however, by at least initially increasing support for it and granting it official 
administrative powers. The PLO used these powers to undermine Hamas and the 
Mujama in a few ways. One was by setting up a Ministry of Religious Affairs, making 
sure that ‘religious affairs, including waqf (endowments) and courts as well as the 
salaries of official clergy, were... placed in the new Ministry....’59 It also used its newly 
granted permission openly to operate and enlarge PLO-controlled security forces against
Hamas, forces which greatly outnumbered those Hamas could muster.60
Mahmoud al-Zahar promised to respond to PLO ‘provocations’ and to ‘defend 
ourselves against Israel and the PLO’, showing the great extent to which Hamas felt 
under threat.61 It began building its own arsenal to counter the PA by smuggling 
57 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 51–52.
58 Byman, A High Price, 74.
59 Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 76.
60 Ibid., 74–75.
61 Ibid., 67.
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weapons through tunnels into Gaza. It also began to infiltrate the PA’s security forces.62 
The most effective way to undercut the PLO, however, was to stop the peace process 
with which it was associated and to which Hamas was anyway opposed on ideological 
grounds, calling it ‘an act of betrayal of fundamental Palestinian rights’.63 The growing 
strength of the PLO and the momentum behind the Oslo process acted as ‘push’ factors 
that encouraged Hamas to commit violence. At the same time, the susceptibility of the 
Oslo Accords to disruption via violence, along with Israel’s then open borders with the 
Palestinian Territories, were ‘pull factors’, vulnerabilities in Hamas’s opponents offering
opportunities for attack. On the other hand, the powers that the PLO gained through the 
Oslo Accords gave it a reason to work towards their success. This increased the mutual 
interests shared by Israel and the PLO and made possible the use of a tactic against 
Hamas that Israel had once used against the PLO and against infiltration from Egypt and
Jordan: ‘indirect deterrence’. The Oslo Accords thus significantly altered the security 
landscape.
4.2 Israel’s response to armed resistance to the Oslo peace process
The first Oslo Accord, signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in September 
1993, left security arrangements for late final status negotiations and made no mention 
whatsoever of terrorism or security cooperation. It gave the Palestinian police force 
responsibility for the domestic security of Palestinians, ‘while Israel will continue to 
carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their 
62 Ibid., 77.
63 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch, 2011), 190.
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internal security and public order’.64 The separate ‘Agreement on the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area’ set out how the first Israeli withdrawals would be performed.65 Annex I 
also established the ‘Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual 
Security Purposes’ (JSC) and ‘Joint District Coordination Offices’ (DCOs). Israelis and 
Palestinians were to patrol roads jointly and inform each other about incidents. In 
addition, Palestinian security forces were given responsibility for enforcing ‘special 
security measures aimed at preventing infiltrations across the [Gaza Strip] Delimiting 
Line or the introduction into the Security Perimeter of any arms, ammunition or related 
equipment’.66
Some security cooperation had thus been established, but there was little in the 
agreement that gave the PLO real responsibility for halting other groups’ terror attacks 
and thus as yet no formal mechanism for applying indirect deterrence. The agreement 
later that year on the ‘Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between 
Israel and the PLO’ did nothing to rectify this. It made no mention of terrorism and 
Article VI Section 5 specified that: ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the 
continued authority of the military government [of Israel] and its Civil Administration to
exercise their powers and responsibilities with regard to security and public order.’67
Although this language remained much the same in the 1995 ‘Oslo II’ 
Agreement, with Israel retaining ‘responsibility for overall security of Israelis and 
64 Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, “Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement : 1993,” The 
Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, 
September 13, 1993), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp (emphasis added).
65 “Agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho Area” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 4, 1994), 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho 
Area.aspx.
66 “Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex I” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 4, 1994), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Gaza-Jericho%20Agremeent
%20Annex%20I.aspx.
67 “Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO” 
(New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, August 29, 1994), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/transfer_powers.asp.
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Settlements’, there were important additions.68 Most important among these, it specified 
that the ‘Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expressions of violence 
and terror’ and that they would ‘arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of 
perpetrating acts of violence and terror’. Furthermore, both sides were to ‘cooperate in 
the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall 
immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an 
act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent 
such occurrence’. This cooperation would occur through the JSC, ‘Joint Regional 
Security Committees’ (RSCs), and the DCOs.69 1995 was thus the beginning of Israel’s 
attempt to have the Palestinian Authority assist in providing security for Israel and it 
came at a time of rising Hamas violence and increasing effectiveness of Hamas attacks 
(see figures 4.1 above and 4.3 below). Setting out specific responsibilities for the PA 
with regard to counterterrorism provided criteria for assessing the PA’s progress on that 
front and that could allow Israel to make withdrawals contingent upon improved 
security, though language on such conditionality was not yet introduced.
In addition to formal security arrangements, Israel and the PLO had reached an 
unofficial ‘understanding’ on security cooperation: ‘[I]n return for intelligence on the 
Palestinian opposition and particularly the Islamist Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
movements, the GSS [Israel’s General Security Service (Shin Bet)] and the IDF would 
grant Dahlan and Rajoub [the heads of the Preventive Security Force in Gaza and the 
West Bank, respectively] a free hand to create a de facto Palestinian police force 
throughout the West Bank and Gaza.’ This was the so-called ‘Rome Agreement’ and, 
68 “Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II),” Jewishvirtuallibrary.org, 
September 28, 1995, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html.
69 “Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Annex I,” Jewishvirtuallibrary.org, 
September 28, 1995, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/iaannex1.html#article1.
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though it was not a formal document, Rabin confirmed that it existed, saying that PA 
security operated throughout the West Bank ‘in cooperation with Israel’s security forces 
to safeguard Israel’s security interests’.70
Security cooperation was vital because Israel had begun withdrawing from areas 
of Gaza and the West Bank, depriving it of crucial intelligence. Before that time, Shin 
Bet agents had considerable local knowledge. ‘[The local Shin Bet captain] was 
responsible for every person in my neighbourhood. He knew who worked where, who 
was in school, what they studied, whose wife had just had a baby, and no doubt what the
baby weighed. Everything.’71 In 1995, in contrast to earlier and to conditions in the West
Bank, Israel’s head of the military intelligence research division, Brigadier General 
Yaakov Amidror, said that ‘Israel’s intelligence capacity in Gaza [had] dropped to zero’. 
The lack of intelligence led Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak to say that Israel had 
‘no response for dealing with suicide bombers’.72 Yuval Diskin, Head of Shin Bet from 
2005 to 2011 and a member of the organization in the 1990s, remembers: ‘We asked 
how we could prevent terrorism if we no longer control the territories. […] The Shin Bet
needed new tools and they had to be developed.’73 Shmuel Bar mentioned in an 
interview with the author that he had once told a senior Fatah negotiator that the 
Palestinians would not have a state until they had an ‘Altalena’ (a ship sunk by the Israel
Defence Forces because it was bringing weapons to a Jewish militia group not under the
new government’s control). The negotiator said there would ‘never’ be a Palestinian 
Altalena.74
One could argue, however, that Fatah’s crackdown on Hamas in the 1990s was 
70 Graham Usher, Dispatches from Palestine: The Collapse of the Oslo Agreement (London: Pluto Press, 
1998), 72–73.
71 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 78–79.
72 Byman, A High Price, 83.
73 Yuval Diskin, interviewed in Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
74 Shmuel Bar, Author interview in person, February 27, 2013.
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akin to the Altalena affair. Ami Ayalon, who became Head of Shin Bet after the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, insists that the most important factor in 
improving security was having the PA on board. ‘We prevented more attacks each year. 
We achieved greater security every year. How did it happen? It had a lot to do with 
changes we made in the Shin Bet, but the truth must be told. The more significant 
achievement was cooperation between us and the Palestinians.’ The top Palestinian 
security officials he worked closely with warned him, however: ‘We don’t put Hamas 
members in prison for your sake. We only do it because our people believe that at the 
end of the day we’ll have a state beside Israel. When we no longer believe that, forget 
about us.’75 Just as the Israelis could make implementation of Olso contingent on 
security, so the Palestinians could make cooperation on security contingent on the 
implementation of Oslo. It was a precarious balancing act that would easily be 
threatened if progress on either front stalled.
Conditions on the ground were thus making disruption more difficult but were 
now making ‘indirect deterrence’ more practicable. To make this a true policy of 
‘indirect deterrence’ of Hamas via the PA, however, Israel would have had to make 
threats of consequences for the PA in the case of poor security. The implementation of 
the Oslo Accords had not been made contingent upon any particular security goals. Gil 
Murciano, a senior Israeli analyst, argues that this was by design, as Rabin and Peres 
feared that conditionality would only play into Hamas’s hands: By admitting that it 
would halt withdrawals if Hamas kept attacking, Israel would in effect hand Hamas an 
instruction manual on how to achieve its goal of stopping the peace process.76 Rabin 
thus sought to de-link terrorism and the peace process: He vowed to ‘fight terrorism as 
75 Ami Ayalon, interviewed in Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
76 Gil Murciano, Author interview via Skype, February 4, 2014.
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if there were no peace process, and work for an agreement as if there were no 
terrorism’.77 He continued to target Hamas and other terror groups directly using any 
leverage Israel had in order to gain intelligence: allowing visits to family abroad, job 
offers, access to universities in Israel-controlled areas, medical treatment in Israel for a 
sick child, import permits, government contracts, and cash payments. Palestinians also 
reported entrapment by Israeli security forces, who used video recordings of adulterous 
or homosexual affairs to recruit informants. For its part, the PA used its role as a 
middleman in selecting eligible Palestinians for Israeli approval for permits for travel 
into Israel to enrich itself and take care of its own members to the exclusion of Hamas.78
While fighting terrorism directly wherever possible and working to strengthen 
cooperation between Israel and the PLO, Rabin did not hold the PLO responsible for 
terror attacks as long as they did not emanate from its ranks. In October 1993, for 
example, Rabin responded to anger in Israel that he had not pressed Arafat to condemn 
recent attacks by saying ‘all that we asked from the PLO was a general condemnation of
terrorism. Beyond that, the main point is that those Palestinians under Arafat’s authority 
have stopped terrorism.’79 He responded to increased attacks using Israeli forces. He 
noted: ‘IDF and other security forces have reinforced their deployment to the highest 
levels since the outbreak of the intifada six years ago. There are 120 companies now 
deployed in Judea and Samaria; four times the number on the northern border.’80
Rabin also attempted to reduce terror attacks through other, more indirect, 
means: by closing the crossing points between Israel and the territories—a tool he used 
77 Maayana Miskin, “Rabin’s Son Slams ‘Wicked’ Oslo-Terror Link,” Israel National News, October 15,
2013, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/172868.
78 Byman, A High Price, 83.
79 David Makovsky, “Rabin Slammed for Not Calling on Arafat to Condemn Terrorist Killings,” The 
Jerusalem Post, October 26, 1993, sec. News.
80 Amir Rozenblit, “Israel to Free More Prisoners as Rabin Meets Arafat,” The Jerusalem Post, 
December 12, 1993, sec. News.
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with increasing frequency. Prior to the Oslo Accords, Palestinians could move freely 
between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. Rabin ordered the closure of the crossing 
point between Israel and the Territories in the spring of 1993 (following a series of 
bombings) for the first time since 1967.81 Increasing restrictions were now put in place, 
and though Palestinians’ freedom of movement was greater than it is today, it was 
increasingly curtailed. In 1994, the border with the Territories was closed for 43 days. 
By 1996, this number had climbed to more than 100. Standing orders for the border 
police were made more aggressive as well, according to an interview by the Israeli 
newspaper Maariv with a border police officer: ‘If you see someone holding a cinder 
block, Molotov cocktail, or an iron bar, you shoot them without making any bones about
the matter. There is no longer a procedure for apprehending a subject.’82 Closing the 
border ‘looked tough’ to Israelis and its economic effects were a ‘way of pushing Arafat 
to act against Hamas’. This was a way to ‘indirectly deter’ Hamas that did not hold 
peace talks hostage.83
Though conditionality was not contained in the Oslo agreements, and despite 
fears of playing into Hamas’s hands, Rabin did slowly move towards a certain level of 
linkage between progress on the implementation of the Oslo Accords and progress in the
PA’s fight against Palestinian terrorism. An act of Jewish terrorism sparked the round of 
escalation that would bring Rabin to change approaches. On 25 February 1994, Baruch 
Goldstein, an Israeli settler originally from the United States, walked into the Tomb of 
the Patriarchs in Hebron, which was filled with 800 Muslim worshippers, at just before 
6 AM. Dressed as an Israeli soldier and using an automatic assault rifle used by the 
81 Martin Van Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey: The Rise of Modern Israel (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books, St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 248.
82 Usher, Dispatches from Palestine.
83 Byman, A High Price, 84.
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Israeli military, he massacred 48 Palestinians and wounded a further 150 before either 
shooting himself or being beaten to death by other Palestinians at the tomb. News of the 
attack led to demonstrations throughout the Palestinian territories, ‘which ultimately led 
to an increase in the number of Palestinian fatalities’.84 Until that time, Hamas had not 
used suicide attacks.85 After Goldstein’s attack, Hamas claimed it resorted to suicide 
bombings in self-defence against an Israeli population intent on harming Palestinians. 
Goldstein attacked ‘the Ibrahim Mosque and then we began to feel we should use 
suicide bombers.... It’s very clear that the idea of a suicide bomber is... a natural 
response to violence’.86 Moreover, Hamas’s attacks in 1993 had killed no more than a 
few people per attack, and that number generally included one or more of the attackers 
themselves. In 1994, they became more successful, with casualties from all types of 
attacks increasing from around 50 to well over 200.87
Hamas took explicit revenge for Goldtsein’s attack. It first waited 40 days after 
the Hebron massacre (the standard Muslim period of mourning) and then launched its 
first successful suicide attack using a car bomb at a bus stop in Afula, Israel, killing 
seven Israelis and the bomber himself while wounding around 50 other people. It 
committed a second revenge attack a week later, killing a further five Israelis.88 In 
October, Hamas abducted Israeli soldier Nachson Wachsman, demanding the release of 
Sheikh Yassin and members of Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and ‘seven radical Islamic and 
84 Peter Jennings, “Massacre in Arab Mosque by Israeli Gunman,” ABC World News Tonight (New York: 
ABC News, February 25, 1994).
85 Hamas had committed only one attack that was allegedly a suicide bombing, but it is not clear that the 
bomber intended to kill himself because he used a car bomb and the Qassam Brigades, who claimed 
responsibility for the attack, never called it a suicide bombing. See: Jon Immanuel, Michael Rotem, 
and David Rudge, “Only Luck Prevents Disaster in Suicide Car-Bomb Attack in Territories,” The 
Jerusalem Post, April 18, 1993, sec. News.
86 Abbas Al Sayyad, Interview with Abbas al Sayyad, January 30, 2005, Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King’s College London.
87 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
88 Ibid.
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Palestinian organizations’.89
This round of violence led Rabin towards the first linkage of security with 
progress on Oslo: In addition to sealing off the Gaza Strip (though Shin Bet would later 
find that Wachsman was being held in the West Bank), he suspended talks with the 
PLO.90 Although this halt was temporary, the linkage was not: Rabin began to use such 
suspensions to punish the PLO. In April 1995, for example, Rabin stated that 
negotiations with the Palestinians would continue ‘only based on the premise that they 
do their part in observing the agreement we have signed, namely, assuring us that they 
are operating decisively against armed groups under their jurisdiction, against those who
plan and those who carry out terror attacks’, while stressing that this was ‘a test that 
cannot be evaluated in one or two days’.91 Speaking of the closure of the Gaza Strip, he 
asserted that security would now outweigh all other considerations: ‘I recognise that the 
measures we have taken put a heavy burden on the economy of the people in the Gaza 
Strip, collectively and individually. But it is up to the Palestinian Authority to carry out 
its own responsibility... to make sure there will be only one armed law enforcement 
force in the Gaza Strip’.92 This came very close to linking progress on Oslo to progress 
on security, though he also insisted that ‘any attempt to halt the peace process and 
negotiations will only increase, not weaken the terror’.93 As noted above, the ‘Oslo II’ 
agreement signed later that year also added additional language on security cooperation 
and specified the PA’s responsibilities towards fighting terrorism.
89 Ibid.
90 Barton Gellman, “Hamas Kidnaps Israeli, Threatens to Kill Him; Rabin Suspends PLO Talks, Seals 
Gaza Strip,” The Washington Post, October 12, 1994, Final edition, sec. First; Byman, A High Price, 
84.
91 Alon Pinkas, “Rabin: May Take Months for PA to Be Effective against Terror,” The Jerusalem Post, 
April 14, 1995, sec. News.
92 Derek Brown, “Gaza Blockade to Stay, Says Rabin,” The Guardian, April 19, 1995, sec. The Guardian
Foreign Page.
93 David Makovsky, Liat Collins, and Alon Pinkas, “Rabin: IDF Won’t Return to Gaza. ‘Palestinian State
in Gaza Could Be Acceptable.,’” The Jerusalem Post, April 13, 1995, sec. News.
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The PA did indeed step up security operations. Throughout 1994 and 1995, ‘after
each Hamas or Islamic Jihad attack against Israeli targets the government of Yitzhak 
Rabin demanded that the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] move against the Islamic
movement; the PNA would respond, inviting Islamist accusations that the authority was 
collaborating with Israel’. By November 1995, PA-Hamas relations were worse than 
ever: ‘In the year since the establishment of the authority the forces of political Islam 
had been weakened severely.’94
Arafat’s approach was not exclusively hard-line. Although he had disliked 
Hamas from the beginning, describing its members as ‘ants who should cower in their 
holes lest he and his forces crushed them’, he continually tried to co-opt them. Despite 
the PA’s increased arrests of Hamas members, Arafat visited Sheikh Yassin’s family in 
1995 and promised he would do everything he could to secure the Hamas founder’s 
release.95 With support for Hamas among Palestinians declining to just 11% by October 
of 1995, Sheikh Yassin feared inter-Palestinian violence and offered Arafat a truce in 
discussions with the PA. ‘Without an end to violence’, as one PA official noted, ‘any 
agreement would be meaningless’ because Hamas would still be undermining the PA 
and Oslo.96 The PA thus had nearly as much interest in Israel’s security as Israel itself 
due to its linkage with the promise of a Palestinian state. In an attempt to convince 
Hamas to halt violence and join the political process, the PA released Mahmoud Zahar, 
whom it had held in a Gaza prison for four months.97 Arafat also initially offered Hamas 
4-5% of seats in the Palestinian National Council (the PLO’s legislative body) and later 
tried to convince the group’s internal leadership (and through them the more hard-line 
94 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine, 176.
95 Jon Immanuel and Itim, “Arafat Visits Sheikh Yassin’s Family,” The Jerusalem Post, March 3, 1995, 
sec. News, Nexis UK.
96 Jon Immanuel, “Yassin Fears Intra-Arab Violence,” The Jerusalem Post, October 19, 1995, sec. News,
Nexis UK.
97 Ibid.
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external leadership) to participate in the January 1996 Palestinian Legislative Council 
elections. To do so, Arafat ‘persuaded the Israelis to allow an inside Hamas delegation 
to leave Palestine to travel to Khartoum... to meet with a group of outside Hamas 
leaders, and then to hold talks with the Palestinian Authority in Cairo’. In the end, 
Hamas decided not to participate because the elections ‘were a product of the Oslo 
Agreement which in turn is a Zionist project’.98 Hamas stuck to its principles and could 
not be co-opted, which would soon lead Arafat to adopt a harsher approach.
Shimon Peres, who became Prime Minister after Rabin’s assassination, 
continued to move progress on the Oslo Accords towards greater conditionality on 
security. On 25 February 1996, responding to devastating Hamas attacks, he ordered the
closure of the West Bank and Gaza and a temporary freeze on contacts between Israel 
and the PA. Raising the stakes for the PA, he also announced that he was ‘reconsidering’
redeployment from Hebron. Meanwhile, doubts were emerging about Arafat’s ability to 
co-opt Hamas. On 26 February 1996, US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk 
commented: ‘We want more stick and less carrot from Arafat. The process of co-opting 
[Hamas] has failed.’99 Until that point, Arafat’s ‘carrot and stick’ policy had shown some
success: ‘From April 1995 on... Arafat has applied force against Hamas. In Gaza, PA 
police have arrested literally hundreds of Palestinians after every suicide operation in 
Israel. But Arafat has also dangled the carrot,’ generally leaving Hamas’s civic and 
religious institutions alone. Despite such ‘softness,’ Arafat had long used the stick as 
well, to significant effect: ‘soon all of the top leaders of Hamas, along with thousands of
its members, were locked away in Palestinian prisons. Many were tortured for 
information. Some died.’100 During that time, popular support for Hamas fell and it 
98 Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 189–193.
99 Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, 83–84.
100Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 62.
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agreed to a cease-fire during the last quarter of 1995, ‘during which time only one 
Israeli was killed’.101 Arafat was not alone in combining punishment with incentives. 
Peres considered releasing Sheikh Yassin from prison once the PLO had changed its 
charter and even some within Israel’s security establishment recommended this be done.
The thinking was that acceding to Arafat’s requests to release Yassin would reward the 
former for his counterterrorism efforts. ‘In addition, there [were] constant concerns 
about Yassin’s health, and there [was] fear that if his health deteriorate[d], there would 
be an outbreak of terrorism.’102
In addition to the difficulty of adding conditionality to progress on peace talks 
due to fears this would give Hamas a clear path to derailing them, Hamas was difficult 
to ‘deter’ indirectly via the PA alone because the political leadership of the former acted 
freely in Jordan. Arafat claimed he was doing all he could to control Hamas but that he 
was ‘being undermined by the continued hospitality given by Jordan to Hamas’s senior 
leadership.’103 ‘[B]y the summer of 1994, [Israel, the United States, and] the Palestinian 
Authority missed no opportunity to interpret any activity on the part of Hamas in 
Jordan... as an act of hostility against Israel that would undermine international efforts to
make peace’.104 Jordan had signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 1994 and it 
began to respond to these pressures. In May 1995, after Hamas leaders in Jordan refused
a request from Arafat to halt violence, Jordan’s Interior Minister Salamah Hamad 
informed the non-Jordanian members of Hamas’s leadership that they had to leave 
Jordan within the month.105 During the months that followed, Jordanian authorities 
continued to ‘harass’ the remaining members of Hamas in Jordan, though they were not 
101Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, 84.
102David Makovsky, “Darawshe: Peres Promised to Release Yassin After Change in PLO Charter,” The 
Jerusalem Post, May 8, 1996, sec. News, Nexis UK.
103Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 82.
104Ibid., 80.
105Ibid., 82.
Page 123 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
yet asked to leave and Hamas was not banned from operating.106 As attempts to co-opt 
Hamas continually failed, and violence continued to rise in 1996, both Israel and the PA 
began to focus more heavily on the threat and use of force against Hamas. Greater focus
would also be placed on Hamas’s activities in Jordan.
4.3 1996 and thereafter: More stick and less carrot
Three events occurred in the first months of 1996 that convinced Arafat to target 
Hamas more aggressively. Arafat’s attempts to co-opt Hamas by convincing it to 
participate in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections of 20 January 1996 failed, 
showing that it was not willing to participate on Arafat’s terms and publicly 
underscoring its opposition not only to Israel, but to Arafat and PLO as well. Hamas 
also increased its suicide attacks after Israel’s targeted killing of Yahya Ayyash (‘the 
Engineer’), Hamas’s main bomb maker, on 5 January 1996. Finally, the anti-terrorism 
consensus that emerged from the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit brought the US, Israel, 
Russia, and Arab leaders behind the PA, encouraging it to shift away from attempts to 
co-opt Hamas and towards applying more pressure.107 Observers from Hamas ‘could not
help but conclude that the summit was nothing but a declaration of war on Hamas’.
The attitude towards Hamas in Jordan also began to shift as a result. Like the 
infiltrations of the first decade of Israel’s existence covered in the last chapter, Hamas 
could only be countered with effective Jordanian action. 100 Hamas men there were 
arrested and interrogated in 1996 and 1997 and Hamas was prohibited from speaking to 
106Ibid., 86.
107William Clinton and Hosnie Mubarak, “Summit of Peacemakers-Sharm El-Sheikh--Final Statement,” 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1996, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Summit of Peacemakers - Sharm el-Sheikh- 
March 13-.aspx; “Peacemakers Unite to Defeat Terrorism,” CNN, March 13, 1996, 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9603/summit_sharm/13/index.html.
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the media. In May 1996, Hamas’s Gaza spokesman, Mahmoud Al-Zahar, stated that 
‘martyrdom operations’ (suicide bombings) had been a mistake. Hamas’s official 
spokesman, Ibrahim Gosheh, broke Jordan’s media ban to announce that Al-Zahar’s 
statement had been made under duress. Jordanian intelligence issued him with a stern 
warning as a result. When he spoke to the media again in September of 1997, he was 
arrested.108
Tamimi also alleges that Jordanian intelligence acted against Hamas by driving a
wedge between it and the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood by taking 
advantage of internal divisions within the latter group.109 Even if this was not the case, 
tensions were increasing between Hamas and its Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood hosts. 
Former members of Hamas in Jordan began claiming that it had plans to ‘infiltrate’ the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and that it was Hamas, not Jordanian intelligence, as the 
Brotherhood had assumed, that had circulated documents attacking the Brotherhood’s 
leadership.110 This ‘accelerated the deterioration of the relationship between Hamas and 
the’ Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.111 Tamimi concludes that ‘1996 had been Hamas’s 
toughest year by far since its creation. In both Jordan and Palestine, the movement had 
taken severe punishment’.112 As a result of this pressure, and despite an initial spike in 
violence, it began negotiating with the PA on a ceasefire, which resulted in a halt to 
Hamas’s attacks that lasted from March 1996 until March 1997, when Netanyahu 
announced renewed settlement construction in East Jeruslam.113
In Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, meanwhile, cooperation between Israel and 
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the PA ‘surged in part because Arafat recognized that Shimon Peres... was weak 
electorally and that Hamas was gaining in strength. ...Palestinian security chiefs knew 
that without security, peace talks would go nowhere’.114 Many in Israel alleged that PA 
prisons resembled ‘revolving doors’, however. The PA would arrest Hamas militants, 
only to release them or facilitate their escapes later.115 Even when they did not release 
the prisoners, the conditions in which some were held would hardly have precluded 
them from coordinating further attacks: ‘In one instance the PA arrested Awad Silmi, a 
wanted terrorist [but] did not arrest the three other Hamas members with him because 
Israel did not specifically demand it. ...Senior IDF officials claim Silmi’s detention was 
comfortable: He kept his pistol, he stayed in a private home, and he left the house 
during the day as he pleased.’116
Others assert that PA actions against Hamas were increasingly severe and had 
definite effects. Shlomo Brom is a retired Brigadier General and former director of the 
IDF’s Strategic Planning Division in the Planning Branch of the General Staff. He 
participated in peace negotiations with the PLO and became Deputy National Security 
Advisor in 2000. He insists that the idea that PA prisons were a ‘revolving door’ is 
‘simply wrong’. The PA ‘insulted’ Hamas by arresting prominent leaders and shaving 
their beards.117 It also began blocking Hamas’s humanitarian institutions that year. This 
was a dramatic step, illustrated by Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin’s denunciation that 
even ‘Israel never dared to close these associations when I headed them or even 
afterwards’.118 The PA had ‘quite a sophisticated policy of dealing with Hamas’, but 
Brom notes that this was not just repression by force, as many Israelis might have liked 
114Byman, A High Price, 105.
115“Gov’t Officials Step Up Criticism of PA ahead of the Talks in Washington,” Mideast Mirror, 
November 3, 1997; Jim Lehrer, “Fragile Peace,” The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS, March 24, 
1997).
116Byman, A High Price, 106.
117Shlomo Brom, Author interview via telephone, February 26, 2014.
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to have seen. He suggests that this was responsible for the impression in Israel that the 
PA was soft on Hamas. He confirms that Arafat also used incentives for Hamas to 
encourage it to ‘behave’.119
An expert with a background in military intelligence who had extensive contact 
with Hamas prisoners confirms that the PA was not ‘soft’ on them, though the expert 
asserts Arafat did not toughen up until the summer of 1997. During that time, prisoners 
told the expert that ‘the pressure on them [from Arafat] was very high’. In accounting 
for the fall in Israeli deaths from 1997, the expert contends that ‘Israeli countermeasures
were the most important, but cooperation with Arafat was also important when it 
worked’.120 Several other sources concur with this idea, though the show that the PA’s 
crackdown on Hamas began much earlier. In addition to Tamimi’s above assertion that 
1996 was extremely difficult for Hamas, Hamas experts Beverly Milton-Edwards and 
Stephen Farrell note that ‘thousands of Palestinian security forces were deployed in the 
move against Hamas’ in response to the wave of Hamas violence unleashed after Israel’s
killing of Ayyash. ‘Over 2,000 leaders, members, activists, and supporters were arrested 
and thrown into Palestinian jails and so-called detention centres. Hundreds of [Hamas-
controlled] mosques... were placed under the direct authority of the PA. Many 
institutions in Hamas’s network of social, welfare, political, educational, research, and 
medical institutions were raided and closed down.’121
For Hamas, the worst part of this crackdown was not that so many of their 
members and supporters were thrown in jail, it was what happened while they were in 
118“Sheikh Yassin Denounces Closing of HAMAS Institutions,” Agence France Presse -- English, 
October 2, 1997, sec. International News, Nexis UK; see also: Oshrat Kottler, Aharon Barnea, and 
Sulayman Al-Shafi, “Shaykh Yasin Says PNA ‘Harassing’ Hamas,” Meet the Press (Jerusalem: 
Channel 2 TV, January 24, 1998), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
119Brom, interview.
120Expert with a background in military intelligence, Author interview via Skype, March 25, 2014.
121Milton-Edwards, Hamas, 219.
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detention. Abdel Aziz Rantissi later recounted: ‘You know they shaved the beards off 
our imams and sodomized them with bottles... We will never forget the men of Fatah 
who did this to us.’122 Khaled Meshaal laments, ‘the harshness of the Palestinian 
Authority’s security services during the nineties... starting with Hamas and the torture 
and degradation of its leaders—opened up psychological wounds that are still 
unhealed’.123 Amnesty International’s reports on PA prisons confirm this. In a December 
1996 report covering 1995 and most of 1996, Amnesty declared that ‘more than 2,000 
political detainees [had been] arrested and detained over the past two years by the 
Palestinian Authority... Most of the political arrests carried out have been made without 
any arrest warrant and those detained have not been brought before a judge or a public 
prosecutor. Arrests frequently involve large numbers of armed security personnel and 
unwarranted violence. Frequently, members of the family are taken as hostages, to put 
pressure on a family member to give himself up to the police.’124 It also reports that, 
while torture in prisons during the first year of the PA’s operation was generally reserved
for those ‘accused of cooperating with the Israeli security services or detainees accused 
of... [involvement] in drug-dealing or prostitution’, this had changed by mid-1995, when
‘reports of beatings and ill-treatment of political and common law detainees in Gaza 
were growing more frequent.’ It goes on to note that ‘[t]orture appears now to be most 
widespread in Gaza’, Hamas’s stronghold.125 Azzam Tamimi describes how the PA 
detained ‘more than 1000 Hamas members and supporters’ as part of a campaign to 
respond to Hamas’s increased violence after the killing of Ayyash. He notes that this 
122Ibid.
123Khaled Meshaal, The Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement HAMAS (London: 
MEMO Publishers, 2013), 70.
124“Palestinian Authority: Prolonged Political Detention, Torture and Unfair Trials: A Synopsis” 
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campaign was strengthened by the March 1996 Sharm el-Sheikh summit.
A 1999 report by Amnesty International, which summarized the PA’s detention 
of ‘political prisoners’ (those ‘held for suspected membership of Islamist or leftist 
groups opposed to the peace process with Israel’), declared that, at that time, there were 
‘about 120 “political prisoners” who have been held by the Palestinian Authority 
without charge or trial for more than one year, in addition to about 100 held for less than
a year’.126 It suggests pressure from Israel, the United States, and others supporting the 
peace process was largely the reason. This took the form of ‘pressure from outside the 
Palestinian Authority to put down “terrorists”’. It also suggests that the ‘revolving door’ 
phenomenon was an outdated and exaggerated notion. It asserts that the creation of the 
State Security Court in February 1995 meant that, ‘from April 1995, a number of those 
thought to have organized suicide bombs, recruited bombers, or members of the ‘Izz al-
Din al-Qassam brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, were tried in grossly unfair trials—
secret and summary, often in the middle of the night, with military judges, prosecutors 
and defence—and given heavy prison sentences of up to 25 years’. Public outcry over 
this nevertheless meant that, from June 1995, such trials were more often used ‘against 
those whose extradition may be sought by Israel if they are not swiftly sentenced’.127 
This suggests that those Israel most wanted to see detained for long periods, those for 
which it would seek extradition for trial in Israel, were tried and sentenced to long 
incarcerations by the PA. Finally, a PA official hinted in 1997 that those held without 
trial and later released were not involved in attacks on Israelis: ‘Those concerned with 
justice knew “that 80% of those we arrested had committed no offence either under 
126“Palestinian Authority--Defying the Rule of Law: Political Detainees Held Without Charge or Trial,” 
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Palestinian or under Israeli law”; they were just being arrested because of pressure from 
Israel, either because they were suspected of being Islamist activists or to “make up the 
numbers” and show that the Palestinian Authority was making a serious effort to act 
against “terrorism”.’ When the PA released just 40 prisoners who had never been 
charged with any offence in 1999, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decried this as 
‘a resumption of the revolving door.’128 All of this shows that the PA’s activities against 
Hamas were increasingly severe from 1995-1996 due to pressure from Israel, the US, 
and even Arab countries to act decisively against terrorism. The PA saw stopping Hamas
violence as commensurate with its interests because Hamas was an obstacle to the peace
process upon which the PA had staked its legitimacy.
4.4 Acceptance, deterrence, and disruption of Hamas in its early years:
It is striking that 1996, along with allegedly being Hamas’s most difficult year 
since its inception, also marked a peak in its violence and effectiveness (see figures 4.1 
above and 4.3 below).129
128Ibid., 6.
129Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 102.
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Figure 4.3: Effectiveness of Hamas attacks prior to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which began 
on 28 September 2000.130
This begs the question: Was Hamas opportunistically violent in 1996 (i.e. controls on it 
became so lax it could easily circumvent them) or was it violent out of desperation? 
How can the steady decline in violence from 1997 to the first part of 2000 be explained?
There are three possibilities, which will be covered in turn. The first is that Israel began 
to disrupt Hamas effectively by jailing its members, halting funding flows, and 
confiscating weapons, for example. The second possibility is that Hamas, seeing its 
raison d’etre endangered by the peace process and its organization itself endangered by 
the rising support and power of the PA, used suicide attacks to derail the peace process 
and undermine the PA’s legitimacy and therefore support. After seeing that this was 
succeeding, it reduced its attacks. This would mean ‘push’ factors (attacks out of 
desperation) were the primary driver. The third possibility is that, by making progress 
on the peace process increasingly contingent upon improved security, and as Arafat saw 
130Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks” Note: Suicide attack data include the bomber among 
the dead.
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that Hamas violence was threatening to derail the peace process that would make him 
head of a new Palestinian state, the PA was forced to control Hamas, which it did 
effectively (‘indirect deterrence’).
The first possibility is almost certainly incorrect. There is no evidence that Israel 
began to gain significant control over Hamas. Gil Murciano confirms this: ‘There was 
no fundamental change in [anti-terror] infrastructure in the 1990s.’131 There is also 
overwhelming evidence that Israel did not severely reduce Hamas’s capabilities. The 
most striking proof is provided by a look at the Second Intifada, during which Hamas 
was able to re-launch its suicide bombing campaign at an even more deadly level than 
before (see chapter 4). As Israel obviously did not simply allow Hamas to restart attacks
at that time, it is clear this was to do with the PA’s release of Hamas prisoners in late 
2000. Israel clearly had not single-handedly defeated Hamas in the late 1990s.
The second possibility is that the initial peak in Hamas violence was due to 
desperation and that the subsequent fall in violence was due to Hamas seeing the threat 
recede. Viewed in this way, increasing security cooperation between Israel and the PA 
and other attempts to ‘deter’ Hamas ‘indirectly’ made things difficult for Hamas and 
caused it to increase its violence. The introduction of conditionality into the peace 
process was supposed to improve security by forcing the PA into greater action. 
Paradoxically, however, it accomplished that improvement by giving Hamas an easy 
way to foil the peace process, while the introduction of conditionality itself provided 
evidence that Hamas was succeeding in damaging the peace process and sowing 
division between Israel and the PA. One jailed Hamas member, Abu Warda, claims this 
was part of Hamas’s calculus: ‘Speaking of the military wing of the Islamic resistance 
movement Hamas, Mr. Abu Warda said its leaders had stepped up their military actions 
131Murciano, interview.
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[in early 1996] in part because the Israeli elections, originally scheduled for next fall, 
had been moved forward to May. “They thought that the military operations would work
to the benefit of the Likud and against the left,” he said. “They wanted to destroy the 
political process, and they thought that if the right succeeded, the political process 
would stop.”’132
Benjamin Netanyahu came to office emphasizing security, not denouncing the 
peace process per se. He signed the Hebron Accord and later the Wye River 
Memorandum, which, unbeknownst to him at the time, was the product of ongoing 
peace negotiations between members of Israel’s opposition and negotiators close to 
Arafat.133 The peace process, therefore, was not yet hopeless and Hamas could not yet 
assume it could halt its attacks because its goals had been achieved. When Netanyahu 
agreed to the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron in January 1997, former
Prime Minister Shimon Peres, along with other commentators who supported the peace 
process, were optimistic. Columnist Tom Friedman commented that there was now ‘a 
solid tent of Oslo’ because the Hebron Protocol had brought in ‘half of the other half’ 
(i.e. half of the half of the population that did not vote for Labour and was thus sceptical
of Oslo) on board.134 Shimon Peres echoed this view: ‘I think Netanyahu and his party 
realized that the Oslo agreement is the only game in town. ...The camp that has insisted 
on the superiority of the territorial request... gave up its ideological position.’ Asked 
what the alternative to Oslo was, Peres replied: ‘Renewing the confrontation with all its 
consequences, which may have led again to terror, boycott, to a hostile world, to a 
132Serge Schmemann, “Target Was Israeli Government, Says Arab Linked to 3 Bombings,” The New 




133Ahron Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America (London; New York: Penguin 
Books, 2005), xxvi–xxvii.
134Charlie Rose, “A Conversation about the Hebron Accord,” Charlie Rose (PBS, January 15, 1997).
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reserved United States, everything. The United States does not forget it was a witness to
the agreement and being a witness includes a commitment to see it realized.’135 Senior 
Israeli analyst Gil Murciano agrees with this assessment, saying that Netanyahu was 
‘locked into’ the peace process.136 The language used here is telling, however, as it 
reveals Netanyahu was forced to go along with Oslo rather than being committed to it 
out of personal conviction. When Peres was asked if Netanyahu was now where he and 
Rabin were with the Oslo Accord, he responded ‘I wish that this would be the overall 
conclusion. I’m not so sure,’ suggesting that it was still unclear, even then and even to 
the person perhaps most committed to the peace process, whether Netanyahu would 
continue with redeployments or back out. Former Shin Bet Head Yaakov Peri believes 
the peace process was already all but doomed during Netanyahu’s reign: ‘Just as there 
was a strong desire, a firm decision, and a real intent by Peres and Rabin to reach an 
agreement, after Rabin was gone, the desire, or Israel’s intent to reach a real agreement 
dwindled, to put it mildly.’137 Ami Ayalon insists ‘there was no good faith. There was no 
good faith from the Palestinian side and not from the Israeli side. We wanted security 
and got more terrorism. They wanted a state and got more settlements’.138
The text of the later Wye Memorandum left Netanyahu room for manoeuvre 
with regard to redeployments. The time line that was part of the agreement set out the 
order in which both sides were to accomplish agreed tasks. The clustering of these tasks 
into stages (one through four) also allowed the interpretation that work on the next stage
could be halted if progress on the current stage was insufficient.139 In the end, Israel only
implemented the first stage of the agreement (a transfer of 2% of Israel-controlled Area 
135Charlie Rose, “A Conversation about the Peace Process,” Charlie Rose (PBS, January 15, 1997).
136Murciano, interview.
137Yaakov Peri, interviewed in Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
138Ami Ayalon, interviewed in ibid.
139The Wye River Memorandum, 1998, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/wye_eng.htm.
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C to jointly controlled Area B and a transfer of 7.1% of land from Area B to PA-
controlled Area A). Less than two months after the signing of the agreement, Israel set 
out conditions for the implementation of stages two and three. These included Arafat 
refraining from a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, improvements in security, 
and collection of illegal arms.140
Trust in the peace process was also already fading. ‘In personal interviews many 
Palestinians date their lack of faith in the peace process to the assassination [of Rabin] 
and the Netanyahu victory.’141 Netanyahu viewed redeployments and further agreements
with the PLO as ‘concessions’. When riots broke out after Netanyahu approved 
excavation in the Hasmonean Tunnel under the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, ‘some 
observers believe Netanyahu, facing heavy U.S. pressure, felt compelled to make 
concessions.’142 Tom Friedman was one of those observers. He believed the Hebron 
Accord came about as a result of the Hasmonean Tunnel uprisings.143 Director of 
Military Intelligence General Amos Malka remarked that the ‘tunnel incidents [were] an
initiated move of violence that was aimed, from Arafat’s perspective, at instilling a 
sense of urgency.’144
Arafat’s tactic undermined Israelis’ trust in him, however, which helped to 
undermine the peace process itself. After the tunnel riots, Israelis ‘determined that they 
would never again allow Palestinians to be rewarded politically for fomenting 
violence’.145 In a bid to please his ring-wing base, Netanyahu approved the building of 
140Israeli Government Press Office, “Israel Sets Conditions for Wye Implementation,” 
Jewishvirtuallibrary.org, December 12, 1998, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/wyecon.html.
141Byman, A High Price, 87.
142Ibid., 88.
143Rose, “A Conversation about the Hebron Accord.”
144Akiva Eldar, “Popular Misconceptions,” Ha’aretz, June 11, 2004, FOFOGNET Archives -- June 2004,
week 2 (#6), http://list2.mcgill.ca/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0406b&L=fofognet&P=744.
145Byman, A High Price, 90.
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the Har Homa settlement in Arab East Jerusalem. This in turn led to disillusion among 
Palestinians. As a result of the Har Homa settlement construction, ‘the PLO suspended 
all negotiations with the Netanyahu government, including all cooperation between 
Israeli military and Palestinian Authority security forces. ...Opinion polls registered a 
decline in Palestinian support for the Oslo process, the PA and the leadership of Yassir 
Arafat, and a rise in support for Hamas, including its advocacy of armed attacks on 
Israeli targets. Professional and student elections saw Islamist-led lists achieve victories 
in Gaza, Nablus, Hebron and East Jerusalem.’146 Hamas also perpetrated its first suicide 
bombing in nearly a year, stating that it was in retaliation for the planned settlement 
construction.147 Hamas was gaining at the PLO’s expense and the peace process, which 
Hamas so vehemently opposed, looked more vulnerable than ever.
Netanyahu’s attempt to come down hard on Hamas also backfired that same 
year. On 25 September, 1997, two Mossad agents attempted to poison the head of 
Hamas’s external political leadership, Khaled Meshal. The agents were apprehended, 
however, and Jordan’s King Hussein was furious that Israel had carried out such an 
operation on Jordanian soil. Eventually, US President Clinton intervened and pressured 
Israel to give Meshal the antidote. Netanyahu also, on King Hussein’s demand, released 
Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Yassin, from prison. The episode ‘placed Hamas once more in 
the spotlight, as well as dampening down for a while the tension... between Hamas and 
the Jordanian regime.’ It also improved relations between Hamas and the PA. Beyond 
that, Sheikh Yassin was able to begin a tour of the Middle East, where he was welcomed
in Gaza, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Kuwait, Syria, and Sudan (although Arafat 
apparently prevented him from being received in South Africa, Iraq, Jordan, and 
146Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, 136.
147“URGENT Caller Says HAMAS Carried Out Tel Aviv Bombing: Israeli TV,” Agence France Presse, 
March 21, 1997, sec. International News, Nexis UK; Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
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Lebanon).148 Yassin denied that he asked for money during these visits, but it did not 
matter: Money flooded in from the Saud family, ‘the Sheiks of Qatar and Kuwait, the 
rulers of the United Arab Emirates and the leaders of Iran’.149 Instead of weakening 
Hamas by decapitating its leadership, Netanyahu had succeeded in granting it great 
publicity and strengthening the groups’ finances and support, all while undermining 
Jordanian trust in him and belief among Palestinians and Israelis in the prospects for the 
peace process.
The argument of the second scenario thus runs that Hamas, now strengthened, 
saw less need to launch bombing attacks in the next year, and the number of deaths duly
declined in 1998 (see figures 4.1 and 4.3). Sagit Yehoshua, a criminologist who 
conducted extensive interviews with Hamas members in Israeli prisons in 2004-5, notes 
that Hamas is sensitive to public opinion. She thinks low support for attacks coupled 
with a receding threat from the Oslo process after Likud came to power was the most 
likely reason for reducing attacks towards the end of the 1990s.150 She contends that 
Hamas’s attacks up until 1997, even though the public did not support them, were meant
to show that Hamas was there and to offer an alternative to Fatah. Having achieved this, 
they heeded public opinion and reduced attacks until the public was on their side again 
during the Second Intifada.151 The political situation was generally evolving in its 
direction, so it could afford to wait.
The second possibility is thus attractive, but there are a few problems. One 
problem is that public support for Hamas was falling along with support for violence 
against Israel. Whereas an average of 23% of the Palestinian public supported it in 1994,
148Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 111–115.
149Ibid., 116.
150Sagit Yehoshua, Author interview in person, February 19, 2014.
151Ibid.
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this support had fallen to just 15% by early 1998.152 What is more, the peace process 
appeared to be restarting in 1999 and 2000, years that coincided with falling Hamas 
violence. A final problem is the reason for the fall in violence: A look at figures 4.1 and 
4.3 reveals that deaths and casualties in Hamas attacks fell between 1997 and 1999, but 
that the number of Hamas attacks did not. Hamas committed only two (catastrophic) 
attacks in 1997, increasing that number to four in each of the two following years. A 
variation of two attacks per year may be little more than statistical noise, but it does 
suggest the fall in violence was not due to a Hamas decision to halt attacks. Instead, its 
attacks were simply becoming less effective, a conclusion that supports the idea that the 
PA’s arrests and repression of Hamas were making it difficult for the organization to 
operate effectively. Further evidence of this is provided by events surrounding targeted 
killing. When Israel killed Ayyash in 1996, Hamas increased its attacks dramatically 
(before halting them for a year thereafter). When Israel killed two Hamas military 
commanders in 1998, Hamas accused the PA of colluding with Israel in their killing, but
it did not succeed in causing anything like the devastation it had caused two years 
earlier: 1998 saw many fewer Hamas terror casualties than 1996 or 1997. 
The third possibility is thus the most plausible, as it is clear that the PA did 
indeed arrest Hamas members during the mid- to late 1990s and that this, combined 
with pressure placed on Jordan to stop showing Hamas’s leadership there such 
‘hospitality’, were enough to make things very difficult for Hamas by 1996.153 How can 
the fact that these difficulties initially coincided with an increase in Hamas violence, 
rather than the opposite, be explained?
As mentioned above, Jordan dealt more harshly with Hamas in Amman, but it 
152Khalil Shikaki, “Peace Now or Hamas Later,” Foreign Affairs, The Politics of Paralysis, 77, no. 4 
(August 1998): 33.
153Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 82; Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine, 176.
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did not deport its leadership or ban the organization altogether until 1999—after 
Hamas’s level of violence was already in decline.154 Brom explains that the PA had been 
taking a tougher line since 1996, before Netanyahu’s arrival in power. It took time for 
this to cause a fall in violence, however, because counterinsurgency generates an 
‘accumulated effect’ rather than immediate results. Once the PA changed policies in 
1996 and Israel’s security continued operations, there were accumulated achievements 
that took time to become visible. ‘As you arrest, there are, of course, people also 
joining, but if the rate of draining water from the pool is faster than the rate at which it 
is going in, you have an accumulated effect.’ In essence, changes in Hamas violence had
little to do with changes in Israel’s government or its policies throughout the 1990s 
except for the incentive to be violent provided by the peace process and the related 
incentive this gave the PA to take action against Hamas.155 Eventually, the latter 
incentive had the more powerful effect.
Shlomi Eldar, an Israeli journalist who has covered Gaza for the past two 
decades, agrees with this assessment. He notes that all of Hamas’s internal political and 
military leaders were in PA prisons at some point. He himself visited one in 1997 that 
housed numerous Hamas prisoners. He says they were afraid of the PA and of Dahlan’s 
‘gang’ (the PA official responsible for security in the Gaza Strip) in particular. When 
asked why Hamas violence decreased between 1996 and 2000, he argues it was these 
efforts with the PA plus the effects of public opinion, which opposed suicide attacks on 
Israel as long as there was a prospect of peace. After Israel killed Ayyash, Hamas went 
154Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 134; Although Meshaal was uncomfortable enough in Jordan to announce the 
moving of Hamas’s office to Syria already in June 1998: “Jordan has become a theater for the Israeli 
Mossad activities, and after (National Infrastructure Ministry) Arik Sharon”s declarations that Khaled 
Mashaal is still a goal for assassination, Hamas believes that Syria is safer than Jordan.’; This suggests
Israel’s attemmpted assassination of Meshaal may have been more successful, in one way, than 
thought. See: Margot Dudkevitch and Mohammed Najib, “Mashaal to Move Office to Syria,” The 
Jerusalem Post, June 10, 1998, sec. News, Nexis UK.
155Brom, interview.
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‘crazy’. Eldar interviewed a Hamas member who said they had no choice but to retaliate
because they feared they might all end up in PA prisons. By 1999, they had concluded 
that they could not fight the PA or Oslo. When Eldar was in Gaza in 1999, he remarks 
‘Hamas was nowhere to be seen. They had gone underground.’ Many were in PA 
prisons, others had fled to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. During this time, Hamas returned 
focus to its social institutions, as the economic situation in Gaza was dire from the 
border closures.156 As Mosab Hassan Yousef, no fan of the PLO, admits, 
Hamas—once the ascendant power among Palestinians—was in shambles. The 
shattered organization’s bitter rival for hearts and minds was now in complete 
control.
Through intrigue and deal making, the Palestinian Authority had 
accomplished what Israel had been unable to do through sheer might. It had 
destroyed the military wing of Hamas and thrown its leadership and fighters into 
prison. Even after they were released, the Hamas members went home and did 
nothing more against the PA or the occupation. The young feda’iyeen were 
exhausted. Their leaders were divided and deeply suspicious of one another.157
As a final piece of evidence for how forcefully the PA moved against Hamas, 
Eldar notes Hamas’s continued hatred of Dahlan and Hamas forces’ symbolic attack on 
Dahlan’s ‘preventive security’ offices during their 2007 takeover of Gaza. ‘They felt the 
hand of Dahlan and that’s why they hate him so much.’ He also remarks on the fact that 
Hamas was unsuccessful in its return to violence during the Second Intifada until 
important Hamas prisoners were released from PA prisons in the first months of the 
uprising.158
The historian Ahron Bregman agrees, asserting that Hamas had begun to see the 
peace process as inevitable by the late 1990s. He notes that by then, Hamas did not (or 
was unable to) increase violence in response to renewed peace negotiations: Ehud 
156Shlomi Eldar, Author interview via Skype, February 26, 2014.
157Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 125.
158Eldar, interview; Hamas attempted two attacks in late 2000, but they failed to kill anyone but the 
bomber: Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
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Barak’s election as Israel’s Prime Minister sparked renewed optimism about the peace 
process, yet Hamas violence did not increase in 1999. ‘When there is a peace process, 
there’s an effort by Arafat or Abu Mazen to keep Hamas down, but if it looks like it’s 
getting close, Hamas may increase attacks.’159 This all indicates that Hamas was indeed 
heavily weakened by 1999 and mostly by the PA—a success for ‘indirect deterrence’.
This suggests that Hamas’s increased violence in the first half of the 1990s is 
explained by the rise of the peace process and the PLO (a ‘push factor’ encouraging 
Hamas to attack) and the opportunity provided by Israel’s inability and the PA’s 
unwillingness to act against Hamas (a ‘pull factor’ encouraging Hamas to attack). 
Conversely, the fall in violence from 1997 to 2000 is best explained by stark measures 
pursued by the PA (a reduction in opportunity and therefore in the ‘pull factor’). As 
suggested by Bregman, Eldar, and Brom in interviews, Hamas may have decided to 
change tactics in 2000 as a result of this repression. As Eldar notes, Hamas is sensitive 
to public opinion. ‘If the public doesn’t support their activities, they wait or do 
something different.’160
The third scenario was thus the most important (the PA was preventing Hamas 
from violence), but the ‘push’ factors from the second may also have had an impact. 
Hamas was no longer a nearly unknown political opposition group. It now enjoyed 
increased publicity and public approval. It had succeeded in announcing its presence 
and registering its opposition to the PLO and Oslo. Having established itself, the ‘push’ 
factors of feared irrelevance or extinction were now less powerful. At the same time, 
increased PA repression made attacks more difficult and increasingly counter-
productive, encouraging Hamas to change tactics and focus on its humanitarian 
159Ahron Bregman, Author interview in person, February 26, 2014.
160Eldar, interview.
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institutions. ‘Indirect deterrence’ was thus working, but it relied on a precarious 
alignment of interests between Israel and the PA and perhaps even on the relative 
strength of Hamas as an opposition force. Tactical deterrence of Hamas was thus 
working well by 1999 and 2000, but a strategic end to the conflict was still needed. As 
the model in the introduction suggests (figure 1.4), the ‘pull’ factors involved in indirect 
deterrence are controlled by the proxy (here, the PA) and are reliant on that proxy 
viewing the status quo (of the peace process and progress towards a Palestinian state) 
positively. If the PA no longer accepted the status quo, for example because it no longer 
believed Israel would give it a state, its control of Hamas could instantly be withdrawn. 
The failure of Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to agree on a peace deal in 2000 meant, in 
the words of former Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon, ‘it was obvious we were heading 
toward another Intifada, another round of violence by a group, a society, a nation that 
felt it had nothing to lose’.161 The advent of the Second Intifada would then throw the 
interests of Israel and the PA still further out of alignment and make continued ‘indirect 
deterrence’ all but impossible. The next chapter is devoted to the collapse of the indirect 
deterrence relationship and illustrates Israel’s shift to more direct deterrence of Hamas 
as well as towards greater reliance on defence and deterrence-by-denial via the West 
Bank security barrier.
161Former Shin Bet Head Ami Ayalon, interviewed in Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
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5. The Second Intifada to Hamas’s Gaza Takeover:
Towards Direct Deterrence, 2000 to 2007
The period leading up to the Second Intifada was full of dark predictions of 
renewed unrest should the peace process fail. The fact that Palestinians hailed Arafat as 
a hero upon his return from the failed Camp David talks illustrates that they thought 
Palestinians had offered too many concessions already and that they were losing faith in 
Oslo.1 Giora Eiland, then Head of the IDF’s Operations Directorate, said, ‘we knew that 
the year 2000 would be the year in which the Palestinians would try to do something 
violent.’2
Despite these predictions, when Ehud Barak became Prime Minister a little more
than a year before the Second Intifada began, he insisted on negotiating peace with 
Syria first because, among other things ‘a deal with Syria [would] limit Arafat’s ability 
to manoeuvre’.3 Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon warned Barak: ‘[I]f we don’t have 
something with the Palestinians within twelve months from now we shall surely have a 
disaster. We are losing them as a partner.’4 Barak’s ‘Syria first’ approach was dangerous 
because, if Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) no longer had faith in the peace 
process nor thought they had anything to gain from cooperation with Israel, their 
incentive to be seen keeping Hamas in check would be reduced.
The ‘indirect deterrence’ relationship between Israel, the PA and Hamas relied 
1 Ibrahim Barzak, “Palestinians Offer Arafat a Hero’s Welcome,” Associated Press International, July 
26, 2000, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
2 Giora Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland, interview by Brooke Lapping, 2005, Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King’s College London.
3 Other reasons included the fact that the Golan Heights issue was simpler and that peace with Syria 
would isolate the anti-Israel powers Iraq and Iran. See subsequent footnote.
4 Ahron Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America (London; New York: Penguin 
Books, 2005), 26.
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heavily on the alignment of interests between Israel and the PA provided by the Oslo 
Accords. As former Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon recalls, PA leaders told him: ‘We don’t 
put Hamas members in prison for your sake. We only do it because our people believe 
that at the end of the day we’ll have a state beside Israel. When we no longer believe 
that, forget about us.’5 President Arafat and Prime Minster Barak’s failure to reach a 
peace deal at Camp David in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second (or ‘Al Aqsa’) 
Intifada thereafter, strained relations between Israel and the PA to the breaking point, 
driving their interests to diverge. This divergence destroyed the ‘indirect deterrence’ of 
Hamas that had grown out of the Israel-PA cooperation of the Oslo period. Moreover, 
particularly under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel became less 
concerned with how its actions might affect its relationship with the PA, the Arab world,
or the United States, and instead intensified efforts directly to combat, deter, and deny 
Hamas success. The September 11th, 2001 terror attacks on New York’s World Trade 
Centre and US President Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ meant that Sharon enjoyed at least US 
acquiescence in these direct actions.
The two most important of these direct actions were the construction of the West 
Bank security barrier and the targeted killing of Hamas’s leadership. The former made it
much more difficult for Hamas suicide bombers to cross into Israel to carry out attacks, 
eventually playing a large role in Hamas’s shift away from suicide tactics. The latter 
disrupted Hamas’s operations (building bombs was a skill that had to be perfected) and 
alarmed Hamas’s leadership enough to cause it specifically to demand a halt to targeted 
killings during ceasefire negotiations. The breakdown in the three-way ‘indirect 
deterrence’ relationship between Israel, the PA, and Hamas thus initially led to a vast 
increase in violence, but later to a more direct situation of deterrence between Hamas 
5 Ami Ayalon, interviewed in: Dror Moreh, The Gatekeepers, DVD, Documentary, (2013).
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and Israel.
The year 2000 thus saw a situation arise whereby Arafat and the PA thought they
had more to gain through violence, as Arafat had calculated with the 1996 tunnel riots 
(see chapter 3), causing the relative stability of the prevailing indirect deterrence 
relationship to disintegrate. All that was needed was a spark to ignite unrest again and 
dissolve the relationship between Israel, the PA, and Hamas altogether.
5.1 The outbreak of the Second Intifada: The collapse of the indirect 
deterrence relationship
On 25 September 2000, Palestinian President Yasser Arafat flew to Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak’s home in Israel to discuss re-starting the negotiations that had 
collapsed so dramatically at Camp David. Arafat and his delegation had heard that a 
member of Israel’s Knesset (parliament), Ariel Sharon, was planning to visit the Temple 
Mount (known to Arabs as the Haram al-Sharif). Mohammed Dahlan, Arafat’s security 
chief for the Gaza Strip, claims the only reason Arafat had agreed to see Barak was to 
stop Sharon ‘from going to the mosque [on the Temple Mount]’. ‘We were 100% 
convinced that this would explode the situation.’6 Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat 
recalls Arafat begging Barak before he left his home ‘Please, please, please, your 
excellency, don’t allow Sharon to come to Haram’. Barak recalls replying: ‘Mr. 
Chairman, anyone can visit Temple Mount. That includes Israeli MPs. It’s not a closed 
military zone.’ This somewhat contradicts a statement he later made, in which he 
6 Mohammed Dahlan, interview by Brooke Lapping, October 27, 2004, Original Records for BBC 
Documentary “Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs,” Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s
College London.
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admitted: ‘I could stop him, but politically, what would I gain?’7 Ariel Sharon thus 
visited the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000, exclaiming, ‘The Temple Mount is in 
our hands and will remain in our hands’, though he also said ‘I came here with a 
message of peace. I believe that we can live together with the Palestinians’.8 Interviewed
later, he insisted that his intentions were benign, that he had been to the Temple Mount 
many times before, and that the intifada ‘started before’ his visit, anyway.9 Sharon’s 
conciliatory remarks notwithstanding, riots did begin after his visit to the Temple 
Mount, as feared. Many, like Suha Arafat, Yasser Arafat’s wife; Mamdouh Nawfal, 
Arafat’s then Advisor on Internal Affairs and a member of the Palestinian Supreme 
National Security Council; and Shin Bet mole Mosab Hassan Yousef; claim that Arafat 
himself put together the protests that began the Second Intifada, using Sharon’s visit to 
the Temple Mount as a pretext.10 Whatever the case, the protests spread through the 
West Bank first. The next day, Israeli police fired on Palestinian protesters, killing 
seven.11 The escalating situation caused almost immediate damage to cooperation 
between Israel and the PA. Dahlan recounts:
On Friday I spoke with [Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul] Mofaz in the evening, and I 
asked him that no confrontations should take place in Gaza, and if the people 
demonstrate, let them demonstrate, do not let your soldiers use arms. We will let the 
Palestinian police try to control the demonstrations. The demonstrations started by 10
o’clock in the morning, 14 Palestinian civilian martyrs were killed all over the Gaza 
7 Dan Edge, Mark Anderson, and Juliet Stevenson, Elusive Peace Israel and the Arabs, Documentary, 
Israel and the Arabs (Alexandria, VA: PBS Home Video, 2005), pt. I, www.pbs.org.
8 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Rioting as Sharon Visits Islam Holy Site,” The Guardian, September 29, 2000, 
sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/29/israel; Edge, Anderson, and 
Stevenson, Elusive Peace.
9 Ariel Sharon, Interview with Ariel Sharon, interview by Brooke Lapping, Tape, September 18, 2005, 
Original Records for BBC Documentary “Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs,” Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King’s College London.
10 JPost.com Staff, “‘Suha Arafat Admits Husband Premeditated Intifada,’” www.JPost.com, December 
29, 2012, Online edition, sec. Middle East, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Suha-Arafat-admits-
husband-premeditated-Intifada; Mosab Hassan Yousef and Ron Brackin, Son of Hamas (Milton 
Keynes, UK: Authentic Media, 2010), 127–131; Itamar Marcus and Jacques Zilberdik, “Arafat 
Planned and Led the Intifada: Testimonies from PA Leaders and Others,” Palestinian Media Watch, 
November 28, 2011, http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=5875.
11 Edge, Anderson, and Stevenson, Elusive Peace, pt. I.
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Strip. He tried to call me back and I told him it’s over... he wanted me to intervene, to
stop something that I told him in advance that I cannot control... Then he wanted me 
to meet with him in Gaza and I refused.12
Cooperation between Israel and the PA was therefore already strained. The 
opinion on the Palestinian street had shifted against negotiations (see Figure 5.1 below), 
putting Arafat in a near-impossible position. Passions on the street were such that Arafat
could not now simply ask for calm and regain control without taking harsher measures
—measures that would damage his image and credibility in Palestinian eyes, as he 
would appear to be siding with Israel against the Palestinian people. As Dahlan put it, 
when Colin Powell months later visited Arafat in his compound in Ramallah, ‘He was 
clear in his demands, and also clear in his threats, but he realized, or did not realize, that
the response would be negative, because President Arafat cannot—does not have the 
authority of the power to have a ceasefire. But the painful issue is that the US and Israel 
do not believe that he does not have the authority, they thought he is a magician.’ Arafat 
himself did not want to admit he could not stop the Intifada, however: ‘He doesn’t want 
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Figure 5.1: Palestinian response to the question: ‘What’s your opinion of the Oslo 
agreement? Would you say that you strongly support, support, oppose, or strongly 
oppose it?’14
Arafat might have been willing to act more forcefully against the uprising if he 
could have reaped substantial political gains as a result, however. After he won the 
election, but before taking office, Sharon met with Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) and 
Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurie) and told them he was willing to allow the PA to create a state 
on the 42% of the West Bank and Gaza that were already under full or partial 
Palestinian control. The idea behind this was that two states could then engage in 
negotiations on remaining issues, including borders.15 By the end of February 2001, 
before Sharon’s government had even taken office, they had ‘a secret but written 
understanding’. Arafat and Sharon would meet, Israel would withdraw to the positions it
held before the Second Intifada in exchange for Arafat’s condemnation of violence and a
14 Charmaine Seitz, “Tracking Palestinian Public Support over 20 Years of the Oslo Agreements” 
(Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, November 2013), 
http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=864.
15 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 153.
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pledge to fight terrorism. Israel and the PA would resume security cooperation and Israel
would engage in the symbolic release of 40 Palestinian prisoners. Final status 
negotiations would begin in April. ‘A senior Palestinian who was involved in these 
secret talks says, “everything was agreed and ready down to the nitty gritty”’, but Arafat
backed out at the last minute because he did not wish to re-start talks with the Israelis 
before the Arab summit in Amman at the end of March 2001. He thus missed what was 
to be his only chance at a working relationship with Sharon.16 Without that working 
relationship, ‘indirect deterrence’ was doomed.
Hamas member and Shin Bet mole Mosab Hassan Yousef asserts ‘Hamas had 
been all but dead before the Second Intifada.’17 Within days of the start of riots, 
however, the PA released most of the Hamas members held in its prisons, allowing the 
group to regain its strength.18 ‘It didn’t take long at all [to rebuild the Qassam Brigades].
The rebuilt organization wasn’t big, but it was deadly.’19 He claims the reason behind 
this was to ‘send [Hamas] in for another round so the PA could knock it cold again 
before a cheering crowd.’20 If that was the intention, however, then Arafat had 
overestimated his and the PA’s ability to retain control of the situation. About six weeks 
later, Hamas committed its first two bombings of the Second Intifada. The first, on 22 
November, consisted of a bomb left near a bus in Hadera. ‘At least two people were 
killed and another 29 injured.’21 A second bomb in late December killed no one, but 
16 Ibid.
17 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 142.
18 “URGENT--- Palestinians Release Most Detained Hamas Prisoners,” Agence France Presse, October 
12, 2000, sec. International News.
19 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 211.
20 Ibid., 127–128.
21 “Hamas Cannot Confirm or Deny Hadera Bomb, but Says Israel Should Be Hit,” Agence France 
Presse, November 22, 2000, sec. International News; Qassam Brigades claim responsibility: Gil 
Hoffman, “Expert Blames Hamas for Hadera Attack,” The Jerusalem Post, November 24, 2000, sec. 
News.
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injured 14.22 Hamas launched its first suicide attack of the Second Intifada on 1 January 
2001, which succeeded only in killing the bomber himself, who died later in the 
hospital, but did wound 19 others.23 Its next attack in early March killed four (including 
the bomber) and wounded ‘dozens’.24
These incidents marked the beginning of several years of suicide attacks against 
Israel, but three related events in particular stand out because, together, they changed 
Israel’s strategic thinking. The first of these three events was the capture by Israel of the 
Karine A, a ship bound for the PA loaded with weapons and explosives prohibited by the
Oslo Accords. The plan was for the ship to sail close to Gazan waters and dump the 
weapons overboard in barrels to be collected by the commander of Palestine’s naval 
police.25 US Special Envoy General Anthony Zinni, who was preparing to meet with 
Arafat to discuss a ceasefire between the Palestinian factions and Israel, was infuriated 
when he found out about the ship. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
recalls: ‘Zinni called me and he was really pissed off. He asked me if I knew about it 
[the Karine A] and I was hearing about it for the first time, so I joined him in the pissed 
off club. All of us were very sceptical that Yasser Arafat was as Lilly white on the thing 
as he wanted to make out.’26 Colin Powell explained that, though he could not prove that
Arafat knew about it or had authorized it, ‘it’s close enough that the [Palestinian] 
Authority has to take responsibility for it’. US sympathy for Arafat was severely 
damaged.
22 Charles Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks,” Database of Hamas Terror Attacks, January 
2015, www.hamasterrordatabase.com.
23 Ibid.; It is not entirely clear whether this was meant to be a suicide attack, though the Qassam 
Brigades labelled it as such after the fact. See: “Hamas Announces Death of Own Militant in Netanya 
‘Suicide Attack,’” Agence France Presse, January 9, 2001, sec. International News.
24 “Hamas Claims Responsibility for Israel Suicide Bombing,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2001, 
sec. International News.
25 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 169.
26 Edge, Anderson, and Stevenson, Elusive Peace, pt. II.
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Sharon decided to take advantage of the momentum provided to Israel by the 
Karine A affair by killing Arafat’s guerilla commanders one by one. The first target was 
to be Raed Karmi, who had long evaded Israel. As Defence Minister Ben-Eliezer saw it,
however, there was a problem with the plan. ‘There was a time when we could have 
done it. But it now could do more harm than good. There’s a ceasefire. This will end it.’ 
Giora Eiland, now head of the IDF’s planning directorate and also involved in talks 
between the Israeli government and the Palestinians, argued then that cooperating with 
the PA made more sense:
The question was brought... whether or not to carry out an operation against Karmi, 
the question was whether we understood correctly the effects of the 11th September 
event on the world situation, and I think some of us did not understand it 
correctly. ...the leaders of the world... moved from supporting the Palestinians to 
supporting us. ...Arafat often creates ceasefires, and usually [doesn’t mean] it, but 
this time he actually meant it, and gave orders which were really carried out, and 
there was quite a significant reduction, diminishing of terrorism from the middle of 
December to the middle of January. ...[I]n this context, the question of whether or not
to carry out an operation which naturally could lead the Palestinians back into 
violence was more than a tactical question, but quite more a strategic one. ...our 
insistence on any continued dialogue beginning with seven days of complete quiet 
seemed to me like a mistake... because at least some of the Palestinian people, the 
(NAME) [sic], and others, were under real pressure... all as a result of the 11th of 
September and its effect on world public opinion and demands of Palestinians. ...
[W]e thought it was an opportunity to try to [return] to security cooperation with the 
Palestinians to try to achieve some quiet [because] many of them were of the opinion 
that this armed struggle was only leading them into bad places and it was best to stop 
it. And regarding this I wrote a paper, which in the end I presented to the Prime 
Minister, in which I argued what the negative consequences would be of our 
continued policy, which I think was too hard-lined at the time, and did not take 
advantage of the opportunity after the 11th September and world public opinion.27
In the end, Ben-Eliezer and Eiland found themselves in the minority and Israel went 
ahead with Karmi’s targeted killing on 14 January 2002. As feared, killing Karmi led to 
‘the most frenzied killing, on both sides, in the entire Intifada’.28 No organization can 
27 Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland. Note that Arafat’s ceasefire suggests he had greater capabilities 
than Dahlan claimed (see interview cited earlier).
28 Edge, Anderson, and Stevenson, Elusive Peace, pt. II.
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long survive and continue to operate effectively if its upper echelons are being killed. 
No organization can thus tolerate a status quo in which targeted killings are continually 
being carried out. Targeted killing thus cannot be used for deterrence, as deterrence 
seeks to maintain the status quo. This means targeted killing may be an effective 
compellent for ending already high levels of violence, but it may leave an opponent no 
choice but to escalate during a period of low violence (e.g. a ceasefire) by breaking the 
‘conciliatory promise’ implicit in a ceasefire and in deterrence, thus sparking a new 
round of escalation.
The second event that led Israel to change strategies followed in the months after
the first. It was one of the most severe suicide bombings of the Second Intifada: that of 
the Park Hotel in Netanya on 27 March 2002.29 The Hamas bomber set off from 
Tulkarm in the West Bank looking ‘for any gathering of people’, according to the driver,
Fatri Khasib.30 Eventually, they settled on the Park Hotel in Netanya. The bomber blew 
himself up just as Passover dinner was beginning at the hotel, killing more than 20 and 
injuring more than 70 others. The Park Hotel attack led Israel fundamentally to reassess 
its approach to Palestinian violence, particularly with regard to the Palestinian Authority
and Arafat. In a 2005 interview in which he speaks about the bombing, Ariel Sharon 
admits: ‘...it’s not as if I was surprised when I found out that [Arafat] couldn’t do 
anything. I never had any expectations that he was capable or wanted to do anything... 
Of course he could have prevented these actions. Of course, he never attempted to do 
so’.31 One interpretation of this rather ambiguous statement is that Sharon viewed Arafat
to be technically able to stop the violence but prevented from doing so by a lack of will 
29 “Death Toll From Israeli Hotel Bombing Rises to 20,” Agence France Presse, March 28, 2002, sec. 
International News.
30 Edge, Anderson, and Stevenson, Elusive Peace, pt. II.
31 Sharon, Interview with Ariel Sharon.
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stemming, in part, from a political environment that would not allow it. Giora Eiland, 
who had previously supported pursuing cooperation with Arafat, was now against any 
further attempts. In a meeting after the attack, he recalls how he recommended a 
fundamental strategic shift:
The Defence Minister [Binyamin Ben-Eliezer] began by saying that the Hamas had 
crossed all the lines and that we have to make an operation against the Hamas, and 
we tried to explain to him that this was not the reality, mainly, the person who spoke 
out was [Moshe Ya’alon], who was Deputy Chief of Staff.... He said the problem was
not the Hamas, that we didn’t have any Hamas headquarters or Hamas targets which 
we could effectively operate against. The problem was... the Palestinian Authority 
which was allowing this reality to exist, and the only way to stop this crazy tidal 
wave of violence... was to recapture the Palestinian cities, and as a result not... to rely
in any way on the Palestinian Authority with regard to security... because in the end 
to trust them would prove to be one big mistake. This was a very deep strategic 
change. ...[S]trategically speaking we had crossed a certain line in which we were not
fighting only against those who belonged to some particular organization that was 
fighting against us... but that we were entering a direct and frontal fight with the 
Palestinian Authority.... That was the meaning of the Defensive Shield Operation [a 
large-scale reoccupation of Palestinian areas].32
It is important to note here that, by recommending what was in his own words a ‘deep 
strategic change’, he tacitly accepts that Israel had relied quite heavily on the PA for 
security during the Oslo period. Despite this new ‘direct and frontal fight with the 
Palestinian Authority’, however, there was ‘fear that an action against Arafat would, in 
the Arab world, and perhaps throughout the world, be considered crossing a line... and 
that we might jeopardize the military achievements for something political, which was 
unreasonable. So the decision was not to capture him, not to expel him, not to kill him, 
but only to isolate the muqata [(Arafat’s compound)] area, but in fact not to act 
physically against him.’33
The third event came in the wake of a number of particularly bloody attacks in 
32 Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland, emphasis added.
33 Ibid.
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June and July 2002, including a bus bomb in Jerusalem that killed 19 people,34 a car 
bomb that struck a bus and killed 16 and wounded around 50 in northern Israel,35 and an
ambush of a bus of settlers that left seven people dead and 19 wounded.36 The second 
attack was particularly galling, as one of the two groups claiming responsibility for it 
was the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which was linked to Arafat’s Fatah. These led Israel’s
cabinet finally to push to escape any need to rely on the Palestinian Authority. It would 
do so by physically stopping suicide bombers from crossing the border using the 
security barrier. Eiland recalls:
The events of July 2002, after Defensive Shield, showed that at least in the short run, 
just our presence in Palestinian cities was not enough, and that we needed another 
line of military action, so that if someone does come out of a Palestinian city for a 
suicide attack, there would be a way to stop him. So more or less in June 2002 the 
matter of the fence became a consensus. [Though work on the fence had already 
begun before then,] the sense of urgency, and the need to begin fast... and to work 
much faster, and to remove obstacles was mainly at the beginning of June, when it 
was clear that the fence was effective.37
Even after the urgency of the violence of 2002 convinced Israel’s cabinet to move faster 
to construct the barrier, it still went up ‘at a snail’s pace’.38 Its effect on the current 
violence was thus minimal. Over time, however, it would force militants from Hamas 
and other factions to shift to tactics that could work around the barrier, primarily rocket 
and mortar attacks, which soon began to increase in number even as suicide attacks 
became less frequent (see ‘section 3: direct deterrence by denial’ below).
In the meantime, Israel also sought new ways directly to target Hamas. Eiland 
explains, ‘We identified two matters which we... had not tried before. One was action 
34 Charles Gibson, “Suicide Bomber in Jerusalem Kills 19,” News, World News Tonight (New York: 
ABC News, June 18, 2002), Nexis UK.
35 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 225.
36 Michael Blum, “Deadly Bus Ambush Chills Mideast Talks,” Agence France Presse, July 17, 2002, 
sec. International News.
37 Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland.
38 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 325.
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against Hamas’s financial sources.... The second matter was the targeted assassinations, 
and who they would be directed against. It was clear that the possibility of stopping 
Hamas’s activities, and other organizations, was by scaring them. [We had to target] the 
decision makers, and those people at the top... of the pyramid... in order to damage the 
abilities of the organization, and also in order to make them wonder if they should try to 
reduce their activity, even if it’s for their own good.’39 Over the next two years, targeted 
killings and the security barrier would begin to reduce Hamas attacks and decrease their 
deadliness (see figures 5.2 and 5.3 below), reversing the rising trend from the end of 
2000 to first half of 2003 as direct deterrence measures slowly filled the void left by the 
collapse of indirect deterrence.
39 Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland.
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40 Both charts: Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
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5.2 Direct deterrence by punishment: targeted killings











Targeted killings of Hamas military members
By month
Figure 5.4: This chart shows targeted killings of Hamas militants by month.41





Targeted killings and attempts on Hamas political leaders
By month
Figure 5.5: Targeted killings of Hamas political leaders. This chart includes attempts, 
for even they can be expected to have effects due to their relative rarity and audacity. 
The first incident is the attempt on Khaled Meshal in Jordan. The second includes the 
successful killing of Dr. Ibrahim al-Makadme and an attempt on Rantissi in June 2003. 
The third is the killing of Abu Shenab that August, with a fourth showing the attempts on
Sheikh Yassin and Mahmoud Zahar in September. The final two represent the successful 
killings of Yassin and Rantissi in March and April 2004, respectively.42
41 “Israeli Targeted Killings of Terrorists,” Jewishvirtuallibrary.org, July 2014, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hits.html.
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The charts above show a dramatic increase in targeted killings in the second half 
of 2002, including the killing of Hamas political leaders beginning in 2003. The initial 
rise in targeted killings did not bring immediate gains, as violence continued apace 
through 2003. It began to decline after Israel started targeting Hamas’s political leaders 
and founders, however. The effect was visible in 2004. As the former director of the 
IDF’s Strategic Planning Division and Deputy National Security Advisor Brig. Gen. 
(ret.) Shlomo Brom points out, this was likely partly because the operations against 
militants had an ‘accumulated effect’. As militants are arrested or killed, others are 
recruited or promoted to fill their place. ‘But if the rate of draining water from the pool 
is faster than the rate at which it is going in, you have an accumulated effect.’43 Former 
Shin Bet head Avi Dichter believes it has an effect beyond disruption: ‘I’ve often said 
“terror is a barrel with a bottom.” You can reach the bottom. You don’t need to reach the
last terrorist. You can reach a critical mass, and that’s enough of a deterrent.’44 Another 
expert on Israeli policy this author spoke with confirmed that targeted killings were 
intended to create a deterrent effect and asserted that they ‘definitely’ worked and that 
this effect was visible almost immediately.45 Targeted killings also made life difficult for
militants and potentially disrupted operations because others were afraid to associate 
with them: Taxi drivers and even barbers would refuse them service for fear of 
encountering trouble with Israel’s security services or even of being killed alongside the 
42 Ibid.; Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & Co., 2007); Matthew Gutman, 
“Hamas Takes a Blow,” The Jerusalem Post, March 9, 2003, sec. News, Nexis UK; Oliver Knox, 
“Bush ‘Deeply Troubled’ by Israeli Strike,” Agence France Presse, June 10, 2003, sec. Domestic, 
Non-Washington, General News, Nexis UK; Lara Sukhitan, “Abbas Resigns; Israel Bombs Gaza City 
Home in Failed Attack on Hamas Leadership,” Associated Press International, September 6, 2003, 
sec. International News.
43 Shlomo Brom, Author interview via telephone, February 26, 2014.
44 Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
45 Expert on Israeli policy, Author interview in person, January 31, 2013.
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militant if he were attacked.46
Despite its continued violence, Hamas was showing signs of a change in tactics, 
at least, by the spring of 2003. At that point, its leaders feared internal strife with the PA 
more than attacks by Israel, suggesting that the prospect of attacks by PA forces could 
still be used to coerce it. Israel’s targeted killing of Hamas members was already 
causing alarm, however. Hamas could see that its violence was not forcing Israel to 
make concessions and Israel was now hitting Hamas’s financial resources and directly 
targeting its members. At the same time, the prospect of a ceasefire between Israel and 
the PA meant that there could soon be a return to the oppression Hamas felt at the hands 
of the PA during the late 1990s. All this meant that, having rejected elections just a few 
years earlier, Hamas representatives now said the organization desired elections and 
power-sharing, displaying a wish to join the political process for the first time. At a 
face-to-face meeting between Abbas and Hamas leaders in spring 2003 to discuss a 
ceasefire, Ziad Abu Amir, who organized the meeting on behalf of the PA, says Hamas 
wanted a halt to PA arrests of its members, no weapon collection, some power sharing 
until elections, and a promise not to place any obstacles in Hamas’s way for 
participation in elections. ‘Now with regard to conditions on the Israelis, the Hamas 
leaders talked about cessation of assassinations. They talked about withdrawals [from] 
Palestinian areas.’ The Hamas leaders ‘said that the most worrying element in [US 
President Bush’s] road map... was the requirement from the PA to attack, to dismantle 
the infrastructure, to arrest them, which would push the Palestinians to internal violation
[sic]. And they didn’t want this to happen’. ‘I remember one of them said, clearly, and in
a very straightforward fashion, when he was asked why do you want to do the hudna 
46 Avi Issacharoff, “In the West Bank, Wanted Militants Are Made to Feel Unwanted,” Haaretz Daily 
Newspaper, November 13, 2007, sec. Israel News, http://www.haaretz.com/news/in-the-west-bank-
wanted-militants-are-made-to-feel-unwanted-1.233094.
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[ceasefire], he said to avoid internal bloodshed.’47
Mohammed Dahlan believed Israel’s direct approach could never be as effective 
as the PA had been. In 2002, he asserted: ‘the Palestinian Authority should be given the 
opportunity to carry out its duties and its role, with no barriers, and if you can’t help, at 
least don’t put barriers. In other words, in 1996 we succeeded because the whole 
international situation helped us, and gave us a hand. I did my duty in protecting the 
Palestinian people first, and protecting the peace process, why the authority cannot do 
that now, because Israel is destroying the Palestinian Authority simply.’48
According to Abu Amir, the ‘international situation’ remained unhelpful to the 
PA even after Abbas took over as Palestinian Prime Minister in March 2003. Though it 
was largely due to American and Israeli pressure that he became Prime Minister, the 
‘Americans were indifferent.... Sharon worked hard to cut down and undermine 
[Abbas’s] government. He never gave one sign of support to this government, despite all
the things his government tried to do, the [June 2003] truce for instance. Sharon did not 
reciprocate... he continued his incursions... he did not give any gesture of good will: He 
did not release prisoners, he did not redeploy his forces from certain Palestinian cities.’ 
Abbas’s support among Palestinians was lacking, too, however, at least in part due to 
friction with Arafat, who was not used to sharing power. Abu Amir recalled an incident 
at the Palestinian Legislative Council when demonstrators threatened Abbas and there 
was no security there to protect the Prime Minister. Abu Amir hints that this lack of 
security was orchestrated by Arafat.49 In any case, the PA was in a state of disarray and 
likely would have found it difficult to exert the kind of force it had during the 1990s.
47 Ziad Abu Amir, Interview with Ziad Abu Amir, 2005, Original Records for BBC Documentary 
“Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs,” Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College 
London.
48 Dahlan, interview.
49 Abu Amir, Interview with Ziad Abu Amir.
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In reality, Hamas’s leaders need not have worried much. As Abu Amir notes, 
Sharon could not engage in any real negotiations with the Palestinians because of his 
own political situation: ‘Jerusalem [is] taboo, Sharon cannot talk about. The refugees. 
The settlements. The borders. All of these issues are burning issues and if Sharon sat 
and negotiated with Abu Mazen on any one of them, his government would collapse, so 
it was understandable why Sharon would undermine the Abu Mazen government.’50 
Without the chance of progress on peace talks, any cease-fire would have been short-
lived. It would now have been very difficult for Israel to change course away from its 
direct approach.
In the meantime, that direct approach continued in the form of targeted killings, 
which were becoming a real problem for Hamas. Inside information from Mosab 
Hassan Yousef supports Brom’s ‘water in the pool’ analogy. He notes that Hamas’s first 
official suicide bombing in 1994 ‘was actually the third attempt, part of a trial-and-error 
phase during which Hamas bomb maker Yahya Ayyash perfected his craft.’51 There may 
have been a nearly endless supply of potential Hamas recruits willing to blow 
themselves up, but planning and coordinating attacks and building bombs required skills
that had to be learned and perfected. Killing or arresting members with bomb-making 
skills could thus certainly disrupt Hamas’s ability to launch suicide attacks, at least 
temporarily. Similarly, there was only a finite number of top leaders, and attempts to kill
them disturbed the leadership enough to compel it to consider ceasefires. Abu Amir 
remembers a PA team talking to Rantisi, Zahar, Haniyeh, and Abu Shenab.
The assassinations were continuing and I think this was one of the reasons why we 
wanted to reach an agreement, a truce. We thought this would stop Israeli 
assassinations, although Israel would not give any commitment. But we thought it 
would be embarrassing for Israel if we established a truce... while they continued 
50 Ibid.
51 Yousef and Brackin, Son of Hamas, 55.
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assassinations. So I think the attempt on Rantissi’s life [on 10 June 2003] was a 
catalyst of some sort. Especially when certain intelligence came to the Palestinian 
side to the effect that Israel was determined to liquidate all the Hamas leaders. And I 
think the Hamas leaders and we, too, took that very seriously. And I remember I 
asked... are you better off with your leaders around, is Hamas better off with its 
founders and top leaders around, or do you think this is irrelevant? If you think it is 
important... I think we have to do something political about it right now.52
Major General Giora Eiland, then head of the IDF’s Planning Directorate, corroborates 
this sequence of events. ‘The unsuccessful attempt to hit Rantisi caused Rantisi, who 
was one of the worst extremists among the Hamas leaders, ...to change his mind 
overnight and to suddenly accept requests by the Palestinian Authority and the 
Egyptians to give a chance to the hudna. ...the effect of the attempt on his life was 
immediate.’53
Hamas and other factions duly informed Abbas they had agreed to a ceasefire, 
which went into effect on 27 June. At the same time, they told him that they now wanted
reciprocity from the Israelis. The month of July 2003 thus passed without a single 
Hamas attack. Pressure from Israel, in the form of targeted killing and the halting of 
financial flows, and from the PA, in the form of a ceasefire between it and Israel and the
potential repression of Hamas that would entail, had succeeded in pushing Hamas and 
other militant factions to accept a ceasefire along with the PA. The truce began to fray 
less than six weeks in, however. An Israeli raid in Nablus on 8 August led to the death of
four Palestinians and one Israeli soldier. Hamas’s armed wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam 
Brigades, warned Israel would ‘pay a commensurate price’ for the deaths, though 
Hamas’s political leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi stated, ‘Hamas is still committed to the 
truce it declared but ... Zionist violations will not go unanswered’.54 Hamas wished to 
52 Abu Amir, Interview with Ziad Abu Amir, emphasis added.
53 Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland, 53–54.
54 Imad Saada, “Four Palestinians, One Soldier Killed in Israeli Raid,” Agence France Presse, August 8, 
2003, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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retaliate for the raid but keep the truce thereafter. Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades carried out two back-to-back suicide bombings that killed two Israelis and 
wounded 12 others.55
Viewing the attacks on 12 August as a limited retaliation for the Israeli raid on 8 
August, Abu Amir asserts that the truce was still in effect when Israel killed PIJ member
Mohammed Seder in Hebron on 14 August. Amir tried in vain to convince Hamas not to
give the Israelis ‘a reason to destroy the truce and resume their war on the Palestinians’, 
but Hamas retaliated for the attack on a member of its sister organization. The attack on 
a Jerusalem bus killed 19 people and wounded 139 others. The ceasefire collapsed. In 
retrospect, Abu Amir says, ‘the Hamas leaders later acknowledged [that their retaliation 
with a bus bomb] in Jerusalem [was an] overdose. How do you control retaliation? 
...You don’t know how many people will be killed. ...Let’s say a few people were 
injured or... killed... perhaps it [the ceasefire] could have been salvaged. But that was 
not the case.’ He also mentioned that there were rumours that Hamas’s leadership had 
not planned the attack and that it was carried out by a friend or relative of Seder’s within
Hamas instead, but no one knows.56 If the attack was more deadly than planned or was 
unintentional, this suggests that Hamas viewed Israel’s threats as credible and harmful 
enough to cause it to desire the ceasefire but that it simply failed to control its 
organization well enough to prevent escalation. Lack of central control over forces is a 
classic difficulty in maintaining deterrence stability. It is particularly problematic with a 
group like Hamas, with political a political wing with internal and external leaderships, 
and a  semi-autonomous military wing with multiple cells.
Israel responded to Hamas’s bus bombing by killing Ismail Abu Shenab. As with
55 Chris Otton, “Two Israelis Killed as Back-to-Back Suicide Attacks Puncture Truce,” Agence France 
Presse, August 12, 2003, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
56 Abu Amir, Interview with Ziad Abu Amir.
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the killing of Karmi in January 2002, this stoked violence rather than preventing it, as 
Hamas had previously been minded to uphold the ceasefire with Israel and targeted 
killings alter the status quo. The PA’s Dahlan also viewed Hamas as the defender and 
Israel’s attacks as aggressive, undermining their attempts at negotiations. This was not 
only because they killed a Hamas member, but also because of who they killed. As 
Dahlan recounts, ‘I was surprised that they picked a liberal person like Abu Shenab… 
He is the one who stood up and objected to the Jerusalem operation in public. Then he is
killed. And then I realized it was a senseless waste of time to continue to talk to 
Sharon.’57 Violence increased and Israel and the PA were as far apart as ever.
To try to counter the renewed violence, Israel attempted its most audacious 
targeted killing yet just two weeks later: that of Hamas founder and spiritual leader 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. After the failed attempt, the IDF vowed to ‘continue to wage a 
relentless war against Hamas and other terrorist organizations’. Hamas senior official 
Abdel Aziz Rantissi promised ‘This ugly crime will not pass without a punishment, a 
very strong punishment,’ adding that the group’s armed wing, Qassam Brigades, ‘must 
answer this crime’.58 Three days later, Hamas launched two suicide attacks, one near a 
military base near Tel Aviv and one in a cafe in West Jerusalem. Together, they killed 15
Israelis plus the bombers. Israel’s response was immediate. The next day, Israel bombed 
the home of Hamas senior leader Mahmoud Zahar, killing his eldest son and bodyguard,
though only wounding Zahar himself.59 Despite Hamas’s defiant rhetoric at the time, it 
carried out no attacks for the rest of September. In fact, the rest of the year was quiet, 
with just three Israelis killed in a joint Hamas/Islamic Jihad attack on an Israeli 
57 Dahlan, interview.
58 “Israel Confirms Attempt on Yassin, Renews Vow of ‘Relentless War’ on Hamas,” Agence France 
Presse, September 6, 2003, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
59 Matthew Rosenberg, “Hamas Remains Defiant Despite Intense Israeli Campaign to Wipe Out 
Militants,” Associated Press International, September 11, 2003, sec. International News.
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settlement in the Gaza Strip in October. Hamas launched no attacks in November and 
launched just one rocket attack in December, which did not result in casualties.60
This lull in attacks was not a coincidence. The left-wing Israeli newspaper 
Haaretz reported in late December 2003 that, according to ‘Palestinian and other 
sources’, ‘senior members of Hamas’ political branch held a meeting in Doha, Qatar’ to 
discuss a ceasefire proposal that the Qataris later passed on to the Americans. A Hamas 
operative in Lebanon also reportedly met with ‘retired American officials’ there to 
deliver a similar proposal to end suicide attacks within Israel in exchange for a cessation
of ‘assassination attempts on Hamas targets in Gaza’.61 The Palestinian Authority was in
talks with several Palestinian factions about a year-long halt to attacks on Israeli 
civilians. Hamas publicly rejected this, but was open to a cessation of attacks on 
civilians within Israel proper (as it had reportedly offered previously through its Qatari 
and American interlocutors). The fact that it did not engage in any further suicide 
attacks on 2003 is evidence that it enacted its own proposed ceasefire right away. 
Combined with some pressure from the PA, targeted killings of its leaders had 
compelled Hamas to halt its attacks.
Israel, in turn, temporarily halted its attacks on Hamas militants and political 
leaders. It did not carry out any targeted killings in October or November, with just one 
in December, in which it killed a Hamas bomb maker. Hamas responded the next day by
launching a rocket, which ‘landed unexploded in an agricultural field in southern Israel’,
injuring no one.62 January saw Hamas increase attacks again, possibly in response to 
60 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
61 Arnon Regular, “Hamas Proposed a Cease-Fire via Qatari Mediators; Message Relayed to U.S.,” 
Ha’aretz Daily Newspaper, December 23, 2003, Print edition, sec. Israel News, Nexis UK, 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/hamas-proposed-a-cease-fire-via-qatari-mediators-
message-relayed-to-u-s-1.109551.
62 “Qassam Rockets Fired at Southern Israel, No Injuries,” Agence France Presse, December 26, 2003, 
sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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Sharon’s announcement of plans to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza (see section 3 
below). It launched five mortar shells in the early days of January followed by a suicide 
attack at the Erez crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip on 14 January.63 Crucially, 
the PA did not condemn the suicide attack, which was a joint operation between the 
armed wings of Hamas and Arafat’s Fatah. Instead, Arafat’s chief advisor, Nabil Abu 
Rudeina, claimed ‘Israel bears sole responsibility for what has happened as it continues 
the occupation, construction of the wall (Israel’s West Bank security barrier), the 
closures and the escalation’.64 In response, Israel sealed off the Gaza Strip and 
announced that it was resuming the targeted killing of senior Hamas militants.65 Hamas 
did not heed this warning, instead carrying out a particularly devastating attack on the 
#19 bus in Jerusalem on 29 January that left 11 dead and 48 wounded.66
Despite the increase in violence in January, February was quiet. Hamas launched
no attacks, during that month and Israel did not liquidate any Hamas militants, instead 
killing four from Islamic Jihad. Israel finally struck back against Hamas in March, 
killing three senior Hamas militants in a missile strike.67 Hamas responded by launching
a rocket at Israel the next day. It caused no injuries or damage other than some ‘minor 
damage’ to nearby shops.68 On 10 March, Israel killed five militants from the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades in Jenin. The group retaliated in a joint operation with Hamas four 
days later with twin suicide attacks on the port in the southern Israeli city of Ashdod. 12 
days later, Israel tried again to take out Yassin—this time successfully. Hamas 
63 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
64 Adel Zaanoun, “Four Israelis Killed in Israel-Gaza Crossing Suicide Attack,” Agence France Presse, 
January 14, 2004, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
65 Mark Lavie, “Security Official: Israel to Resume Targeted Killings of Hamas Activists Following 
Suicide Attack,” Associated Press Worldtream, January 15, 2004, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
66 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
67 “Israeli Targeted Killings.”
68 “Palestinian Rocket Explodes in Israel; Militants Nabbed in West Bank,” Agence France Presse, 
March 5, 2004, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
Page 166 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
responded, rather feebly, by launching several rockets the same day and with a shooting 
attack near a Jewish settlement in the northern West Bank more than a week later. It 
finally committed a suicide attack on 17 April, which killed only the bomber but 
wounded four Israelis.69 Israel’s response was immediate: It successfully killed Abdel 
Aziz Rantissi the same day.70
One might expect Hamas to respond to the targeted killing of two of its most 
important leaders, including Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin, with 
increased violence. Instead, violence declined from March, when Yassin was killed, to 
April. After Rantissi was killed, it declined still further: No Israelis were killed in 
attacks by Hamas in May 2004. The head of Hamas’s external leadership, Khaled 
Meshal, denied that the reason Hamas did not retaliate more forcefully for the targeted 
killing of its leaders was because it had lost the ability to penetrate Israeli security. The 
reason he gave, however, contradicted that denial: He claimed the fall in suicide attacks 
was due to ‘“difficulties on the ground” dictated by “a temporary extraordinary 
situation,” such as the Israeli army’s stringent measures’. In other words: Hamas was 
finding it very difficult to penetrate Israeli security, at least temporarily.71 It may also 
have been temporarily disoriented by the loss of two of its most important leaders. 
Hamas ‘had to reorganize after Israel killed two of its main leaders, founder Yassin and 
Abd al-Aziz Rantisi... which also forced the group to cease to disclose its leadership 
structure publicly’.72
Israel was indeed hitting Hamas on all fronts. As was the case in the 1990s, 
Hamas’s external leadership found safety in a neighbouring country, this time Syria. 
69 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
70 “Israeli Targeted Killings.”
71 Sam F. Ghattas, “Palestinian Militant Group’s Leader Rejects Talk of Cease-Fire Amid Israeli 
Attacks,” Associated Press International, May 17, 2004, sec. International News.
72 Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration, Kindle edition 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), l. 1942.
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Israel in 2004 thus made threats against Hamas’s leadership in Syria and against the 
Syrian government itself: Deputy Defence Minister Zeev Boim told Israeli public radio 
‘The rule that “anyone who deals in terror against Israel is a target” is a rule that must be
stated and one that we must stand behind... It is possible to launch operations, provided 
that the targets are well chosen and that the moment is right, in order to make the 
Syrians understand that there are red lines that cannot be crossed.’ Boim was careful to 
qualify this hawkish remark by stating that Israel would be careful not to cause a 
‘conflagration’ on its northern border. Judging that such a conflagration would not be 
easily ignited, Israel responded to a deadly suicide attack by the PIJ in Beersheva by 
attacking ‘an alleged Palestinian militant training camp deep inside Syria.’73 This hard 
line had an impact on Hamas in Damascus, if only temporarily: Hamas leaders in 
Damascus reportedly fled for Lebanon (where they were ‘looked after’ by Hezbollah) 
and Qatar after Israel’s above warning.74 Aside from the rather ineffectual attack 
mentioned above, Hamas carried out only one further, admittedly devastating, suicide 
attack in 2004 in August. Instead, it began to rely increasingly on rockets and mortars. 
These killed and injured far fewer people and thus provoked less of a response from 
Israel than suicide attacks. Perhaps more importantly, however, they could fly over the 
security barrier, which was helping to make suicide attacks within Israel considerably 
more difficult.
73 “Israel Threatens Syria Strike after Deadly Bombings,” Agence France Presse, September 2, 2004, 
Nexis UK.
74 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Brass Flees Syria,” The Jerusalem Post, September 6, 2004, sec. News, 
Nexis UK.
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5.3 Direct deterrence by denial: the security barrier and a political 
opening
Israel’s West Bank security barrier is highly controversial, but evidence suggests 
that it is also highly effective. As the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld points
out: ‘History shows that walls, provided people are prepared to do what is necessary to 
defend them and prevent other people from crossing them, by using lethal force if 
necessary, work.’75 He notes that stand-offs between Soviet and American tanks in 
Berlin, common between 1958 and 1961, came to an immediate and almost complete 
end after the Wall was erected. Furthermore, the ‘heavily fortified fence that separates 
the two Koreas has been working for fifty years; the one that separates Greek Cypriots 
from Turkish ones for thirty. … The latter has helped bring relations between the two 
communities to the point where few people can so much as remember when the last 
incident took place’ and there is now even talk of pulling the barrier down.’76 As far as 
Israel is concerned, there was a precedent for the West Bank barrier: the barrier along 
the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, which was built between 1993 and 1996. Only 
one suicide attack carried out in Israel originated from the Gaza Strip, when two 
bombers hid in a container that passed through the Karni crossing before blowing 
themselves up in Ashdod on 14 March 2004.77 ‘In 2000-2003 125 suicide bombers 
crossed from the West Bank into Israel.’ Many of these were successful. ‘During the 
same period... the fence that surrounds Gaza has worked very well indeed. ...throughout 
the Uprising it kept terrorists out almost entirely. It compelled them to confine their 
75 Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Controversial Plan Toward Peace, 1st ed (New York: 
Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 66.
76 Ibid., 67.
77 Etgar Lefkovits, “Karni Guard Let Bombers Pass,” Jerusalem Post, March 31, 2004, sec. News.
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operations to Israeli targets inside the Strip—of which, unfortunately, there [was] no 
shortage.’78 Writing in 2003 or early 2004, before the effects of work on the West Bank 
barrier were discernible, he predicted that a well constructed and defended barrier (his 
preference was for a wall rather than a fence) would reduce attacks on Israelis protected 
by it.
The length of Israel’s border with the West Bank, the incompleteness of the 
barrier, and the fact that there are many more Palestinians and Israelis living close to 
one another on each side, makes the task the barrier there must perform more difficult 
and its effects harder to assess. Nevertheless, the evidence supports Van Creveld’s 
prediction that a barrier would provide security. By 2004, construction of the security 
barrier was about half complete.79 Crucially, this first half of the barrier separated Israel 
proper from Palestinian areas from which suicide bombers had been most likely to 
originate, particularly the north-western West Bank.80 The evidence suggests that, while 
the barrier has never stopped crossings into Israel altogether, it was already making 
them more difficult, making suicide and sabotage operations more costly and risky for 
Hamas and other militant groups. Hillel Frisch of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic 
Studies uses several tests to establish the efficacy of the security barrier in comparison 
to offensive measures Israel was also undertaking. His most useful test compares 
changes in levels of violence in areas within the Green Line that became protected by 
the security barrier during this period and changes in areas within the Green Line where 
78 Van Creveld, Defending Israel, 68–69.
79 George Gavrilis, “Sharon’s Endgame for the West Bank Barrier,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 4 
(Autumn 2004): 7–20.
80 Zohar Palti, “Israel’s Security Fence: Effective in Reducing Suicide Attacks from the Northern West 
Bank,” Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, July 7, 2004), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israels-security-fence-
effective-in-reducing-suicide-attacks-from-the-north.
Page 170 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
no barrier was yet built or even under construction.81 The results of this test are 
particularly sturdy due to the combination of a longitudinal analysis, which controls for 
variations between locations that may have nothing to do with the barrier, and multiple 
case studies, which control for effects over time (such as an overall decline in violence) 
that may also be unrelated to the barrier. The results are strikingly clear: ‘While 
fatalities within [the Green Line] declined to significantly less than half in areas parallel 
to where the fence existed, they more than doubled in areas bordering Judea and 
Samaria where no border existed.’82 As Frisch also notes, these numbers illustrate a 
particularly challenging aspect of deterrence-by-denial: the tendency for attackers 
simply to substitute easier targets once certain targets have become more difficult to 
attack. It also clearly shows that attackers were no less motivated to cross than before. 
Moreover, it suggests that more than pure defence was involved: It was not that 
attackers were trying and failing to cross the barrier, they were instead deciding not to 
bother and to attack easier targets instead. In other words: Hamas was deterred by denial
from targets protected by the barrier.
Militant leaders themselves have admitted that the barrier makes attacks more 
difficult. On 11 November 2006, Islamic Jihad leader Abdallah Ramadan Shalah said on
Al-Manar TV that terrorist organizations wished to continue suicide bombing attacks, 
but that this was not entirely within their control. He said ‘the separation fence... is an 
obstacle to the resistance, and if it were not there the situation would be entirely 
different.’83 In a March 2008 interview in Al-Sharq, he admitted again that the security 
81 His other tests were less robust because they assumed, among other things, that the barrier made no 
difference in security while under construction, only once the first section was complete, or failed to 
control for other possible causes of changes in the level of violence.
82 Hillel Frisch, “(The) Fence or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of ‘the Fence’ in Judea and 
Samaria,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies (Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
Studies, October 2007), 21.
83 Mitchell Bard, “Background & Overview of Israel’s Security Fence,” Jewishvirtuallibrary.org, July 
2005, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html.
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barrier ‘limits the ability of the resistance... to carry out suicide bombing attacks’.84 The 
barrier also reduced successful suicide attacks, even as arrests of attempted bombers 
increased. ‘Between October 2000 and July 2003, the date of completion of the first 
phase (known as Stage A) of construction of the fence along [the] northwestern rim of 
the West Bank, thirty-five “successful” suicide attacks [originated] from the northern 
West Bank alone. In contrast, since Stage A was completed last summer, only three 
“successful” suicide attacks have originated from the northern West Bank.’85 This fall in 
successful attacks was not for a lack of trying. The numbers instead suggest that the 
barrier helped Israeli security to apprehend more bombers. ‘Since January 2004, 
nineteen suicide bomb belts have been discovered, all originating from Nablus and 
designated for use by suicide bombers in Israel.’86 The barrier was thus working to 
reduce the odds of attacks’ success, though it had not yet resulted in overall deterrence-
by-denial: Hamas had not yet decided to abandon suicide attacks altogether in favour of 
methods that could circumvent the barrier, like rockets, though the number of rockets 
Hamas fired did rise steadily into 2004 (see figure 5.6 below), again showing Hamas’s 
continued will to attack Israel.
The barrier’s effect extends beyond simply slowing down crossings, which 
continue to this day even across sections of land where the barrier is complete.87 It helps
catch militants by magnifying the effects of other Israeli counterterrorism efforts and 
intelligence. The barrier along the north-west border forces bombers south, especially to
Jerusalem and its surroundings, allowing Israel to focus its attention there. ‘From the 
start of 2004, about 2,000 Palestinians have been apprehended. Of those arrests, fifty-
84 Quoted in: Byman, A High Price, 328.
85 Palti, “Israel’s Security Fence.”
86 Ibid.
87 Unofficial estimates the author heard from Israelis and Palestinians ranged from 5,000 to 25,000 
crossings per week. In any event, no one asserts that the barrier is even close to 100% effective.
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eight were suicide bombers caught in the West Bank.’88 The longer path into Israel also 
gives Israeli intelligence more time and opportunities to foil an attack. Travelling south 
from Jenin or Nablus means ‘different terrorist cells would have to work together, 
exposing themselves to Israeli counterterrorism in the process.... “One plus one is 
eleven” when it comes to counterterrorism, [former Shin Bet head Avi] Dichter 
contends, arguing that this expansion of the operation’s circle from one cell to another 
offers exponentially more opportunities for disruption.’89 By 2004, Shin Bet claims it 
‘was able to stop 95 percent of the attempted attacks on Israel, capturing almost every 
suicide bomber who dared attempt crossing into Israel’.90 Increased checkpoints and 
improved intelligence within the West Bank will also have played a role, but there is 
little doubt that the reduced number of crossing points between the West Bank and Israel
made carrying out suicide bombing operations considerably more difficult and assisted 
Israeli security in foiling such attempts.
At the same time, and in a sign of a further ‘substitution effect’, rockets, which 
are impervious to the security barrier, were raining down in increasing numbers in 2004,
suggesting militants were responding to the difficulties presented by the security barrier 
by changing tactics (see figure 5.6 below). Hamas had carried out seven suicide attacks 
in 2004, but carried out just two in 2005. In the spring of 2006, moreover, Hamas 
declared that it would no longer use suicide attacks. ‘The suicide bombings happened in 
an exceptional period and they have now stopped. They came to an end as a change of 
belief.’91 In fact, Hamas continued to use suicide bombings intermittently, carrying out 
one later that year and two in 2008.92 Nevertheless, the age of constant Palestinian 
88 Palti, “Israel’s Security Fence.”
89 Byman, A High Price, 328.
90 Ibid., 153.
91 Conal Urquhart, “Hamas in Call to End Suicide Bombings,” The Observer, April 9, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/09/israel.
92 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
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suicide bombings, at least those originating within the Palestinian territories, seems to 
have come to a permanent end.93 The barrier and the improved active security it helps 
make possible have deterred Hamas from all but occasional suicide attacks not by 
making such attacks impossible, but by making them costly, in particular with regard to 
the intelligence Israeli security can gain from captured bombers.
Figure 5.694
At the same time as the security barrier was going up, Ariel Sharon made an 
announcement one would expect to undermine deterrence-by-denial. At a conference in 
Herzliya, Israel, on 18 December 2003, he announced ‘I want to say to the Palestinians: 
It is not in our interest to govern you. We will not remain in all the places where we are 
today.’ He continued to say that Israel would be withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and 
removing 8,000 Israeli settlers from there. At the same time, however, he proclaimed: 
93 Note that this does not exclude the possibility of an eventual slew of bombings from disaffected Arab-
Israeli citizens residing within Israel and thus not restricted by the security barrier.
94 Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks” Note that there is no chart for the “effectiveness” of 
rocket and mortar attacks because appropriate data are not available. Many attacks consist of volleys 
of several rockets and mortars. The exact number of projectiles is often unknown, making extracting 
the casualties or deaths per projectile impossible. The disparities in the number of projectiles per 
attack also make calculating effectiveness “per attack” impossible.
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‘As part of this disengagement plan, Israel will strengthen its control over areas of 
Greater Israel. These will be an integral part of the State of Israel in any future 
agreement.’95 This referred to large settlement blocs mostly near the green line to the 
apparent, eventual, and theoretical exclusion of isolated settlements deeper inside the 
West Bank. Sharon received backing from the US on both the withdrawal from Gaza 
and the policy of stopping terror before negotiating, as Sharon’s senior advisor Dov 
Weisglass explains: ‘What’s important is the formula that asserts that the eradication of 
terrorism precedes the start of the political process.’96
Sharon’s announcement came near the peak of the Second Intifada. Attacks were
still frequent, giving the appearance that violence was forcing Israel to withdraw from 
territory and dismantle settlements. Regarding withdrawing from Lebanon in 2000, 
Giora Eiland had said: ‘Since we assessed the year 2000 would be the year in which the 
Palestinians would try to do something, and look for an excuse to do something, then 
withdrawing from Lebanon in a way that would be interpreted as running away, we 
thought it would be dangerous.’97 His fear was that a withdrawal would damage Israel’s 
reputation and credibility, thus encouraging further attacks by undermining deterrence.
To Palestinian militants, this did indeed look like a success for armed struggle. 
Sheikh Nafez Azzam, a PIJ leader, told the Associated Press, ‘This is a new language by
the Israelis, and this is an evidence that the uprising has created a new fact on the 
ground’.98 Abbas al Sayyad, planner of Hamas’s infamous suicide bombing of the Park 
Hotel in Netanya, also saw it that way: ‘The [Park Hotel] operation... made them 
[Israelis] begin to think about the rights of Palestinians. Now we’re talking about 
95 Edge, Anderson, and Stevenson, Elusive Peace, pt. III.
96 Chemi Shalev et al., Ariel Sharon: A Study in Controversy: Reports, Interviews and Euologies from 
Haaretz, Haaretz E-Books (Tel Aviv: Haaretz, 2014), l. 1541.
97 Eiland, Interview with Giora Eiland.
98 Dan Perry, “URGENT Sharon: Israel Will ‘Cut Off’ from Palestinians without Peace Moves,” 
Associated Press International, December 18, 2003, sec. International News.
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retreating from Gaza.... It was the biggest operation in the Intifada, at least until that 
date. And it, it found a, a positive response among the Palestinian population, that this 
was a way that we would achieve our rights.’99 Kobi Michael of Israel’s Institute for 
National Security Studies and former Deputy Director and head of the Palestinian desk 
at Israel’s Ministry for Strategic Affairs, admits ‘I think that they believe that [Israel 
withdrew from Gaza because of the Second Intifada], I think that this is the common 
perception among the Palestinians, not only in the Gaza Strip, I think that among the 
Palestinians as a whole. I think that they have very good reasons to think so.’100 He also 
contends, however, that this perception is ‘totally wrong’ and that Sharon did it for 
different strategic reasons, mainly to strengthen Israel’s hold on the more important 
large settlement blocks in the West Bank, for which he also received the official 
approval of US President George W. Bush.101 He points out that ‘the disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip was accomplished at the end of August, the beginning of 
September, 2005. This is the end of the Second Intifada. It’s pretty calm and it’s pretty 
understood that Israel actually won the Second Intifada’.102
Whether Sharon initiated the disengagement due to the violence of the Second 
Intifada or not, however, matters less than the belief common among Palestinians that 
this was the reason. One would expect this to undermine the long-term deterrence-by-
denial that lies at the heart of Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall strategy for eventual peace with the
Arabs by showing that violence against Israel was not, in fact, futile. Moreover, 
Sharon’s threat that Israel’s disengagement would come ‘only in the event that the 
Palestinians continue to drag their feet and postpone implementation of the Roadmap’ 
99 Abbas Al Sayyad, Interview with Abbas al Sayyad, January 30, 2005, Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King’s College London.
100Kobi Michael, Author Interview in person, June 10, 2014.
101Shalev et al., Ariel Sharon: A Study in Controversy, l. 1608.
102Michael, interview.
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could easily be interpreted as ‘If violence continues, Israel will leave Gaza and take its 
settlers with it’.103 In effect, Sharon gave Hamas and other militant groups a clear ‘road 
map’ of his own for getting Israel out of Gaza: continue the violence. We would thus 
expect to see an increase in violence, or at least no reduction, as a result of Sharon’s 
announcement.
While it is impossible to pinpoint causation in such a complex situation with 
many possible inputs and relatively few outputs (attacks), the data do, in fact, show a 
rise in violence in the short term. As mentioned in section 2 above, Israel’s targeting of 
Hamas political leaders in August and September of 2003 was followed by three months
of relative calm between the two parties amid discussion of a one-year cessation of 
attacks in Israel proper: There were no suicide attacks in the last quarter of 2003 and 
Israel did not attempt to kill any additional members of Hamas’s political leadership. 
Hamas began suicide bombing again in January, less than a month after Sharon vowed 
to pull out of Gaza if the violence continued. The overall trend in violence in 2004 was, 
however, downward. Israel responded to the increase in Hamas’s attacks at the 
beginning of the year by killing two of the most important members of the latter’s 
political leadership: Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin, in March, and his replacement, 
Abdel Aziz Rantissi, in April. The result was a fall in violence. At the same time, the 
security barrier was helping Israeli security reportedly to apprehend ‘95 percent of the 
attempted attacks on Israel’ from within the Palestinian territories.104 It is thus very 
plausible that Sharon’s plan encouraged further attacks, but that this was more than 
compensated for in the medium term with targeted killing and increased security 
103Ariel Sharon, “Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference,” Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, December 18, 2003, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2003/Pages/Address
%20by%20PM%20Ariel%20Sharon%20at%20the%20Fourth%20Herzliya.aspx.
104Byman, A High Price, 153.
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measures. Sharon’s announcement, whether through intent or serendipity, was thus well 
timed.
Just as Hamas’s military activities were becoming more difficult, weighed down 
by disruption, the capture and killing of operatives, the security barrier, and a shift in 
public opinion away from violence, changes were afoot in the political arena that 
granted Hamas potential opportunities to advance its agenda, much of which had always
focused on domestic policy, along political rather than military lines. Yassir Arafat was 
flown to a Jordanian military base on 29 October 2004, from where a French hospital 
plane flew him to Paris for treatment of an as yet undiagnosed illness.105 Less than two 
weeks later, in the early hours of 11 November, he had died.106
‘Hamas... had been deliberating within its own ranks inside and outside Palestine
as to what its strategy in the post-Arafat era should be. One priority was to decide 
whether to participate in the legislative elections Mahmud Abbas promised to conduct 
on 17 July 2005.’107 Hamas was already proving it was capable of performing well in 
elections. During the second round of stage one of municipal elections on 25 January 
2005 in Gaza, it won seven of 10 councils for total of 78 of 118 seats. Following a 
second-place showing in the first round of municipal elections in December 2004, this 
result encouraged many Hamas members to push to take part in the coming Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) elections, with Hamas’s members in Gaza particularly 
enthusiastic (while its members in Hebron, in particular, remained pessimistic). The 
external leadership, as well, was ‘cautiously supportive’.108
Izzat al-Rishiq, a member of Hamas’s Political Bureau, explained Hamas’s 
105Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Arafat Heading to Paris for Treatment in First Trip Abroad Since 2001,” 
Associated Press International, October 29, 2004, sec. International News.
106“World Leaders Who Have Died Lingering Deaths,” Agence France Presse, November 11, 2004.
107Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch, 2011), 209.
108Ibid., 210.
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eventual decision to participate thus: Extensive consultations within the movement 
came to the conclusion that ‘our participation should in no way prejudice our 
commitment to safeguard our people’s legitimate rights and to protect the programme of
resistance as a strategic option until the occupation comes to an end. … The process of 
consultation concluded that the Oslo era was at an end, and therefore the legislative 
elections... were likely to be free from manipulation or constraints. It was these 
constraints and the monopoly over the political process that discouraged us from taking 
part in the 1996 elections. … We knew the Oslo Accords were doomed.... We decided to
stay away because we did not wish to support the unjust settlement in any way. Our 
participation at that time would have bestowed legitimacy on what was in our opinion 
illegitimate.’109 Hamas’s confidence was boosted by ‘the utter failure of the peace 
process, the disappearance of Yasir Arafat from the political scene, and Israel’s 
unilateral decision to end its occupation of the Gaza Strip. Other factors were the belief 
prevalent among the Palestinians that resistance by Hamas and other factions forced the 
Israelis out of Gaza, and the disarray within the Fatah movement.’110 A final reason was 
that Hamas members believed that being elected into government would force ‘the 
international community to abandon its boycott of Hamas. … Eventually, they 
conjectured, Hamas could conceivably achieve its removal from the international lists of
terrorist organizations, simply because nations would have no option but to deal with it 
directly.’111
Benedetta Berti, a research fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security 
Studies who specializes in the political integration of armed groups, points out that ‘the 
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early as fall 2002, while the general approval of political negotiations started to rise 
steadily during 2003, a trend that took place even among Hamas supporters.’112 In 
addition, ‘the intense and prolonged military confrontation with Israel [and] numerous 
direct attacks, arrests, and targeted assassinations [affected] Hamas’s military capacity 
[and] the group found itself weakened, which [had] also pushed the organization into 
accepting a Fatah-brokered cease-fire in June 2003.’113 Finally, ‘the group’s financial 
structure was also under considerable pressure because of the international community’s
post-9/11 increasingly more aggressive [sic] efforts to crack down on its funding 
sources’.114 There were also benefits to be had from political participation that were not 
available previously, as Berti explains. ‘[U]nlike in the early 1990s, Hamas was able to 
capitalize on its political strength and on the simultaneous crisis of the group’s main 
political opponent to gather a significant electoral constituency and reaffirm its 
relevance and legitimacy through institutional expansion.’115 Berti echoes Tamimi and 
al-Rishiq above when she asserts that one of the most important factors in Hamas’s 
decision to take part in elections from 2004 to 2006 was that the political system had 
now opened up, giving Hamas a real chance. Arafat’s death contributed significantly to 
this opening. ‘This single event swiftly altered the preexisting power equilibrium and 
increased the system’s permeability, thus providing a strong incentive for Hamas to 
pursue political participation through institutional politics.’116 ‘Hamas has constantly 
balanced its need to show its military strength to its enemy with the desire to maintain a 
strong internal legitimacy. … While at times violence against Israel has been used to 
boost domestic support and recruit for the group, there have also been occasions when 
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terrorism against Hamas’s main enemy has been a liability for the group.’117 This 
political opening eased ‘push factors’ leading Hamas towards violence (and away from 
deterrence) by providing alternative means of gaining influence while ‘pull factors’ 
(‘holes’ in deterrence and defence that encourage attacks) were being eliminated by the 
security barrier and active Israeli security measures. Forces on all sides of Hamas, in 
other words, were encouraging it to be deterred. This explains why Hamas began to 
reduce rocket and mortar attacks after a peak in 2004 (see figure 5.6 above), even as it 
was also reducing all other types of attack (see figure 5.7 below) and halting suicide 
bombings altogether.
Figure 5.7118
In February 2005, meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to a cessation of hostilities in 
Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Sharon declared ‘we agreed that all Palestinians will stop all 
117Ibid., l. 1866.
118Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
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acts of violence against all Israelis everywhere, and—in parallel—Israel will cease all 
its military activity against all Palestinians anywhere’. Abbas agreed to end ‘all acts of 
violence against Palestinians and Israelis, wherever they are’. As a result, Jordan and 
Egypt also said they would send ambassadors back to Israel after a four-year absence.119 
It now fell to Abbas to solidify an informal cease-fire the Palestinian factions had 
entered into at the beginning of the year. At talks in Cairo in March, Hamas and other 
Palestinian factions agreed to extend the temporary cease-fire (tahadiya). UK-based 
Hamas supporter Azzam Tamimi reports that Hamas knew that ‘Israel and the United 
States needed the continuation of the truce in order to enable Sharon to proceed with the
withdrawal of troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip as the first phase of his 
disengagement plan.’ At the same time, the ‘Hamas leadership was conscious that the 
majority of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank favoured an extension of the 
period of calm. Undeniably, the Palestinians in the occupied territories had been 
exhausted by Israel’s collective punishment measures.’ The most important factor, 
however, was reforms to the PLO’s administrative structure that the PLO had also 
agreed on at Cairo. ‘If [the] PLO were to be restructured to reflect the affinities and 
affiliations of the Palestinian people... Hamas would most likely be the biggest 
beneficiary. [Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khaled] Mish’al saw the Cairo agreement as
the beginning of a process that might enable Hamas to take an active part in ending 
Fatah’s monopoly on decision making within the PLO.’120
The Hamas leadership was correct in its assessment of the mood of the 
Palestinian population. According to a March 2005 poll from the Palestinian Centre for 
Policy and Survey Research, support for bombing attacks in Israel had fallen from 77% 
119Herb Keinon, “Sharon, Abbas: This Time It’s for Real. Leaders at Sharm Vow an End to Hostilities; 
Egypt, Jordan Envoys Due Back ‘Within Days,’” The Jerusalem Post, February 9, 2005, sec. News.
120Tamimi, Hamas, 2007, 212–213.
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the previous September to just 29% at the time of the poll. At the same time, 84% of 
Palestinians supported a return to negotiations, with a majority, 59%, preferring a 
permanent agreement. Accordingly, 59% of Palestinians supported the ‘Road Map’ 
peace plan put forward by the ‘Quartet’ (US, EU, Russia, and the UN) in June 2002.121
Though Hamas enjoyed considerable political successes, these created tensions 
with its rival, Fatah. Fatah came first in the round of 5 May 2005, winning 50 councils 
to Hamas’s 28, but Hamas was the clear winner in urban councils while Fatah tended to 
lead in rural areas. ‘Hamas won most of the seats in Rafah, Beit Lahia, and al-Burajj.’ 
Fatah questioned the accuracy of the vote and declared that the elections would be held 
again. Hamas refused and threatened to demand that Palestinians boycott the vote. Fatah
then agreed to postpone the re-run of voting, but Abbas announced that he was 
postponing the legislative elections indefinitely. After changes to the electoral system, 
including the introduction of a system of partial proportional representation, Abbas 
finally announced that the legislative elections would be held on 25 January 2006.122
5.4 Hamas’s election win, fighting between Hamas and Fatah, takeover
of Gaza
Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections held on 25 
January 2006. Three days later, the head of Hamas’s external leadership, Khaled 
Meshal, held a press conference in Damascus, Syria, promising to work with Fatah and 
other Palestinian factions to form a government. Hamas also announced that it was 
121Survey Research Unit, “Results of Poll #15,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 
March 12, 2005, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p15a.html.
122Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 213–214.
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extending its truce with Israel (there had been few attacks since January 2005 and none 
at all since the kidnapping and murder of an Israeli in September).123
Benedetta Berti notes that the greater emphasis on political action around this 
time ‘put the local political leaders at the organization’s front, while the group’s military
wing largely stood at the margins’.124 ‘The period immediately following Hamas’s 
electoral victory further increased the status of the local political leaders’, who often 
adopted ‘a more accommodation-prone attitude with respect to external and internal 
foes’.125 An internal reorganization within Hamas also granted leaders involved in the 
government more freedom. ‘It is believed that elected officials tended to, at least 
officially, discontinue their internal roles as members of the Shura Council, thus 
granting a level of separation between the Hamas government’s view and the 
movement’s position.’126
Despite its uncompromising charter, its unchanged stance on the eventual 
‘liberation’ of all of Mandatory Palestine from Israeli control, and its history of armed 
resistance and terrorism, maintaining an extended period of peace with Israel does not 
necessarily run counter to Hamas’s ideology. As noted in Chapter 3, Sheikh Yassin and 
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood’s idea into the 1980s was that Palestinians were not
ready to overthrow Israel and that society first needed to return to Islam. Returning 
Palestinian society to Islam is the first step towards Palestinian liberation and Hamas 
needed to remain influential to accomplish that step. With no political possibilities in the
late 1980s and with the popularity of the Intifada, Hamas was born to engage in armed 
resistance, partly to keep the Brotherhood and its message relevant. In 2005, by contrast,
123Ibid., 224.
124Berti, Armed Political Organizations, l. 2511.
125Ibid., l. 2514.
126Ibid., l. 2516.
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Hamas was more popular than ever and public opinion no longer required it to engage in
frequent violence to maintain its credibility. Hamas also now had a political route to 
cementing its popularity with the people and Islamizing Palestinian society through 
political and governmental processes. Stepping back from armed struggle and offering a
hudna were thus consistent with Hamas’s long-term strategy. This would buy Hamas 
time to return Palestinian society to Islam and strengthen brotherhood between Arab 
countries. It would also buy it time to increase its military strength. There was never 
anything ideological that prevented Hamas from halting violence against Israel as long 
as it deemed that halt temporary and it did not currently need violence to maintain its 
legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians. Yassin highlighted this each time he mentioned a 
long-term hudna. If Hamas achieved control and legitimacy through political 
participation and Palestinian opinion remained opposed to armed struggle, Hamas 
would not be subject to ‘push factors’ (elements making the status quo unacceptable) 
encouraging it to engage in violence. If Israeli security and deterrence measures 
remained robust, eliminating ‘pull factors’ while avoiding exacerbating ‘push factors’, 
there was thus a chance that Hamas could have been deterred for an extended period.
Those push factors soon returned, however, in the form of actions by Fatah, 
which dominated the outgoing PLC and was not willing to wait and see if Hamas kept 
its promises to work with Fatah and adhere to its ceasefire. On their last day in power, 
the PLC’s outgoing Members of Parliament passed a law establishing a new 
Constitutional Court and a second granting the Palestinian Authority President the 
power to appoint the court’s nine judges without PLC approval. That court would have 
the power to ‘rule on any disputes about the division of powers between the executive, 
legislative and judiciary branches of government’.127 In effect, President Abbas had 
127“Hamas Slams Measures Adopted by Outgoing MPs,” Agence France Presse, February 13, 2006.
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ensured that he would have final say in any decisions by the Palestinian Authority. 
Abbas later also ‘claimed exclusive presidential authority over the police force, the 
various media outlets such as TV, radio, and the WAFA news agency, the Property Sale 
and Registration Department, and control over the crossing points between Israel and 
the Palestinian territories. [He also] appointed Rashid Abu Shbak in charge of internal 
security.’128 The most important parts of the government thus fell under the President’s 
control. This split was more than just political, it also paved the way for the more severe
geographical split that was to come, as Abbas and his offices were located in the West 
Bank, while most of the Hamas leadership resided in Gaza.129
In the meantime, some still speculated that Hamas would moderate its stance 
significantly. According to Israel’s Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, this included 
Egyptian President Mubarak: ‘The president says that he believes that Hamas will 
change its ways in the future and adopt the Israeli conditions’ of abandoning its violent 
ideology, recognizing Israel’s right to exist, and honouring previous agreements 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Mubarak also apparently pledged to ‘exert all of his 
efforts’ to make Hamas do so.130 London-based Hamas supporter Azzam Tamimi also 
revealed that he was working with Hamas to change its charter to make it less anti-
Semitic and more moderate (though it would still call for an eventual end of the State of 
Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state in all of Mandatory Palestine). Hamas 
leaders within the West Bank and Gaza claimed to know nothing about this change, 
however, and to this day, it has not come to pass. It was not out of the question, 
however. As the Hamas politician Sheikh Yasser Mansour commented, ‘we could 
128Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 228–9.
129Berti, Armed Political Organizations, l. 2550.
130“Mubarak Thinks Hamas Will Succumb to International Pressure, Change Ways: Israel’s Mofaz,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, February 14, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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discuss changes. The charter is not the Koran.’131 Mansour was echoing a comment 
made by a Hamas leader from Nablus, Professor Mohammed Ghazal, who also said the 
charter could be changed, as it was ‘not the Koran’. Ghazal went even further, 
suggesting that this could allow the group one day to recognize Israel, though senior 
leader Mahmoud al-Zahar immediately denied such a possibility.132 Muaman Bseiso, a 
columnist for the Hamas weekly Al-Risala, also wrote ‘The charter is not the Koran … I
believe that one day it will be changed or replaced according to the views of the Hamas,
in order to realize the national interests of the Palestinians.’133 Various voices within 
Hamas were thus sending partly contradictory messages, in part due to Hamas’s 
structure, with internal and external leaders, as well as political and military wings, 
acting with varying degrees of autonomy. Even as members of the new Hamas-led 
government were adopting a more moderate tone, the external leadership, along with the
military wing, maintained a more hard-line stance, with Meshal reiterating: ‘Our 
mission is to liberate Jerusalem and purify the al-Aqsa Mosque. … This victory (in PA 
elections) is a message from the Palestinian nation that it is united behind the jihad 
option’. He also added: ‘The entire Israeli arsenal is not enough to provide peace to the 
Israelis.’134
The international pressure Mubarak thought would force Hamas to change was 
indeed having an effect: ‘The most painful measure taken against Hamas has so far been
the economic sanctions imposed by the international community. … The real problem 
131Orly Halpern, “EXCLUSIVE: Hamas Working on ‘New Charter,’” Jerusalem Post, February 16, 
2006, http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1139395429041.
132“Hamas Leader Says Charter Is Not Koran; Group Could One Day Recognize Israel,” Haaretz.com, 
September 22, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/hamas-leader-says-charter-is-not-
koran-group-could-one-day-recognize-israel-1.170461.
133“Hamas in Run-up to Elections: Relatively Pragmatic Statements Alongside Extremist Statements,” 
Special Dispatch (Washington, DC: The Middle East Media Research Institute, January 27, 2006), 
http://www.memri.org/report/en/print1591.htm#_edn6.
134Ali Waked, “Hamas: Our Goal – Liberate Jerusalem,” Ynetnews, February 14, 2006, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3215968,00.html.
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was that there was virtually no means of delivering money to the government; all 
channels had been blocked. The United States and Israel used all the resources at their 
disposal in order to prevent any money from getting through.’ Tamimi concluded that 
the real intention of these policies was ‘to provoke Palestinian Authority employees and 
members of the various police forces... to turn against the new Palestinian Authority for 
failing to pay their salaries’.135 As progress via the political route seemed increasingly 
blocked (a revival of a ‘push factor’ that helped to limit Hamas’s options to violence or 
acceptance of a diminished status), the way was paved for renewed tensions between 
Hamas and Fatah as well as an end to an eight-month period, from 26 September 2005 
until 10 June 2006, during which Hamas had avoided violence against Israel.136
As far back as the beginning of 2005, after Hamas enjoyed its first election 
victories, tension between it and Fatah was high, with one PA official at that time 
threatening a ‘“Fallujah-style” operation against Hamas’.137 The split between the Fatah-
controlled executive and Hamas-controlled legislature and between the West Bank and 
Gaza stoked these tensions again. By early June 2006, there were daily reports of 
Palestinians being killed in clashes between Hamas and Fatah, and many more were 
wounded, including in a drive-by shooting that targeted a member of Hamas’s military 
wing.138 Attacks on Fatah members led the group to respond by posting gunmen on the 
Gaza border, ostensibly to guard against Israeli aggression, but with a threat to ‘deploy 
this unit in the main streets of the Gaza Strip to protect Palestinian citizens [if] 
assassinations by unknown (gunmen) continue’.139 The next day, gunmen associated 
135Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 230.
136Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks.”
137Khaled Abu Toameh, “PA Official Threatens ‘Fallujah-Style’ Operation Against Hamas,” The 
Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2005, sec. NEWS.
138“Senior Member of Hamas Military Wing Wounded in Drive-by Shooting,” Associated Press 
International, June 3, 2006, sec. International News.
139“Fatah-Linked Group to Deploy Gunmen on Gaza Border,” Agence France Presse -- English, June 4, 
2006.
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with Hamas stormed a Palestinian TV studio in Gaza. Although a Hamas spokesman 
claimed the group had nothing to do with the attack, he did mention that the television 
station ‘frequently resorts to incitement against Hamas, which raises tensions’. Bank 
branches also had to be closed for security reasons after clashes broke out with unpaid 
civil servants.140 At the same time, the truce between Hamas and Israel also collapsed 
after more than eight months of complete quiet and around 16 months of relative calm. 
The first incident was the targeted killing of Jamal Abu Samhadana, a member of the 
Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) and a Hamas appointee to the Interior Ministry 
with responsibility for overseeing Hamas’s militia forces in Gaza.141 This, combined 
with the alleged Israeli shelling of a Gaza beach, which killed eight civilians (the IDF 
would later assert that the explosion on the beach was not its doing), led Hamas to 
announce it was breaking the ceasefire by launching rockets into Israel.142 This led to 
further escalation, as Israel’s Defence Minister Peretz announced that he had approved 
plans to resume targeting Hamas political leaders. He did give Hamas a way out, 
however, noting that he had instructed the army to ‘wait several days before carrying 
out the plan in hopes that the situation would calm’.143 Despite intermittent offers to 
renew the truce, however, the situation escalated irreparably when Hamas kidnapped 
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit on 25 June.144
Different parts of Hamas’s organization responded differently, and in at times 
contradictory ways, to the various pressures at this time. The internal political leadership
140“Gunmen Storm Palestine TV Office,” Agence France Presse, June 5, 2006.
141“Israeli Air Strike Kills Two Palestinians,” Agence France Presse, June 8, 2006.
142Scott Wilson, “Israeli Airstrike Kills 10 Palestinians; Eight Civilians Among Dead; Israel Denies Role
in Last Week’s Fatal Beach Explosion,” The Washington Post, June 14, 2006, sec. A Section; “Hamas 
Armed Wing Claims Rocket Attack Breaking Truce,” Agence France Presse, June 10, 2006, Nexis 
UK.
143“Report: Israel’s Defense Minister Approves Plans to Begin Targeting Hamas Political Leaders,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, June 11, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
144“Israel Vows Revenge after Brazen Gaza Attack,” Agence France Presse, June 25, 2006, Nexis UK.
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has control only of domestic political tools and thus sought political ways past the 
tensions with Fatah. Shortly after Shalit was kidnapped, internal political leaders 
announced a deal with Fatah that would have implicitly recognized Israel, seemingly 
unaware of the actions of the Qassam Brigades and intent on moving forward with the 
political process.145 Deputy Prime Minister Nasser Shaer said ‘We care about the life of 
the soldier and we call upon the kidnappers to guarantee his life and to release him’.146 
Benedetta Berti argues that the interpretation by much of the Western media during the 
period that these contradictory actions were a sign of internal disagreements within 
Hamas betrays a lack of understanding about how Hamas operates. She asserts that the 
organization was in fact quite cohesive at the time. She stresses that the fact that the 
political leadership was pursuing a seemingly moderate line while the Qassam Brigades 
took a more aggressive stance is not because the latter ‘went behind [the political 
leadership’s] back’ but is simply a reflection of how Hamas is organized, with the 
Qassam Brigades enjoying considerable autonomy.147 Azzam Tamimi’s description of 
Hamas’s structure supports this interpretation. He writes that, while policy-level 
decisions are ‘taken at the highest level of the leadership of the Hamas movement... the 
tactics used to force Israel to release prisoners and withdraw from occupied land are 
local choices’ made by individual cells of the Qassam Brigades. He also notes that 
Ismail Haniyeh and other members of the government would naturally have been 
unaware of the plans because it ‘was agreed within Hamas before the legislative 
elections were held that members of the movement who were elected to the PLC or 
appointed to the cabinet should forfeit their leadership positions within the 
145Ibrahim Barzak, “Hamas, Fatah Agree to Plan That Implicitly Recognizes Israel,” Associated Press 
Worldtream, June 27, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
146Aron Heller, “Palestinians Attack Border, Kill 2 Soldiers, Capture 1; Israel Threatens Harsh Reprisal,”
Associated Press International, June 25, 2006, sec. International News.
147Benedetta Berti, “‘Gilad Shalit’ Email Correspondence with Author,” October 8, 2014.
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movement’.148 The split may not be between the political and military wings of Hamas, 
but within the political wing itself, however, particularly between the internal and 
external leaderships. An elder member of Hamas, Sayed Salem Abu Musameh, admitted
around the time of the kidnapping in 2006 that there were internal tensions within 
Hamas. ‘Haniyeh is from the pragmatic school, but there is great pressure on him from 
the hardliners.’149
Gilad Shalit’s abduction guaranteed escalation with Israel, thereby closing the 
door on a political pathway for Hamas. Two days after the abduction, Israeli troops 
entered southern Gaza and planes attacked two bridges and a power station that supplied
electricity to much of the Gaza strip.150 A planned expansion of the incursion into the 
northern Gaza Strip went forward on 5 July.151 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made
clear that this operation was an attempt to compel Hamas to free Shalit, saying ‘We have
no particular desire to topple the Hamas government’.152 Israel continued incursions into
the Gaza Strip for much of the rest of 2006. During ‘Operation Squeezed Fruit’ in 
October, Defence Minister Peretz reiterated that the goal of the missions was 
compellence and/or disruption, stating that Israel had ‘no intention of reoccupying the 
Gaza Strip’.153 When he ordered the expansion of the operation on 31 October, Prime 
Minister Olmert once again stressed that Israel would not reoccupy Gaza: ‘We will have
148Tamimi, Hamas, 2011, 242.
149Beverley Milton-Edwards, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010),
129.
150Steven Gutkin, “Israeli Planes Attack Power Station and Two Bridges, Knocking Out Power in Most 
of Gaza Strip,” Associated Press Worldtream, June 27, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
151Thomas Wagner, “Israel Authorizes Army to Invade Northern Gaza,” Associated Press Worldtream, 
July 5, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
152“Olmert Denies Plans to Topple Hamas-Led Palestinian Government,” Associated Press Worldstream, 
July 10, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
153Josh Brannon and Sheera Claire Frenkel, “Peretz: IDF Operations in the South Must Continue to Stop 
Terrorism. Gazans Have Anti-Tank Missiles Halutz Confirms,” The Jerusalem Post, October 25, 2006,
sec. News, Nexis UK.
Page 191 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
to take various steps without creating a permanent military presence there.’154 In effect, 
a ceasefire agreed on 26 November between Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas shifted the problem of combating rockets from 
the Gaza Strip to Abbas.155 The result was rising violence between Hamas and Fatah. A 
member of Abbas’s guard was killed in a raid by Hamas gunmen on a training camp in 
Gaza.156 Combined with clashes elsewhere in Gaza and in the West Bank between 
gunmen from Hamas and Fatah, a Fatah MP exclaimed that the situation ‘looks like a 
civil war’.157
Prime Minister Olmert, for his part, preferred Hamas and Fatah fighting each 
other to both of them fighting Israel. He thus vowed to continue with a ‘policy of 
restraint’, despite rocket fire from Gaza, which continued regardless of the ceasefire 
between Israel and factions loyal to Abbas, out of fear that a ‘harsh Israeli response... 
would weaken Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and unite the warring 
Fatah and Hamas factions’.158 Instead, Olmert met with Abbas and agrred to release 
$100 million in tax money Israel had collected on behalf of the PA but refused to 
transfer to the PA after Hamas’s election victory earlier in the year.159 He also removed 
dozens of roadblocks in the West Bank and cancelled the planned construction of a new 
154Josh Brannon and Sheera Claire Frankel, “PM: IDF Will Expand Gaza Operation to Stop Arms 
Smuggling. Boasts That 300 Hamas Terrorists Have Been Killed in Three Months,” The Jerusalem 
Post, October 31, 2006, sec. News, Nexis UK.
155Sakher Abu al-Oun, “Ceasefire Holds in Gaza Despite West Bank Deaths,” Agence France Presse, 
November 27, 2006, Nexis UK.
156Avi Issacharoff, “Member of Abbas’ Guard Dies as Gunmen Raid Gaza Training Camp,” Haaretz 
Daily Newspaper, December 15, 2006, Online edition, sec. News, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/member-of-abbas-guard-dies-as-gunmen-raid-gaza-training-camp-
1.207300.
157Rory McCarthy, “‘This Looks Like Civil War’ - Palestinians Battle on the Streets: Clashes Between 
Hamas and Fatah Leave 30 Injured Rival Accused of Trying to Assassinate PM Haniyeh,” The 
Guardian, December 16, 2006, Final edition, sec. Guardian international pages, Nexis UK.
158Herb Keinon and Yaakov Katz, “Olmert Still Restrained Despite Kassams. PM Fears a Military 
Response Would Weaken Abbas * Peretz Urges Action,” The Jerusalem Post, December 22, 2006, sec.
News, Nexis UK.
159Herb Keinon, Khaled Abu Toameh, and Yaakov Katz, “Olmert Agrees to Release $ 100m. in PA Tax 
Revenue. Decision Announced After Olmert Meets with Abbas,” The Jerusalem Post, December 24, 
2006, sec. News, Nexis UK.
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West Bank settlement, in effect to reward Palestinians there for their support for 
Abbas.160 This arrangement looked similar to that before the Second Intifada, whereby 
Israel and the PA cooperated to weaken Hamas. Hamas’s attention was also most keenly
focused on Fatah: Although rocket fire from Gaza was more frequent in 2006 than in 
2005 (see figure 5.8 below), Hamas was not responsible for most of it. Shin Bet head 
Yuval Diskin reported ‘that Hamas was careful not to fire Kassam rockets on Israel and 
that the organization was respecting the calm’. In addition, while Islamic Jihad was 
launching most of the rockets, it was not getting them from Hamas, in contrast to earlier
rounds of launches. He also calculated that the odds of a Palestinian unity government 
would rise in parallel with violence between Hamas and Fatah.161
160Mark Lavie, “Israel to Remove Dozens of West Bank Roadblocks in Attempt to Boost Abbas,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, December 25, 2006, sec. International News, Nexis UK; Steve 
Weizman, “Israel Releases $100 Million to Abbas Before His Unity Talks with Hamas,” Associated 
Press Worldstream, January 19, 2007, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
161Herb Keinon and Khaled Abu Toameh, “Rice Boosts Livni’s Plan for Palestinian ‘Political Horizon’. 
US Secretary of State Stresses Need to Show ‘How We Might Move Toward a Palestinian State,’” The
Jerusalem Post, January 15, 2007, sec. News, Nexis UK.
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Figure 5.8: Rockets launched at Israel from 2001 through the end of 2013.162
Diskin was prescient, to a degree. A Hamas-Fatah unity government was indeed 
formed in February 2007. Prime Minister Olmert initially predicted the unity 
government would collapse, which is perhaps why he saw no need to cut ties with 
Abbas as a result of its formation, despite a cabinet-approved boycott on ties with the 
rest of the unity government.163 Instead, he agreed to begin talks with Abbas, moderated 
by US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, on the ‘contours’ of a future Palestinian 
162“Rocket Attacks on Israel From Gaza • IDF Blog | The Official Blog of the Israel Defense Forces,” 
accessed January 15, 2014, http://www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attacks-toward-israel/.
163“Olmert Sees Palestinian Unity Govt ‘Collapse,’” Agence France Presse, February 12, 2007, Nexis 
UK; Herb Keinon, “PM Won’t Cut Ties with Abbas Over Mecca Deal,” The Jerusalem Post, February 
16, 2007, sec. News, Nexis UK; “Israeli Cabinet Approves Boycott of New Palestinian Government,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, March 18, 2007, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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state.164 At the same time, Israel allowed a transfer of arms from Egypt to a ‘military 
force loyal to’ Abbas, which Israeli defence officials claimed was necessary ‘to counter 
a massive military force Hamas [was] building in the Gaza Strip’.165 At the same time, 
Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin told the American ambassador that the US should not send 
further weapons to Fatah security forces, revealing in a leaked cable that their 
intelligence indicated that ‘most of the Fatah-aligned security forces have been 
penetrated by Hamas’ and that he feared weapons sent to Fatah would not reach their 
intended recipients. The situation in Gaza was dire for Fatah, as Hamas was dominant in
‘most areas’ there. ‘We have received requests to train their forces in Egypt and Yemen. 
We would like them to get the training they need, and to be more powerful, but they do 
not have anyone to lead them. … They are approaching a zero-sum situation, and yet 
they ask us to attack Hamas. This is a new development. We have never seen this 
before. They are desperate.’166
Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin painted a more positive picture of the 
infighting. He predicted that Hamas would win control of Gaza because Fatah was weak
there and ‘he would be surprised if Fatah fights and even more surprised if they win.’ 
Fatah was still strong in the West Bank, and had even begun to kidnap Hamas activists. 
Israel could thus work with a Fatah regime in the West Bank and, although this was not 
necessarily the consensus view within military intelligence, he remarked that a Hamas 
takeover of the Gaza Strip ‘would please Israel since it would enable the IDF to treat 
164Herb Keinon, “Israel Agrees to Discuss Contours of Palestinian State. Rice Launches PM-Abbas Talks
Every Two Weeks; Sends Message to Arab League Meeting Today to Be ‘Creative,’” The Jerusalem 
Post, March 28, 2007, sec. News, Nexis UK.
165Yaakov Katz, “Officials Back PM on Arms Transfer to Abbas,” The Jerusalem Post, April 17, 2007, 
sec. News, Nexis UK.
166Yuval Diskin and Richard Jones, “ISA Chief Diskin on Situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank,” 
Leaked Diplomatic Cable (Tel Aviv: US Embassy, June 13, 2007), 
https://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07TELAVIV1732.html.
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Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal with Hamas as a non-state actor’.167 
Yadlin thus expressed a preference for a deterrence situation that would indeed soon 
arise between Israel and Gaza. Three days after his meeting with US Ambassador Jones,
Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip was complete. Israel now had a clear ‘return 
address’ for reprisals against Hamas attacks, greatly lengthening its list of potential 
targets.
During the Second Intifada, Israel had shown itself capable of moving from 
indirect deterrence to direct deterrence, by both punishment, in the form of targeted 
killings, and denial, in the form of the security barrier, improved intelligence, and the 
disruption of operations. This had succeeded in halting Hamas suicide bombing attacks 
almost completely, but had come at the cost of an initial massive increase in violence, 
the physical separation of Israelis and Palestinians through withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip and the construction of the security barrier, and the death of the peace process. 
These new methods had so far been less effective against rockets and mortars. Hamas’s 
takeover of Gaza now meant a more straightforward direct deterrence relationship that, 
in the absence of bombings, would allow Israel to place more focus on rockets and 
mortars. This new relationship is the subject of the next chapter.
167Amos Yadlin and Richard Jones, “Military Intelligence Director Yadlin Comments on Gaza, Syria and
Lebanon,” Leaked Diplomatic Cable (Tel Aviv: US Embassy, June 13, 2007), 
https://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07TELAVIV1733.html.
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6. Hamas in Power: Compellence and Deterrence-by-
Punishment, 2007 to 2014
Hamas’s June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip marked a shift to a third distinct 
period in Israel’s deterrence of Hamas. It also left Israel’s defence establishment with 
three options, as reported by the Jerusalem Post’s defence analyst Yaakov Katz: 
intervene militarily to assist Fatah, seal Gaza off completely and ignore it, or attempt to 
talk to Hamas. Israel’s leaders immediately ruled out the first option, not wanting to re-
invade Gaza so soon after pulling out of it.1 Some defence officials recognized that 
Hamas’s takeover of Gaza meant a fundamental shift in the group’s relationship with 
Israel—one that had clear benefits as well as dangers. As one official ‘involved in 
monitoring events in Gaza and planning policy’ explained shortly before Hamas’s 
takeover was complete: ‘The bank of targets has grown tremendously with Hamas’s 
takeover. Hamas is a clear and defined enemy and that means that when we decide to 
respond it will be easier than before since all their buildings are now targets as is anyone
walking around with a weapon.’2 As Israel’s military intelligence director Amos Yadlin 
confided to US Ambassador Richard Jones a few days prior to the takeover in a cable 
later leaked to WikiLeaks, a Hamas takeover of Gaza ‘would please Israel since it would
enable the IDF to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal with Hamas 
as a non-state actor’.3 The head of Israel’s internal security service (‘Shin Bet’), Yuval 
1 Yaakov Katz, “Israel’s Main Options: Disconnect Totally from Gaza or Talk to Hamas. Security 
Chiefs Discount Notion of Invading Strip to Try and Help Fatah,” The Jerusalem Post, June 15, 2007, 
sec. News, Nexis UK.
2 Ibid.
3 Amos Yadlin and Richard Jones, “Military Intelligence Director Yadlin Comments on Gaza, Syria and 
Lebanon,” Leaked Diplomatic Cable (Tel Aviv: US Embassy, June 13, 2007), 
https://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07TELAVIV1733.html.
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Diskin, was less sanguine, reportedly stating ‘Palestinian society is disintegrating and 
that this bodes ill for Israel’. He asserted: ‘We have to give Fatah the conditions to 
succeed.’4 At the same time, it would also attempt to ensure Hamas did not have the 
conditions to succeed. It thus chose the second option: Seal Gaza off completely and 
ignore it. At the same time, it began to focus on improving conditions in the West Bank 
to create a starker contrast to the conditions in Hamas-controlled Gaza.
6.1 ‘Flowering Fatahland, wilting Hamstan’: An attempt at 
compellence5
The two intelligence heads sum up nicely the stick-and-carrot approach Israel 
was to take towards Gaza and the West Bank (and Hamas and Fatah, respectively) in the
aftermath of Hamas’s takeover. Days thereafter, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and
US President George W. Bush announced a plan to ‘shun Hamas and bolster Fatah’. 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas founded an emergency government to rule the 
West Bank. The US had imposed an aid embargo on the Palestinian government after 
Hamas won the elections the year before. It now announced that it would soon lift that 
embargo against Abbas’s new government while continuing it for Hamas. Israel also 
considered deploying a force on the border between Gaza and Egypt to stop the 
smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip.6 This policy remains broadly in place at the 
4 Yuval Diskin and Richard Jones, “ISA Chief Diskin on Situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank,” 
Leaked Diplomatic Cable (Tel Aviv: US Embassy, June 13, 2007), 
https://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07TELAVIV1732.html.
5 Description by Jonathan Freedland in Jonathan Freedland, “The Scene of Fatahland Flowering as 
Hamastan Wilts Is Sheer Fantasy: There Are Huge Dangers in Offering Palestinians a Choice of 
Statelets - It Will Only Push Hamas Further into Iran’s Orbit,” The Guardian, June 20, 2007, Final 
edition, sec. Guardian Comment and Debate Pages, Nexis UK.
6 Steven Gutkin, “Olmert and Bush to Map Out Strategy to Shun Hamas and Bolster Fatah,” Associated
Press Worldstream, June 16, 2007, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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time of writing eight years later.
This approach was an attempt at compellence (a type of ‘negative 
reinforcement’—punishment unless and until the other party does what is desired) 
designed with the people of Gaza in mind, not Hamas. As Yadlin surmised, Gaza was 
‘hopeless for now’ and the Palestinians had to realize that Hamas offered no solution. 
Israel ranked Gaza as only its fourth-largest security threat, behind Iran, Syria, and 
Hezbollah.7 Israel’s security officials were thus apparently confident that any threat 
from Hamas could now be contained. In addition to its attempt at compellence, Israel 
maintained a deterrence threat, noting that it could retaliate for attacks using the newly 
widened array of targets available to it in Gaza. The strategic aim was thus, in essence, 
to keep Gaza an unpleasant place to live and show the Fatah-ruled West Bank to be a 
better alternative until support for Hamas withered away and either a more moderate 
government took over in Gaza or Hamas agreed to the conditions Israel and its allies 
had set out for ending the embargo against it: renouncing violence, recognizing Israel’s 
right to exist, and accepting all previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA).
To that end, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and US President George W. 
Bush met on 16 June 2007, just a day after Hamas took over control of Gaza, to discuss 
how to bolster Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the expense of Hamas. Over the
next few days, a flurry of measures were announced: In addition to the US lifting its 
embargo on the part of the Palestinian government controlled by Abbas, Israel 
announced that it would unfreeze tax money it had previously held, release 250 
Palestinian prisoners, and renew negotiations on the ‘future contours’ of a Palestinian 
7 Yadlin and Jones, “Military Intelligence Director Yadlin Comments on Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.”
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state at a new summit hosted by Egypt.8 The interests of Israel and the PA were aligning;
the two thus also re-established security coordination.9 Arab countries joined in this 
compellence exercise: In a surprising move, Egypt and Jordan headed an Arab League 
delegation to Israel for the first time ever to begin talks with Israeli officials on the 2002
Arab Peace Initiative, which proposed Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for 
withdrawal from land occupied in 1967.10
In the Gaza Strip, meanwhile, Hamas had new responsibilities. ‘As a 
government Hamas had to arrange trash collection, pay municipal servants, handle the 
courts and police, and otherwise make 1,001 daily decisions. Sending each one up the 
chain of command and conferring with the external leadership would have been 
impossible. Now Hamas’s political center shifted to Gaza. Under the most trying 
circumstances imaginable, Hamas was finally being tested on whether it could govern as
well as resist Israel.’11 One of the central problems it faced was the economy, which was
being hit by the blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt. These issues were daunting and 
would seem to conspire to help Israel’s attempt at compelling Gazans to rid themselves 
of Hamas. Compellence, however, is more difficult to achieve than deterrence for at 
least two reasons. The first is that compliance with a compellent demand requires 
positive action, which is obvious and therefore humiliating (unlike compliance with a 
deterrent demand, which is negative and can always be explained away by the deterred 
8 Anne Gearan, “U.S. Poised to Lift Palestinian Embargo,” Associated Press Worldstream, June 18, 
2007, sec. Interational News, Nexis UK; “Olmert Says Israel to Free 250 Fatah Prisoners,” Agence 
France Presse, June 25, 2007, Nexis UK; Steve Kirby, “Israel Cabinet Unfreezes Palestinian Taxes 
Ahead of Summit,” Agence France Presse, June 24, 2007, Nexis UK; Mohammed Daraghmeh, 
“Abbas Aide: Egypt Arranging Regional Summit Next Week in Show of Support for Abbas,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, June 21, 2007, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
9 Matti Friedman, “Israelis, Palestinians Resume Security Talks, Signaling Renewed Cooperation,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, July 3, 2007, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
10 Mark Weiss, “First-Ever Arab League Team Due Here This Week. Talks to Focus on How to Bolter 
Abbas,” The Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2007, sec. News, Nexis UK.
11 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 182.
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side by claiming it had no intention to carry out the given activity, anyway). The second 
reason is that complying with a deterrent demand maintains the status quo and thus does
not invite further demands. This is not the case for compellence, compliance with which
often involves a loss of potential power in addition to a loss of face, bringing the 
compliant party into a worse position should the compeller then simply make additional 
demands. Resistance to compellent demands is thus likely to be vehement and take on 
an importance bordering on pure survival. In the case of Israel versus Hamas, for 
instance, compliance on Hamas’s part would see it either removed from power or 
accepting the ideas of the Oslo Accords—the first of which would severely reduce its 
power and influence, the second of which violate its very raison d’etre, while both 
could be seen as threatening its very survival. It should therefore not have been hard to 
imagine that Hamas would seek to make do without complying or would even find ways
to benefit from the situation.
One of these ways of making do and perhaps benefiting from sanctions was via 
the smuggling tunnels with Egypt. ‘Within weeks of the takeover, [Hamas’s] military 
wing had established oversight over much of the tunnel network that extends beneath 
the [border with Egypt].... An informed observer estimated the number of economically 
active tunnels had risen from fifteen in June 2007 to 120 by March 2008. The control at 
times is indirect; non-Hamas groups continue to smuggle, but Hamas imposes a tax on 
certain commodities. Hamas closed tunnels of operators failing to pay the new duties or 
caught trafficking illegal drugs or weapons to non-Hamas groups.’12  The tunnels were 
beneficial enough to Hamas that some in Gaza claimed Hamas preferred to keep border 
crossings with Israel shut—further evidence that the blockade may actually have helped 
12 “Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas,” Middle East Report (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
March 19, 2008), 18.
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Hamas rather than hurt it. According to a ‘local observer’ interviewed in Gaza City in 
March 2008 by the International Crisis Group, ‘Hamas calls all the time for Israel to 
open the crossings, and when they are open they shoot at them’. This led a Gaza City 
economist to argue in a December 2007 interview ‘that Israeli crossings were shelled to 
keep them closed and thereby ensure the tunnels retained their importance’. The report 
cites the example of the Kerem Shalom goods crossing near Rafah. When it was opened,
‘shelling intensified until merchants appealed to the Hamas government to hold fire’.13
Compellence thus showed signs of failure as early as late 2007. The deterrence 
portion of the policy, however, was somewhat more successful, though the level of 
violence of the current status quo was high enough that a confrontation was likely 
sooner or later. Hamas initially showed restraint, opting in addition to the shootings at 
crossings only to fire mortars at nearby military targets within Israel. It refrained from 
launching rockets or targeting Israeli civilians, but it did not prevent other groups from 
doing so.14 A period of escalation began in early January 2008, however, when Gazan 
militants launched a Katyusha rocket that landed in northern Ashkelon, a southern 
Israeli city considerably larger than the town of Sderot, which had been bearing the 
brunt of projectile attacks from Gaza. This was the farthest a Gazan rocket had travelled 
up to that point and, because Ashkelon is more populous, was provocative. Israeli 
government spokesman David Baker said: ‘The Palestinians have attacked a major 
Israeli city ... and thus have upped the ante. Israel will not allow any cities to be attacked
by Palestinian rocket fire.’ Israel responded by sending troops into Gaza overnight, who 
killed two Hamas militants.15
13 Ibid., 7.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibrahim Barzak, “Israel Hits Back for Rocket Fire, Killing 11 in Gaza Attacks,” Associated Press 
Worldstream, January 4, 2008, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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On 15 January, Israeli troops, tanks, and helicopters moved into the northern 
Gaza Strip in what they deemed a routine operation against militants. The Israeli troops 
completed the operation with no casualties on their side, but they killed three civilians 
and 14 militants, including the son of Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, Hussam Zahar. 
Hamas responded by launching a barrage of rockets at Sderot, the first time it had 
admitted to doing so in months, and fatally shot Carlos Chavez, an Ecuadorian volunteer
working on a farm near the border with Gaza.16 Violence continued, leading Israel’s 
Defence Minister Ehud Barak to order the closure of the Gaza Strip for several days.17 
Such tit-for-tat actions continued until June.
After months of talks mediated by Egypt, Israel and Hamas came to a ceasefire 
agreement on 18 June 2008.18 The ceasefire required Hamas to end rocket fire and 
weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip in return for an easing of the Israeli blockade 
and a possible opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt if there was progress on 
releasing abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israel would implement its side of the 
agreement in phases in exchange for Hamas’s fulfilment of its own terms.19 Egypt, for 
its part, promised Israel not to open the Rafah border crossing until Gilad Shalit was 
returned to Israel.20 Hamas’s reliance on tunnel smuggling calls into question the 
effectiveness of these policies as carrots, but the ceasefire was largely successful: The 
number of rockets and mortars hitting Israel fell dramatically after it went into effect. 
Between 1 January 2008 and 18 June 2008, 2262 rockets and mortars had fallen on 
16 Ibrahim Barzak, “19 Gazans, Ecuadorean Kibbutz Volunteer Killed in Israeli-Palestinian Clashes,” 
Associated Press International, January 16, 2008, sec. International News.
17 Adel Zaanoun, “Israel Locks down Gaza,” Agence France Presse, January 18, 2008, Nexis UK.
18 Matti Friedman, “Israelis, Palestinians Greet Gaza Truce Accord with Some Relief and Much Doubt,” 
Associated Press International, June 18, 2008, sec. International News.
19 Griff Witte and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Israel, Hamas Agree on Gaza Strip Truce, Accord Would Be 
Phased In, With Cease-Fire Beginning as Soon as Tomorrow,” The Washington Post, June 18, 2008, 
Suburban edition, sec. Foreign, Nexis UK.
20 Steve Weizman, “Egypt Pledges in Olmert-Mubarak Talks Not to Reopen Gaza Crossing Till Israeli 
Soldier Is Free,” Associated Press Worldstream, June 24, 2008, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
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Israel, an average of 13.3 per day. After the ceasefire, between 19 June and 4 November,
only 38 hit Israel, an average of just 0.3 per day.21 Compellence thus showed no signs as
yet of working to rid Gaza of Hamas, but a deterrence relationship did seem to be 
emerging.
This period of calm ended abruptly on 11 November 2008, when Israeli troops 
entered Gaza to destroy a tunnel leading to Israel they said was ready for immediate use 
to kidnap Israeli soldiers. An alleged plot uncovered by Israel’s Shin Bet security 
service just two weeks earlier to abduct Israeli soldiers and smuggle them into Gaza by 
luring them into a drug deal near the Egyptian border and drugging them with sleeping 
pills, combined with the fact that Gilad Shalit was still captive, suggests there was a real
threat of abduction.22 When the Israeli troops arrived on the Gazan side of the border to 
destroy the tunnel on 11 November, a gun battle with Hamas militants ensued, injuring 
three Palestinians, including one woman, and killing one militant confirmed by local 
residents to be a member of Hamas. In response, Hamas launched mortars into Israel 
and admitted to doing so. Israel, in turn, attacked the mortar launching site, killing five 
militants. Abu Obeida, the spokesman of Hamas’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, 
promised revenge. Both sides saw the other as having broken the truce and each claimed
they intended to continue to uphold it; each side felt it was simply responding to 
provocations by the other side.23 This meant each side saw itself responding to a new, 
more violent status quo. The situation thus continued to escalate. Hamas soon began 
launching rockets at Israel and, within less than two weeks, Israel began sending tanks 
21 “Rocket and Mortar Hits (launched from Gaza) 2001-2014” (Sderot, Israel: Sderot Media Center, 
September 4, 2014), http://sderotmedia.org.il/library/Gaza-Rocket-Handout-pages3-4.pdf.
22 Yaakov Katz, “Shin Bet Foils Hamas Plot to Kidnap IDF Soldiers at Border,” The Jerusalem Post, 
October 27, 2008, sec. News, Nexis UK.
23 Diaa Hadid, “Israeli Troops Clash with Palestinian Militants,” Associated Press International, 
November 4, 2008, sec. INTERNATIONAL NEWS.
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into Gaza.24 The number of rockets and mortars per day rose to 7.5, still much lower 
than before the ceasefire, but around 20 times higher than during the calm. In the week 
between the official expiry of the ceasefire and the launch of Israel’s Operation Cast 
Lead alone, 161 rockets and mortars were fired, amounting to 23 per day.25 Israel 
launched its operation on 27 December in response.
Hamas may have been able to prevent Operation Cast Lead by de-escalating, but
it had in the meantime prepared itself for an Israeli invasion and may have believed such
an invasion would benefit it politically. It ‘tried to ensure that, like Hizballah, it could 
continue launching rocket attacks on Israel even if the IDF invaded Gaza; the ground 
forces would protect the rockets and inflict casualties, eventually wearing down the IDF
and the Israeli people.’26 It built three lines of defence. The first, located near the border 
with Israel, included ‘“kill zones” with observation posts, IEDs [(Improvised Explosive 
Devices)], mines, ambush sites, and preregistered mortar fire’. The second was located 
on the outskirts of the major Gazan cities and consisted of ‘heavy mortars (120 
millimeters), machine guns, antitank weapons, snipers, and suicide bombers [organized]
in ambushes along anticipated axes of advance’. The final line of defence included ‘a 
complex network of tunnels for moving fighters and weapons, positioning snipers, and 
kidnapping IDF soldiers, as well as an elaborate system of boobytrapped houses’ within 
Gaza’s cities.27 In addition to the deterrent effect this might have, Hamas also believed 
that Israel’s recent humiliating experience in Lebanon in 2006 would provide it an 
additional reason not to launch an invasion in the first place. Abu Obeida made this 
24 Reuters, “Hamas Fires Rockets at Israel After Airstrike,” The Washington Post, November 5, 2008, 
Met 2 edition, sec. Foreign, Nexis UK; Ibrahim Barzak, “Israeli Tanks Rumble into Gaza,” Associated
Press Worldstream, November 18, 2008, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
25 “Rocket and Mortar Hits 2001-2014.”
26 Byman, A High Price, 191.
27 Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian 
Islamic Resistance Movement,” Policy Focus (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 2009), http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Hamas_in_Combat.pdf.
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bullish statement published on the official website of the Qassam Brigades just days 
before Operation Cast Lead: ‘the reason is clear that Zionists military commander or 
political cannot afford results of a decision as big as the invasion of the Gaza Strip, 
especially the feel of defeat, failure and disappointment are still fresh to them after the 
war in Lebanon’28 As Abu Bakr Nofal, a senior Hamas official on Gaza, put it, ‘Many of
the Arab regimes and international leaders were living under the illusion that the Israeli 
army was unbeatable. This war has had a huge negative effect on the Israeli street.’ 
Israel’s susceptibility to Hezbollah’s rockets, and its apparent inability to stop them from
being fired, has a particularly strong effect.29
Hamas also likely felt emboldened by the mood among Gaza’s residents. 
Richard Falk, the UN’s Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Territories, described the 
situation in Gaza in 2008 as an ‘emergency situation that is producing a humanitarian 
catastrophe that is unfolding day by day’.30 Sharyn Lock, a campaigner with the Free 
Gaza movement who was present in Gaza in December 2008, wrote, ‘everyone asks 
everyone solicitously - “you have gas?” [Her friend] Moh pointed out that his gas 
canister is covered in mud, a legacy of its journey through the tunnels from Egypt which
keep besieged Gaza supplied with such necessities – expensively […] Moh paid the 
equivalent of £65 for [his canister of gas], which most families couldn’t possibly 
afford.’31 Mohammed Abdalfatah, Director of International Cooperation for the 
Municipality of Gaza, describes the mood in Gaza City at the end of 2008, before Cast 
28 Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades - Information Office, “Abu Ubaida: We Are Not Trotting to Calm,” Al-
Qassam, December 16, 2008, http://www.qassam.ps/news-903-
Abu_Ubaida_We_are_not_trotting_to_calm.html.
29 Beverley Milton-Edwards, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 
132.
30 Richard Falk, “Gaza: Silence Is Not an Option,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, December 9, 2008, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=8380&LangID=E.
31 Sharyn Lock, Gaza: Beneath the Bombs (London ; New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 25–26.
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Lead. He says things were so bad that people wanted any change. ‘There was a slow 
suffering in August, September, October and you thought “let it come!”’32 Gazans thus 
viewed the status quo as unacceptable enough that they did not fear a confrontation with
Israel—a ‘push factor’ that meant Israel’s deterrence of Hamas was unlikely to hold.
Hamas thus saw weakness in Israel and strength on its own side, both ‘pull’ 
factors in the deterrence model, and support from the Gazan population for a 
confrontation as a result of what Gazans felt was a desperate and unacceptable status 
quo, a ‘push’ factor that combined with the ‘pull’ factors to undermine deterrence. At the
same time, the picture on the Israeli side was similar and had the same effect. Oxford 
Professor and historian of Israel Avi Shlaim contends that Israel was to blame for the 
tunnel incident that sparked the escalation that led to Cast Lead, as it was a unilateral 
action that violated the ceasefire. ‘[T]he ceasefire worked until Israel violated it by 
launching a raid into Gaza [in] November 2008 killing six Hamas fighters and then 
hostilities resumed. […] The excuse was that Hamas was building a tunnel, which was 
half a kilometre from the border, but the Israelis said that they wanted to build a tunnel 
under the border to capture another Israeli soldier. But that’s not an excuse to break the 
ceasefire. Israel broke the ceasefire and Hamas retaliated with rocket attacks.’33 He also 
confirms what Abu Obeida claimed above with regard to the Israeli view of the 2006 
Lebanon War, but argues Israel saw this as a reason to attack, not a reason not to. ‘[T]he 
second Lebanon war was regarded by all Israelis as a failure and the military were 
annoyed that the failure eroded the deterrent power of the IDF, so they wanted to restore
the deterrent power of the IDF by going into Gaza and showing what damage they could
do. So one of the motives for the attack on Gaza, although there was a ceasefire, it could
32 Mohammed Abdalfatah, Author interview in person, March 13, 2014.
33 Avi Shlaim, Author interview in person, May 29, 2014.
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have been presumed, was to enhance the deterrent power of the IDF by the brute and 
crushing use of military force.’34
Kobi Michael, a former deputy director general and head of the Palestinian desk 
at Israel’s Ministry for Strategic Affairs, who is now a senior research fellow at Tel 
Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a senior lecturer in the 
Department of Political Science at Ariel University, confirms part of Avi Shlaim’s 
assessment: ‘[T]he second Lebanon war... was perceived in Israel as a strategic failure 
from the military point of view and even the political point of view.’35  Another Israeli 
affairs expert and former Foreign Ministry official explained to this author that a ground
invasion was necessary in 2008 because Hamas believed Israel would not invade. Israel 
had to show Hamas that this was not the case.36 Both Israel and Hamas were thus 
unsatisfied with the status quo and neither feared the consequences of an escalation so 
much that they wished to return to that status quo. Hamas had kept to the ceasefire as far
as launching rockets and mortars was concerned and it did prevent many projectile 
launches by other groups, which can perhaps be considered the most important aspect of
the ceasefire. At the same time, however, Israeli security reports that Hamas continued 
to smuggle weapons into Gaza and used the concrete allowed into Gaza as a result of 
the ceasefire to build underground bunkers.37 Perhaps most importantly, there is no 
mention of tunnels in reports on the ceasefire agreement. In the event, both sides could 
view themselves as the defenders in this situation, making both less likely to back down.
Hamas viewed itself as strong, doubted Israel’s willingness to invade Gaza, and found 
the status quo increasingly unacceptable. Israel did not view Hamas as strong, but did 
34 Ibid.
35 Kobi Michael, Author Interview in person, June 10, 2014.
36 Expert on Israeli policy, Author interview in person, January 31, 2013.
37 Herb Keinon, “Calm in Gaza Allows Hamas to Strengthen Position, Cabinet Told. Diskin: Group Has 
Smuggled in 4 Tons of Explosives Since Cease-Fire,” The Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2008, sec. News, 
Nexis UK.
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see that its willingness to attack might be questioned. The status quo, in which Hamas 
smuggled weapons into Gaza and built tunnels into Israel, was poor enough that Israelis 
could hope that a better status quo might be achieved after a round of escalation.
With hindsight, it is easy to see that all signs pointed to a violent confrontation. 
Deterrence failed because the factors that would lead to it were not properly in place. In 
fact, the policies of deterrence and compellence came into direct competition with one 
another, as one would expect, because compellence seeks to alter the status quo while 
deterrence seeks to maintain it. In this case, compellence required making the status quo
unbearable to encourage the ‘right’ sort of reaction in Gaza. For deterrence to work, 
however, Gazans would need to accept the status quo. The worsening situation in Gaza 
thus undermined deterrence and made an outbreak of violence more likely. This is not 
an uncommon situation in Israel’s ongoing confrontation with Hamas, even as the 
equation shifted away from compellence and toward deterrence from after Operation 
Cast Lead in 2008-2009.
6.2 Direct deterrence of Hamas: Cast Lead and its aftermath
With talk of an almost inevitable heavy military operation in the Gaza Strip 
increasing in Israel, a senior defence official laid out Israel’s ‘red lines’ on rocket fire: 
‘We will only accept quiet like there was before the operation in November.... Sporadic 
fire of several Kassams a day is unacceptable and will lead us to a collision course with 
Hamas.’38 This was not enough to compel Hamas to end the violence; it announced the 
38 Yaakov Katz and Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Chiefs Go into Hiding as Crumbling Cease-Fire Ends.
11 Rockets Fired. Only ‘Complete Quiet’ Will Prevent Collision, Says Israel. Armored Vehicles 
Deploy on Border. UN Suspends Food Distribution,” The Jerusalem Post, December 19, 2008, sec. 
News, Nexis UK.
Page 209 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
official suspension of the ceasefire on 18 December, though there were rumours that it 
would soon reverse its decision. A further announced measure by Israel had a greater 
effect than the above ‘red lines’. Despite a comment made in June by Hamas Prime 
Minister Ismael Haniyeh that threats to kill Hamas leaders ‘don’t even scare the smallest
Palestinian child’, the Israelis reported that Hamas chiefs went into hiding after 
announcing the end of the ceasefire. Hamas also reportedly ‘evacuated many of its 
institutions and security installations in anticipation of an escalation with the IDF’.39 
This may be at least in part due to Egypt. After talks with the Israelis and Hamas, ‘Egypt
warned Hamas that if it didn’t stop the rocket attacks, Israel would embark on an 
assassination campaign against all the terror chieftains in Gaza’. That same day, the 
number of Qassam rockets falling on Israel dropped from 10-20 per day over the 
weekend to ‘just a handful’, suggesting once again that threats against Hamas’s 
leadership are taken seriously and can be enough to compel it to stop violence that has 
already begun.40 This seeming success was extremely short-lived, however: The next 
day, Israel killed three militants in Gaza. Hamas retaliated by launching more than 70 
projectiles at Israel the next day.41 Just a few days later, Israel began Operation Cast 
Lead, with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stating that the aim was ending ‘insufferable’ 
rocket attacks and ‘indiscriminate terror’.42
Israel’s goal was not to topple Hamas and it was careful to avoid doing so 
accidentally. Mohammed Abdalfatah notes that Israel did not attack Hamas’s main 
39 Witte and Knickmeyer, “Israel, Hamas Agree on Gaza Strip Truce, Accord Would Be Phased In, With 
Cease-Fire Beginning as Soon as Tomorrow”; Katz and Toameh, “Hamas Chiefs Go into Hiding as 
Crumbling Cease-Fire Ends. 11 Rockets Fired. Only ‘Complete Quiet’ Will Prevent Collision, Says 
Israel. Armored Vehicles Deploy on Border. UN Suspends Food Distribution.”
40 Yaakov Katz, “Barak Maneuvering Between Cairo and Livni,” The Jerusalem Post, December 23, 
2008, sec. News, Nexis UK.
41 Sakher Abu El-Oun, “Hamas Rockets Pound Israel as Truce Hopes Fade,” Agence France Presse, 
December 24, 2008, Nexis UK.
42 David Horovitz, “Fighting Hamas in the Shadow of 2006’s Mistakes. Have the Lessons of the War 
Against Hizbullah Been Learned?,” The Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2008, sec. News, Nexis UK.
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buildings. He comments that they knew where the Cabinet was, but they did not strike it
for a week—after everyone was already underground. He asserts that no more than 100 
Qassam Brigades members died. Israel attacked Hamas’s weapons infrastructure, but 
not Hamas’s own infrastructure. They could have taken out the entire internal leadership
if they had wanted to; he noted that they came within 100 metres of Mahmoud al-
Zahar’s house. Instead, they attacked the police, ‘200 in one attack’.43 As a writer for the
Associated Press reported, the ‘initial wave of airstrikes took Gaza by surprise, targeting
militants and Hamas security forces at key installations.... But the government buildings
targeted later were empty, as Gazans became fearful of venturing out into the streets,’ 
noting that these buildings served as ‘symbols of Hamas' power’.44 Abdalfatah 
concludes: ‘The people’ paid the price and that was Israel’s intention. They ‘wanted to 
teach Hamas and the Gazans a lesson’.45 Reports from this stage, even from sources 
more sympathetic to Palestinians, admitted that the vast majority of those killed were 
members of Hamas’s security services and rocket launching squads, with only around 
one in six victims being civilians.46 Israel claims it targeted the Hamas security services 
because a great number of them were members of the Qassam Brigades, with some of 
them even filling command functions within the organization.47 The Hamas government 
does not deny this: ‘Many of the Qassam operate within both the Qassam Brigades and 
the Internal Security. In our laws, we do not prevent any resistance fighter from joining 
the police or a security service, provided that he is committed to the rules and 
43 Abdalfatah, interview; Hazem Balousha and Rory McCarthy, “Gaza Bombings: Civilian Death Toll 
Rises after Second Day of Air Strikes,” The Guardian, December 29, 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/29/israelandthepalestinians-middleeast.
44 Ibrahim Barzak and Amy Teibel, “Israeli Warplanes Slam Hamas Government Compound,” 
Associated Press Worldstream, December 30, 2008, sec. International News, Nexis UK.
45 Abdalfatah, interview.
46 Balousha and McCarthy, “Gaza Bombings.”
47 “Hamas Police ‘Dual Function’ in the Gaza Strip,” Israel Security Agency, 2010, 
http://www.shabak.gov.il/ENGLISH/ENTERRORDATA/REVIEWS/Pages/Hamas120709.aspx.
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regulations of the department he belongs to ... We make sure that their activities, outside
of their official jobs, remain separate.’48 Israel’s targeting of Hamas police and security 
forces was thus not merely symbolic. In addition, Abdalfatah may be overestimating 
Israeli intelligence. Because Hamas’s leadership went underground before Operation 
Cast Lead began, it is not clear that Israel could really have killed ‘the entire leadership’ 
if it had wanted to, though Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni implied at the start of Cast Lead
that political leaders could soon be targeted, saying ‘Hamas is a terrorist organization 
and nobody is immune.’49
Prime Minister Olmert’s initial aim of halting the rocket fire was not achieved 
during Operation Cast Lead. In fact, the number of rockets and mortars hitting Israel 
daily rose by nearly 50%, from 23.0 per day before the operation to 33.7 per day during 
it.50 Nevertheless, Prime Minister Olmert declared a unilateral ceasefire that would go 
into effect in the early hours of 18 January 2009, claiming ‘We have reached all the 
goals of the war, and beyond’. He also declared that Israeli troops would remain in Gaza
for the moment, ready to return fire if fired upon.51 In effect, Israel was engaging in 
‘tacit bargaining’: It stopped first to give Hamas a chance to reciprocate without actually
negotiating with it. Although Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhum stated ‘We will not 
accept the presence of a single soldier in Gaza’, Hamas did indeed reciprocate, holding 
its fire and allowing Israeli troops to leave the Strip.
According to an Israeli affairs expert and former Foreign Ministry official, the 
main reason Israel halted Cast Lead when it did is because it wished to ‘stop while [it] 
48 Abigail Hauslohner, “Gaza’s Police Force: Between Hamas and a Hard Place,” Time, September 17, 
2010, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2019151,00.html.
49 MSNBC.com News Services, “Israeli Airstrikes in Gaza Kill More than 200,” Msnbc.com, December 
28, 2008, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28397813/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/israeli-airstrikes-
gaza-kill-more/.
50 “Rocket and Mortar Hits 2001-2014.”
51 Ron Bousso, “Israeli PM Declares Halt to Gaza Offensive,” Agence France Presse, January 17, 2009, 
Nexis UK.
Page 212 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
had the upper hand’. Israeli intelligence reported that Hamas was already beaten down 
quite heavily militarily and that its leaders were already quite deterred.52 The fact that 
Israel stopped first and that Hamas survived the onslaught, however, could in many 
ways be viewed as a win for Hamas. Kobi Michael underscores the distinction between 
a military win and a political victory. ‘[T]he idea that they can retaliate [against] the 
strong actor […] and the idea that they can challenge […] the IDF and not be defeated 
in the sense that they will remain as a military organization or a military player—or 
even a political player in the scene […]—this is the win in their eyes! This is the 
strategic achievement.... Not only a military win, this is a political victory for them. […]
And therefore deterrence is not only a military concept. Deterrence, [is] also a political 
concept.’53 In addition, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence and 
Atomic Energy Dan Meridor, claims that Israel was deterred after Cast Lead due to 
international condemnation. ‘Wars today are shown on screen throughout the world in 
real time and you can’t stop it. If you are very strong and you use your power and 
everyone sees it, you become a villain. The weak become the “right” side.’54
Despite this view of the result of the conflict, the alleged assessment by Israel’s 
military intelligence that Hamas’s leaders were deterred as a result of the heavy 
pounding Gaza had received during Cast Lead turned out to be correct. Less than one 
rocket or mortar fell on southern Israel per day in 2009 after the end of Cast Lead (see 
figure 6.1 below). This continued in 2010, with just one rocket or mortar every two 
days, on average.55 This low level of projectile fire also shows that it was not only 
Hamas that was refraining from firing; other groups were holding their fire as well. 
52 Expert on Israeli policy.
53 Michael, interview.
54 Dan Meridor, Israeli policy towards Hamas, Author interview via telephone, February 22, 2014.
55 “Rocket and Mortar Hits 2001-2014.”
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They had little choice in this: Hamas enforced the ceasefire. In March, Hamas arrested 
members of Islamic Jihad and forced them to sign an agreement not to launch rockets at 
Israel. A member of Islamic Jihad claimed that the arrested members were ‘tortured and 
interrogated about the identities of those who fire rockets’.56 A Hamas official in Gaza 
said ‘Apparently some Palestinian parties are trying to create an excuse for Israel to 
resume its aggression against our people. Hamas will not allow this to happen.’57 Hamas
continued to enforce the ban on launching rockets and this was reported by multiple 
news outlets relaying interviews with both Hamas and the groups whose members were 
arrested.58 These actions, along with Hamas’s statement of its intention not to ‘create an 
excuse for Israel to resume its aggression’, show that Hamas believed Israel would 
respond violently to rocket fire and that it was determined to avoid such an outcome. 
Hamas was deterred throughout the rest of 2009, all of 2010, and throughout much of 
2011, a year in which projectile hits in southern Israel amounted to less than one per day
except for two brief periods of escalation.59
56 “Hamas Makes Islamic Jihad Vow Not to Fire Rockets,” Agence France Presse, March 9, 2009, Nexis 
UK.
57 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Crackdown on Islamic Jihad Rocket Squads Raises Tensions in Gaza. 
Hamas: Some Palestinian Parties Trying to Create an Excuse for Israel to Resume Its Aggression,” 
The Jerusalem Post, March 11, 2009, sec. News, Nexis UK.
58 For examples, see: “Hamas Seizes Militant Who Fired at Israel: Gaza Group,” Agence France Presse, 
March 26, 2009, Nexis UK; “Hamas ‘Working to Curb Gaza Rocket Attacks,’” BBC News, April 2, 
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8601171.stm.
59 “Rocket and Mortar Hits 2001-2014.”
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Figure 6.1: This chart shows the number of rockets and mortars hitting Israel each year
(launched by all groups, not just Hamas). Note: the figure for 2008 was extended to 18 
January 2009 so as to include all the launches during Cast Lead in one period and to 
contrast this properly with the rest of 2009. The data extend through November 2014.
News reports in late 2010 still quoted Hamas as saying that anyone launching 
rockets on Israel from Gaza was a ‘rebel’ and insisting that it wished to maintain the 
calm.60 First signs also began to appear of a new confidence in Hamas’s fighting 
capabilities, however, which, if it continued to improve, could eventually constitute a 
‘pull’ factor encouraging Hamas to risk another round of violence with Israel. Hamas 
senior leader Mahmoud Zahar said that, although Hamas seriously considered ‘Israel’s 
threats to launch another war on Gaza, [we] frankly say if Israel tries to enter Gaza, it 
will cost it a lot and it won’t be able to achieve its goals.’ In addition, he asserted that it 
was ‘the right of Hamas to have all kinds of weapons to defend itself. If Israel carries 
out another war in the future, it should think thousand [sic] of times before carrying out 
60 Haaretz Service, “Hamas: Anyone Firing Rockets from Gaza at Israel Is a Rebel,” Haaretz, October 
30, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hamas-anyone-firing-rockets-from-gaza-
at-israel-is-a-rebel-1.321953; Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Says It Wishes to Abide by ‘Calm.’ IAF 
Attacks Targets in Gaza Overnight Friday after Rocket Shot into Israel. Izzadon Kassam Chief: You 
Will Cease to Exist and Palestine, with Its Jerusalem, Al-Aksa Mosque, Villages and Cities Will 
Remain Ours,” The Jerusalem Post, December 26, 2010, sec. News, Nexis UK.
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a war.’61 In February 2011, a rocket from Gaza hit the Israeli city of Beersheba, 25 miles
from the Gaza border, for the first time since Operation Cast Lead. Israel responded by 
striking targets in the Gaza Strip, including the launchers thought to have been used by 
Islamic Jihad to fire the rockets at Beersheba, but also several Hamas targets in the 
Strip, showing Hamas that Israel held it responsible as well. A senior official admitted, 
however: ‘Hamas is trying to restrain the other groups.’ The official suggested that the 
tensions noted previously between Hamas and Islamic Jihad, including the alleged 
torture of Islamic Jihad rocket launchers, had not been resolved: ‘Islamic Jihad is trying 
to challenge Hamas and tries to attack even though Hamas is currently committed to the 
quiet’.62
On 16 March, a rocket from Gaza landed in Israel causing no damage or 
casualties. Israel responded with an air strike on a Hamas training camp, killing two 
members of the Qassam Bridages.63 This response is somewhat surprising, as the rocket 
did not cross any of Israel’s apparent red lines: It did not kill anyone or cause any 
damage, it was a single rocket, and it did not fall on a major city. Hamas, reflecting this 
surprise, responded by launching a barrage of rockets at Israel three days later, lightly 
wounding two civilians. Israel, in turn, responded by hitting a Hamas ‘security centre’, 
wounding five.64 Four days later, however, Hamas chose to de-escalate. Spokesman 
Taher al-Nunu announced: ‘We confirm that our stance in the government is set on 
protecting the stability. We will work to restore the field conditions that were prevalent 
over the last few weeks.’65
61 Haaretz Service, “Hamas: Anyone Firing Rockets from Gaza at Israel Is a Rebel.”
62 Yaakov Katz, Tovah Lazaroff, and Judy Siegel, “PM to Hamas after Rocket Fire: Don’t Test Our 
Resolve. At Least One Dead in Rafah Following Fresh Air Force Strike at ‘Terror Target’ on Thursday 
Night,” The Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2011, sec. News, Nexis UK.
63 “Two Militants Killed in Israeli Strike on Gaza,” Agence France Presse, March 16, 2011.
64 “Gaza Militants Shell Israel,” Agence France Presse, March 19, 2011, Nexis UK.
65 “Hamas ‘Vows to Restore Calm’ in Gaza: Statement,” Agence France Presse, March 23, 2011, Nexis 
UK.
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This series of incidents clearly shows the restraint exercised by both sides and 
their reluctance to escalate in 2010 and early 2011. At the same time, it highlights the 
fragility of the deterrence situation and suggests that one or both sides were beginning 
to question the virtues of maintaining the status quo. This can be said to be part of 
Israel’s medium-term strategy of cumulative deterrence, teaching its Arab opponents 
over time to accept lower levels of violence with Israel. As an Israeli academic with a 
security background explained to the author, once deterrence has established a certain 
low level of violence, it is then in Israel’s interest to push violence down still further at 
the end of the next, more or less inevitable, round of escalation.66 Because such a policy 
views escalation as a way of a achieving a new, potentially less violent status quo, it 
makes maintaining a given deterrence situation less desirable. This undermines 
deterrence stability by reducing the commitment to maintaining calm.
A similar calculation exists for Hamas, which often sees its popularity, and thus 
hold on power, increase after an extensive Israeli operation and decrease whenever 
Gaza’s residents see it as uninvolved in major events affecting Palestinians. Figure 6.2 
below shows that, of Gazans who said they would vote in a legislative election, just 
above 30% tend to report they would vote for Hamas. Nevertheless, two dips in support 
immediately become clear: one in September 2010 and one in March 2012, times when 
Hamas was not involved in peace talks and a confrontation with Israel, respectively. 
Highs have occurred in December 2012 and since September 2014, both immediately 
following wars against Israel in Gaza.
66 Israeli academic with a security background, Author interview in person, February 2013.
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Figure 6.2: Percentage of Gazans who reported that they would vote in legislative 
elections who said they would vote for Hamas. Source: Palestinian Public Opinion 
Polls by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, 2008-2014.
In September 2010, just prior to polling, Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the resumption of peace talks.67 On the day the 
talks began in Washington, DC, Hamas’s armed wing announced that it was responsible 
for an attack in the West Bank that wounded two Israeli settlers.68 Although many 
Palestinians approved of that attack, around ‘49% believe[d] that the main motive 
behind Hamas’s attack on settlers was [to] impede the peace process and direct 
negotiations while 39% believe[d] that the motivation was to resist occupation and 
settlements’.69 Furthermore, despite the fact that most Palestinians were opposed to 
resuming talks unless Israel halted settlement construction, support for Hamas, which 
67 Herb Keinon, “PM: Israel Wants Durable Peace, Not ‘Interlude’ between Conflicts. As Talks Begin 
Today, Netanyahu Says, ’We Recognize That Another People Shares This Land with Us,” Jerusalem 
Post, September 2, 2010.
68 “Hamas Armed Wing Claims Latest West Bank Attack,” Agence France Presse, September 1, 2010, 
Nexis UK.
69 “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (37),” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 
October 2, 2010, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/216.
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was not involved in negotiations, fell.70 Amongst the contradictory poll responses of the 
Palestinian public, suggesting widespread uncertainty about what the next step should 
be, this author can only conclude that Gazans support action, peaceful or violent, 
towards resolving the current situation of occupation, even if they remain sceptical of 
the odds of that action’s success. Being seen to do nothing, or to halt attempts at 
progress, is viewed negatively.
This conclusion is strengthened by an analysis of the next low point in support 
for Hamas in March 2012. The number of periods of escalation doubled to four in 2012, 
up from two in 2011. The first of these periods, which began on 9 March when Israel 
killed a leader of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), showed once again that 
targeted killing upsets the status quo and leads to escalations when used in times of 
quiet. As a result, Hamas spokesman Taher al-Nunu said Hamas gave armed groups ‘a 
free hand to respond to the crimes of the occupation.’71 In response, groups in the Gaza 
Strip, primarily Islamic Jihad and the PRC, launched more than 200 rockets, 116 of 
which were confirmed to have hit Israel, though the recently deployed Iron Dome 
missile defence system reportedly intercepted several others, preventing hits on 
populated areas.72 Naji Shurrab at Gaza’s Al-Azhar University concluded that Hamas 
‘allowed the factions to respond so it wouldn’t contradict its stated position on the 
resistance and would not appear to be abandoning the option of resistance’.73 Hamas 
itself, however, refrained from participating in that round of violence, which was 
viewed negatively by Gazans, as the researchers at the centre that conducted the polling 
70 Ibid.
71 “Hamas Walked Fine Line in Gaza Conflict: Analysts,” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2012, Nexis
UK.
72 “Rocket and Mortar Hits 2001-2014.”
73 “Hamas Walked Fine Line in Gaza Conflict: Analysts.”
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also concluded.74
Hamas appears to have learned from this dip in public support. On 18 June, 
militants crossed the border from Egyptian Sinai into Israel and attacked several 
civilians working on the fence between the two countries. An Israeli military 
spokesperson said that the attackers were not from the Egyptian military but could not 
rule out that they originated from the Gaza Strip.75 Although claiming they were 
unrelated to the border incident, Israel launched air strikes on the Gaza Strip merely 
hours later and continued into the next day, killing six Palestinians, including two 
Islamic Jihad militants and at least one member of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades. Israel 
claims these strikes were against militants about to attack Israel. This time, Hamas 
joined in firing rockets at Israel in response.76 An opinion poll was conducted of Gazans 
during the escalation that noted that support had returned to 31%, around its average 
since 2007.77 Hamas agreed to a ceasefire on 20 June, after which Israel stopped 
retaliatory raids for two days but during which non-Hamas militants continued to launch
a smaller number of rockets at Israel, one of which hit an Israeli border police post.78 
Israel eventually responded by resuming strikes in Gaza on 23 June, which led to a 
second Egypt-brokered ceasefire that restored calm.79
Many commentators concluded that Hamas was launching rockets during this 
period of escalation due to the fall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the 
recent success of the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi in Egypt’s 
74 “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (43),” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, March 
17, 2012, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/210.
75 “Israeli Civilian, Two Gunmen Killed in Egypt Border Ambush,” Agence France Presse, June 18, 
2012.
76 “Gaza Rockets Pound Israel after Air Strikes Kill 6,” Agence France Presse, June 19, 2012, Nexis UK.
77 “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (44),” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, June 
23, 2012, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/209.
78 “Gaza Militants Fire Two Rockets into Israel: Army,” Agence France Presse, June 22, 2012, Nexis 
UK.
79 “Hamas Says Ready for Fresh Gaza Truce Bid,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2012.
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presidential elections, which occurred at the same time. As a ‘senior Israeli official’ told 
Agence France Presse: ‘There is a connection between the flare-up of violence in Gaza 
and the Egyptian election. The Islamists are trying to change the status quo.’ Gazan 
academics Ahmad al-Turk and Mukhaimer Abu Saada basically agreed with this 
assessment, with the latter concluding that the Egyptian election had bolstered Hamas 
and led it to ‘test Israel to determine whether it has the intention of launching a war 
against Gaza’.80 Hamas was not terribly provocative during this short escalation, 
however. It agreed to an initial ceasefire after just two days of attacks and, when it did 
attack, it avoided civilian targets.81 It should also be noted that at this stage, both Morsi 
and his opponent, Ahmed Shafiq, were claiming victory in Egypt.82 It would therefore 
have been premature for Hamas to make strategic judgements on this basis if indeed it 
did so. Gazan public opinion, combined with Israel’s deterrent, thus likely provides a 
better explanation for Hamas’s actions: It did not wish to be seen sitting on the sidelines 
during any escalation after it witnessed how unpopular this was among Gazans. At the 
same time, it was careful to keep its retaliation short and restrict it to military and 
government targets, thus reducing the likelihood of a large-scale Israeli retaliation. 
Hamas was not ‘changing the rules of the game’, it was mastering them.
The period of calm following this latest brief escalation was again short. On 7 
October, Israel launched an air strike that critically wounded two men belonging to 
Salafist militant groups in Gaza. The strike also wounded eight others, including five 
children.83 Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched rockets at Israel in response, citing the 
80 “Hamas Retakes the Lead in Attacking Israel,” Agence France Presse, June 22, 2012, Nexis UK.
81 Ibid.
82 Dina Ezzat, “Morsi, Shafiq Campaigns Both Claim Victory in Egypt Presidency Race,” News, Ahram 
Online, (June 20, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/45718/Presidential-
elections-/Presidential-elections-news/Mursi,-Shafiq-campaigns-both-claim-victory-in-Egyp.aspx.
83 “Two Critically Hurt in Israeli Air Strike on Gaza: Medics,” Agence France Presse, October 7, 2012.
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civilian casualties as the reason.84 A very similar attack on two other Salafists on a 
motorcycle a mere six days later, which killed one of them, elicited only a muted 
response from Hamas, which ‘did not even mention [the killed Salafist’s] name in their 
official press release about his death’.85 Presumably because no civilians were wounded 
and the Salafists posed a political threat to Hamas, the latter saw no reason to respond. 
This changed on the 23rd, when a roadside bomb laid by the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) severely wounded an Israeli solider near the border with 
the Gaza Strip just hours before the Qatari emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 
visited the Strip. Israel responded with strikes against two members of Hamas’s Qassam
Brigades who it claimed were about to launch rockets into Israel.86 Since its own 
members had been hit, Hamas and Islamic Jihad responded by launching rockets into 
Israel, one of which severely injured two civilian Thai workers and lightly wounded 
several others, crossing one of Israel’s ‘red lines’: civilian casualties. Israel’s Defence 
Minister Ehud Barak reiterated this red line, saying ‘No terror element responsible for 
causing damage in Israel—or to Israelis—will be spared’.87 Israel responded with air 
strikes in Gaza, which killed two Qassam Brigades members. Hamas responded by 
firing more rockets into Israel. This tit-for-tat violence seemed to have come to an end at
midnight on the 25th, when an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire went into effect.88 On 28 
October, just three days later, Palestinian sources in Gaza reported that Israeli tanks 
entered the southern Strip and that Hamas militants opened fire on them. Israel 
84 “Hamas, Islamic Jihad Fire Rockets into Israel,” Agence France Presse, October 8, 2012, Nexis UK.
85 Jon Donnison, “Israel Seeks to Contain Gaza’s Salafi-Jihadist Threat,” BBC, October 15, 2012, Online
edition, sec. Middle East, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19952325.
86 “Gaza Border Bomb Wounds Israeli Soldier: Military,” Agence France Presse, October 23, 2012; 
“Israeli Officer Severely Hurt on Gaza Border: Military,” Agence France Presse, October 23, 2012.
87 “Israel Vows to Punish Hamas as Gaza Unrest Spikes,” Agence France Presse, October 24, 2012, 
Nexis UK.
88 “Israel Vows to Punish Hamas After Wave of Rockets from Gaza,” Agence France Presse, October 25,
2012, Nexis UK.
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responded with an air strike that killed one of the militants. Hamas, in turn, responded 
by launching rockets at ‘military sites’ within Israel.89 By 31 October, however, the 
cross-border violence had stopped again without any further talk of a ceasefire. Perhaps 
the fact that a ‘top-level Bahraini delegation’ was coming to Gaza on 1 November to 
open two UN-run schools encouraged both sides to return to the previous ceasefire.90
Within days of the Bahraini delegation’s departure, however, the lull came to an 
end. On 5 November, Israeli soldiers shot a Gazan man who approached the security 
barrier with Israel and did not respond to calls to stop. Palestinian sources said he had 
suffered from mental illness. The next day, in what may have been an unrelated event, 
an Israeli soldier on patrol near the Gaza border was moderately injured in a bomb blast,
with two others sustaining light injuries.91 The Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility 
for that attack the next day, a day that also saw a Palestinian teen killed by gunfire from 
an Israeli helicopter providing cover for Israeli soldiers who crossed into Gaza to diffuse
explosive devices. An Israeli soldier was also wounded in an explosion in a booby-
trapped tunnel they had recently discovered and were seeking to destroy.92 On the 10th, 
the PFLP made the headlines again with a rocket attack on an IDF jeep near the Gaza 
border, which injured four soldiers. Israel responded by shelling several sites in Gaza, 
killing four and wounding some 30 others.93 The next day, around 100 rockets hit 
southern Israel, injuring three people in Sderot and leading Defence Minister Ehud 
Barak to threaten to ‘intensify our response’.94 The number of rockets falling on Israel 
89 “Israel Hit by 18 Rockets as Hamas Seeks Revenge,” Agence France Presse, October 29, 2012, 18.
90 “Top-Level Bahraini Delegation to Visit Gaza Thursday,” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2012.
91 Yaakov Lappin, “Blast Injures 3 IDF Soldiers during Patrol on Gaza Border,” Jerusalem Post, 
November 7, 2012, sec. News.
92 “Gaza Teen Killed by Israeli Fire, Bomb Injures Soldier,” Agence France Presse, November 8, 2012.
93 “4 Gazans Killed, 4 Soldiers Hurt as Rocket Hits Army Jeep,” Agence France Presse, November 10, 
2012.
94 Yaakov Lappin and Tovah Lazaroff, “Gazans Pound South with More than 100 Rockets. Three Sderot 
Residents Injured by Barrage. PM: ‘We Are Prepared to Intensify Our Response’. Barak Blames 
Hamas for Attacks,” Jerusalem Post, November 12, 2012, sec. NEWS.
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fell to just two on the 12th, however, as Egyptian efforts at mediation seemed to be 
taking effect: Hamas stated that it would abide by a ceasefire if Israel reciprocated.95
Israel continued to carry out non-lethal strikes on Gaza, however. Defence 
Minister Ehud Barak suggested that the recent status quo, with occasional rocket fire 
and bomb blasts hitting Israeli soldiers patrolling the border, was not acceptable and that
Israel would escalate to establish a new, more peaceful status quo: ‘We intend to 
reinforce the deterrence—and strengthen it—so that we are able to operate along the 
length of the border fence in a way that will ensure the security of all our soldiers who 
are serving around the Gaza Strip.’ A statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu also 
suggests Israel was no longer interested in attempting to salvage the previous status quo:
‘At this time... it is preferable to act (in a timely fashion) rather than just talk.’96 The 
final blow to any chance of calm came when Israel launched an air strike that killed the 
commander of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades in Gaza, Ahmed Jabari.97 Hamas immediately 
responded by launching a barrage of rockets at Israel. Mark Heller of the INSS told 
reporters ‘The deterrence against Hamas had deteriorated and Israel needed to 
reestablish it. Israel’s failure to respond to rocket fire from Gaza led Hamas to think it 
could act with impunity.’98 Israel now began its second major operation in Gaza since 
Hamas’s takeover in 2007: Operation Pillar of Defence (a.k.a. ‘Pillar of Cloud’).
The irony of this escalation is that it came at a time when it appears many in 
Israel were beginning to question the logic of the prevailing ‘wilting Hamastan’ policy. 
95 Jonathan Ferzinger, “Barak Says Israel to Hit Hamas Until Deterrence Restored,” 
BloombergBusinessweek, November 13, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-
13/barak-says-israel-will-hit-hamas-until-deterrence-is-restored; “New Israeli Warnings on Gaza after 
Rocket Fire,” Agence France Presse, November 13, 2012.
96 “New Israeli Warnings on Gaza after Rocket Fire.”
97 Diane Sawyer, “Deadly Strike; Air Strike,” World News with Diane Sawyer (New York: ABC News, 
November 14, 2012).
98 Linda Gradstein, “Israeli Cities Under Fire After Dozens of Rockets Fired from Gaza,” 
JewishJournal.com, November 14, 2012, 
http://www.jewishjournal.com/israel/article/israeli_cities_under_fire_after_dozens_of_rockets_fired_f
rom_gaza.
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Giora Eiland, a former general, head of the INSS, and head of Israel’s National Security 
Council during its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, wrote in the Israeli daily Yediot 
Ahronot that ‘Israel has an interest that Gaza resemble, as much as possible, a state with
a stable government. That is the only way to have an address for both deterrence and 
dealing with security issues. Israel has an interest in economic improvement in Gaza of 
the kind Qatar can bring. Such improvement creates assets that any government would 
be concerned about damaging, and thus it will be more moderate and cautious.’
Benedetta Berti, a research fellow at the INSS who specializes in the political 
integration of militant groups including Hezbollah and Hamas, agrees that the ‘wilting’ 
of Gaza was not producing the desired results: ‘[I]nitially the whole idea of isolation 
was […] grounded in a few different theories. One was that if you push the people in 
Gaza hard enough, they will turn against Hamas, which of course has not happened. In a
way, actually, this has become a fig leaf for Hamas: When they’re not delivering to the 
people, they can always go back to them and say “look, this is the occupation, it’s not 
that we’re not managing our resources effectively.” And to some degree, they’re right. 
[…] Objectively it is true that governing under this situation has created a number of 
important challenges for them … It’s true that for them to deliver what they promised is 
basically impossible given the circumstances.’99 Hamas has also remained popular 
because ‘they are, as far as I understand, perceived to be less corrupt and have more 
integrity than Fatah, which is not so hard’, though Berti noted that, ‘As they become 
more and more embedded in government, you start hearing more about malpractice’.100
Many experts this author spoke to around the time of Pillar of Defence felt that 
Hamas’s isolation was eroding anyway, as more outside leaders visited, and planned to 
99 Benedetta Berti, Author interview in person, February 20, 2013.
100Ibid.
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visit, Gaza. The fact that Hamas’s parent organization the Muslim Brotherhood was in 
power in neighbouring Egypt also made the continued isolation of Gaza seem not only 
less tenable, but less practical. Shmuel Bar, a security expert and former senior Israeli 
intelligence official, believed that ‘The Egyptian government is now headed by people 
who are associated with Hamas, but they won’t do anything to endanger their 
relationship with Israel or the United States’. Nevertheless, smuggling tunnels were still 
open, as they always had been, Hamas looked stronger than ever with regard to its store 
of weapons, in particular, and its isolation seemed to be crumbling.101 At the same time, 
the presence of other, yet more extreme, challenges to Hamas’s authority in Gaza from 
Salafist groups made the prospect of an eventual Hamas government collapse 
unpalatable. Shifting Israeli policy away from one of both deterrence and compellence 
ought to have improved deterrence in the way that Eiland suggested: There would be 
more targets to hold at risk during an escalation and the status quo would be more 
pleasant than an escalation. Ironically, the public debate about the shifting fortunes of 
Hamas and a possible shift in Israeli strategy towards pure deterrence may instead have 
emboldened Hamas in the short term. This time, ‘pull factors’, vulnerabilities in its 
opponent, coupled with a view of its own relative strengths, came together to reduce 
Hamas’s reluctance to engage in a new round of violence.
At the same time, Mahmoud Abbas was determined not to stand still. He 
appeared to relinquish Palestinians’ right to return to their ancestral homes within Israel 
when he stated that he had the right to visit Safed in present-day Israel, where he was 
born, but that he did not have the right to live there. He also stated that, for him, 
Palestine was the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Hamas spoke out vehemently 
101Gradstein, “Israeli Cities Under Fire After Dozens of Rockets Fired from Gaza.”
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against this.102 At the same time, Abbas was working on a UN General Assembly bid to 
become an observer state and was involved in negotiations with Arab and EU 
governments on the matter. Hamas had learned previously that being seen to be 
uninvolved in matters affecting Palestinians hurt its support. Groups like the PFLP were 
also eager to register their resistance to Abbas, saying ‘We will hold Abbas accountable 
for his rejected statement’ on the Palestinian right of return.103 Hamas has always known
that it can halt any Israeli-Palestinian negotiations by turning to violence. Such moves 
would also ensure it remained relevant in Palestinian eyes and did not lose popularity. 
These were ‘push factors’ that encouraged Hamas to depart from the status quo and run 
greater risks of escalation.
A look at Hamas’s performance during Pillar of Defence itself suggests that it 
was right to view itself as stronger than before, making the risks it ran in the run-up less 
surprising. Mohammed Abdalfatah comments that ‘Hamas wasn’t ready for such a war’ 
in 2008. He contends that it learned from the 2008-9 war and was ready in 2012.104 An 
employee for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 
agrees that Hamas performed much better in 2012 than in 2008-9. ‘In 2012, I had the 
impression that many in Israel did not expect Hamas’s tactical and operational 
performance to be so good. I was living in Ramallah at the time and I remember sirens 
in areas around Jerusalem, and I don’t remember that ever happening. Two things 
surprised people: The ability of Hamas to continue launching rockets in a coordinated 
way for a longer period. The second thing was the tactical cohesion and the fact that... 
the Israelis concentrated their attacks on the same areas, but the launching sites were 
102“Abbas ‘Refugee’ Comments Wow Israel, Enrage Gaza,” Agence France Presse, November 3, 2012; 
“BBC Monitoring Headlines, Quotes from Palestinian Press 6 Nov 12,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
November 6, 2012, sec. BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political.
103“BBC Monitoring Headlines, Quotes from Palestinian Press 6 Nov 12.”
104Abdalfatah, interview.
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underground. Many from the Gazan side claimed Hamas did not use a lot of resources, 
either personnel or firepower. You could see that [Defence Minister Ehud] Barak was 
not happy when the political aspect kicked in with the US, Egypt, and Europe.’105
A look at the Israeli side also suggests reasons Hamas could feel more confident.
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy Dan 
Meridor suggests Israel learned its own lessons from the 2008-9 war. Being seen as too 
strong and harsh by the international community during Cast Lead hemmed Israel in. He
says Israel learned from this in Pillar of Defence, which was very heavy, but very 
precise. Israel said from the outset ‘we don’t want to conquer Gaza’ so as not to create 
frustration when it was not done. This precision did not cause condemnation and 
improved Israel’s ability to act. He admitted that Israel was, in a way, deterred by the 
international community after Operation Cast Lead in that it could not be seen to be as 
violent as it had been that time.106 Others confirm this. When asked why Israel did not 
go as far during Pillar of Defence, a former Foreign Ministry official with a security 
background responded that there are levels in the assaults on the Gaza Strip. Israel was 
running out of targets on what the interviewee called levels one and two. It would have 
had to move to the next level soon and that would have been much more extreme. The 
interviewee drew a map of Gaza with four concentric zones. No one lives in the outer 
one and militants launch rockets from there. The interviewee indicated that Israel could 
easily have occupied that area. The next ring was villages, then cities, then refugee 
camps. Each progressive step would obviously be more controversial. At the same time, 
a ground incursion was not necessary in Pillar of Defence, unlike during Cast Lead, 
when it was important because Hamas did not believe Israel would do it. In 2008, Israel 
105Employee of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Author interview via 
Skype, March 30, 2014.
106Dan Meridor, Author interview on Israeli policy towards Hamas, telephone, February 22, 2014.
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had to do it to show Hamas that this was not the case. In Pillar of Defence, the Israeli 
leadership wanted to end with the upper hand and Defence Minister Ehud Barak 
believed it would be better to stop while coming to an agreement with Hamas that had 
international support and guarantees. His view thus prevailed. In addition, the 
interviewee pointed out that it was surely relevant that this took place three weeks 
before an election in Israel.107
6.3 After Pillar of Defence: Israeli policy as a rare constant
After Pillar of Defence, many once again professed that Hamas had emerged the 
victor. The same Israeli policy expert insists that Hamas basically got everything it 
wanted, as it desired three things: A halt to the targeted killing of political leaders, the 
opening of the Rafah crossing, and that Arab leaders be allowed to visit Gaza (which the
interviewee stated was not officially part of the agreement, but was actually something 
Israel agreed to and this is the reason so many leaders from other Muslim countries have
now visited Gaza and that Khaled Meshaal has also been there).108 Mukhaimer Abu 
Saada, a political scientist at Gaza’s Azhar University, claims ‘Palestinians were happy 
to see rockets landing on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for the first time. It may be crazy but 
there’s admiration that Hamas was able to manufacture long-range missiles and deter 
Israel. Palestinians believe the Israelis were begging for a ceasefire. The conclusion 
Palestinians reach is that the way to get results is resistance, is to make the occupation 
costly to Israel’.109 As Kobi Michael suggested in an interview, however, ‘sometimes we
107Expert on Israeli policy.
108Ibid.
109Chris McGreal, “Middle East: View from Gaza: ‘The Israelis Were Begging for a Ceasefire,’” The 
Guardian, November 23, 2012, Final Edition edition, sec. Guardian International Pages.
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need a sort of perspective’ to understand the real effect of any operation.110 As figure 6.1 
above clearly shows, Pillar of Defence resulted in a period of calm, with total rockets 
falling to a record low of just 45 in 2013 and remaining low for the first half of 2014.
Perspective also reveals, however, that this period of calm was much shorter than
the one that prevailed before it. Hamas weathered dramatic changes to the political 
landscape surrounding it in this period, which saw its supporters in Egypt, the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Mohammed Morsi, ousted in a coup, and another important backer, 
Qatar, isolated by other powers in the region. Mahmoud Abbas also featured more 
strongly on the Israeli-Palestinian scene as he worked with US Secretary of State John 
Kerry on a peace agreement with Israel and, when that failed, worked to further 
Palestinian recognition at UN institutions. The period eventually saw Hamas weakened 
enough that it entered a unity deal with the PA. The period from mid-2013 to mid-2014 
saw a steady deterioration in the status quo in Gaza and for Hamas both in Gaza and 
abroad. As the status quo became less acceptable, an escalation began once again to 
appear comparatively more inviting. A weakened Hamas was thus no guarantor of 
peace. As it reached an apparent low point in 2014, violence spiked again.
Within days of the truce agreement that ended Pillar of Defence, Khaled 
Meshaal, Hamas’s external leader, began working towards unity between Hamas and 
Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah movement. The calculation at that point was very different 
from that observed in 2014. In late 2012 and early 2013, Meshaal saw an opportunity 
possibly to achieve Palestinian unity with Hamas in a position to dictate the terms of 
any agreement, no doubt hoping to shift Fatah more strongly towards ‘resistance’.111 
Shmuel Bar believes the support of Hamas’s external leadership for Hamas-Fatah 
110Michael, interview.
111“Meshaal Repositions Hamas before Palestinian Unity Talks,” Agence France Presse, December 11, 
2012.
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reconciliation in 2013 came largely because Egypt’s Muslim Brothers were very 
interested in Palestinian unity. Meshaal was shifting towards them out of affinity, but 
also because it was becoming increasingly difficult to be seen to be close to Shia Iran, 
with its support for the Shia regime in Syria as it was killing Sunni Muslims there.112 
Hamas and Israel also soon began indirect negotiations in Cairo on easing the Gaza 
blockade, as promised in the truce agreement.113 It also once again enforced the ceasefire
by arresting rocket launchers from other militant groups.114 Israel retaliated for one such 
launch, which occurred during a visit by US President Barack Obama, by halving the 
distance from shore that Gazan fisherman were allowed to sail. Hamas responded to this
with diplomacy rather than violence, by appealing to Egypt.115 Whatever its 
intransigence during Pillar of Defence, Hamas was now clearly committed to the 
ceasefire.
At the time, it seemed that Israel might be moving away from its ‘wilting 
Hamastan’ policy despite the recent war. Benedetta Berti contended: ‘The terms of the 
cease-fire basically said, between the lines, that the idea is to move beyond [the 
isolation policy], not in these terms, not verbatim, of course, but after the cease-fire, 
there have already been a couple of talks going on in Egypt and the idea is how to deal 
with the Gaza border. Israel is hoping that the biggest share will be basically taken on by
Egypt. So Egypt will relax the border so that Israel doesn’t have to go the full way. 
Long-term, that’s the process: to open the border.’ It was hard to be certain about the 
112Shmuel Bar, Author interview in person, February 27, 2013.
113“Hamas Official Confirms Indirect Talks with Israel,” JPost.com, February 14, 2013, 
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=303580; “Hamas Negotiates with Israel 
the Opening of Gaza Borders,” Radio, The Voice of Russia, (February 20, 2013), 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_02_20/Hamas-negotiates-with-Israel-the-opening-of-Gaza-borders/.
114“Hamas Arrests Hardline Islamists over Rocket Attacks,” Agence France Presse -- English, March 22,
2013.
115Dan Williams, “Hamas Appeals to Egypt After Israel Halves Gaza Fishing Zone,” Reuters, March 22, 
2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/uk-palestinians-israel-truce-
idUKBRE92L0DX20130322.
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future course, however because ‘everything’s up in the air […] because we’re in 
between governments and the process […] obviously stopped after December. I think, 
as far as I understand, Egypt is still willing to be the venue for the talks to continue.’116
Within months, however, Hamas’s optimism began to fade, along with talk of 
easing Gaza’s isolation. Just as Hamas was shifting away from Iran and Syria and 
towards Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, those countries encountered changing conditions that 
would see a government hostile to Hamas take power (Egypt) and their influence 
curtailed (Qatar and, to a certain extent, Turkey). Even before this, the relationship 
between Gaza and Morsi’s Egypt was highly contradictory. As Berti explained,
the interest to keep [the border] as monitored as possible and to prevent infiltrations, 
and prevent smuggling [has continued since the fall of Mubarak]. That’s … an 
interest of the security establishment, but it’s also the interest of [President Morsi], 
who doesn’t want to have another big fiasco like the one last August when 16 
Egyptian security personnel were [killed]. […] [T]he difference is that he also has a 
competing interest, to follow up, first of all, on his promises: One of the things he 
said after the election is that he would open the border. He met with high officials 
from Hamas, he met with Meshaal and with Haniyeh in the summer, I think, after the
elections, he said that was the direction, that makes sense given the ideological 
connections and all that between the Brotherhood and Hamas. ...At the beginning the 
interest to open up and to show a real change with the regime trumped the security 
concern, meaning that he started to make a few announcements and, as far as I 
understand, there started to be some relaxation of the border. Then the attack 
happened, and then they closed it off again, and [since] then […] the opening has 
been going forward, but at a very glacial pace because they are very reluctant.117
The instability on the Gaza-Egypt border continued in 2013. In March, the 
Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram accused Hamas of killing 16 Egyptian border security 
guards in retaliation for Egypt’s closure of smuggling tunnels. Hamas’s armed wing 
vehemently denied this claim.118 As Berti points out, ‘the way out of [the difficulty with 
116Berti, interview.
117Ibid.
118Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Denies Involvements in Sinai Attack That Left 16 Egyptian Dead,” 
Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2013, sec. NEWS.
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border insecurity], which I’ve heard from a number of Egyptian officials as well, is to 
[…] get Hamas on board on closing the tunnels, because that’s the trade-off: [We] open 
the border for you, but you deal with the tunnels.’119 Although Al-Ahram’s report seems 
to contradict what Hamas would want, it is not entirely far-fetched. Closing tunnels was 
highly problematic for Hamas. Although it had an interest in cracking down on Salfists 
in Gaza, it was also—especially its armed wing, the Qassam Brigades—heavily reliant 
on the smuggling tunnels. Berti explains, ‘Hamas runs the tunnels. There’s a tunnel 
ministry, you get a permit, they regulate the construction, they collect taxes from it. And
a lot of the... tunnels are run by Hamas’s military wing, so the Qassam Brigades are 
making money directly, which means there’s also potential for intra-organizational 
strife. If the Hamas government starts to shut down all the tunnels, this will result in 
people from the Qassam Brigades losing money, so it’s a problem.’120 It is therefore 
possible that, even as Hamas’s political leadership wished to open the crossing with 
Egypt, increase security on the border, and crack down on Salafists, members of its 
military wing resisted such moves because they would result in a loss of income. It is 
even possible that they used violence to ensure that Egypt did not open the crossings 
and Gaza continued to rely on tunnels—just as some locals reported was the case in the 
early days of Hamas’s control of the territory.121 On top of all this, a further incident 
occurred in May in which seven Egyptian guards were kidnapped.122
Positive reinforcement of the status quo, which could have made maintaining a 
calm with Israel more palatable to Hamas, was difficult because the Morsi government 
in Egypt was not as supportive of Gaza as Hamas had hoped and cooperation with it 
119Berti, interview.
120Ibid.
121“Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas.”
122“Hamas Tightens Border Security After Kidnapping of Egyptian Officers,” Ahram Online, May 16, 
2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/71614/Egypt/Politics-/Hamas-tightens-border-
security-after-kidnapping-of.aspx.
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involved trade-offs Hamas, or parts of it, may have been unwilling to make. On 3 July 
2013, however, things became much worse as Morsi was forcibly removed from 
government by the Egyptian military after mass protests against his rule had swept 
throughout Egypt.123 Two days later, further attacks in Sinai, one of which originated in 
Rafah, Gaza, led the new Egyptian government to seal the Rafah crossing entirely, 
sparking protest from Hamas. Meanwhile, ‘Ahmed Assaf, a Fatah spokesman, blamed 
Hamas for the closure of the terminal. He said that Hamas’s meddling in the internal 
affairs of Egypt—by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood—[had] harmed the national 
interests of the Palestinians’. Some in Fatah even went so far as to call for Gazans to 
follow Egyptians’ lead and overthrow Hamas.124 Egypt also redoubled efforts to destroy 
all Hamas’s smuggling tunnels and Hamas soon claimed Egypt was flying helicopters 
over the Gaza Strip. A Hamas official complained ‘Even [former Egyptian president] 
Hosni Mubarak did not starve the Gaza Strip. By destroying the tunnels without 
providing an alternative, the Egyptians are punishing the entire population of the Gaza 
Strip and deepening the humanitarian and economic crisis’. Hamas leader Mousa Abu 
Marzook even went so far as openly to muse that Egypt might be attempting to restore 
the control over Gaza it had when it occupied the territory from 1948 to 1967.125 Hamas 
even began holding military parades to show Egypt they were ready for battle if it 
sought to topple them, bringing warnings from Egypt against threatening Egyptian 
123Ben Wedeman, Reza Sayah, and Matt Smith, “Coup Topples Egypt’s Morsy; Supporters Reportedly 
Rounded up,” CNN, July 4, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-
protests/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
124Aswat Masriya, “Egypt; One Soldier Dead, Three Injured in Sinai Attacks,” Africa News, July 5, 
2013; Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Calls on Egypt to Reopen Rafah Crossing,” Jerusalem Post, July 
8, 2013, sec. NEWS.
125Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas: Egypt Trying to Restore Rule Over Gaza,” www.JPost.com, July 23, 
2013, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hamas-Egypt-is-trying-to-restore-sovereignty-over-Gaza-
320825.
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national security.126 The effects of the tunnel closures were serious, with Hamas losing 
an estimated $230 million per month.127 The loss of a sympathetic government in Egypt 
had turned the tables dramatically against Hamas. As Hamas’s very control of the Gaza 
Strip was threatened, the status quo risked becoming dangerously untenable.
At the same time, forces in the wider region were aligning against another 
Hamas ally: Qatar. Just before Morsi’s ouster in Egypt, the Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifa al-Thani surrendered rule of the country to his son, who wished to give 
Qatar a lower profile. By September, the situation was bad enough for Hamas that its 
external leadership officially agreed to leave Qatar.128 In fact, Khaled Meshaal was still 
in Qatar at least nine months later, when he was interviewed by Charlie Rose on 
America’s PBS network.129 Since then, rumours have again surfaced that he has been 
forced out and now lives in Turkey, but there has been no official report of this.130 Qatar,
and its popular satellite news channel Al-Jazeera, had been vocal supporters of the Arab 
Spring protests in general and of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in particular. The fall of 
Morsi meant a deterioration in Qatar’s relations with Egypt. At the same time, the 
Saudis never approved of Al-Jazeera, Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, or 
Qatar’s outsized influence in the wider region. As The Economist noted in 2013, ‘all the
other monarchs of the Gulf, bar none, wanted Sheikh Hamad and Qatar taken down a 
126Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Threatens Egypt, Israel and Palestinian Authority,” Gatestone Institute, 
September 27, 2013, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3993/hamas-egypt-israel-palestinian-authority; 
“Egypt FM Puts Hamas on Notice: Threatens ‘Harsh Response’, ‘Military and Security’ Options,” The
Tower, September 27, 2013, http://www.thetower.org/egypt-fm-hamas-harsh-response/.
127“Hamas Loses $230 Million a Month Due to Tunnel Closure,” JNS.org, October 28, 2013, 
http://www.jns.org/news-briefs/2013/10/28/tunnel-closure-costing-hamas-230-million-a-month.
128“Report: Hamas Leader Mashaal Agrees to Leave Qatar,” Ynet, September 27, 2013, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4433810,00.html.
129Charlie Rose, “Charlie Rose Interviews Khaled Meshaal,” Charlie Rose (Doha: PBS, July 28, 2014), 
http://video.pbs.org/video/2365297457/.
130Rafaat Murra, “Attacking Khaled Meshaal,” Middle East Monitor - The Latest from the Middle East, 
January 20, 2015, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/16448-attacking-khaled-
meshaal.
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peg or two’.131 Saudi Arabia even went so far as to threaten to close Qatar’s only land 
border if it did not cut ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and close Al Jazeera, among 
other grievances.132 Though it is not clear whether Meshaal has been forced to move to 
Turkey, it is clear that he can no longer live as openly and easily in Qatar, which is 
under growing international pressure not to host him. The external leadership may once 
again be (or have been) robbed of a haven.
In the meantime, Turkey’s support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
well as its criticism of the coup that ousted Morsi in Egypt, led to a souring of ties 
between Turkey and Egypt and made cooperation between the former and Hamas more 
difficult. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had planned to visit Gaza in 
July, but postponed due to the turmoil in Egypt. He was soon thereafter forced to cancel 
the visit altogether due to his criticism of the West’s and the Arab states’ ‘double 
standards’ with regard to Morsi’s ouster, which the US did not label a coup in order to 
avoid being forced by its own laws to implement sanctions on the Egyptian 
government.133 As world attention focused ever more on the Syrian civil war and the rise
of the Islamic State there and in Iraq, Turkey would also find itself increasingly cajoled 
into cooperating with an international coalition against IS made up largely of powers 
opposed to Hamas, including the US and Saudi Arabia. Hamas was fast losing support 
131“No More Own Goals,” The Economist, September 28, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21586886-new-emir-wants-more-discipline-
home-and-less-risk-taking-abroad-no-more-own.
132“Saudi Arabia Threatens To Lay Siege To Qatar: Cooperation Or Confrontation?,” The Huffington 
Post, March 9, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-hearst/saudi-arabia-threatens-
to_b_4930518.html; This even lead some to speculate that Saudi Arabia might even close its airspace 
to planes registered in Qatar, forcing its well known flag carrier, Qatar Airways, to fly around Saudi 
Arabia, costing it time, money, and passengers. See: Courtney Trenwith, “Saudi Could Block Qatar 
Airways from Air Space: Military Analyst,” Arabian Business, March 16, 2014, 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-could-block-qatar-airways-from-air-space-military-analyst-
542699.html.
133“Erdogan Cancels Gaza Trip After Running Afoul of Egypt Government,” www.JPost.com, August 4, 
2013, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Erdogan-cancels-Gaza-trip-after-running-afoul-of-Egypt-
government-322005.
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among Arab and Muslim governments in the region.
If Hamas had been overly optimistic in assuming that the rise of Morsi in Egypt 
had changed Middle Eastern politics in its favour, it cannot be faulted for staying still 
when it became apparent that this was not the case. Even before Morsi was ousted, 
Hamas officials allegedly met in Beirut with representatives of Iran and Hezbollah to 
discuss their common cause against Israel and to agree to disagree about Syria.134 
Previous efforts at reconciliation had failed, but these seem to have succeeded, perhaps 
due to the pressure on Hamas caused by the fall of Morsi. By September, representatives
of both Hamas and Iran were reporting improved ties and media reports had also 
surfaced of resumed financial backing.135
During these difficult times, Hamas upheld its ceasefire with Israel, but its 
control of other groups was imperfect. In February, Israeli soldiers killed a Palestinian in
the exclusion zone along the Gaza border. Fighters from the PRC saw this as a violation 
of the ceasefire and launched grad rockets into Israel, which caused no damage. As one 
PRC fighter explained, ‘We are committed to a ceasefire as long as the occupation is, 
but Hamas is a government. Their interests are not the same as ours. Should we ask for 
their permission to attack when Israel violates the agreement?’136 This particular 
incident did not lead to an escalation, but one on 11 March did. Islamic Jihad militants 
fired mortars at what they say were Israeli tanks attempting to enter the southern Gaza 
Strip near Khan Yunis. Israel responded with an air strike that killed three of the 
militants. It is possible that Israeli forces were attempting to recover an Israeli drone that
134“Report: Hamas, Iran Secretly Met in Beirut to Talk Truce,” www.JPost.com, July 28, 2013, 
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Report-Hamas-Iran-secretly-met-in-Beirut-to-talk-
truce-321260.
135“Hamas Announces Stronger Pact, ‘Axis of Resistance’ With Iran and Hezbollah,” The Tower, 
September 23, 2013, http://www.thetower.org/straying-hamas-appears-returning-iran-embrace/.
136Ian Black, “Gaza Militants Put Pressure on Hamas and Fragile Ceasefire: Islamists Put Little Hope in 
Kerry Talks as Border Clashes Threaten Truce with Israel,” The Guardian, February 22, 2014, Final 
edition edition, sec. GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES.
Page 237 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
had malfunctioned and crashed in the vicinity two hours earlier.137 Later that day and 
into the next, Islamic Jihad responded to that strike by launching 90 rockets at Israel, 
leading Israel to hit 29 targets belonging to Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Hamas spokeman 
Ihab al-Ghassin said that Hamas held Israel responsible for the deteriorating situation 
and warned it ‘of the consequences of any escalation’, though it did not participate 
itself.138 Embarrassingly for Hamas, Egypt brokered a return to the ceasefire directly 
with Islamic Jihad, without informing Hamas about its actions.139 Despite all this, 
Hamas remained popular in the Gaza Strip, once again showing the difficulty of 
sanctioning an entire population in the hope of turning it against its government.140 
There can be little doubt, however, that the heavy siege was weakening Hamas’s ability 
to pay workers, fight crime, and otherwise carry out government functions, even if this 
did not yet cause a fall in its popularity. Across the border in Israel, opponents of the 
ceasefire were also becoming more vocal, with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman 
telling a television audience that Israel had ‘no alternative to a full reoccupation of the 
entire Gaza Strip’.141
This round of escalation was brief and both sides sought to send messages rather 
than escalate. Islamic Jihad launched more rockets than had been launched in a day 
since Operation Pillar of Defence, but it launched them almost exclusively at 
unpopulated areas. Israel, for its part, also retaliated with a big number, hitting 29 sites 
in Gaza. Its targets were limited to militant sites, however, and these had generally been 
abandoned hours before, as the militants fled expecting retaliation. Israel’s former 
137“Israel Raid Kills Three Islamic Jihad Fighters in Gaza,” Agence France Presse, March 11, 2014.
138“Israeli Warplanes Strike Back over Gaza Rocket Salvo,” Agence France Presse -- English, March 12,
2014.
139“Egypt ‘Intentionally’ Ignored Hamas on Gaza Ceasefire,” Maan News Agency, March 13, 2014, 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=681373.
140“Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No - 51,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, March 
22, 2014.
141“Israel Must ‘Reoccupy’ Gaza: Lieberman,” Agence France Presse -- English, March 12, 2014.
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National Security Advisor Uzi Dayan explained what he called ‘a battle of deterrence’: 
‘The Israeli approach is one where we respond with force in order to restore deterrence 
but not so brutally as to oblige them to retaliate too violently, with the hope that there 
will not be victims.’142 City of Gaza employee Abdalfatah echoed this assessment when 
he told this author during the flare-up that he believed Islamic Jihad’s rocket fire was 
‘rada’ (deterrence) aimed at Israel in retaliation for killing three of their members. He 
noted that, at that moment, they were only launching short-range rockets that landed 
near Gaza. If Israel were to kill more PIJ members, they would launch longer-range 
Grad rockets. If those killed Israelis, there would be a war. ‘Everyone knows how to 
play the game now.’143
On 23 April, Hamas and the PA announced that they had reached an agreement 
on a unity government.144 Within days, the two sides signalled their seriousness by 
lifting bans on their respective opposition’s newspapers in the West Bank and Gaza. 145 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately halted ongoing peace 
negotiations with the PA as a result of this deal, though Abbas attempted to reassure 
Israel, Europe, and the US that any unity government, even with Hamas in it, ‘would 
work under my orders and my policy’.146 It was not immediately clear how the unity 
deal would change things on the ground, as it did not require Hamas’s armed wing or 
142“Gaza Groups, Israel Seek Political Gains after Flare-Up,” Agence France Presse, March 13, 2014.
143Abdalfatah, interview.
144Robert Tait, “Fatah and the Hamas Agree Unity Government,” The Telegraph, April 23, 2014, Online 
edition, sec. Middle East - Palestinian Authority, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/10783716/Fatah-and-
the-Hamas-agree-unity-government.html.
145“Hamas Lifts 6-Year Ban on Popular West Bank Newspaper in Gaza,” Israel Hayom, May 8, 2014, 
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=17355; Reuters, “Pro-Hamas Newspaper 
Back on Sale in West Bank in New Unity Step,” Chicagotribune.com, May 10, 2014, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-palestinian-israel-hamas-20140510,0,3391873.story.
146Associated Press, “Abbas Tries to Reassure Israel About Hamas Role,” The Epoch Times, April 26, 
2014, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/642580-abbas-tries-to-reassure-israel-about-hamas-role/.
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security services to disarm, nor did it place them under PA control.147 A Hamas source 
explained that the goal was to shift towards a ‘Hezbollah model’. ‘If anyone expects 
Hamas to hand over its missile network to the PA, he’s making a big mistake. Hamas 
wants to avoid ministerial responsibility for civilian matters, but it wants to maintain its 
power as a popular-resistance group.’148 Hamas had long been unable to pay its workers 
as the siege had cut off vital revenues. Rather than encouraging Hamas to give up or 
someone else to take over power, however, this statement suggests that Hamas was 
instead trying to get the PA to take over financing the day-to-day governance of Gaza 
while it went back to ‘resistance’, which can only be assumed to be a renewed focus on 
at times violent opposition towards Israel and any moves towards negotiations. Giving 
up on day-to-day responsibilities and governance would thus theoretically reduce the 
number of targets available to Israel’s deterrent policy. It could also help to drag the PA 
back towards resistance if offices in Gaza now seen as its responsibility became targets 
of Israeli attack.
According to Kobi Michael, the Israeli view taken at the time was nuanced. He 
contended that Netanyahu was not opposed to the unity government, though he claimed 
to be in public statements.
This is a paradoxical logic. On the one hand, we have to condemn the unity 
government, ...we have to make all the effort in order to keep the political 
achievement we have reached [that the three Quartet conditions are upheld by 
Hamas]. We have to remember that Hamas is a terror organization and that we have 
to keep... the international community from supporting them. We have to be very, 
very aware [of] the possibility that the unity government will become a platform for 
supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, we do remember that Hamas 
is the... real political power in the Gaza Strip and we have to remember that they are 
a population of 1.5 million people who have to live and we don’t want to have a 
humanitarian crisis. So you have to balance and you have to manoeuvre and you have
147“Hamas Not Giving up Military Wing, Despite Agreement,” Ammonnews.net, May 3, 2014, 
http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=25155#.U3N8iPldWSo.
148Jack Khoury, “Hamas Wants to Employ the ‘Hezbollah Model,’” Haaretz.com, May 19, 2014, Online 
edition, sec. Diplomacy and Defense, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-
1.591501.
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to play the right... play in order to assure that it will not be or become a humanitarian 
crisis [and] that Hamas will not gain [militarily] from this situation. And here, the 
idea that we have common strategic interests with the Egyptians... plays in our 
favour. Here, by cooperating with the Egyptians, we can deter Hamas without using 
military force.149
At the same time, the  humiliating language used by the PA threatened the 
longevity of the unity deal while simultaneously increasing pressure on Hamas to show 
its strength. The Ramallah-based news agency Ma’an described the unity deal thus: 
‘Weakened Hamas cedes power to save face’. In the same article, Adnan Abu Amer, 
politics professor at Gaza’s Ummah University, mused ‘Hamas gave in, either from a 
genuine desire for reconciliation or from a lack of options, and it still needs time to 
repair the damage sustained from being in power’. All of these factors were negative 
from a deterrence perspective. After all, political weakness threatened Hamas’s power 
and acted as a ‘push’ factor even as Hamas’s military strength was as great as ever, a 
‘pull’ factor that could intensify its willingness to attack. Indeed, both Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad said they would continue to work to liberate all of historic Palestine, with 
Ismael Haniyeh speaking of their role as ‘teachers and preachers’ and Islamic Jihad 
leader Khaled Al-Batesh saying ‘Weapons [of resistance] will remain in our hands [. . .] 
in order to liberate all of Palestine’.150
This apparent disconnect between the goals of Fatah and Hamas began to show 
more prominently in June, when Hamas asked the PA to pay its employees’ salaries and 
the PA refused.151 Hamas spokesman Hussam Badran then called on the Qassam 
Brigades in the West Bank to kidnap Israeli soldiers and settlers there, echoing a similar 
statement from Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in April, in which he said that 
149Michael, interview.
150Dalit Halevi and Tova Dvorin, “Hamas, Islamic Jihad Vow to Continue Terror - No Matter What,” 
News, Arutz Sheva, (June 8, 2014), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/181470.
151“Hamas to Palestinian Authority: Take Our Employees Onto Your Payroll,” Middle East Online, June 
5, 2014, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=66412.
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kidnapping Israeli soldiers was ‘a top priority’.152 A third statement by the head of all of 
Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, in May may also have been a signal to the Qassam Brigades to
execute a kidnapping to free Palestinian prisoners, which is what Israeli security 
believes.153 Just two days after Badran’s statement, a Qassam Brigades cell in Hebron 
complied with his instructions, abducting three Israeli teens who were hitch-hiking 
home from a yeshiva near Hebron in the West Bank. Hamas leaders initially denied any 
knowledge of the kidnapping and some commentators speculated that the Hamas 
members responsible for the abduction were a ‘rogue branch’ registering its protest at 
the unity agreement.154 Evidence in addition to Badran’s call for kidnappings soon began
to mount, however, that suggested that the cell was not simply acting on its own. On 19 
June, the IDF claimed that a Hamas militant known to train kidnappers, Saleh al-Arouri,
had coordinated the abduction.155 Two months later, al-Arouri finally admitted that he 
had coordinated the attack, though this was not yet confirmed by anyone else in Hamas. 
Hugh Lovatt, Israel and Palestine coordinator at the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, was sceptical of this claim, saying ‘Given the timing I would be very 
suspicious about his claim. I still don’t believe Hamas as an organisation and its upper 
echelons sanctioned the kidnappings—something that Israeli intelligence also 
152Elhanan Miller, “Hamas Calls on Armed Wing to Kill Soldiers and Settlers,” The Times of Israel, June
10, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-calls-on-armed-wing-to-kill-soldiers-and-settlers/; 
“Kidnapping Israeli Soldiers ‘Top Priority’ Hamas Says,” April 16, 2014, 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/insideisrael/2014/April/Kidnapping-Israeli-Soldiers-Top-Priority-
Hamas-says/.
153YAAKOV LAPPIN, “Mashaal’s Speech May Have Been Signal for Kidnapping,” Jerusalem Post, 
June 19, 2014, sec. NEWS.
154Times of Israel staff, “Hamas Denies Any Knowledge of Kidnapped Teens,” The Times of Israel, June 
14, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-denies-any-knowledge-surrounding-disappearance-of-
teens/; Shlomi Eldar, “Accused Kidnappers Are Rogue Hamas Branch,” Al-Monitor, June 29, 2014, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/qawasmeh-clan-hebron-hamas-leadership-
mahmoud-abbas.html.
155Ari Yashar, “IDF Reveals Hamas in Turkey Likely Behind Kidnapping,” Arutz Sheva, June 19, 2014, 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/181951.
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believes’.156 A month later, however, Hamas’s external head, who is responsible for 
strategic decisions like policies on abduction, said in a BBC television interview 
‘Hamas hasn’t avoided responsibility for this event. Hamas cells did it, but in the 
context of self defence against Israeli occupation and settlement policy’.157
The confusion over who planned, authorized, and carried out the abduction may 
simply be down to Hamas’s organizational structure. As Hamas supporter and friend of 
Khaled Meshaal explains in his book on Hamas (which was written before the 
kidnappings and thus did not refer to them): ‘Issues pertaining to major matters of 
policy, such as whether to end or continue a cease-fire, are indeed taken at the highest 
level of the leadership of the Hamas movement. … However, the tactics used to force 
Israel to release prisoners and withdraw from occupied land are local choices.’158 
Benedetta Berti made much the same point in an email to this author, using the example 
of the 2006 abduction of Gilad Shalit, just before which Hamas’s internal leadership 
was making conciliatory noises:
1) The fact that the political leaders did not know about the kidnapping is NOT 
[because] the QB [Qassam Brigades] went behind their back—it is the way 
Hamas works (i.e operational autonomy of the QB);
2) the move per se did not go well with the political leaders’ conciliatory strategy
3) yet after it happened the shura council etc stepped in and the organization [fell] 
in line.159
The 2014 kidnapping seems to fit this mould as well, with initial denials of any 
knowledge, followed by mounting evidence, finally topped off with an admission of 
involvement. It should be noted, however, that even Meshaal’s final admission of 
Hamas involvement does not mean that he authorized it or even knew about it at the 
156Orlando Crowcroft, “Hamas Official: We Were behind the Kidnapping of Three Israeli Teenagers,” 
The Guardian, August 21, 2014, Online edition, http://www.nexis.com/docview/getDocForCuiReq?
lni=5CYJ-YK71-JC60-
C4W2&csi=8277,10903,10911,166768,138211,10939,138620&oc=00240&perma=true.
157“The War of the Tunnels,” Panorama (Israel and Gaza: BBC, September 23, 2014).
158Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch, 2011), 242.
159Benedetta Berti, “‘Gilad Shalit’ Email Correspondence with Author,” October 8, 2014.
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time. As Berti and Tamimi point out, Hamas is intentionally structured so that the 
political leadership is unaware of military operations. This allows Hamas political 
members to move more freely, as interrogating or killing them will not affect operations.
Presumably, Meshaal could have communicated to the Qassam Brigades that 
kidnappings should not occur. It seems the Hamas leadership wished to give no such 
instruction, however, given Hamas spokesman Hussam Badran’s comments just two 
days before the abduction and Meshaal’s own comments prior to that. There is therefore 
no reason to conclude that the kidnapping was a ‘rogue’ operation unattributable to 
Hamas as a whole.
The abduction of Israeli citizens, particularly innocent youths, crosses one of 
Israel’s most dramatic ‘red lines’. Believing the teens were still alive, it initially 
responded with a search-and-rescue operation dubbed ‘Operation Brother’s Keeper’, 
arresting 80 Hamas members in the West Bank in the first two days. It did not 
immediately attack Hamas in Gaza as doubts still lingered about Hamas’s 
involvement.160 By the 15th, however, Netanyahu had announced that Israel was 
convinced Hamas was directly to blame.161 US Secretary of State John Kerry agreed, 
stating that ‘many indications point to Hamas’ involvement’.162 Israel expanded its 
operation to arrest several Hamas leaders in the West Bank, but still left Gaza mostly 
untouched for the moment.163 In fact, the IDF even reportedly began reducing raids on 
160Yaakov Lappin, “Watch: IDF Arrests 80 Hamas Members in West Bank in Response to Kidnapping,” 
The Jerusalem Post, June 15, 2014, Online edition, sec. Defense, http://www.jpost.com/Defense/IDF-
arrests-80-Hamas-members-in-West-Bank-in-response-to-kidnapping-359354.
161Tovah Lazaroff, Yaakov Lappin, and Khaled Abu Toameh, “IDF Targets Hamas as PM Says Group 
Took the Boys. Security Source: We’re Assuming the Teenagers Are Alive · Kerry: This Was a 
Despicable Act of Terrorism · Army Issues Limited Call-up of Reservists,” Jerusalem Post, June 16, 
2014, sec. NEWS.
162Barak Ravid, “Kerry Points to Hamas Role in Israelis’ Kidnapping,” Haaretz, June 15, 2014, Online 
edition, sec. Diplomacy and Defense, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-
1.598941.
163Mark Weiss, “Israel Arrests Hamas Leadership in Security Sweep,” Irish Times, June 17, 2014, Online
edition, sec. Middle East, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/israel-arrests-hamas-
leadership-in-security-sweep-1.1834713.
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Hamas in the West Bank on 23 June, concentrating instead on finding the three teens. 
This may have been because Israel’s heavy-handed approach in the West Bank was 
infuriating Palestinians there and making life difficult for Mahmoud Abbas, whom the 
Israelis wanted to help find the boys.164 Israel’s approach up to that point risked an 
escalation that it did not want. Israel did find itself launching an increasing number of 
small strikes in Gaza in response to a steady stream of rockets from there, which in turn 
were being launched by smaller Islamist groups like the PRC in response to the Israeli 
operation in the West Bank.165 Israel did not escalate because Hamas was not yet 
involved in rocket launches. It was the subject of smaller strikes purely because Israel 
believed it was not doing enough to stop other groups’ launches.166
On the other side, Hamas in Gaza was doing its best to deter Israel from 
escalating. Even after it was discovered that the teens had been murdered, Al Monitor 
reports that ‘Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said that Hamas is not interested in a 
confrontation at this stage, but added, “If such a confrontation is imposed, the world will
discover the fragility of our enemy.” Abu Zuhri warned against Israel continuing to 
escalate the situation and suggested that it not test Hamas’ patience for too long.’167 Abu 
Zuhri’s claim that Hamas (in Gaza, at least) was not interested in an escalation was 
underscored by the fact that it had not yet joined in launching rockets. Israel began to 
strike back more forcefully, however, after the boys’ bodies were found, as it held 
Hamas responsible for their deaths and for the steady drizzle of rockets from the Strip. 
164Josef Federman and Karin Laub, “Palestinian Leader Defends Cooperation with Israel,” Associated 
Press International, June 18, 2014, sec. INTERNATIONAL NEWS; DOMESTIC NEWS.
165Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Militants Killed in Israeli Airstrike in Gaza,” Associated Press 
International, June 27, 2014, sec. INTERNATIONAL NEWS; DOMESTIC NEWS.
166Yaakov Lappin and Daniel K. Eisenbud, “IAF Strikes Terrorists Ready to Fire. Source: Hamas Has to 
Be More Assertive against Anyone Firing Missiles,” Jerusalem Post, June 30, 2014, sec. NEWS.
167Asmaa al-Ghoul, “Hamas, Islamic Jihad Warn Israel About Retaliation in Gaza,” Al-Monitor, July 2, 
2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulseen/originals/2014/07/hamas-islamic-jihad-palestine-israel-
strikes-war.html.
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At the same time, however, a ‘senior security source’ stated that ‘If Hamas’s aim is to 
escalate, we will act accordingly’, suggesting Israel also did not yet wish for another 
extended round of violence in Gaza.168 On 3 July, Israel reported that 40 rockets rained 
down on Israel. In response, Israel sent additional troops to the Gaza border. Lieutenant 
Colonel Peter Lerner said of the move: ‘Everything we are doing is to de-escalate the 
situation but on the other hand be prepared for actions that can develop if they do not 
de-escalate.’169 On the other side, two ‘senior officials’ from Hamas also insisted Hamas 
had ‘no interest’ in escalation and wished to return to the previous ceasefire. Both sides 
clearly saw themselves as ‘defenders’, responding only to provocations by the other 
side.
Events were beginning to develop a momentum of their own. On the morning of 
2 July, a day after the three murdered Israeli teens were buried, a Palestinian teen was 
burned alive by extremist Jewish youths in retaliation. Protests broke out among 
Palestinians in Jerusalem, which soon spread throughout Israel.170 With protests and 
riots continuing and rockets still falling on southern Israel, the situation could no longer 
be seen as one of ‘restoring deterrence’. Demanding that Hamas stop rocket fire that had
already started was a compellent demand, not a deterrent threat, and could thus be 
expected to require a ‘disproportionate’ response. On 3 July, Israel reportedly sent an 
official ultimatum to Hamas via the Egyptians to halt rocket fire within 48 hours. Prime 
Minister Netanyahu stated that there were two possibilities. ‘One possibility is that the 
fire will stop and the quiet continues. The other is that the fire continues and then the 
168Yaakov Lappin, “IAF Strikes 34 Targets Early on Tuesday. ‘If Hamas’s Aim Is to Escalate, We Will 
Act Accordingly,’ Senior Security Source Says,” Jerusalem Post, July 2, 2014, sec. NEWS.
169Josef Federman, “Israel Rushes Forces to Southern Border with Gaza,” Associated Press 
International, July 3, 2014, sec. INTERNATIONAL NEWS.
170Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Palestinian Teen Burned to Death, Autopsy Shows,” Associated Press 
International, July 5, 2014, sec. International News; Domestic News; Attila Somfalvi, Omri Efraim, 
and Itay Blumental, “Three Suspects in Murder of Arab Teen Confess to Crime,” Ynetnews.com, July 
7, 2014, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4538864,00.html.
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increased forces that are in the south will act forcefully.’171 Sources within Hamas 
claimed the next day that a ceasefire agreement brokered by Egypt would go into effect 
‘within hours’.172
It was not to be. Hamas had already launched its first rockets at Israel since 2012
on 30 June, but it had since refrained.173 In the early hours of 7 July, seven Hamas 
members were killed in an Israeli air strike, which was itself in response to continuing 
rocket fire from Gaza.174 Hamas vowed revenge and again launched rockets into Israel. 
Rockets that day also extended farther into Israel than any since 2012, hitting the city of 
Beersheba, 40 kilometres from the Strip. Israel retaliated by hitting over 30 targets near 
Rafah in southern Gaza.175 With the conflagration appearing to spread rather than abate, 
Israel launched Operation Protective Edge the following day, the third ‘Gaza War’ since 
Hamas had taken control of the Strip seven years before. In many ways, this newest 
confrontation was also the most dramatic and potentially harmful, especially for Israel: 
Hamas immediately upped the ante, firing rockets at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa the 
same day.176 More worryingly, it specifically targeted Ben Gurion Airport, by far Israel’s
main international airport, serving its two main cities, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, leading 
many airlines to halt all flights to Ben Gurion, thus in effect halting all their flights to 
Israel.177 A ‘senior security source’ in Israel, meanwhile, claimed that Israel had 
destroyed more targets in Gaza in the first 36 hours of the operation than in all of Pillar 
171Lea Speyer, “Hamas Given 48-Hour Ultimatum to Stop Rockets,” Breaking Israel News, July 4, 2014,
48, http://www.breakingisraelnews.com/17641/hamas-given-48-hour-ultimatum-stop-rockets/.
172“Hamas Suggests Ceasefire with Israel ‘Within Hours,’” World Bulletin, July 4, 2014, 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/world/140048/thieves-in-mexico-steal-truck-with-radioactive-load.
173Avi Issacharoff and Times of Israel staff, “Hamas Fires Rockets for First Time since 2012, Israeli 
Officials Say,” The Times of Israel, June 30, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-fired-rockets-
for-first-time-since-2012-israeli-officials-say/.
174Josef Federman, “Hamas Says 7 Militants Killed in Israeli Strikes,” Associated Press International, 
July 7, 2014, sec. INTERNATIONAL NEWS.
175“Gaza on Brink of War as Hamas Rockets Slam Israel,” Agence France Presse -- English, July 7, 
2014.
176“Hamas Claims Rocket Fire on Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa,” Agence France Presse, July 8, 2014.
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of Defence.178 Israeli intelligence apparently believed this harsh response had made 
Hamas ready to accept a ceasefire, but it was mistaken. Israel paused its operation for 
six hours in response to an Egyptian ceasefire proposal, but Hamas did not reciprocate, 
leading Israel to expand operations, including calling up 8,000 additional reservists for a
ground offensive.179 Justice Minister Tzipi Livni emphasized that the goal of the 
operation was primarily to destroy Hamas’s tunnel network and rocket launching 
capacity, but she also stated that she wasn’t ‘taking anything off the table’, suggesting 
taking out Hamas’s leadership and even toppling its government could be a goal.180 In 
any case, Hamas’s leaders were already underground, expecting to be targeted.181 
Further attempts at ceasefires (on 27 July, 1 August, 5 August, and 11 August) all failed, 
though the one on 11 August did hold for six days after being extended beyond its initial
72-hour deadline.182 Finally, on 26 August, Israel and Hamas agreed to an open-ended 
ceasefire through their Egyptian intermediaries that is still holding at the time of writing
in April 2015. Palestinians in Gaza poured onto the streets to celebrate Hamas’s 
‘victory’, while Israeli officials talked of the ‘severe blow’ Hamas had been dealt, which
177Aron Heller, “Airlines Ban Flights to Israel after Rocket Strike,” Associated Press International, July 
22, 2014, sec. Business News; International News; “Hamas Militants to Airlines: We’re Targeting 
Ben-Gurion Airport,” NBC News, July 11, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-
unrest/hamas-militants-airlines-were-targeting-ben-gurion-airport-n153446.
178YAAKOV LAPPIN, “‘In 36 Hours, IAF Destroyed More Targets than in All of Pillar of Defense.’ ‘We
Are Attacking Where We Can Operate,’ Says Senior Security Source, Adding: Not a Single Hamas 
Brigade Commander Has a Home to Go back to,” Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2014, sec. NEWS.
179Yaakov Lappin, “Hamas Searching for a Way Out of Conflict, Israeli Security Sources Believe,” 
www.JPost.com, July 14, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Hamas-searching-
for-a-way-out-of-conflict-Israeli-security-sources-believe-362758; Herb Keinon and Yaakov Lappin, 
“Hamas Rejects Ceasefire; Netanyahu Authorizes IDF to Resume Strikes on Gaza,” www.JPost.com, 
July 15, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/IDF-resumes-strikes-in-Gaza-after-
Hamas-rejects-ceasefire-launches-dozens-of-rockets-362872; Yaakov Lappin, “Cabinet Authorizes 
Call-up of 8,000 More Reservists. IDF Investigating Deaths of 4 Boys in Gaza · Terror Groups Fire 
More than 150 Rockets at Israel,” Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2014, sec. News; “Israel Launches Ground
Operation in Gaza,” Agence France Presse -- English, July 17, 2014.
180Times of Israel staff, “Livni: All Options on Table, Including Bringing Down Hamas,” The Times of 
Israel, July 18, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/livni-all-options-on-table-including-bring-down-
hamas/.
181“Invisible Leaders: Senior Figures Go ‘Underground,’” The Guardian, July 18, 2014, Final edition 
edition, sec. GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES.
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included the destruction of an estimated 70-80% of its rocket inventory and all 32 attack
tunnels the IDF had located leading into Israel.183
Given Hamas’s ability to halt a significant portion of commercial air traffic in 
and out of Israel, target cities ever farther from the Gaza border, and to remain in control
of Gaza despite what certainly was a ‘severe blow’, the Israeli journalist and defence 
affairs expert Herb Keinon was surely right to ask Justice Minister Tzipi Livni if ‘Israel 
was destined to “mow the lawn” in Gaza at ever-increasingly short intervals’.184 The 
logic of these ‘ever-increasingly short intervals’ of conflict in Gaza suggests Israel 
would eventually end up toppling Hamas and reoccupying the Gaza Strip. There are a 
few points discussed in this chapter and thesis so far that suggest that Israel may instead 
be able to practice deterrence better, but that would require a change in approach. Israel 
has had considerable success with deterring Hamas violence directly via denial (the 
security barrier, intelligence operations, and its continued existence and ability to fight) 
and punishment (air strikes on Gaza) and with compelling directly (three wars and 
targeted killings), as well as some success deterring indirectly (via the PA in the late 
1990s as well as actions to end Jordan’s support for the group). Its policies on Gaza 
182Khaled Abu Toameh and Reuters, “Hamas Spokesperson: We Did Not Agree to Extension of Cease-
Fire Until Midnight,” www.JPost.com, July 26, 2014, Web edition, sec. Operation Protective Edge, 
http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Israel-agrees-to-extend-Gaza-cease-fire-by-four-
hours-Israeli-official-says-368989; “Israel, Gaza Militants Start 72-Hour Ceasefire,” Agence France 
Presse, August 1, 2014; “Israel Calls off Gaza Truce, Fearing Soldier Abducted,” Agence France 
Presse, August 1, 2014; “Israel Withdraws Gaza Troops as 72-Hour Truce Begins,” Agence France 
Presse, August 5, 2014; “Israel ‘Ready to Extend Gaza Truce Unconditionally,’” Agence France 
Presse, August 6, 2014; Karin Laub and Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Israel, Hamas Resume Fire After 
3-Day Gaza Truce,” Yahoo News, August 8, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/israel-hamas-resume-fire-3-
day-gaza-truce-082928084.html; “Fresh 72-Hour Truce Begins in Gaza,” Agence France Presse, 
August 11, 2014; “Hamas Armed Wing Claim Rocket Attack on Jerusalem,” Agence France Presse, 
August 19, 2014; “Israel Hits Gaza, Suspends Cairo Talks after Rocket Fire,” Agence France Presse, 
August 19, 2014.
183Herb Keinon and Khaled Abu Toameh, “Israel Accepts yet Another Open-Ended Cease-Fire. Officials 
Say Hamas Took Huge Hit and Is on Verge of Losing Control of Gaza. Terrorist Group Claims Victory
as Thousands Celebrate in Strip,” Jerusalem Post, August 27, 2014, sec. News.
184Herb Keinon, “Livni: No Policy to Reoccupy Gaza, but If Rockets Don’t Stop, ‘All Options on 
Table,’” www.JPost.com, July 21, 2014, sec. Operation Protective Edge, 
http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Livni-No-policy-to-reoccupy-Gaza-but-if-rockets-
dont-stop-all-options-on-table-367171.
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have remained strikingly consistent since 2007. The ‘conciliatory promise’, a form of 
positive reinforcement that is on the flip-side of the deterrence coin and makes the status
quo more attractive and therefore more stable, however, has too often been neglected. 
The following chapter will examine this oversight in greater detail and ask what options 
Israel has with regard to security vis-a-vis Hamas in the future.
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7. Conclusion
The aim set out in the introduction of this thesis was to examine the relationship 
between Israel and Hamas using the updated, non-nuclear, restrictive, cumulative 
deterrence model set forth in chapter 2. Specifically, it set out to investigate what 
deterrence could tell us about—and how it might explain—periods of calm, escalation, 
cooperation, rising violence, falling violence, and tactical shifts and learning on both 
sides. The thesis attempted strictly to separate deterrence from compellence. What 
insights has that provided with regard to escalation, establishing and maintaining ‘rules 
of the game’, and the use of certain tactics and their timing? Do pre-emption, disruption,
and compellence undermine deterrence? Does Israel focus too heavily on credibility (i.e.
‘pull’ factors) to the detriment of stability (‘push’ factors), as many scholars have 
asserted is a common mistake of ‘defenders’? How well does the Iron Wall strategy 
bring together pre-emption, disruption, compellence, and deterrence to create 
cumulative deterrence? Does the case of Israel versus Hamas also illuminate the limits 
of deterrence? This chapter will sum up the evidence on these questions from earlier 
chapters before turning to questions regarding Israel’s future. These include whether 
deterrence has become a default option for Israel to the exclusion of other approaches, 
whether it is sustainable over the longer term, what risks Israel may face in the future, 
how it might respond to them, and the possibilities for moving ‘beyond’ deterrence.
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7.1 Israel’s deterrence of Hamas—types, methods, successes, and 
failures
The non-nuclear, restrictive, and cumulative deterrence model laid out in chapter
2 of this thesis thus does provide explanations for periods of calm and escalation 
between Israel and Hamas. An absolute model based on the nuclear paradigm would 
have struggled to tell us much of anything about Israel and Hamas, seeing as it would 
merely a string of almost inexplicable deterrence failures or perhaps even a situation in 
which deterrence could not apply at all due to the non-state nature of the opponent. 
Furthermore, traditional Cold War models of deterrence would have difficulty 
explaining how Hamas could fail to be deterred considering the asymmetry between its 
capabilities and those of Israel. The so-called ‘push factors’ uncovered by Ned Lebow 
and Janice Gross Stein explain this: There are simply situations in which ‘domestic’ 
factors (in Hamas’s case, pressures from its members and, later, the Gazan public) 
encouraging violence are too great to be overcome by deterrent threats, while 
criminological insights on proportionality explain how overly harsh punishments can 
encourage attacks. The insights on push factors  and proportionality led this author to 
conclude that deterrence and compellence are fundamentally different tactics, the former
concerned with maintaining the status quo and requiring ‘proportional’ attacks that lie 
within the current ‘rules of the game’, the latter concerned with changing the status quo 
and requiring an escalation to attacks outside the ‘rules of the game’. A theme 
throughout this thesis has been the way in which ‘proportional’ reprisals can 
accumulate, however, leading to the erosion of a status quos and requiring compellence, 
via an escalation to ‘disproportionate’ reprisals, to achieve new periods of calm. The 
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calm Israel experienced in the late 1990s is also explained by the addition of 
Bar/Harkavy’s concept of ‘indirect deterrence’, which accounts for Israel’s partnership 
with the PA in countering Hamas.1 Finally, the criminology provides both the theoretical
basis and the evidence that deterrence can be learned through through punishment in its 
concept of specific deterrence. Increasing levels of specific deterrence achieved over 
multiple rounds of violence is termed cumulative deterrence.  One of the aims of this 
thesis was to assess the success and prospects of this cumulative deterrence and that will
be the topic of section 7.2 below. First, however, we turn to a retrospective look at the 
model in practice throughout the case study chapters (4-6) of this thesis.
The model that has been used throughout the thesis to analyse the relationship 
between Israel and Hamas and to illustrate the forces working on Hamas that Israel can 
influence, directly or indirectly, in its attempts to deter Hamas is reproduced in figure 
7.1 below.
1 Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah,” Comparative Strategy 26, 
no. 5 (December 13, 2007): 469–93, doi:10.1080/01495930701750307; Robert E. Harkavy, 
“Triangular or Indirect Deterrence/compellence: Something New in Deterrence Theory?,” 
Comparative Strategy 17, no. 1 (January 1998): 63–81, doi:10.1080/01495939808403132.
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Figure 7.1: Diagram of the deterrence relationship between Israel, seen here as the 
‘defender’, and Hamas, displayed as the ‘opponent’.
This diagram works for both direct deterrence-by-punishment and deterrence by denial 
and it includes ‘push’ factors that make Hamas more likely to attack and that can make 
either side more willing to escalate. One push factor for either side is whether the type 
of attacks the other chooses and their severity fall within the currently perceived ‘rules 
of the game’. For example, Israel’s choice of reprisals, pre-emptive strikes, or targeted 
killing, and their magnitude, constitute one type of ‘push’ factor on Hamas. The dashed 
lines also show that both Israel and Hamas have some influence over the other’s ‘status 
quo’ and therefore on how content each is to maintain it (though Israel’s capability to 
affect Hamas’s status quo, e.g. through the blockade of Gaza, is much greater). ‘Indirect 
deterrence’ functions in a similar manner, but is more complex, requiring a second 
diagram:
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Figure 7.2: Model of a three-way indirect deterrence relationship. A defender can still 
strengthen deterrence during peaceful periods by maintaining strength and resolve, 
abiding by the established ‘rules of the game’, and improving the status quo, but now 
many of these aspects are related more closely to the proxy than the opponent, making 
calibration more complex.
The two models were used throughout to analyse and explain Israel’s use of 
deterrence and its successes, failures, learning processes, and challenges. During the 
Oslo Period, covered in chapter 4, Israel turned to indirect deterrence against Hamas 
attacks, as it increasingly did not control the territories from which the attackers came, 
had few other means of direct deterrence, and did not yet have a barrier separating the 
Palestinian territories from Israel, which would later provide deterrence-by-denial. The 
Oslo Accords meant that Israel needed the PA for security and the PA needed Israel for a
state. This alignment of interests allowed indirect deterrence to function, mostly without
any ‘deterrent’ threats from Israel, as Arafat and the PA recognized that Israel’s security 
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was important if there was ever to be a Palestinian state. Some conditionality was 
added, however, with Israeli leaders increasingly making progress on Oslo contingent 
upon improved security (in effect attempting to compel the proxy, the PA, to rein in 
Hamas). The evidence presented in the chapter suggests that restrictive deterrence was 
increasingly successful by the end of the 1990s and that Israel, the PA, and Hamas were 
all ‘learning’ in the situation, with Hamas shifting focus away from armed resistance, at 
least for the moment. The model depicted in figure 7.2 predicts that deterrence would 
fail, at least temporarily, if the PA (the proxy) came to view the status quo as 
unacceptable. The acceptable status quo in this case included progress on the foundation
of a Palestinian state. Lack of progress towards it severely undermined the stability of 
the deterrence relationship. In fact, both sides saw their core concerns as insufficiently 
addressed, leading to a breakdown in their cooperation and in progress towards a 
Palestinian state, rendering the status quo unacceptable to the PA and further 
cooperation unpalatable. This, in turn, stalled progress on security, making further 
progress on the implementation of Oslo unpalatable for Israel. Their interests thus 
diverged, removing the foundation upon which the indirect deterrence of Hamas stood 
and weakening the PA’s desire to stifle Hamas (which thus acted as a ‘pull’ factor 
encouraging attacks on Israel, the defender). Opportunities to restore this cooperation 
were missed, in part because Arafat underestimated the momentum events would take 
on, but also due to miscalculations on Israel’s side. The result was a spiral into the 
violence of the Second Intifada and Israel’s shift away from reliance on indirect 
deterrence altogether.
 In the run-up to the 1956 Suez War, Israel attempted to use violence to halt 
negotiations between Israel and Britain on the removal of the latter’s forces from the 
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Canal Zone in Egypt.2 In 2000, Arafat attempted to use riots and violence to force Israel 
to grant concessions. In the case of Egypt in 1956, this convinced President Nasser that 
there was no point in continuing secret negotiations with Israel. The status quo was 
unattractive, as the choice was not between war and peace, but between war and Israeli 
sabotage and other covert actions in Egypt.3 In the case of the Second Intifada, the 
violence made the status quo, and thus, for the moment at least, the entire peace process,
unacceptable to Israel. Eventually, the spiral of violence convinced Israel under Ariel 
Sharon to change tactics altogether and abandon the peace process. The conditionality 
slowly added in the 1990s ended up being a threat to the peace process in an 
unanticipated way. It was originally feared that it would hand Hamas an instruction 
manual for foiling the implementation of Oslo. In fact, Hamas violence actually began 
to decline as the Israeli government increased conditional demands. Instead, 
conditionality gave Israel and the PA ways to measure progress and accuse each other of
acting in bad faith. This eventually led to the stagnation of the peace process and thus a 
deterioration in the status quo for the PA and, in turn, to Arafat’s attempts also to 
increase the pressure (i.e. conditionality) on Israel, which led to the collapse of both the 
peace process and the indirect deterrence of Hamas. These conditional sanctions are 
similar to reprisals in deterrence-by-punishment in that they can also accumulate and 
establish a new status quo less palatable to both sides, making cooperation more 
difficult. Once these conditional sanctions had become the norm and led to stagnation in
the peace process, actions by both sides were then examples of compellence, with Arafat
attempting to compel greater urgency on the establishment of a Palestinian state by 
threatening Israel’s security, and Israel threatening to halt progress on a Palestinian state
2 Ahron Bregman and Jihan El-Tahri, The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs (London: Penguin 
Group and BBC Worldwide Ltd, 1998), 51–56.
3 Ibid., 55.
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unless Arafat cracked down on terrorism. Once the situation had shifted to one of 
compellence, this began to undermine the deterrence relationship between Israel and the
PA, which relied on cooperation. In effect, compellence undermined deterrence, a topic 
that became highly salient with Hamas’s takeover of Gaza (see chapter 6).
Chapter 5 followed Israel’s change of approach in the 2000s, when it shifted 
from indirect to direct deterrence-by-punishment and -by-denial against what was then 
still a non-state actor with no ‘return address’ (i.e. no specific territory that could be the 
target of reprisals). Israel learned in this period that targeted killings were not useful for 
deterrence—as opposed to compellence—if they were actually carried out (though a 
credible threat to use them may be). The model in 7.1 would suggest that Israel’s killing 
of Raed Karmi during a period of relative quiet would be interpreted as disproportionate
—outside the current rules of the game—as it constituted a violation and worsening of 
the status quo for Hamas. The result was indeed increased violence. Targeted killing was
useful for compellence when violence was already high, however, as compellence 
functions by making the status quo unpleasant to encourage movement away from it in a
specific direction. When Israel began killing and openly attempting to kill more Hamas 
political leaders during periods of heavy violence in 2003 and 2004, Hamas began 
asking for ceasefires, explicitly demanding a halt to targeted killings in exchange for 
quiet. Violence declined partly as a result, establishing a new status quo for deterrence.
The other half (or perhaps more) of the equation for halting the violence was 
deterrence-by-denial via the West Bank security barrier. Martin van Creveld has argued 
convincingly that properly defended walls have worked throughout history, pointing out
that suicide bombers crossed into Israel almost exclusively from the West Bank, not 
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from Gaza, which already had a barrier around it during the Second Intifada.4 The fact 
that bombers did not originate in Gaza is striking considering Hamas’s deep roots there 
and it suggests the barrier around the Gaza Strip kept suicide bombers out of Israel. In 
addition, Hillel Frisch discovered that, after sections of the West Bank barrier were 
built, ‘fatalities within [Israel proper] declined to significantly less than half in areas 
parallel to where the fence existed, [while] they more than doubled in areas bordering 
[the West Bank] where no border existed.’5 The fact that attacks on unprotected areas 
doubled once some areas became harder to hit illustrates nicely one of deterrence-by-
denial’s most important limitations: attackers respond to it by shifting to more 
vulnerable targets (in the language of the model, they respond to the ‘pull’ factor of 
defender weakness in other places). If changing targets is difficult or impossible, they 
may also respond by shifting tactics instead. Hamas ‘learned’ to be increasingly deterred
from suicide bombings in 2004 because getting suicide bombers into Israel became too 
costly. It responded to this denial by changing tactics and launching rockets and mortars 
instead. Such tactical shifts in response to denial are a constant risk and something Israel
will have to deal with again soon, as Hamas may shift away from rockets and mortars as
a result of the success of Israel’s Iron Dome missile defence system. All tactics are not 
created equal, of course: Suicide bombings were much more deadly than projectile 
attacks. Hamas’s move away from them from 2004 was thus a triumph for deterrence-
by-denial and, in the form of ceasefire requests after targeted killings, deterrence-by-
punishment. Like the period covered in chapter 4, the period in chapter 5 ended with a 
much lower level of violence as deterrence took hold.
4 Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Controversial Plan Toward Peace, 1st ed (New York: 
Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2004).
5 Hillel Frisch, “(The) Fence or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of ‘the Fence’ in Judea and 
Samaria,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies (Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
Studies, October 2007).
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Chapter 6 explored the development of a new iteration of direct deterrence-by-
punishment of Hamas once it gained control of the Gaza Strip. Prior to that, deterrence-
by-punishment against Hamas was difficult due to a lack of assets that could be targeted
outside of its members themselves, which often led to escalation if carried out during a 
period of relative calm. With Hamas responsible for the entire Gaza Strip, this changed 
and, in many ways, deterrence became more straightforward as it began to resemble the 
conventional deterrence of a neighbouring state. Proportional reprisals for smaller 
breaches of peace, like occasional rocket fire landing in an unpopulated area, helped to 
maintain deterrence by confirming to Hamas that Israel was still resolved to fight back. 
Despite this seeming simplicity, however, peace has not been constant and Israel has felt
the need to fight three wars in Gaza since 2007—hardly a promising pattern for the 
indefinite future.
After Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, Israel tried both to compel a change of the 
status quo (encourage Gazans eventually to eject Hamas from power) and maintain it 
(i.e. maintaining the prevailing calm). Israel and Egypt’s blockade of Gaza, as well as 
financial sanctions on Hamas put in place by several governments, meant the status quo 
in Gaza became steadily less acceptable. Mohamed Abdalfatah, Director of International
Cooperation for the Municipality of Gaza, described the mood in Gaza City at the end 
of 2008, before Cast Lead. He said things were so bad that people wanted any change. 
‘There was a slow suffering in August, September, October and you thought “let it 
come!”’6 In addition to this ‘push factor’ put in place largely by Israel, Hamas’s ‘new’ 
tactic of launching rockets and mortars into Israel was not clearly covered by Israel’s 
‘red lines’, constituting a hole in its deterrence and thus a ‘pull’ factor failing to 
discourage rocket launches. Israel had previously been more concerned with suicide 
6 Mohammed Abdalfatah, Author interview, in person, March 13, 2014.
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attacks and gave rocket launches less attention. Israel used Operation Cast Lead in 
2008-9 to establish a new status quo in its relationship with Hamas, but it has continued 
to undervalue ‘push factors’ like a status quo increasingly unacceptable to Gazan 
residents and Hamas and the effects these can have on the medium-term stability of 
deterrence.
Chapter 6 showed that, after Operation Cast Lead, Hamas and Israel were 
committed to maintaining the calm throughout the remainder of 2009 and all of 2010. 
Comments by Hamas leaders during that time lead to the conclusion that Hamas feared 
an Israeli response and that this deterred it from violence. Its active prevention and 
prosecution of rocket launches by other groups in the Gaza Strip is additional evidence 
of this. Nevertheless, throughout 2011 and 2012, there were signs that Hamas was less 
attached to the status quo. This is in part because Gazan opinion favoured some sort of 
action on Hamas’s part, particularly when Mahmoud Abbas was seen negotiating with 
Israel with American involvement and taking action with UN institutions (a ‘push’ 
factor undermining stability and encouraging Hamas to take action). Hamas had also 
improved its capabilities during this time and gained confidence (a ‘pull’ factor 
undermining the credibility of Israel’s deterrent and making Hamas less hesitant to use 
force). At the same time as Hamas’s responses showed less commitment to the status 
quo, Israel’s did, too. As Hamas’s capabilities improved, there was also a drive for Israel
to strike at those capabilities even if such pre-emptive action would undermine stability 
and lead to escalation. Other armed groups in Gaza were also restive, with the PFLP, in 
particular, making headlines with attacks on Israelis. The deterrence situation was thus 
becoming less stable. Each attack, seen now by those launching them on both sides as a 
response to previous attacks, now created a new status quo with a higher level of 
Page 261 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
violence. Returning to a status quo of lower violence now required both sides to back 
down publicly and appear to be compelled to do so. Both sides were instead eventually 
content to escalate to war. This illustrates once again the reprisal risk: that even 
‘proportionate’ responses seen as within the ‘rules of the game’ can establish a new, 
unacceptable status quo should they multiply, continually undermining stability. The 
only solution to this conundrum is to attempt to increase the stability and desirability of 
the original, more peaceful status quo (i.e. to focus on reducing the ‘push’ factors that 
lead an opponent to violence in the first place).
Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012 was followed by another period of quiet. 
Crucially, however, this period was shorter than the one that preceded it, which raises 
serious questions about the future of Israel’s deterrence of Hamas. The abduction and 
murder of three Israeli teens by a Hebron-based Hamas cell sparked a heavy-handed 
response from Israel, which in turn led to protest rocket launches from groups in Gaza 
other than Hamas. We may never be certain about what Hamas’s aims in the kidnapping 
were, if it even had any, or if different autonomous parts of Hamas simply sometimes 
operate at cross purposes. What is clear from this, however, is the difficulty of 
calibrating responses to actions by such a group. It is also clear that Hamas was once 
again facing a worsening situation on the ground in Gaza due to the intensified isolation 
of the Strip, isolation abroad, and weakness at home intense enough for it to seek a unity
deal with the PA. A final point of clarity is that Hamas was stronger militarily than ever 
before, killing far more Israeli soldiers during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 than in
both the previous conflicts with Israel combined (see figure 7.3) and even managing 
temporarily to cut off many commercial flights between Israel and the rest of the world. 
Its political weakness and isolation and its military strength were a dangerous cocktail 
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of push and pull factors. The events of 2014 illustrate a now-familiar pattern of an 
accumulation of retaliatory actions from both sides that eventually establish a new status
quo acceptable to neither and yet also one from which neither side is willing to back 
down, all but requiring a round of heavy violence.









IDF soldiers killed in wars in Gaza
2008 to 2014
Figure 7.3: Nearly six times as many Israeli soldiers died during the most recent 
operation than during Israel’s first two combined (including several killed through 
infiltrations into Israeli territory through Hamas-built tunnels).7
7.2 Beyond deterrence? Cumulative deterrence and conflict resolution 
between Israel and Hamas
Is deterrence an end in itself for Israel in dealing with Hamas? Has a conflict 
7 “IDF Soldiers Killed in Operation Cast Lead,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 8, 2009, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/IDF_soldiers_killed_Operation_Cast_Lead.asp
x; “Israel under Fire-November 2012,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 22, 2012, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Israel_under_fire-November_2012.aspx; 
“Operation Protective Edge: Israel under Fire - IDF Responds,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
August 26, 2014, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Rise-in-rocket-fire-from-
Gaza-3-Jul-2014.aspx.
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management tactic morphed into a de facto substitute for a conflict resolution strategy? 
Several Israeli scholars and even government officials have claimed Israel has no 
strategy, either specifically towards Hamas or towards the Palestinians in general. Harel 
Chorev, head of the Network Analysis desk in the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies at Tel Aviv University, argues that Israel has displayed a ‘sheer lack of strategy’ 
towards Hamas since 2007.8 In 2014, Israel’s then Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman 
insisted ‘Every minister in the government has a strategy, but the Israeli government has
no strategy’.9 Just a few days ago, Major-General Yom-Tov Samia, a former commander
of the IDF’s Southern Command, joined the chorus, saying the ‘state of Israel has no 
serious, deep and long-term strategy’.10 Avraham Shalom, a former head of Shin Bet, 
suggests this has long been the case. Referring to the period after Israel’s occupation of 
the West Bank in 1967, he remarked: ‘All in all, we gained control over the war on 
terror. We kept it on a low flame so the country could do what it wanted. That’s 
important, but it didn’t solve the problem of the occupation. What it did was, instead of 
20 attacks a week, there were 20 a year. […] There was no strategy, just tactics.’11
Two interviews in which this came up also suggested that Israel may be pursuing
deterrence as a default. When asked if Israel had an overall strategy ‘beyond deterrence’ 
for ending the conflict with Hamas, one expert responded ‘you live day by day’. The 
interviewee did illuminate Israel’s policy of ‘cumulative deterrence’, explaining that 
after each round of escalation, Israel would set the ‘red lines’, the maximum level of 
violence it would tolerate, at a lower level than the last, thus reducing the overall level 
8 Harel Chorev, “The Road to Operation Protective Edge: Gaps in Strategic Perception,” trans. Yvette 
Shumacher, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 8, no. 3 (January 2014): 9–24, 
doi:10.1080/23739770.2014.11446599.
9 Tova Dvorin, “Liberman Insists ‘the Israeli Government Has No Strategy,’” Arutz Sheva, June 2, 
2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/181313.
10 Ari Yashar, “Ex-IDF Southern Commander: Israel Has No Strategy,” News, Arutz Sheva, (May 8, 
2016), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/211933.
11 Dror Moreh, The Gatekeepers, DVD, Documentary, (2013).
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of violence over time.12 Senior Israeli analyst Gil Murciano related to the author then 
Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s strategy for Israel’s wars in Gaza. It consisted of 
attempting to lengthen the gaps between wars over time.13 This sounds very much like a 
strategy of deterrence, with the end aim being a Hamas deterred from violence 
altogether.14 This also describes almost perfectly Jansson’s idea of a ‘cycle of deterrence
expansion and failure’ that risks ‘making bolstering deterrence an end in itself’.15 If the 
outcome were an eventual end to violence, however, why would this be objectionable? 
Can cumulative deterrence perhaps end the violence on its own if pursued indefinitely?
The problem is that it is doubtful whether deterrence can be sustained long 
enough to achieve that goal. Since Protective Edge, the Gaza border has returned mostly
to calm. To say that Hamas can currently be deterred from attacking Israel is not to say 
that it is not simultaneously increasing both its defensive and offensive capabilities, 
however, perhaps in the hope of overcoming Israel’s deterrent. Israel currently has the 
ability and credibility to threaten Hamas enough that deterrence can probably be 
maintained and, when necessary, restored via compellence for the time being. There is 
no guarantee that this will go on indefinitely. Furthermore, as Daniel Byman points out: 
Hamas does not have to win a war against Israel in order for Israel’s deterrence to be 
severely damaged and to profit from a perceived victory. This is because ‘Hamas can 
tolerate casualties more than Israel can and its people do not expect them to inflict equal
damage.’16 Once deterrence is eroded, and Hamas gains a greater ability to deter Israel, 
12 Shmuel Bar, Author interview in person, February 27, 2013.
13 Gil Murciano, Author interview via Skype, February 4, 2014.
14 In his book, current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presents a plan for a “durable peace” that 
essentially involves maintaining the status quo until the Palestinians agree to autonomy in the West 
Bank and Gaza and decide against independence. See: Binyamin Netanyahu, A Durable Peace: Israel 
and Its Place among the Nations (New York: Warner Books, 2000), chap. 8.
15 Mark Jansson, “Seeing Deterrence through the Lens of Conflict Resolution,” in Panel 1 - Nuclear 
Strategy for the Changing Security Environment (2010 Capstone Conference, OFFUTT AFB, NE, 
USA: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 59–70.
16 Daniel Byman, A High Price : The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 200.
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the balance of power could begin to shift, even if Hamas never gains anything like 
military parity with Israel. Judging deterrence to be possible as long as Israel’s raw 
military capabilities are greater than those of Hamas may therefore be overly optimistic.
Hamas has indeed improved its overall capabilities, as evidenced by the range of
its rockets and its ability now to target Ben-Gurion Airport. In addition, there was 
evidence of a change in tactics in the last round. The most recent Gaza war was also the 
most deadly for Israel (see figure 7.3 above). A number of deadly attacks came as the 
result of Hamas militants’ infiltration into Israel via Hamas’s many ‘attack tunnels’ 
under the border, which is why destroying such tunnels featured so prominently among 
Israel’s goals in Operation Protective Edge in 2014.17 In addition, since the war ended, 
there have been a number of ‘lone wolf’ attacks within Israel, particularly in Jerusalem. 
Although only one of the attackers is known to have been a member of Hamas, Hamas 
has praised such attacks and has reportedly been expanding a network of terror cells 
within the West Bank.18 These developments all suggest Hamas is adding new tactics in 
addition to its rocket arsenal, which is increasingly subject to interception by Israel’s 
Iron Dome missile defence system. All this means that it is not yet possible to conclude 
that cumulative deterrence will continue to lead to ever-lower levels of violence, though 
17 “Israel Launches Ground Operation in Gaza,” Agence France Presse -- English, July 17, 2014; For 
examples of tunnel use: “Gun Battle Kills 10 Gaza Militants, 4 Israeli Soldiers,” Agence France 
Presse, July 21, 2014; Yaakov Lappin, “7 Soldiers Killed Foiling Hamas Infiltration. Terrorist Squad 
Enters Israel via Tunnel, Fires on IDF Jeep with Anti-Tank Missile. Senior Source: Hamas Planned to 
Carry out Many Attacks through Tunnels,” Jerusalem Post, July 22, 2014, sec. News; Yaakov Lappin, 
“5 Soldiers Killed as Another Cease-Fire Crumbles. Terror Cell Infiltrates via Tunnel to Nahal Oz 
Area, Troops Kill Attacker. IDF: We Need Another Week to Do Away with Remaining Hamas 
Tunnels,” Jerusalem Post, July 29, 2014, sec. News.
18 David Muir, “Terror Attack; Hit and Run in Bethlehem,” TV News Transcript, World News Tonight 
with David Muir (New York: ABC News, November 5, 2014), 
http://www.nexis.com/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=5DJ4-89H1-JC85-
K480&csi=8277,10903,10911,166768,138211,10939,138620&oc=00240&perma=true; “Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad Hail Jerusalem Synagogue Attack,” Agence France Presse, November 18, 2014; Ben 
Hartman, “Hit and Run That Injured 3 Soldiers Deemed Terror Strike. Driver Confesses to Being 
Hamas Member, Planning Attack,” Jerusalem Post, November 21, 2014, sec. News; Yaakov Lappin, 
“Shin Bet Foils Hamas Attack at Jerusalem Soccer Stadium. Turkey-Based Terrorists Also Planned to 
Send Car Bombs into Israel, Strike Light Rail in Capital, Kidnap Israelis,” Jerusalem Post, November 
28, 2014, sec. News.
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the overall trend has certainly been downward since 2002.
Israel has ways of dealing with most, if not all, of these issues. Its attempt to 
prevent tunnel building by prohibiting construction materials from entering Gaza has 
clearly failed: an additional argument for the blockade that has not stood the test of 
reality. Israel has a booming tech industry, however, and has already developed new 
tunnel detection equipment that it is putting into operation near Gaza.19 Israel could 
therefore allow conditions in Gaza to improve, for example by allowing construction 
materials in (the blocking of which did not prevent tunnel building but did hinder 
reconstruction efforts), while destroying tunnels using this new equipment, even as it 
continues to block advanced rocket shipments into Gaza as best it can. Egypt’s 
crackdown on smuggling between it and Gaza provides Israel a golden opportunity to 
ease the blockade while maintaining control of what goes in and out. Israel has also long
shown it has the capacity to keep a lid on terrorism emanating from the West Bank; 
settlements have extensive security provisions and the security barrier continues to 
operate as it has since 2004. Lone wolf attacks, especially those originating from within 
Israel proper and potentially from Israeli citizens, are more difficult to detect ahead of 
time but are also unlikely to become a threat on the level seen during the era of suicide 
bombing. The consequences for Israeli society of an intensified us-versus-them situation
developing within its borders, however, are disturbing and would be extremely 
damaging, including in the eyes of Israel’s foreign allies. This brings us to another, 
potentially more harmful, threat to Israel: international action against it and international
isolation of it.
Kobi Michael, former Deputy Director and head of the Palestinian desk at 
19 Daniel Bernstein, “Israel Deploying Revolutionary Anti-Tunnel System on Gaza Border,” The Times 
of Israel, April 16, 2015, Online edition, sec. Israel & the Region, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/tunnel-detection-system-to-be-deployed-on-gaza-border/.
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Israel’s Ministry for Strategic Affairs, sums up his view of the current Palestinian 
strategy: A Third Intifada is very unlikely. The Palestinians now accept that this would 
not achieve their goals. Instead, they are using a different strategy
led by Abu Mazen [Abbas]. And this is the idea of delegitimizing the State of Israel, 
trying to isolate the State of Israel, trying to sabotage the strategic relations between 
Israel and the United States, and using the international arena, international 
institutions, human rights discourse, the zeitgeist, as we say, in order to push Israel to 
the corner, ...gain some political points, and ...reach some political and even strategic 
achievements that could [otherwise] have been gained by negotiation with Israel. 
...they think that by using this unilateral strategy in the international arena, they can 
reach a very similar result [to negotiations with Israel] without paying the price. They
think, and I think that they have some very good reasons to think so, that they [have] 
the upper hand. And therefore they prefer this strategy. In their eyes... this is a sort of 
deterrence towards Israel. ...So, eventually Israel as a state can be deterred, in this 
way or another, by a non-state actor. Because a non-state actor can use the 
international community and create a sort of political pressure on the State of Israel 
and in this regard can create a sort of... political deterrence, international deterrence, 
towards Israel. […] If it prevents Israel from doing some strategic moves... that have 
some impact on the non-state actor, then it is deterrence!20
At the same time, he believes that this is, on the whole, a strategic achievement 
for Israel:
The Palestinian mainstream actually abandoned terrorism in the sense of at least the 
most serious type of terrorism that we knew, the most dangerous one, which is the 
suicide bombers. And in this regard, this is a huge achievement for the IDF and for 
the State of Israel. And... this is due even to the cooperation between the Israeli 
security apparatuses and the Palestinian security apparatuses, due to the 
understanding with the Palestinians that terrorism is not good for them, that terrorism
actually enhances the capabilities of Israel to use its advantages towards the 
Palestinians because it creates... legitimacy for using military force. […] And in this 
regard, this is an achievement and even a strategic achievement. On the other hand, 
we have to understand that... in any context, [once] you have... achieved a strategic 
achievement, the environment has [changed]... and you will have to adapt 
yourself. ...you have to be able to tackle the new challenges that [are] created in the 
environment that you have influenced by your achievements.21
This is reminiscent of an argument made previously by another interviewee 
familiar with Israel’s security policy:
20 Kobi Michael, Author Interview in person, June 10, 2014.
21 Ibid.
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[With] every round of violence conducted by Israel with Hamas, from one to another,
Israel’s manoeuvrability is being limited. It could do whatever it wanted in 
[Operation] Cast Lead, it could actually invade, it could actually use ground forces 
and so on. Then there was [the] Goldstone [Report] afterwards, there were political 
and international pressures, its manoeuvrability was actually limited. And in the next 
operation, it could not use the same measures that it could use in Cast Lead. So 
Hamas understands that using political pressure... actually limits Israel’s ability to 
use measures and therefore limits Israel’s ability to deter!22
Israel’s reputation abroad is thus becoming a security liability. The Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement has succeeded in encouraging many 
universities in the West to halt cooperation with universities in Israel and some 
churches, including the US Presbyterian Church and the World Council of Churches, 
have pulled investments out of Israeli companies or US companies they view as 
profiting from Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory.23 In October 2014, Sweden 
became the second Western country after Iceland to recognize a Palestinian state.24 The 
same month, the UK Parliament passed a symbolic motion to ‘recognise the state of 
Palestine alongside the state of Israel’.25 Although recognition is a decision made by 
government ministers alone and not by parliament, the fact that the motion received 
such support, particularly among Labour MPs, suggests that Britain could one day 
recognize a Palestinian State regardless of Israel’s objections. In April 2015, US 
Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman warned: ‘If the new Israeli government is seen 
to be stepping back from its commitment to a two-state solution that will make our job 
22 Author interview with Israeli senior analyst, Skype, February 6, 2013.
23 Times of Israel Staff, Rebecca Shimoni Stoil, and Associated Press, “‘We Cannot Profit from the 
Destruction of Homes and Lives,’ Presbyterians Say,” The Times of Israel, June 21, 2014, sec. Israel &
the Region, http://www.timesofisrael.com/we-cannot-profit-from-the-destruction-of-homes-and-lives-
presbyterians-say/; “ADL Dismayed By World Council of Churches Decision to Pursue Divestment 
As Means to Punish Israel,” Anti-Defamation League, February 22, 2005, 
http://archive.adl.org/presrele/chjew_31/4652_31.html#.VUjYjvxVhBE.
24 “Sweden and the Middle East: Clean Hands, Fewer Friends,” The Economist, March 28, 2015, Online 
edition, sec. Europe, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21647357-who-could-take-offence-
over-speech-womens-rights-arab-league-clean-hands-fewer-friends.
25 “MPs Back Palestinian Statehood alongside Israel,” BBC News, October 14, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29596822.
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in the international arena much tougher... it will be harder for us to prevent 
internationalizing the conflict’—a veiled threat not to veto UN resolutions Israel 
dislikes.26 This chimes with the fact that, although Americans overall remain 
considerably more sympathetic to Israel than to the Palestinians, a plurality of those 
polled (45%) would not stand in the way of a Security Council resolution establishing a 
Palestinian state.27 ‘Internationalizing’ the conflict thus seems quite plausible in the 
medium and perhaps even short term. In fact, some of this has already begun. Palestine 
became a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015. The ICC is 
currently examining whether criteria have been met for the Court to investigate Israel 
for crimes allegedly committed in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.28  Any 
future rulings against Israel or its leaders could make it more difficult for those leaders 
to travel abroad and would damage Israel’s legitimacy abroad, providing further impetus
for campaigns to boycott Israeli goods or levy sanctions against it, even if the US 
opposed and vetoed such efforts. A loss of support for Israel abroad, particularly in the 
US, but also in Europe, could be a strategic-level risk for Israel. Its support abroad, in 
turn, so far remains predicated on a commitment to the two-state solution, meaning that 
such a commitment is vital to Israel’s security.
Is deterrence itself hindering the search for alternatives? Israel finds itself in a 
continuous state of Patrick Morgan’s immediate deterrence, with its focus on constant 
possible crises with an opportunistic opponent. He points out that this can lead its 
adherents ‘to emphasize how alternative approaches [to peace] could damage 
26 Barak Ravid, “U.S.: It Will Be Hard to Support Israel in UN If It Steps Back from Two-State 
Solution,” Haaretz, April 27, 2015, sec. Diplomacy and Defense, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.653819.
27 “American Views on Palestinian Statehood,” Jewish Virtual Library, December 2014, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/popalhome.html.
28 “Palestinians Formally Join International Criminal Court,” BBC News, April 1, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32144186.
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[deterrence]’.29 This means that, if Israel cannot escape a constant sense of crisis in its 
conflict with Hamas, it may see other avenues towards managing conflict, like some 
form of political process, blocked because of their possible damage to Israel’s deterrent 
posture. One possible way around this would be for Israel to offer concessions when the 
Gaza border is peaceful and refuse them when it is not. Concessions given from strength
should not damage deterrence the way those given after Pillar of Defence did, for 
instance, when they appeared to be gains Hamas won by attacking Israel (thus 
undermining Israel’s credibility rather than bolstering stability, as they could have done 
were they given unilaterally during a period of calm).30
Can Israel move beyond deterrence or add peace ‘on top of it’ while improving 
stability and security? This will depend on numerous factors and how Israel responds to 
them. One way in which deterrence itself could be making agreeing on a final status 
between Israelis and Palestinians more difficult is the mere fact of the separation of the 
two peoples via the West Bank barrier. Up until the mid-1990s, Israelis and Palestinians 
could travel freely throughout both Israel and the Palestinian territories. Since the Oslo 
Accords, this has changed. There is still significant interaction between the two, 
however. A recent report by Israel’s central bank stated that the number of Palestinians 
working in Israel has doubled to about 92,000 in the last four years.31 What’s more, 
Israelis can travel throughout much of the West Bank as much of it lies in Area C, which
29 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 89 (Cambridge 
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11.
30 One expert interviewed expressed dismay at the results of Pillar of Defense, after which he claimed 
Hamas had gained considerable concessions from Israel. In a seminar at King’s College London, 
another expert expressed the need for a “political horizon” now in order to prevent further outbreaks 
of Palestinian violence. Expert on Israeli policy, Author interview in person, January 31, 2013; Gil 
Messing, “Seeking No War - Achieving No Peace: How Israel and the Palestinian Authority Could 
Maintain Sustainable Non-Violent Relations” (Maintaining Regional Security in the Middle East 
seminar, London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 
(ICSR), 2013).
31 Moti Bassok, “Number of Palestinians Working in Israel Doubled over Four Years, Central Bank Says 
- Business - Israel News | Haaretz,” Haaretz, March 15, 2015, sec. Business, 
http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.645266.
Page 271 of 292
Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas
is subject to exclusive Israeli jurisdiction. This author’s Palestinian guide mentioned that
many Palestinians work in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It is therefore not as if 
the two sides do not regularly encounter each other or know what is at stake.
In reality, it is not overconfidence in Israel’s deterrent power, and thus vehement 
arguments in favour of maintaining it, that are hindering a peace deal. The general 
argument is not that Israel cannot make peace because doing so would weaken 
deterrence. Instead, it is that the withdrawal from Gaza, with its resultant rocket fire and
three wars, has not improved security. It thus follows that withdrawal from the West 
Bank should not be tried because it would produce the same result only worse, as so 
much of Israel’s population would be located close to the new border. This is an 
argument sceptical of deterrence; that it does not work well enough and cannot be relied
upon for Israel’s security in the future if a Palestinian state were established in the West 
Bank. It is therefore not an argument that negotiating would weaken deterrence. 
Improving deterrence therefore might make a peace deal more palatable rather than less 
by convincing the Israeli public that it could be relied upon to provide them security 
after a Palestinian state was formed. Israelis are unlikely to support a peace deal until a 
majority of them are convinced that their security would be assured. Israel may be able 
to do this.
The withdrawal from Gaza may not have been the security blunder it is seen to 
be, or at least, that might one day be the case. As Kobi Michael says:
[S]ometimes we need a sort of perspective.... [For example, in] August 2006, I wrote 
[a newspaper article....] [I]t was... less than two months after the second Lebanon 
war, [which, as] you know, at first was perceived in Israel as a strategic failure.... And
there was huge criticism in Israel and abroad about the failure of the IDF to achieve 
the strategic goals and the failure of the... Israeli government to define the right 
strategic goals... and so on. ...the title of [my] article was ‘Maybe we won’.... And I 
wrote there that we need perspective of time in order to understand what are the real 
ramifications... and if there are some achievements. ...Now we are almost eight years 
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after the war and I think that, from the strategic point of view, this is a huge success. 
Look how Hezbollah is deterred! I would say that, in the last three years after the 
upheaval there in Syria, Hezbollah is pretty occupied there and they have some other 
problems as well, but they are very, very cautious. […] And Nasrallah, the leader of 
Hezbollah, is still in the bunker, eight years after the war. [He] doesn’t dare to come 
out from this bunker! So, from the... pure military point of view, there were some... 
failures or mistakes... in the campaign itself, but analysing it from the strategic point 
of view and having the historic perspective of seven or eight years after the war, this 
is a huge success!32
Israel may be able to achieve greater deterrent stability closer to that of 
Hezbollah. Like the United States during the Cold War, Israel has worried about its 
credibility and taken actions to shore it up. As shown in the last chapter, part of the 
reason for Israel’s ground invasion into Gaza during Operation Cast Lead was to show 
Hamas that it was willing to put boots on the ground. This may have been justified in 
that particular case, but deterrence theorists have long warned that an excessive focus on
credibility can undermine stability, making deterrence less reliable. In the nuclear-based 
conflict of the Cold War, stability was enhanced through arms control agreements 
designed to prevent either side from gaining a strategic advantage. This made the status 
quo easier to accept by removing the need to try to race ahead of the opponent (i.e. it 
removed ‘push factors’). For its part, Israel could increase the stability of its deterrence 
of Hamas by improving the status quo in Gaza, thereby reducing pressure on Hamas to 
attack Israel. Hezbollah also vows to ‘liberate the 1948 borders of Palestine’ and send 
any Jews that survived that war of liberation ‘back to Germany, or wherever they came 
from’. ‘Sayyid Nasrallah himself told a conference held in Tehran [in 2001] that “we all 
have an extraordinary historic opportunity to finish off the entire cancerous Zionist 
project.”’33 Sharp-eyed observers will have noted, however, that Israel’s border with 
Lebanon has been quieter than its border with Gaza since 2007. A key difference is that 
32 Michael, interview.
33 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God - The New Yorker,” The New Yorker, October 14, 2002, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/10/14/in-the-party-of-god?currentPage=4.
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Israel does not threaten Hezbollah’s continued existence or its effective control of a 
large portion of southern Lebanon through occasional talk of a need to re-occupy 
territory there, nor is Hezbollah’s territory subject to a strict economic blockade. The 
status quo is comfortable for Hezbollah, at least for now, and threats to it do not 
emanate primarily from Israel. If the same could be said for Hamas, it is likely the Gaza 
border would be quieter as well.
Deterrence can do little to counter another oft-heard argument: that there is no 
partner with whom Israel can negotiate. Negotiating with Hamas, however, may not be 
necessary: If Gaza were more stable, for example after the declaration of a long-term 
hudna, Israel might be able to make peace with the PA, with Gaza joining a new 
Palestinian state later, once its de facto rulers allow this. The real stumbling blocks for 
peace are, as always, the questions of Jerusalem, the right of return, settlements, the 
Jordan Valley, and demilitarization. Agreement on these issues is at least theoretically 
possible, but would require sacrifices that will only be made if they are seen to be worth
it. This points to a way in which deterrence may have helped stall negotiations: The 
status quo is acceptable enough to Israelis, and perhaps the PA leadership as well, that 
they do not see an urgent need to make concessions. Moreover, given the lessons 
Israelis have drawn (correctly or not) from the withdrawal from Gaza, they are not 
convinced these concessions would be worth making. Finally, the Israeli politician who 
pulls Israel out of the West Bank would not only face political threats, but threats to his 
or her physical safety. Former Shin Bet Head Carmi Gillon has said ‘I believe that we’ll 
see another political assassination surrounding the withdrawal from the West Bank. It 
will come from every direction, mainly from the rabbis, because the rabbis have no 
reason to learn any lesson. As far as the extremist rabbis are concerned, the system 
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proved itself.’ That is, the assassination of Rabin succeeded in halting the peace process 
and preventing a withdrawal from the West Bank.34
This suggests Israel may not enthusiastically take up negotiations with the 
Palestinians again until its citizens again see this as a path to a better future not just in 
the long term, but also in the short to medium term. The historian of Israel Ahron 
Bregman argues that, without the First Intifada, Israel would never have embarked on 
the Oslo Accords.35 The violence of the First Intifada showed that the occupation was 
not free of charge. Violence from Gaza today, however, has the opposite effect, as it 
serves to show that withdrawing from formerly held land does not guarantee security 
and has led Israelis to question the wisdom of further concessions. Israel faces multiple 
threats and changes in the future that may make the status quo, which has seemed 
comfortable enough for now, untenable, however. These threats not only effect the status
quo, but the future of Israel’s deterrence of Hamas and potential future adversaries. That
deterrence is by no means guaranteed.
The good news is thus that deterrence is not, by itself, furthering an antagonistic 
relationship with Hamas that would otherwise be less so. It is therefore not a hindrance 
to peace. In fact, the instability of the deterrence of Hamas may instead be a stumbling 
block. This thesis has argued that improving conditions in Gaza could be the key to 
improving stability and security. For deterrence to work, Gazans would need to accept 
the status quo. The worsening situation in Gaza thus undermines deterrence and makes 
outbreaks of violence more likely. Several threats remain beyond this, however, and 
improving conditions in Gaza is not risk free.
With each round of violence between Israel and Hamas, Hamas has improved its 
34 Carmi Gillon, interviewed in Moreh, The Gatekeepers.
35 Ahron Bregman, Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories, Kindle (London: 
Allen Lane, 2014), 306.
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capabilities. Figure 7.3 above showed that Israel’s wars in Gaza may be getting more 
costly in terms of soldiers’ lives, while 7.4 shows that 2014 was the deadliest year for 
Israelis with regard to Hamas since the Second Intifada. Given Israel’s continued 
overpowering strength and the success and expansion of its missile defence systems, it 
seems unlikely that rising Hamas capabilities by themselves will pose a strategic threat 
to Israel in the foreseeable future, but they might make Israeli leaders more reluctant to 
invade Gaza and otherwise respond to Hamas, slowly eroding Israel’s ability to issue 
credible deterrent threats. Missile defence systems are expensive and can always be 
overwhelmed by a barrage of hundreds of (cheap) rockets. Hamas’s ability to strike near
Ben-Gurion airport, by far Israel’s most important, is therefore worrying. Ahser Susser, 
Director of the Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University, 
points to another problem: ‘According to conventional wisdom, there is a built-in 
asymmetry in favor of Israel in its relationship with the Palestinians. This asymmetry 
stems from the fact that Israel is immeasurably superior to the Palestinians in all 
components of power: military, political, economic, technological and so on. However, 
the more critical asymmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian context actually favors the 
Palestinians in the areas of demography and international legitimacy, where time is 
clearly working for them.’36 Israel has time and again showed it has the resolve to strike 
back when attacked, so it is this author’s conclusion that rising Hamas capabilities 
would not by themselves reduce Israel’s will to strike back, but they will make doing so 
more costly in blood and treasure and, together, with the factors in the Palestinians’ 
favour highlighted by Susser, would lead to increasing international criticism and the 
risk of sanctions. It is likely Israelis would then begin to wonder if there might be 
36 Asher Susser, “Israel, the Arabs and Palestine: Facing Crucial Decisions,” Israel Journal of Foreign 
Affairs 1, no. 1 (January 2006): 57–67, doi:10.1080/23739770.2006.11446240.
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another way out.
















Figure 7.4: This shows 2014 was the deadliest year for Israelis since Hamas took 
control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. In 2014, nearly as many Palestinian militants died 
during attacks on Israelis as Israelis (with many more in some cases), reflecting the 
increased danger of close-range shooting attacks. Note: These statistics do not include 
battles taking place during Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip as they are meant to 
reflect Hamas-initiated terror attacks. This recent change in tactics has made this 
distinction somewhat less clear-cut, however.37
7.3 The only game in town? Israel and the two-state solution
These threats show that Israel should not be complacent. The threat of 
international isolation also shows that military superiority and deterrence alone are not a
guarantee of security. Though Israel is surely right that many will hate it no matter what 
it does, changing the policies that most irritate the Europeans and Americans (above all 
continued settlement construction) would help. This isolation might also push Israel to 
37 Charles Kirchofer, “Database of Hamas Terror Attacks,” Database of Hamas Terror Attacks, January 
2015, www.hamasterrordatabase.com.
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accept a real peace deal with the Palestinians, but the terms of such a deal could be less 
favourable than the terms during previous attempts. Ahron Bregman Israel would 
otherwise not conclude a deal with the Palestinians: ‘for peace negotiations to resume in
a meaningful way the international community, and particularly the US, will have to be 
tough with Israel and when necessary bribe it into compromise. If the past four decades 
have proved anything, it is that the Israelis will not give up the occupied territories 
easily.’38 Israel will likely come under ever increasing pressure to make some kind of 
deal, and a permanent settlement and a two-state solution are still the only game in town
as far as international legitimacy is concerned. As Asher Susser explains, demographic 
changes (the increase in the size of the Palestinian population relative to the Jewish one 
in Israel and the West Bank and Jerusalem) mean that ‘the State of Israel will not be able
to maintain itself, within these boundaries, in the long run, as the state of the Jewish 
people, which by definition requires a solid, longstanding, Jewish majority. Therefore, 
the continuation of the status quo is bound to ensure the failure of Zionism and its 
historical raison d’etre. Moreover, the continuation of the status quo and the 
perpetuation of Israel’s occupation of millions of Palestinians are constantly eroding 
Israel’s international legitimacy. They also provide the justification for a significant 
body of world opinion to support the Palestinians’ use of force against Israel. This 
combined erosion of both Israel’s demographic power and its international
legitimacy is turning the time factor against Israel as well.’39 Moreover, for all the 
difficulties inherent in agreeing to a two-state solution, it is neigh impossible to see how 
a one-state solution could satisfy the needs of both Israelis and Palestinians.
One possibility for progressing on a final status deal could be to make peace 
38 Bregman, Cursed Victory, 307.
39 Susser, “Israel, the Arabs and Palestine.”
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with the PA even without Gaza. A three-state solution, with Gaza remaining a separate, 
quasi-state is not ideal, but from the perspective of Israel’s legitimacy in foreign eyes, 
and therefore ultimately for its security, it would be better than the status quo. A state in 
the West Bank with the withdrawal of most of Israel’s isolated settlements, coupled with
a conditional end to the blockade, would ease most of the issues that most concern 
Israel’s allies in Europe and America as well as several of those that most anger 
Palestinians—and it would not necessarily even require direct negotiation with Hamas, 
though Hamas’s at least tacit acceptance would be key. Israel could continue deterring 
both ‘states’ separately. Furthermore, Gaza would no longer be seen as an anti-Israel 
cause but an example of Hamas preventing Palestinian unity, severely damaging its 
legitimacy and discouraging Arab governments from supporting it. If Israel made peace 
with the PA and a prosperous independent Palestinian state formed in the West Bank, 
Gazans would eventually demand to join it. Last summer’s unity deal suggested Hamas 
might be willing to surrender at least some control of the Gaza Strip. If it lost elections 
and a referendum went ahead that ratified a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza,
this might grant the PA the legitimacy to re-take Gaza, including by force if necessary.
7.4 The benefits and limitations of deterrence
It is, of course, up to Israelis and Palestinians to decide the path their intertwined
fates take. The scenario just proposed is speculative and hypothetical, but the 
assessment of the prevailing strategic conditions for Israel and Hamas is not. The 
evidence suggests that Israel can maintain deterrence for now and even bolster it by 
unilaterally easing the blockade of Gaza during a period of calm while continuing to 
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prove its willingness to do whatever it deems necessary to combat Hamas during 
periods of violence. Israelis have concluded that the withdrawal from Gaza has not 
made them safer because the deterrence of Hamas is not reliable enough. If their 
conclusion is correct, and deterrence cannot be improved, this security concern 
represents a major stumbling block in the way of any territorial agreement. Enhancing 
deterrence would be beneficial in its own right, but it would also not stand in the way of 
a peace deal with the PA and might even aid it if it increased Israelis’ security and 
confidence in their future. Such a peace deal would possibly necessitate the direct 
deterrence of the new State of Palestine, as not all Palestinians would be content with 
the new territorial status quo. As Uri Resnick argues, however: ‘inter-state territorial 
conflicts tend to be shorter than conflicts involving a non-state entity. Together with the 
fact that most cases of independence in the last 200 years have resulted in basically 
amicable relations between predecessor and successor states, this seems to suggest that 
the creation of a Palestinian state will be beneficial, even if it does not completely 
resolve all territorial claims.’40 Deterring violence from a new Palestinian state would 
require a return to the indirect deterrence of Hamas and many of the difficulties entailed 
in this that were covered in chapter 4, but with a crucial difference: The relationship in 
chapter 4 broke down in part due to a lack of progress on a Palestinian state. With that 
major issue removed, security cooperation between Israel and a new Palestinian state 
would likely be smoother and more stable.
The political challenges involved in achieving an agreement with the 
Palestinians that both sides accept have of course not diminished and have probably 
intensified as Israel’s West Bank settlements have spread. The long-term threats Israel 
40 Uri Resnick, “Territorial Disputes: Perspectives on the Israeli—Palestinian Conflict,” Israel Journal 
of Foreign Affairs 2, no. 3 (January 2008): 87–97, doi:10.1080/23739770.2008.11446334.
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faces suggest that it will not be able to rely on deterrence indefinitely and that 
cumulative deterrence will not one day produce Palestinian acquiescence to the current 
situation of limited autonomy in a territory dotted with settlements. Deterrence is not a 
hindrance to peace and may in fact help it, but the long-standing challenges to achieving
it remain regardless and deterrence is at best of limited use in resolving them. Leaders 
of other states dealing with non-state actors would do well to keep that fact in mind and 
keep a close watch on push and pull factors and the timing of concessions and reprisals. 
If the case of Israel and Hamas shows us anything, it is the success that deterrence can 
have, but also the fragility of the fine balance that deterrers must strike and the fact that 
deterrence alone cannot bring lasting peace.
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